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Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff is the son of Sambasiva Ayyar (the adopted son of Sivaramma Ayyar). He sued to recover possession of certain properties that his grandfather, Sivaramma Ayyar, sold on 29 June 1901 to the 1st defendant (the father of defendants Nos. 2–4). The plaintiff's claim was that the sale was not effected out of any necessity and therefore was not binding on his (the plaintiff's) share. Both the plaintiff's father and grandfather are deceased; the plaintiff sought recovery of the entire suit properties.

At first instance the Subordinate Judge found there was no necessity for the sale and held it not binding on the plaintiff's share. The Subordinate Judge decreed a division of the property into two parts and ordered recovery by the plaintiff of one-half with mesne profits from the date of the sale. The defendants appealed against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the sale by Sivaramma Ayyar to the 1st defendant, alleged to be without necessity, is binding on the plaintiff or void/voidable as against the plaintiff's share.
  2. Whether an alienee (purchaser) of an undivided co-parcener's share acquires the right merely to sue for partition or can, in a suit brought by another co-parcener, assert an equitable right to have the specific item assigned or to obtain partition within that suit.
  3. If the purchaser can assert such equitable rights in the defending suit, whether the court should order partition/assignment in the present proceedings or require the purchaser to institute a separate suit.
  4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to mesne profits, and if so, from what date.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Respondent's) Arguments

  • The sale by Sivaramma Ayyar on 29 June 1901 was not effected for any necessity and is therefore not binding on the plaintiff's share.
  • On that basis, the plaintiff sought recovery of the whole of the suit properties and mesne profits (as awarded by the Subordinate Judge from the date of sale).

Defendants' (Appellants') Arguments

  • The decree in favour of the plaintiff was wrong because the 1st defendant acquired a right by the sale in his alienor's share of the family property.
  • In equity the 1st defendant is entitled to recover property not greater in value than his alienor's share and is entitled to ask for partition of the family property and to have the specific item assigned to his alienor's share if consistent with other coparceners' rights.
  • Impliedly, the defendants argued that relief (a declaration of the purchaser's proprietary rights or partition) could and should be given to the purchaser without driving him to institute a separate suit in circumstances where such relief can be conveniently granted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya, 25 M. 690 (F.B.) Established the principle that an alienee from an undivided co-parcener has a right to sue for partition and to recover his alienor's share. The Court relied on this authority as a foundational precedent confirming the alienee's right to seek partition and recovery of an alienor's share.
Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti, 35 M. 47 (1911) (and other reporters cited) Held that the share which passes to the alienee is the share to which the alienor was entitled at the date of alienation. The Court used this ruling to dispose of the respondent's contention that the 1st defendant lost rights on the death of Sivaramma Ayyar; the alienee's entitlement is fixed as at date of alienation.
Deendyal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh, 3 C. 198 (Privy Council) Held that a purchaser of the interest of a co-sharer at a sale in execution acquires merely the right to compel a partition that the judgment-debtor possessed. The Court referred to this as the principle that the purchaser's remedy is to have his alienor's share ascertained by partition; used to frame whether purchaser must be driven to a separate suit.
Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Parkash Missir, 10 C. 626 (Privy Council) Restated the same proposition as Deendyal; Privy Council refused to interfere with a High Court decree ordering partition but observed on how decree could have been framed. The Court noted the Privy Council's stance and that these authorities did not fully discuss the equity of the purchaser to stand in the vendor's shoes in the exact manner presently under consideration.
Kota Balabhadra Pairo v. Khetra Doss, 37 Ind. Cas. 168 (Madras) Madras observations that the purchaser's right is to obtain by a suit for partition the share to which his alienor was entitled. The Court cited this among Madras cases supporting the purchaser's right to seek partition/allotment of the alienor's share.
Nanjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali, 38 M. 684 (Madras) Referenced as a Madras case observing the purchaser's right to obtain his alienor's share by partition. The opinion cites it as part of the body of Madras authority aligning with the partition/right-to-sue principle; no additional specific application beyond citation was stated.
Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venka aramanjulu, 39 M. 265 (Madras) Referenced among Madras cases addressing purchaser's rights. Cited to show a line of Madras decisions on the purchaser's entitlement; no distinct separate application in the opinion beyond citation.
Subbe Goundan v. Krishnamachari, 45 M. 449 (1922) (and reporters) Considered whether the purchaser must be driven to a suit for partition or whether relief could be given to him when defending a suit by another co-parcener. The Court treated this recent Madras case as directly addressing whether relief can be granted in the defending suit; it was used to support that partition/allotment may be ordered when convenient.
Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal, 40 C. 966 (Privy Council) Discussed the competency of the Court to order partition and, if appropriate, make relief conditional to give effect to rights claimed through an alienor; Privy Council expressed itself unwilling to finally decide some points but indicated competency to order partition in certain terms. The Court interpreted passages in Ramkishore as authority that a court remitting a suit is competent to order partition and to make relief conditional to protect rights claimed through the alienor; used to support granting partition/allotment within the present suit.
Davud Beevi Ammal v. Ramakrishna Aiyar, 44 M.L.J. 309 (1923) Held that the alienee from one of the co-parceners was entitled, if otherwise equitable, to retain property alienated to him as the share of his alienor. The Court relied on this case as supportive authority for allowing the alienee to retain the property as his alienor's share where equitable to do so.
Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur, 19 C. 123 (Privy Council) Established that a sale by a manager of the family is not prima facie void but is voidable at the instance of other members of the family. The Court cited this rule in concluding that the sale by the family manager was voidable (not automatically void), which affected entitlement to mesne profits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded from established principles concerning the rights of an alienee (purchaser) of an undivided co-parcener's share. It accepted the propositions drawn from authorities that:

