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  • Area Development Act, 1976
  • section 103-B or 95-A
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  • Area Development Act, 1976
  • section 103-B or 95-A
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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition concerns redevelopment of a large Municipal plot (C.S. No. 17/47 (part), Lower Parel Division) measuring 12,130.07 sq. mtrs., located at Dr. E. Moses Road, Worli Naka, Mumbai. Several buildings constructed on the plot prior to 1940 were occupied by municipal tenants; other buildings housed municipal conservancy staff and a municipal school (constructed in 1959). Some additional commercial structures were erected between 1960 and 1995.

Municipal tenants and municipal conservancy staff formed separate co-operative societies to pursue redevelopment: respondent No. 10 represents the tenants, and respondent Nos. 8 and 9 represent the municipal conservancy staff/employees. Initially a proposal to notionally sub-divide the large plot and redevelop the portion occupied by tenants (approx. 4,905.17 sq. mtrs.) under D.C.R. 33(7) was processed and N.O.C. was issued to the tenants' developer. The petitioners (representing municipal employees) also sought redevelopment of an adjoining portion (approx. 5,761.23 sq. mtrs.).

Despite the earlier N.O.C. and technical recommendations favouring subdivision and separate redevelopment, the Corporation's Technical Committee and thereafter the Improvements Committee approved redevelopment of the entire plot under D.C.R. 33(7) by the tenants' developer (impugned order dated 24/8/2007). The petitioners challenged that decision by filing the present writ petition dated 10/9/2007. During pendency the Corporation rejected the petitioners' revised proposal by order dated 22/1/2008; the petition has been amended to challenge that rejection as well.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, where some dilapidated buildings constructed prior to 1940 occupy only part of a large Municipal plot, the Municipal Corporation is justified in permitting the developer appointed by the tenants to re-develop the entire plot under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 (DCR 1991), instead of permitting re-development by sub-dividing the plot or by re-developing under Regulation 33(9).
  2. Whether the petitioners (claiming to represent municipal employees/occupants who are not tenants) have locus standi to challenge the Corporation's decision, particularly when there is a disputed allegation of withdrawal of consent by their society members.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Madon)

  • The affidavits filed by the Chief Promoters of respondents Nos. 8 and 9 claiming withdrawal of consent are false; many individual members swore affidavits denying any withdrawal. Accordingly, petitioners retained locus standi.
  • The Corporation initially approved sub-division and had granted N.O.C. for redevelopment of the tenants' notional sub-divided plot; it could not arbitrarily switch to permitting redevelopment of the entire plot under D.C.R. 33(7) and thereby confer excess benefit (State largesse) on the tenants' developer.
  • The Corporation's approval to redevelop the whole plot under D.C.R. 33(7) instead of subdivision (or redevelopment under D.C.R. 33(9)) was unfair, unreasonable, mala fide and not in public interest.
  • D.C.R. 33(7) applies to buildings constructed prior to 1940; the municipal school (built in 1959) is not covered and so the entire plot should not have been permitted to be redeveloped under 33(7).
  • If whole-plot redevelopment was necessary in the planning interest, the Corporation should have invited tenders (or redevelopment under D.C.R. 33(9)), rather than award the work to the tenants' developer without tender. The petitioners were willing to pay a higher capitalised premium (offered Rs. 130 crores and produced a Rs. 15 crore bank draft) showing bona fides.
  • The Corporation's computation of the cost for reconstruction of the municipal school and other structures (Rs. 3,16,50,660/-) was unreasonable and excessive; petitioners were even willing to construct those works free of cost.
  • The Corporation rejected petitioners' proposal dated 16/7/2007 without application of mind, wrongly demanding a comprehensive plan for the entire plot and consent of occupants of the whole plot notwithstanding the earlier N.O.C. for the sub-divided portion.

Respondents' Arguments (as advanced by counsel for respondent Nos. 5, 6 and contesting respondents)

  • Preliminary objections: (a) consent given to the petitioners by members of respondents Nos. 8 and 9 societies was withdrawn (resolutions dated 3/11/2007 and 6/11/2007), so petitioners lack locus standi; (b) entitlement to redevelop under D.C.R. 33(7) is available only to municipal tenants — municipal employees are not tenants and therefore have no right under D.C.R. 33(7).
  • From planning and feasibility perspectives, subdivision was not workable and the tenants' developer is entitled to incentive F.S.I. of 2.5 on "gross plot area"; therefore the tenants' developer could lawfully seek redevelopment of the entire undivided plot.
  • Redevelopment under D.C.R. 33(9) by the Corporation or MHADA/Board was not feasible due to height restriction under D.C.R. 31(4)(a) (proximity to Nehru Centre); hence redevelopment under 33(7) by the tenants' developer was the pragmatic option.
  • The Corporation imposed stringent rehabilitation conditions and secured a large premium on surplus F.S.I. (computed using the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner (SDRR)) — this was the best deal for the Corporation.
  • Reliance on precedents: societies formed by occupants need not invite tenders to select their developer; where there is no violation of mandatory provisions, courts should not interfere with administrative decisions.
  • Accused the petitioners of pursuing the petition for ulterior motives and to delay redevelopment by respondent No. 6.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion)
Ramana Shetty v. I.A. Authority of India (1979) 3 SCC 489; A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 Cited by petitioners in support of principles limiting arbitrariness in administrative action (as relied upon by Mr. Madon). The case was relied upon by petitioners; the opinion records the citation but primarily treats it as part of the authorities addressing fairness in administrative discretion.
Haji T.M. Hassan v. Kerala Finance Corporation (1988) 1 SCC 166; A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 157 Cited by petitioners on the scope of administrative fairness (as relied upon by Mr. Madon). Recorded by the Court as relied upon by petitioners; used to support submission about illegitimate distribution of State largesse.
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra (Original Side Writ Petition No. 2687 of 1999) (Division Bench decision dated 19/9/2005) Relied upon by petitioners in supporting submissions on redevelopment procedures and municipal obligations (as referred by Mr. Madon). Cited by petitioners; the Court recorded the reliance and considered it among authorities on municipal redevelopment policy.
Ramchandra K. Paralikar v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (Writ Petition No. 118 of 1983) (unreported decision dated 5/7/1990) Relied upon by respondents to contend municipal staff occupying staff quarters have no legal right to remain in quarters nor compel redevelopment. The Court found this decision distinguishable on the facts because guidelines were framed in the present case; it therefore rejected the respondents' attempt to treat it as directly decisive.
Mangesh Janardhan Mohite (President) v. State of Maharashtra, 2002 (5) Bom.C.R. 653 Interpreted provisions concerning F.S.I. for reconstruction by co-operative societies; held that co-operative societies of occupiers need not invite tenders to select a developer in certain statutory schemes. Respondents relied on it to justify selection of the tenants' developer without tenders. The Court held the decision was distinguishable and not decisive on the central question whether the Corporation should have permitted entire-plot redevelopment rather than subdivision or redevelopment under D.C.R. 33(9).
Subhash R. Acharya v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (Original Side Writ Petition No. 580 of 2007) (16 Aug 2007), 2007 (6) Bom.C.R. 100 (O.S.) Addressed distribution of State largesse, public trust and accountability, and limits on arbitrariness in administrative award of contracts. The Court quoted this decision to explain principles of public accountability and judicial review applied when State largesse is distributed or contractual obligations are awarded.
Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union of India, (1996) 6 SCC 558 Example of setting aside discretionary allotments as misuse of duty and actionable mis-feasance. Quoted in the opinion to illustrate that misuse of discretionary allotment can attract judicial intervention; formed part of the contextual jurisprudence on arbitrariness.
State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev Alias Bitto, (2005) 5 SCC 181; A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 2080 Describes the trend to restrict arbitrariness in administrative action and allows intervention where the decision-making process itself is per se faulty. The Court relied on the principle to justify scrutiny of the Corporation's decision-making process rather than merely its merits.
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651; A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 11 Establishes that unreasonable decisions, or decisions without proper application of mind or with procedural impropriety, fall within limited judicial review. The Court applied the proposition to examine whether the Corporation's decision was arrived at with proper application of mind and without procedural impropriety.
Vijay Kumar Gupta v. State of Maharashtra (Original Side Writ Petition No. 1889 of 2007) (13 Mar 2008), 2008 (3) Bom.C.R. 593 Explains fairness and equal opportunity in distribution of State largesse, the need for tendering except in exceptional bona fide circumstances, and legitimate expectation doctrine. The Court relied on these principles to test whether the Corporation's decision respected fairness, equal opportunity and legitimate expectations of other interested parties.
Chairman & M.D., B.P.L. Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaje, (2003) 8 SCC 567; A.I.R. 2003 S.C. 4536 Reiterates that where no mandatory provision is violated, courts should be cautious about interfering with administrative decisions made under framed guidelines. Respondents relied upon it to urge non-interference; the Court considered this principle but found that, on the facts, the Corporation's decision had other infirmities warranting intervention.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two main stages: (A) consideration of preliminary objections and locus standi; and (B) merits analysis focused on statutory purpose, administrative fairness and the decision-making process adopted by the Corporation.