  • An alienee has an equitable right to recover his alienor's share, and where a specific item is sold the alienee may have an equitable right to have that property assigned to the alienor's share if possible.
  • The share that passes to the alienee is the share to which the alienor was entitled at the date of the alienation.
  • While in some authorities the purchaser's remedy is described as a right to sue for partition, that rule must be read in context: where the alienee has an equity which can be enforced without a separate suit, equitable principles do not require driving the alienee to a separate proceeding.

Applying these principles to the facts the Court found:

  1. At the time of the alienation Sivaramma Ayyar (the vendor) was entitled to one-half of the family property because he had only one son. The family properties then amounted to approximately 13 Velies of land and about two Velies were sold — therefore the property sold was not more than Sivaramma Ayyar's share.
  2. There were no other surviving co-parceners who needed to be impleaded; the plaintiff was the only surviving member of the family for the purposes relevant to partition. Consequently, the share which could be ascertained and allotted could be done "without any trouble at all."
  3. Given that the alienee's equity could be enforced in the present suit without multiplicity of litigation, the Court concluded it was appropriate to give effect to that equity by allotting the plaint property to Sivaramma Ayyar's share and thereby to the 1st defendant.
  4. On mesne profits, the Court applied the principle from Hanuman Kamat that a sale by a family manager is voidable — not prima facie void — and therefore any entitlement to mesne profits for the plaintiff would arise only from the date of the plaint. Because the Court held that the defendants were entitled to retain possession, the plaintiff was not entitled to any mesne profits.

The Court thus reconciled the line of authority that sometimes suggests the purchaser's remedy is to institute partition proceedings with the equitable principle that permits enforcing an alienee's rights within the same suit where, as here, the share could be ascertained and allotted without inconvenience or multiplicity of litigation.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's suit is dismissed with costs throughout. The Memorandum of Objections is also dismissed.

Implications for the Parties:

  • The defendants (including the 1st defendant) are entitled to retain possession of the suit property.
  • The 1st defendant is entitled, in equity, to have the plaint property treated as falling within the alienor's (Sivaramma Ayyar's) share and thus to the benefit of that share, because the alienor's share at the date of alienation was at least equal in value to the property sold.
  • The plaintiff is not entitled to mesne profits (the Court held that, at best, mesne profits could be claimed only from the date of the plaint, but since the defendants were entitled to retain possession, the plaintiff receives nothing on this head).

The opinion applies and reconciles established authorities on the buyer's equitable rights; it does not purport to create a novel legal principle. No broader or new precedent beyond the application of existing authorities is asserted in the text.

Judge: Venkatasubba Rao, J. (concurred by an additional brief concurrence: “I agree.”)

    Ramaswami Iyer And Ors. v. A.S. Venkatarama Iyer

    1. In this case the plaintiff is the son of one Sambasiva Ayyar, the adopted son of one Sivaramma Ayyar, and he sues to recover possession of certain properties, sold by his grandfather, Sivaramma Ayyar on the 29th of June 1901 to the 1st defendant who is the father of defedants Nos. 2 to 4 on the ground that the sale was not effected for any necessity and is not binding on him. The plaintiff's father and grandfather are now both dead and, therefore, the plaintiff claims to recover the whole of the suit properties.

    2. The Subordinate Judge has found that there was no necessity for the sale and that it is, therefore, not binding on the plaintiff's share and he has given a decree to the plaintiff for a division of the property into two parts and for recovery of possession by the plaintiff of one-half with mesne profits from the date of the sale. The defendants now appeal and state that the decree is wrong and that the plaintiff's suit should have been dismissed on the ground that the first defendant acquired a right by the sale in his alienor's share of the family property and that he is in equity entitled to recover property not greater in value than his alienor's share, and that he is also entitled to ask for partition of the family property, and to have the specific item assigned to his alienor's share, if that is consistent with the rights of other coparceners.