A. Preliminary Objections and Locus Standi

  • The Court observed there was a serious factual dispute about whether the consent originally given by members of respondent Nos. 8 and 9 societies to the petitioners had been withdrawn. Because petitioners admittedly had locus standi at the time of filing and the withdrawal of consent was contested by affidavits, the Court declined to dismiss the petition at the threshold on this ground.
  • Regarding the objection that only tenants can redevelop under D.C.R. 33(7), the Court noted that guidelines for rehabilitation of municipal employees were pending with the State Government and considered that the question whether the Corporation could lawfully entrust redevelopment of the entire plot to the tenants' developer required merits consideration rather than a preliminary dismissal.

B. Merits — statutory purpose and application to facts

  • The Court explained the twin objectives of D.C.R. 33(7): (1) ensure safety and habitability by demolishing and reconstructing dilapidated pre-1940 buildings and provide free habitable accommodation to eligible tenants/occupants; and (2) use incentive F.S.I. to enable developers to recover the cost of that free accommodation while contributing additional housing supply.
  • The Court identified the core legal question: whether D.C.R. 33(7) entitles a tenants' developer to redevelop an entire large municipal plot merely because some pre-1940 dilapidated buildings occupied by tenants lie on a portion of that plot.
  • Factual matrix: the Dy. Chief Engineer had earlier recommended subdivision and redevelopment of the tenants' portion (4905.17 sq. mtrs.) and an N.O.C. was issued for that notional subdivision. The Court found no legal impediment on record to subdivision and accepted that the technical committee had not found fault with the Dy. Chief Engineer's recommendation.
  • The Court rejected the respondents' argument based on the phrase "gross plot area" in D.C.R. 33(7): the regulation sets the quantum of F.S.I. available, but does not by itself entitle a developer to redevelop an entire undivided plot irrespective of feasibility of subdivision. The fact that the Corporation charged premium on surplus F.S.I. further contradicts the respondents' interpretation that an automatic right to whole-plot redevelopment exists under 33(7).
  • The Court observed alternative lawful courses: (a) permit redevelopment of the tenants' sub-divided plot under D.C.R. 33(7) and separately consider the petitioners' proposal for the other sub-divided portion; or (b) if subdivision were infeasible, the Corporation could have pursued redevelopment of the entire plot under D.C.R. 33(9) (4.0 F.S.I) by itself or by inviting tenders.
  • Respondents' justification for not using D.C.R. 33(9) (height restriction under D.C.R. 31(4)(a)) was rejected: the Court found this reasoning to be an inadequate excuse because the Corporation could have sought relaxation and there was evidence of adjacent/or nearby towers having obtained relaxations from the Urban Development authority.
  • On computation of premium: the Court held that the Corporation's use of Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner (SDRR) as the basis to compute capitalised value and premium on surplus F.S.I. did not reflect the current market rate. SDRR sets a yardstick for stamp duty (a minimum), and does not necessarily represent prevailing market price; basing the premium solely on SDRR made the quantum arbitrary and unreasonable.
  • The Court reviewed competing precedents relied upon by parties. While certain authorities permit occupant societies to select developers without tenders in specific statutory schemes, the Court distinguished those authorities on the facts and framed issue: whether the Corporation's decision to permit entire-plot redevelopment was bona fide and taken in public interest. The Court concluded it was not.
  • On procedural fairness and limits of judicial review, the Court cited authorities establishing that judicial review focuses on the decision-making process (not substituting merits) and is warranted where the process was per se faulty, unreasonable, arbitrary or without proper application of mind; applying those principles, the Court found the impugned decision arbitrary and tainted by favouring the tenants' developer.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court quashed and set aside the Improvements Committee's impugned order dated 24/8/2007 permitting redevelopment of the entire plot under D.C.R. 33(7) by the developer appointed by the municipal tenants, and also set aside the Corporation's order dated 22/1/2008 rejecting the petitioners' proposal (both orders being interrelated).

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The Corporation is directed to reconsider both proposals afresh and in accordance with law — that is, reconsider the tenants' developer's proposal for redevelopment of the sub-divided plot and the petitioners' proposal for the adjoining sub-divided plot.
  • If subdivision of the plot proves infeasible for any reason, the Corporation is directed to redevelop the plot under D.C.R. 33(9) either by the Corporation itself or by inviting tenders (i.e., following a process consistent with public accountability and ensuring competitive value realization), rather than automatically conferring the entire-plot redevelopment right under D.C.R. 33(7) to the tenants' developer.
  • The Court found the Corporation's earlier decision to be arbitrary, not bona fide and not in public interest; it criticized the method of fixing premium based solely on SDRR as arbitrary. The Corporation must therefore reassess proposals without the infirmities identified by the Court.
  • No costs were awarded; the petition was disposed of in the terms set out by the Court.

Note: This summary has been prepared strictly from the material contained in the provided opinion. It does not add, infer, or interpret facts or law beyond what is expressly stated in that opinion.

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    Lokhandwala Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation Of Greater Mumbai & Ors.

    Devadhar J.P, J.:— Where some of the buildings constructed prior to 1940 on a large Municipal plot are occupied by the tenants, whether the Municipal Corporation would be justified in permitting the developer appointed by the tenants to re-develop the entire plot under Regulation 33(7) of the Development Regulations for Greater Murnbai, 1991 instead of permitting re-development either by sub-dividing the plot or developing the plot under Regulation 33(9) is the question raised in this petition.

    2. The dispute in the present case relates to the re-development of a large plot belonging to the Mumbai Municipal Corporation (‘Corporation’ for short) admeasuring 12130.07 sq. mtrs. bearing C.S No. 17/47 (part) of Lower Parel Division situated at Dr. E. Moses Road, Worli Naka, G/South Ward, Mumbai-400018 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘plot in question’).

    3. On the plot in question, the Corporation had constructed several buildings prior to 1940, some of which are occupied by the Municipal tenants and the remaining buildings are used for housing the Municipal Conservancy staff. Subsequently in the year 1959, a building for Municipal school has also been constructed by the Corporation on the plot in question. Some other commercial structures have also been constructed on the said plot during the period from 1960 to 1/1/1995.

    4. As the buildings constructed prior to 1940, have become dilapidated and the Corporation has not taken any steps for reconstruction of the said buildings, the Municipal tenants as well as the Municipal conservancy staff have formed independent co-operative societies with a view to re-develop their dilapidated buildings: Respondent No. 10 society is formed by the Municipal tenants and respondent No. 8 and 9 societies are formed by the Municipal conservancy staff.

    5. Since the plot in question is a large plot, the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants had sought sub-division of the said plot and N.O.C for re-development of the sub-divided plot on which buildings occupied by the Municipal tenants are existing. The petitioners representing the Municipal employees had also applied for redevelopment of the adjoining subdivided plot on which the buildings occupied by the Municipal employees are existing. The Municipal Authorities had approved the sub-division of the plot in question and granted N.O.C to the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the sub-divided plot. However, by the impugned decision dated 24/8/2007. the Improvement Committee of the Corporation decided to allow the respondent No. 6, developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot in question. Challenging the above order, the present petition is filed. During the pendency of the petition, the Corporation by the impugned order dated 22/1/2008 rejected the proposal submitted by the Architect of the petitioner-developer. The writ petition has been amended to challenge the said order dated 22-1-2008.

    6. Regulation 33(7) and 33(9) of the Development Control Regulations for Greater Bombay, 1991 (‘DCR 1991’ for short) published by the State Government to the extent relevant herein read thus:—

    33(7) Reconstruction or re-development of cessed buildings in the Island City by Co-operative Housing Societies or of old Corporation buildings belonging to the Corporation.—

    For reconstruction/re-development to be undertaken by Co-operative Housing Societies of existing tenants or by Co-operative Housing Societies of Landlords and/or Occupiers of a cessed buildings of ‘A’ category in Island City, which attracts the provisions of MHADA Act, 1976 and for reconstruction/re-development of the buildings of Corporation constructed prior to 1940, the F.S.I, shall be 2.5 on the gross plot area or the F.S.I required for Rehabilitation of existing tenants plus incentive F.S.I as specified in Appendix III whichever is more.

    Provided, …..”

    “33(9) Repairs and reconstruction of cessed buildings and Urban Renewal Scheme.-For repairs and reconstruction of cessed buildings and Urban Renewal Scheme undertaken by the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority or the Mumbai Housing and Area Development Board or Corporation in the Island City, the F.S.I shall be 4.00 or the F.S.I required for rehabilitation of existing tenants/occupiers, whichever is more.

    7. The relevant facts are that by a letter dated 26/10/2002, the Chief Promoter of the respondent No. 8 - Society formed by the Municipal employees had requested the improvement committee of the Corporation not to evict the Municipal employees from the Municipal staff quarters situated on the plot in question which are dilapidated and instead the Municipal employees should be conferred with the status of tenancy, so that they can re-develop their buildings at their own costs by availing the incentive F.S.I available under Regulation 33(7) or 33(9) of D.C.R, 1991.

    8. By a letter dated 6/4/2003, the Corporation informed the Chief Promoter of the respondent No. 8 Society that the redevelopment of the plot in question would be undertaken under Regulation 33(9) of D.C.R, 1991 by inviting tenders. The Deputy Mayor of the Corporation vide his letter dated 28/5/2004 informed the Assistant Municipal Commissioner that the fresh guide-lines prepared by the Corporation for re-development of the Municipal staff quarters are pending approval before the State Government and as and when the said guide-lines are approved, the proposal submitted for redevelopment of the Municipal staff quarters by the Municipal staff would be considered.

    9. It appears that on 14/10/2004, the Architect appointed by the respondent No. 10 - Society of the Municipal tenants had submitted a Plan for sub-division of the plot in question so as to re-develop the sub-divided plot on which the dilapidated buildings occupied by Municipal tenants are existing by availing the incentive F.S.I under D.C.R 33(7).