    3. It is not disputed that an alienee from an undivided co-parcener has alright to sue for a partition of the family property and to recover his alienor's share, in the case of a sale of an undivided share, that share itself, and in the case of tale of a specific item of property an equitable right to have that property assigned, if possible, to his alienor's share. This principle was laid down in Aiyyagari Venkataramayya v. Aiyyagari Ramayya 25 M. 690 (F.B.) and was followed in Chinnu Pillai v. Kalimuthu Chetti 9 Ind. Cas. 5961 : 35 M. 47 (1911) 1 M.W.N. 238 : 9 M.L.T. 389 : 21 M.L.J. 246 where it was further held that the share of the alienor which passes to the alienee is the share to which the former was entitled at the date of alienation. This latter ruling disposes of the respondent's contention that the 1st defendant has lost all right to the property on the death of Sivaramma Ayyar. It is thus quite clear on all the authorities that the 1st defendant is entitled to a partition of the family property and to have the plaint property assigned to Sivarama Ayyar's share, if that can equitably be done, and can bring a suit for that purpose.

    4. It is then argued for the respondent that relief cannot be given to the defendants in this suit and that they must be left to work out their rights in a subsequent suit, and reliance is placed on several cases cited, beginning with Deendyal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh 3 C. 198 : 1 C.L.R. 49 : 4 I.A. 247 : 3 Sar. P.C.J. 730 : 3 Suth. P.C.J. 468 : 1 Ind. Jur. 6041 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 715 (P.C.). In that case it was held by the Privy Council that the purchaser of the right, title and interest of a co-sharer in joint ancestral estate at a sale in execution acquires merely the right to compel a partition as against the other co-sharers which the judgment-debtor possessed. In a subsequent case Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Parkash Missir 10 C. 626 : 11 I.A. 26 : 8 Ind. Jur. 211 : 4 Sar P.C.J. 510 : 5 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 420 (P.C.) the same proposition was enunciated, but the Privy Council refused to interfere with the decree of the High Court ordering a partition and allotting a share to the purchaser, but observed that the decree ought to have been for the recovery of the whole property with the other co-parcener with a declaration of the rights of the purchaser. In neither of these cases was the equity of the purchaser to stand in his vendor's shoes with which we are now concerned fully discussed. There have also been observations in several Madras cases that the right of the purchaser is only a right to obtain by a suit for partition, the share to which his alienor was entitled vide Kota Balabhadra Pairo v. Khetra Doss 37 Ind. Cas. 168 : 31 M.L.J. 275 : 4 L.W. 99 : (1917) M.W.N. 149 to which one of us was a party; Nanjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali 22 Ind. Cas. 555 : 38 M. 684 : 15 M.L.T. 186 : (1914) M.W.N. 356 : 26 M.L.J. 576 and Maharaja of Bobbili v Venka aramanjulu 25 Ind. Cas. 585 : 39 M. 265 : 16 M.L.T. 181 : 27 M.L.J. 409 and also a very recent case Subbe Goundan v. Krishnamachari 68 Ind. Cas. 869 : 45 M. 449 : 30 M.L.T. 217 : 42 M.L.J. 372 : 15 L.W. 537 : (1922) M.W.N. 269 : (1922) A.I.R. (M.) 112. It is only in the last case, however, that the question really arose as to whether the purchaser was to be driven to a suit for partition, or whether relief could be given to him when defending a suit by another co-parcener. In this case the Privy Council ruling in Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal 20 Ind. Cas. 958 : 40 C. 966 : (1913) M.W.N. 661 : 14 M.L.T. 163 : 17 C.W.N. 1189 : 18 C.L.J. 237 : 15 Bom. L.R. 867 : 11 A.L.J. 865 : 25 M.L.J. 512 : 10 N.L.R. 1 : 40 I.A. 213 (P.C.) was interpreted as meaning that the Privy Council, while raising the point, expressed themselves unwilling to decide it. In Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal 20 Ind. Cas. 958 : 40 C. 966 : (1913) M.W.N. 661 : 14 M.L.T. 163 : 17 C.W.N. 1189 : 18 C.L.J. 237 : 15 Bom. L.R. 867 : 11 A.L.J. 865 : 25 M.L.J. 512 : 10 N.L.R. 1 : 40 I.A. 213 (P.C.) the suit was instituted by members of a Hindu joint family to Set aside an alienation in favour of the 1st respondent who claimed to be adopted into the family and it was held that, as between the father Kedarnath and the alienee, Jaynarayan "the latter may be entitled to insist that he stands in the shoes of the former as to the share which would come to the former upon a partition; and that- the Court, if that position were established, would itself, at Jaynarayan's instance, decree a partition as between the plaintiffs on the one hand and Kedarnath on the other. Their Lordships think that on the present pleadings it is open to Jaynarayan to set up such a case, but express no opinion as to its validity either in law or fact;'' that this pronouncement does relate to the competency of a Court to give a decree for partition in such a suit is, I think, clear from the succeeding passage, according to which, the suit is remanded for trial, "with a declaration that it is competent for the Court in the event of the respondent, Jaynarayan, failing in his other defences, to make the whole or any part of the relief granted to the plaintiffs conditional on their assenting to a partition so far as regards Kedarnath's interest in the estate, so as to give effect to any right to which the respondent may be entitled claiming through Kedarnath." This latter statement seems to me to lay down quite clearly that the Court to which the suit was remanded was competent to order partition and to give the. decree accordingly and that the statement in the previous paragraph that their Lordships "express no opinion as to the validity either in law or fact" refers merely to the question of how much of his case Jaynarayan would be able to establish when it formed the subject-matter of enquiry and this is the view taken by the learned Chief Justice in Davud Beevi Ammal v. Ramakrishna Aiyar 72 Ind. Cas. 81 : 17 L.W. 332 : 44 M.L.J. 309 : (1923) M.W.N. 202 : 32 M.L.T. 263 : (1923) A.I.R. (M.) 467. In this latter case the suit was by a member of a family for general partition and it was held that the alienee from one of the co-parceners was entitled, if otherwise equitable, to retain property alienated to him as the share of his alienor. No doubt in many cases it would not be easy to enforce the alienee's equitable right in a suit brought by one of the co-parceners to recover the property, because it would be necessay to add all the co-parceners to the suit and ascertain the amount of family property available for division, etc., and consequently it would often be simpler to refer the alienee to a separate suit but that is not to say that, when the circumstances are favourable, the alienee must of necessity be driven to another suit. The principle originally laid down in Demdyal v, Jugdeep Narain Singh 3 C. 198 : 1 C.L.R. 49 : 4 I.A. 247 : 3 Sar. P.C.J. 730 : 3 Suth. P.C.J. 468 : 1 Ind. Jur. 6041 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 715 (P.C.) is that the purchaser has the right to compel partition and it was held that he was entitled to take proceedings to have his alienor's share ascertained by partition.