    10. On consideration of the proposal, the Deputy Chief Engineer (P.I Cell) submitted a report to the Assistant Municipal Commissioner on 18-1-2005 stating therein that redevelopment of the respective portion of the plot occupied by the tenants as well as the Municipal employees can be considered separately in case the layout/sub-division of the plot is approvable. Accordingly, the Assistant Commissioner (Estates) by his letter dated 27/6/2005 forwarded N.O.C for redevelopment of the sub-divided plot in the form of Annexure-11 to the Architect appointed by the Municipal tenants Society and requested him to submit a scheme for redevelopment of the sub-divided plot admeasuring 4905.17 sq.mt (out of total area of 12,130.17 sq. mtrs), subject to final demarcation by the D.I.L.R By the said letter, the Architect of the Municipal tenants was further called upon to submit the scheme of redevelopment in the form of Annexure I and III along with plans, scrutiny fee of Rs. 1,000/- and also information about the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants. On receipt of the Annexure I and III from the Architect of the Municipal tenants, the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (Estates) forwarded the same to the technical committee for scrutiny on 26/8/2005.

    11. In the meantime, the Architect of the petitioners representing the Municipal employees (respondent Nos. 8 and 9) submitted a proposal on 26/9/2005 seeking permission to re-develop a portion of the plot in question admeasuring 5761.23 sq.’mtrs. area (out of the total area of 12,130.07 sq. mtrs.) so as to reconstruct the buildings occupied by Municipal employees on the terms more particularly set out therein. Thereupon, the Deputy Chief Engineer (B.P) City 1.c in his report dated 21/10/2005 remarked that the sub-division of the plot in question into three plots is acceptable and though from the planning point of view it was always better to develop the entire plot at a time, in view of the delay in finalisation of the policy guide-lines in respect of Municipal staff quarters, the proposal submitted by the Municipal employees would have to be delayed till the policy guide-lines are finalised by the State Government. The Dy. Chief Engineer further remarked that since the plot falls in the height restriction zone covered under D.C.R 31(4)(a), relaxation provided under D.C.R 33(10) would have to be sought for.

    12. While the proposal for re-development of the sub-divided plot submitted by the Architect of the Municipal tenants under D.C.R 33(7) was pending final approval by the technical committee of the Corporation, suddenly on 16/11/2006 the Architect of the Municipal tenants gave up the proposal for re-development of the sub-divided plot admeasuring 4905.17 sq. mtrs. and submitted modified Annexure I and III for re-development of the entire plot in question admeasuring 12,130.07 sq. mtrs. by availing 2.5 F.S.I under D.C.R 33(7). The Architect of the Municipal tenants further offered to pay to the Corporation premium on the surplus area of 17,193.49 sq. mtrs. remaining after rehabilitating the Municipal tenants, Municipal employees, Municipal school and other structures set out therein, at a capitalised value of Rs. 31,22,33,780/- calculated on the basis of the market value set out in the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner (“SDRR” for short).

    13. In the meantime, the Chief Promoter of the Municipal employees Society as well as their Architect wrote letters on 17/1/2007 and 22/1/2007 objecting to the Architect of the Municipal tenants sub-mitting modified Annexure I and III for re-development of the entire plot in question. In the meantime the Architect of the Municipal employees submitted modified Annexure I and III on 16/7/2007 seeking approval for re-development of the sub-divided plot admeasuring 5761.23 sq. mtrs. with 2.5 F.S.I and offered to pay to the Corporation a premium of Rs. 14,33,59,040/- on the surplus area of 6445.31 sq. mtrs. calculated at the rate prescribed under S.D.R.R 2007.

    14. The technical Committee which met on 15-5-2007 approved re-development of the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7) by the respondent No. 6 - developer appointed by the Municipal tenants.

    15. The Improvements Committee by the impugned order dated 24/8/2007, approved the recommendations of the technical committee dated 15/5/2007 and permitted the respondent No. 6 re-presenting the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot in question subject to the conditions set out therein and subject to payment of premium on the surplus area calculated on the basis of the price set out in S.D.R.R at Rs. 99,76,85,205/- less Rs. 3,16,50,660/- towards the cost of reconstruction of the Municipal school building and reconstruction of the structures built after 1960 but prior to 1/1/1995. Challenging the aforesaid decision, the present writ petition was filed on 10/9/2007.

    16. On 17/9/2007, this Court while issuing Court notice to all the respondents directed that any steps taken for re-development of the plot in question thereafter shall be subject to further orders of the Court. On 19th October, 2007, this Court recorded the statement of the Counsel for respondent Nos. 5 and 6 that they would not take any action in furtherance to the impugned decision of the Corporation till the next date of hearing. By order dated 19th December, 2007, the statement made by the Counsel for the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 on 19th October, 2007 was continued till the next date of hearing.

    17. To complete the narration of facts, it may be noted that pursuant to the direction given by this Court, the Corporation considered the proposal for re-development of the sub-divided plot submitted by the Architect of the petitioners and by the impugned order dated 22/1/2008 rejected the proposal submitted by the petitioners for re-development of the sub-divided plot and also rejected the petitioners' objection to the Corporation granting permission to the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to redevelop the entire plot in question. The writ petition has been amended to challenge that order as well.

    18. At the outset, Mr. Singh, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 5 and 6, raised preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the present writ petition mainly on two grounds. Firstly, he submitted that the petitioners claim right to re-develop the property in question on the basis of the consent given by the Municipal employees who have formed respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society. Since the members of respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society have resolved on 6/11/2007 and 3/11/2007 respectively to withdraw the consent, the petitioners have no focus standi to pursue the present writ petition. Secondly, he submitted that the right to re-develop the plot under D.C.R 33(7) is available only to the Municipal tenants and not to the Municipal employees. Since the Municipal employees do not have the status of tenants, they have no right to re-develop the plot in question under D.C.R 33(7) and consequently the petitioners who claim to represent the Municipal employees do not have any right to redevelop the plot in question.

    19. Dealing with the first preliminary objection, Mr. Madon, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that the Affidavits filed by the Chief Promoters of respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society to the effect that the members of the society have resolved to withdraw their consent is totally false. Mr. Madon referred to various Affidavits filed by the individual members of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society wherein they have denied the allegation that the individual members of the society have resolved to cancel and/or withdraw the consent and/or development rights given to the petitioners. He submitted that the Chief Promoters of respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society have filed the false Affidavits at the instance of respondent Nos. 5 and 6 because, this Court on 19-10-2007 had ordered that the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 shall not implement the decision of the Corporation. Accordingly, Mr. Madon submitted that in view of the irrevocable consent given by more than 70% of the members of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society to the petitioners for re-development of the plot in question is still valid and subsisting, the petitioners would have locus standi to pursue the present writ petition.