    5. This being the principle, where such share can be ascertained without driving the parties to a separate suit, it should be done in order to avoid multiplicity of litigation. The observations referred to above that the alienee has only a right to sue must be read with reference to the facts of the cases concerned, for, if an equity exists in the alienee and it can be enforced without a separate suit, there seems to me to be no reason for restricting that equity to a mere right to sue, a limitation which cannot be supported on equitable principles. As I read Ramkishore Kedarnath v. Jainarayan Ramrachpal 20 Ind. Cas. 958 : 40 C. 966 : (1913) M.W.N. 661 : 14 M.L.T. 163 : 17 C.W.N. 1189 : 18 C.L.J. 237 : 15 Bom. L.R. 867 : 11 A.L.J. 865 : 25 M.L.J. 512 : 10 N.L.R. 1 : 40 I.A. 213 (P.C.) that case is authority for the proposition that, in a suit by a co-parcener for recovery of the property or for partition, the alienee is entitled to claim partition if it can conveniently be done. In the present case the plaintiff is the only surviving member of his family and at the time of the alienation on the 1st defendant the plaintiff's grandfather was entitled to one-half share in the family property, he having only one son. The family property at that time was a great deal more than double the amount sold to the 1st defendant for by that sale about two Velies were sold at a time when the family properties amounted to something like 13 Velies of land. There is no necessity in the present case to implead any other co-parceners for they do not exist, and the partition, so far as the plaint property is concerned, can be effected without any trouble at all. Sivaramma Ayyar was entitled to property at least equal in value to the property alienated and there is no reason why it should not be allotted to his share and consequently to the 1st defendant.

    6. The plaintiff has also claimed mesne profits, but he would not be entitled to such except from the date of the plaint. The sale was by a manager of the family and, as such, is not prima facie void but only voidable at the instance of other members of the family. [Vide. Hanuman Kamat v. Hanuman Mandur 19 C. 123 : 18 I.A. 158 : 6 Sar. P.C.J. 91 : 9 Ind. Dec, (N.S.) 527 (P.C.) also Subbe Goundan v. Krishnamacharl 68 Ind. Cas. 869 : 45 M. 449 : 30 M.L.T. 217 : 42 M.L.J. 372 : 15 L.W. 537 : (1922) M.W.N. 269 : (1922) A.I.R. (M.) 112 J The plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to any mesne profits until the date of plaint and as it has been held that the defendants are entitled to retain possession of the property, it follows that he is not untitled to any mesne profits. The appeal is allowed and the plaintiff's, suit dismissed with costs throughout. The Memorandum of Objections is also dismissed.

    Venkatasubba Rao, J.

    7. I agree.

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    Comments

    Ramaswami Iyer And Ors. v. A.S. Venkatarama Iyer
    (Mar 21, 1923)