    20. With reference to the second preliminary objection relating to the maintainability of the writ petition, Mr. Madon submitted that admittedly the guide-lines framed by the Corporation regarding the re-development rights of the Municipal employees occupying Municipal staff quarters are pending for approval before the State Government and during the pendency of the said approval, if the respondent No. 6 developer appointed by the Municipal tenants is permitted to re-develop the entire plot in question, then grave prejudice will be caused to the petitioners as well as the members of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society. Mr. Madon further submitted that in any event, where the action of the Corporation is vitiated by mala fides and the same is not in public interest, the petitioners can invoke writ jurisdiction to enforce the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

    21. As to the merits of the case, Mr. Madon submitted that once the Corporation took decision to sub-divide the plot and permit re-development of the sub-divided plot the Corporation could not have arbitrarily decided to permit the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot in question under D.C.R 33(7). By permitting the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7), instead of a portion of the plot, the Corporation purported to distribute the State largesse upon the respondent No. 6 - developer which is totally unfair, unreasonable and unsustainable. In this connection he relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court in (Ramana Shetty v. I.A Authority of India)1, reported in 1979 DGLS (soft) 296 : (1979) 3 SCC 489 : A.I.R 1979 S.C 1628 (para 11), (Haji T.M Hassan v. Kerala Finance Corporation)2, reported in 1987 DGLS (soft) 835 : (1988) 1 SCC 166 : A.I.R 1988 S.C 157 (Para 14).

    22. Mr. Madon further submitted that when admittedly the guide-lines framed by the Corporation in respect of the Municipal staff quarters was pending for approval before the State Government, the Corporation ought not to have hastily taken a decision so as to deprive the Municipal employees of their right to re-develop the sub-divided plot in question by availing the benefits under D.C.R 33(7),

    23. Mr. Madon submitted that D.C.R 33(7) applies to reconstruction or re-development of the cessed buildings or old buildings belonging to the Corporation which were constructed prior to 1940. The Municipal school on the plot in question was constructed in the year 1959 for which D.C.R 33(7) was not applicable and, therefore, permitting the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7) is totally illegal and contrary to law.

    24. Assuming that the re-development of the entire plot as a whole was essential from the planning point of view, then, it is submitted by Mr. Madon that the proper course was to invite tenders and award the work to the highest tenderer, instead of arbitrarily and illegally awarding the re-development work to the respondent No. 6 developer without inviting tenders. He submitted that by determining the capitalized value of the surplus F.S.I based on SDRR the Corporation is made to suffer huge losses. He submitted that as against the capitalized value of Rs. 99,76,85,205/- determined by the Corporation, the petitioners were willing to re-develop the said plot on the same terms and conditions by offering capitalised value on the surplus area at Rs. 130 crores and to prove the bona fides, Mr. Madon produced before us a bank draft in the sum of Rs. 15 crores drawn in favour of the Corporation. Accordingly, it is contended that the impugned decision of the Corporation is neither bona fide nor in public interest. He placed reliance on the Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of (Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra)3, (Original Side Writ Petition No. 2687 of 1999) decided on 19/9/2005.

    25. Mr. Madon further submitted that the decision of the Corporation in computing the cost of construction of the Municipal school and other structures at Rs. 3,16,50,660/- is not only unreasonable but excessively high. He submitted that if the re-development of the plot in question is entrusted to the petitioners, they are willing to construct the Municipal school and other structures free of cost and offer higher premium on the surplus area as stated hereinabove. Accordingly, Mr. Madon submitted that by the impugned decision the Corporation has purported to favour the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants at the cost of the Corporation which is wholly unsustainable in law.

    26. With reference to the order passed by the Corporation on 22/1/2008 whereby the proposal for re-development given by the petitioners is rejected, Mr. Madon submitted that the said order has been passed without application of mind. The proposal given by the petitioners has been rejected firstly on the ground that the petitioners have not submitted a comprehensive plan for the entire plot. When the Corporation had already granted N.O.C to the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the plot by notionally sub-dividing the plot, there is no question of the petitioners submitting a composite plan for the entire plot. In any event, if the Corporation had called upon the petitioners or its Architect to submit a comprehensive plan, the petitioners would have gladly submitted comprehensive plan and in such a case the Corporation would have been immensely benefited. Secondly, the proposal submitted by the petitioners has been rejected on the ground that the petitioners have not obtained the consent of the tenants/occupants of the entire plot. When the petitioners were seeking to re-develop the subdivided plot there was no question of obtaining consent of the tenants/occupants of the entire plot. Thirdly, during the pendency of the approval of the guide-lines framed by the Corporation in respect of the Municipal employees, the Corporation ought not to have favoured the respondent No. 6 by conferring the benefits of D.C.R 33(7) available on the entire plot to defeat the rights of the petitioners. Accordingly Mr. Madon submitted that the approval granted by the Corporation to the respondent No. 6 for re-development of the plot in question which is vitiated by mala fides, favouritism and entails huge loss to the public exchequer be quashed and set aside and the Corporation be directed to approve the plans submitted by the petitioners on such terms and conditions as this Court deems fit and proper.

    27. Mr. A.Y Sakhare, Mr. Aspi Chinoy and Mr. C.U Singh, learned Senior Advocates appearing on behalf of the respective contesting respondents have vehemently opposed the claim of the petitioners. Their main contention is that re-development of the plot in question under D.C.R 33(7) could be undertaken only by the Municipal tenants and not by Municipal employees. Admittedly the members of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 - Society are not Municipal tenants, and therefore they do not have legal right to seek redevelopment of the plot in question. Consequently, the petitioners who claim to represent the interest of the Municipal employees have neither the right to develop the property under D.C.R 33(7) nor they have any right to challenge the permission granted to the respondent No. 6 to re-develop the plot in question under D.C.R 33(7). It is contended that the petitioners having failed in their mission to obtain permission to re-develop the plot on behalf of the Municipal employees have filed the present writ petition with ulterior motives and with a view to delay the re-development of the plot in question by the respondent No. 6.

    28. Learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondents further submitted that in the present case, initially the Officers of the Corporation were considering re-development by sub-dividing the plot in question. However, as the sub-division of the plot in question was not feasible and under D.C.R 33(7) the Municipal tenants were entitled to the incentive F.S.I of 2.5 on the ‘gross plot area’ and further from the planning point of view, development of the plot as a whole was advisable it was decided to permit the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7). Therefore, the fact that initially the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants had erroneously applied for re-development of the notionally sub-divided plot it cannot be said that the said developer is estopped from submitting revised proposal for development of the entire plot. It is submitted that the plot in question being an undivided plot, under D.C.R 33(7) the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants was entitled to re-develop the entire plot. Moreover, in the present case, the Corporation has imposed stringent conditions by directing the developer of the Municipal tenants to re-develop the Municipal staff quarters, Municipal school etc. at a nominal cost of Rs. 3,16,50,660/- and further the Corporation has charged premium on the surplus F.S.I at Rs. 96,60,34,545/- which is the best deal ever secured by the Corporation.

    29. It is further contended that the re-development of the plot in question could not be carried on by the Corporation itself under D.C.R 33(9) because of the height restriction contained in D.C.R 31(4)(a) as plot in question is in the vicinity of the Nehru Centre. In these circumstances, on examination of all the issues, it was decided that firstly, re-development of the plot in question under D.C.R 33(9) was not possible due to height restriction, secondly re-development of the plot in question under D.C.R 33(7) could be done only by the developers appointed by the Municipal tenants and not by the Municipal employees. Thirdly, the plot in question being a single undivided plot and the sub-division of the plot was feasible, in the best interest of the Corporation, bona fide decision has been taken to permit the respondent No. 6 to re-develop the entire plot in question by imposing stringent Conditions and further premium of Rs. 96.60 crores on the surplus F.S.I has been secured which is the best development proposal ever secured by the Corporation.

    30. It is further contended by Counsel for the contesting respondents that the petitioners cannot find fault with the determination of the premium amount on the surplus F.S.I based on SDRR because, even the petitioners themselves had calculated premium based on SDRR while seeking to re develop a portion of the plot in question. SDRR represents the current market price and, therefore, no fault can be found in determining the premium amount based on SDRR. Referring to the administrative guidelines framed by the Corporation for the implementation of D.C.R 33(7) for reconstruction/re-development of old Municipal properties by Municipal tenant's Co-operative Housing Societies, Counsel for the respondents submitted that it is only the Municipal tenants who are entitled to re-develop the plot in question and quantification of the total built up area required for rehabilitation and the surplus F.S.I as well as the premium thereon has been done in strict compliance of law, while granting permission to the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to redevelop the entire plot. Accordingly, it is submitted that there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed.

    31. Relying upon an unreported decision of this Court dated 5/7/1990 in Writ Petition No. 118 of 1983 (Ramchandra K. Paralikar v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay)4, Counsel for the respondents have contended that the Municipal staff occupying the Municipal staff guar-ters have no legal right whatsoever to remain in the quarters nor they can compel the Corporation to grant permission to re-develop the plot in question.

    32. Reliance is also placed on the decision of this Court in the case of (Mangesh Janardhan Mohite (President) v. State of Maharashtra)5, reported in 2002 (5) Bom.C.R 653, wherein, while dealing with the similar provisions contained in the Maharashtra Housing & Area Development Act, 1976 it is observed thus:—

    “….Now as far as the reconstruction in respect of cessed properties located in the island city, which attract the provisions of MHADA Act to be taken up by co-operative housing societies is concerned, the F.S.I made available is 2.5 as per the provision quoted earlier. This F.S.I is subject to provision of Appendix HI to these Regulations. This Appendix III lays down how much should be the minimum area for a tenement and how much should be the maximum. Clause 11 of this Appendix III lays down that the decision with respect to F.S.I to be allowed under D.C.R 33(7) is to be taken by the Municipal Commissioner only after he is satisfied that the said society fulfills all conditions to be eligible for the benefits under this Regulations. Clause 4 of this Appendix III provides that the tenements in the reconstructed building shall be allotted by the occupant society as per the list certified by the Bombay Housing and Area Development Board and from amongst them. It also provides that the prescribed precentage of the surplus built up area as per the Third Schedule of the MHADA Act is to be made available to the Bombay Board for accommodating the other tenants in the transit camp of the cessed building which cannot be reconstructed. Thus as far as the co-operative societies of the occupants of the cessed buildings either under section 103-B or 95-A are concerned, there is no requirement under the MHADA Act or the Regulations that they should invite tenders for selecting the developer. This is because under both the provisions 70% of the occupiers have moved the proposal. In the case of a proposal under section 103-B, they form or propose a co-operative society and then approach the board without the landlord, but with 30% of the acquisition amount. Under section 95-A, they approach the board for the N.O.C along with the landlord. Under both these situations, therefore, it is quite understandable that they are permitted to select their own developer, and it is not necessary for them to invite any tender. In fact, the so-called developer is nothing but a contractor for reconstruction when the work is executed under these two sections.”

    33. In the light of the above decision of this Court, Counsel for the respondents submitted that in the facts of the present case, the decision of the Corporation to grant re-development of the plot in question to the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants without inviting tenders is in accordance with law.

    34. Relying upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of (Chairman & M.D, B.P.L Ltd. v. S.P Gururaje)6, reported in 2003 DGLS (soft) 570 : (2003) 8 SCC 567 : A.I.R 2003 S.C 4536, it is contended that since there is no violation of any mandatory provisions, it will not be proper for this Court to interfere with the impugned decisions which are taken in accordance with the guidelines framed in that behalf. Accordingly, Counsel for the respondents submit that the petitioners have neither the locus standi nor any right to re-develop the property in question, nor there is any infirmity in the impugned order and, therefore, the present petition is liable to be dismissed with exemplary costs.

    35. We have carefully considered the rival submissions.

    36. We may first deal with the preliminary objections raised by the respondents. According to the respondents, the petitioners do not have locus standi in pursuing the writ petition because the authority given to them have been withdrawn by the members of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society during the pendency of the petition as is evident from the affidavits filed by the Chief Promoters of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society. The petitioners have disputed the correctness of these affidavits and have tendered affidavits of some of the members of the respondent Nos. 8 and 9 society to show that the consent given to the petitioners by the individual members has not been withdrawn. In these circumstances, in view of the serious dispute regarding the withdrawal of the consent, we do not consider it proper to reject the petition at the threshold since the petitioners admittedly had locus standi on the date of the filing of the petition. The second preliminary objection raised by the respondents is that the right to re-develop the plot under D.C.R 33(7) is available only to the Municipal tenants and, therefore, a writ petition at the instance of the Municipal employees or their developers would not be maintainable. It is pertinent to note that the guide-lines framed by the Corporation for rehabilitation of the Municipal employees is pending before the State Government and during the pendency of the said approval, whether, the Corporation is justified in entrusting re-development of the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7) to the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants is a question which needs to be considered on merits. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, we do not consider it proper to reject the petition on the basis of the preliminary objections raised by the respondents.

    37. Turning to the merits of the case, the basic object of D.C.R 33(7) is to get the dilapidated buildings constructed prior to 1940 demolished and reconstructed through a developer by granting incentive F.S.I, so that the tenants/occupants living in the dilapidated buildings get accommodation of a habitable size, free of cost, in the newly constructed building. Thus, D.C.R 33(7) seeks to achieve twin objects, namely (one) safety of the tenants/occupants living in the buildings constructed prior to 1940 which are in dilapidated condition by demolishing and reconstructing new buildings with incentive F.S.I and providing free of cost accommodation of a habitable size to the said tenants/occupants and (two) the additional construction put up by the developer by consuming the incentive F.S.I not only helps hirn to recover the cost free accommodation given to the tenants/occupants but also helps in solving the acute housing problem prevailing in the city of Mumbai.

    38. The question is, where there is a large Municipal plot and, the buildings occupied by the tenants are situate on a portion of the said plot, whether under D.C.R 33(7), the Corporation is obliged to permit the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot?

    39. This Court in Original Side Writ Petition No. 580 of 2007 (Subhash R. Acharya… v. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.…)7, decided on 16th August, 2007 reported in 2007 (6) Bom.C.R 100 (O.S) considering various judgments of the Apex Court has observed thus:—

    “17. While dealing with the aspect of distribution of State largesse or contractual obligations of the State, the principles of public trust and public accountability have to be applied injudicial determination. The State authorities should exercise discretion in awarding contracts but such discretion should be fair and in public interest. They should be free of arbitrariness and nowhere should amount to mis-feasance in public office. In the case of (Shivsagar Tiwari v. Union of India)8, 1996 DGLS (soft) 1646 : (1996) 6 SCC 558, the Supreme Court while setting aside the discretionary allotments made by the Minister of Urban Development to his employees, relatives, etc. even directed that this amounted to misuse of duty and awarded exemplary damages as actionable in tort.

    18. Judicial review of administrative action was further expanded by the Supreme Court in the case of (State of NCT of Delhi v. Sanjeev Alias Bitto)9, 2005 DGLS (soft) 298 : (2005) 5 SCC 181 : A.I.R 2005 S.C 2080. The Supreme Court emphasised that the present trend of judicial opinion is to further restrict arbitrariness in the administrative action of the Government referable to the executive, legislative or quasi judicial nature. Though the scope of judicial review was stated to be limited but where the decision-making process was per se faulty and not in conformity with rules, judicial intervention was permissible.

    19. Reference in this regard can also be made to the case of (Tata Cellular v. Union Of India.)10, 1994 DGLS (soft) 649 : (1994) 6 SCC 651 : A.I.R 1996 S.C 11, wherein the Supreme Court has held that unreasonable decision or a decision without proper application of mind or decision with procedural impropriety were the kind of cases which would squarely fall within the limited scope of judicial intervention.”

    40. Again, in Original Side Writ Petition No. 1889 of 2007 (Vijay Kumar Gupta v. State of Maharashtra)11, decided on 13th March, 2008 reported in 2008 (3) Bom.C.R 593 Division Bench of this Court (Swatanter Kumar, C.J) observed thus:—

    “6.3 ….Besides statutory restrictions, in the case of a Government, the limitation of fairness, equal opportunity to persons even in a stated class are also indicated in law relating to contracts. A State is free to choose its course of action in relation to contracts and matters of State largess. It must adhere to the principle of equality and fairness in the distribution of State largess either directly or by inviting tenders for utilisation of the assets, commodities and resources of the State. Except in exceptional circumstances, where the State may, out of public necessity in the larger interest of administration, choose to enter into private contracts by negotiations or otherwise. This mode may be for the contracts relating to specialised technical-know how and in such fields where recourse to normal methodology of inviting tenders may be prejudicial to the interest of the State or such other circumstances in the opinion of the authorities which are bona fide and ex facie unquestionable. (Refer Mulla Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, twelfth Edition & Anson's Law of Contract, 28th Edition by J. Beatson).

    6.4 The scope of judicial review in public contracts or such actions of the State is limited and it is settled rule that the judicial review will be concerned in reviewing not the merits of the decision made but the decision making process itself. If the contract by State or its instrumentalities has been entered into without ignoring the procedure which can be said to be basic in nature and after an objective consideration of different options available taking into account the interest of the State and the public, then the Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority by substituting its opinion in respect of selection made for entering into the contract. If the Court is of the opinion that public interest has been made to suffer then it would interfere in the larger interest of the public. Another facet of this is the legitimate expectation of the persons who claim to be interested or similarly situated is that where persons are legitimately entitled to except that certain entitlements would continue with them, but they are not continued. The courts insist that the decision affecting such expectation should be taken after giving to such persons an opportunity of being heard. There must exists good and even compelling circumstances to justify exclusion of all other eligible persons. The legitimacy of expectation can be inferred only it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. In other words, the orders and decisions in such commercial field would be tested by the touchstone of fairness in executive action and exceptions may be there where larger public interest may outweigh the legitimate expectation of the public at large.

    41. In the light of the aforesaid decisions, the question to be considered is, whether the decision of the Corporation in permitting the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot in question is reasonable and is in public interest? In the present case, the plot in question admeasures 12130.07 sq. mtrs. The developer appointed by the Municipal tenants had put up proposal for sub-division of the plot in question and had sought permission to re-develop the sub-divided plot admeasuring 4905.17 sq. mtrs. under D.C.R 33(7). The Dy. Chief Engineer (BP) on scrutiny of the proposal had recommended re-development by sub-dividing the plot in question. Accordingly, N.O.C was granted to the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to redevelop the notionally sub-divided plot. There is no material on record to suggest that the technical committee had found any fault with the re-commendation of the Dy. Chief Engineer (BP). Even before us it is not argued that sub-division of the plot in question is not legally permissible and the recommendation of the Dy. Chief Engineer (BP) for subdivision of the plot in question was erroneous. Therefore, in the absence of any legal impediment for sub-division of the plot in question, the decision of the Corporation to allow the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot admeasuring 12130.07 sq. mtrs. with 2.5 F.S.I instead of the sub-divided plot admeasuring 4905.17 sq. mtrs. with 2.5 F.S.I amounts to conferring relief to the Municipal tenants/occupants in excess of what is contemplated under D.C.R 33(7).

    42. It was however contended that the plot in question being a single undivided plot covered under D.C.R 33(7), it was obligator)’ on the part of the Corporation to permit the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants to re-develop the entire plot. Reliance is also placed on the word ‘gross plot area’ used in D.C.R 33(7). There is no merit in this contention because, D.C.R 33(7) merely provides for the quantum of F.S.I available to the developer and it does not provide that the developer is entitled to re-develop the entire plot irrespective of the size of the plot. The word ‘gross plot area’ is used in relation to the quantum F.S.I available to the developer under D.C.R 33(7). Moreover, the very fact that the Corporation has charged premium on the surplus F.S.I, that is, the F.S.I in excess of what is contemplated under D.C.R 33(7), clearly negates the argument of the respondents that under D.C.R 33(7) the developer is entitled to re-develop the entire plot. In other words, where the plot could be easily sub-divided and the developer appointed by the tenants/occupants could be permitted to re-develop the sub-divided plot under D.C.R 33(7), the decision of the Corporation in permitting the re-development of the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7) by the developer appointed by the tenants/occupants would amount to distributing Government largesse without any justification.

    43. If the plot in question was sub-divided, then in respect of one of the sub-divided plot, the Corporation could have permitted the developer appointed by the tenants to re-develop under D.C.R 33(7) and could have independently considered the proposal submitted by the petitioners in respect of the other sub-divided plot or in the alternative the Corporation itself could have re-developed the entire plot under D.C.R 33(9) by inviting tenders. Redevelopment of the entire plot by subdividing it or under D.C.R 33(9) with 4 F.S.I would certainly be beneficial to the Corporation instead of re-development under D.C.R 33(7) with 2.5 F.S.I In fact, initially the Corporation had decided to re-develop the entire plot with 4 F.S.I under D.C.R 33(9) by inviting tenders. However, the same has not been pursued without any justification and by the impugned order the Corporation has arbitrarily decided to allow re-development of the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7) by the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants.

    44. The only explanation given by the Corporation for not developing the plot under D.C.R 33(9) is that the plot in question falls within the height restrictions set out in D.C.R 31(4)(a). This explanation is a false excuse given by the Corporation which is wholly unsustainable, because, firstly, the Corporation could have applied for relaxation of the height restriction which is permissible under D.C.R 1991 and secondly, there is evidence on record to show that in the same locality and in fact on the adjoining plot several towers have been constructed by the developers by obtaining relaxation of the height restriction from the Urban Development which is not disputed. To a query raised by the Court, Counsel for the Corporation fairly stated that if there were no tenants then the Corporation would have redeveloped the plot in question under D.C.R 33(9). In these circumstances, the decision of the Corporation in not permitting re-development by sub-dividing the plot in question as also the decision not to re-develop the plot under D.C.R 33(9) by inviting tenders but to permit the developer appointed by the tenants/occupants under D.C.R 33(7) cannot be said to be bona fide decision taken in public interest or in the interest of the Corporation.

    45. The impugned decision is sought to be justified by arguing that the Corporation has imposed stringent conditions upon the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants by directing him to rehabilitate the Municipal tenants, Municipal employees, Municipal school, other structures, etc. and further the Corporation has charged premium on the surplus F.S.I at the prevailing market rate. There is no merit in this contention because, admittedly, the premium on the surplus F.S.I is fixed on the basis of the price set out in the Stamp Duty Ready Reckoner (SDRR) and not on the basis of the current market rate of the saleable F.S.I SDRR merely prescribes a yardstick for the purpose of stamp duty. It provides for the minimum price that could be considered for the purpose of stamp duty. It provides that for payment of stamp duty, the market value is the value worked out as per SDRR or the consideration stated in the document, whichever is higher. Thus SDRR does not reflect the market price. Therefore, the decision taken by the Corporation in computing the premium on the surplus F.S.I based on SDRR cannot be said to represent the current market rate of the saleable F.S.I Consequently the quantum of premium determined without taking into consideration the current market rate would be wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and prejudicial to the public interest and the interest of the Corporation.

    46. Strong reliance was placed by the Counsel for the respondents on the decision of this Court in the case of Ramchandra K. Paralikar (supra) and Mangesh J. Mohite (supra) in support of their contention that the Municipal employees do not have any right to seek re-development of the Municipal plot and that the society formed by the tenants is not required to issue tenders in selecting its developer. The decision of this Court in the case of Ramchandra K. Paralikar (supra) is distinguishable on facts, because, at that time there were no guide-lines framed by the Corporation, whereas, in the present case, admittedly guide-lines have been framed by the Corporation for re-habilitation of the Municipal employees and the same is pending for approval before the State Government. Therefore, the decision of this Court in the case of Ramchandra K. Paralikar is distinguishable on facts.

    47. Similarly, the decision of this Court in the case of Mangesh Mohite (supra) is also not applicable to the facts of the present case. There can be no dispute with the proposition laid down therein that the society formed by the tenants need not invite tenders while selecting its developer. The question in the present case is altogether different. The question is, whether the Corporation ought to have re-developed the plot by sub-dividing it or under D.C.R 33(9) by inviting tenders instead of permitting re-development of the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7) by the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants. The question is, whetner the Corporation is justified in arbitrarily determining the premium on the surplus F.S.I without inviting tenders to ascertain the market value of the saleable F.S.I Therefore, the aforesaid decision of this Court has no relevance in the facts of the present case. Similarly, other decisions relied upon by the Counsel for the respondents are distinguishable on facts.

    48. As noted earlier, in the present case, the decision of the Corporation in not permitting re-development by sub-dividing the plot or not edeveloping the plot under D.C.R 33(9) is without any justiciable basis. It is apparent that the impugned decision has been taken solely with a view to favour the developer appointed by the tenants/occupants in re-developing the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7). Even the quantum of premium on the surplus F.S.I has been fixed arbitrarily without ascertaining the market value of the saleable F.S.I This is established by the petitioners by offering to re-develop the plot in question on the same terms and paying to the Corporation premium on the surplus F.S.I at Rs. 130 crores instead of Rs. 96.60 crores fixed by the Corporation. Thus, the decision of the Corporation being wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and contrary to public interest, the same is liable to be quashed and set aside.

    49. Accordingly, we hold that the decision of the Corporation in permitting redevelopment of the entire plot under D.C.R 33(7) by the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants is not a bona fide decision taken in public interest and consequently the impugned order dated 24/8/2007 is quashed and set aside. Since the decision of the Corporation in rejecting the proposal of the petitioners is primarily based on its decision dated 24/8/2007, the said decision dated 22/1/2008 is also set aside and the Corporation is directed to reconsider both the proposals for re-development by sub-dividing the plot submitted by the developer appointed by the Municipal tenants as well as the petitioners afresh and in accordance with law. If for any reason sub-division of the plot in question is not feasible, then the Corporation shall re-develop the plot under D.C.R 33(9) either by itself or by inviting tenders.

    50. The petition is disposed off in the above terms with no order as to costs.

    51. Petition disposed off.

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