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  • provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India
  • provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
  • ARTICLE 16 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions contained in Rules 71, 73
  • Sub-Section (1) of Section 12
  • server.6. Rules 71, 73
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  • provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India
  • provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution
  • ARTICLE 16 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • provisions contained in Rules 71, 73
  • Sub-Section (1) of Section 12
  • server.6. Rules 71, 73
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Writ Petition was filed on 3.4.2001 by the Petitioner seeking a direction to the Opposite Parties to allow him to continue as a Candidate Peon and to consider his case for regular appointment as a Process Server whenever a vacancy occurs in future.

The factual allegations in the petition, as set out in the opinion, are:

  • Petitioner applied for the post of Candidate Peon and, pursuant to an intimation dated 27.12.1993 from the Registrar, Civil Courts, Kalahandi-Nuapada (Opposite Party No. 2), appeared in a written test.
  • After selection, by letter dated 2.2.1994 the Petitioner was directed to appear before the District Judge, Kalahandi, Nuapada (Opposite Party No. 1) on 11.2.1994 for interview.
  • Petitioner passed the medical test, submitted character certificates, and was enrolled as a Candidate Peon by Order dated 21.2.1994 and attached by Order dated 26.4.1994 to the office of the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dharamgarh.
  • Petitioner was relieved from Bhawanipatna to join at Dharamgarh on 1.5.1994 and did join. However, his name was removed from the list of Candidate Peons by Order dated 10.6.1994 and he was not permitted to work.
  • Petitioner made several representations which, he alleges, went undecided; other similarly situated persons continued as Candidate Peons and some were appointed as Process Server in substantive capacity. Hence the Writ Petition challenging those acts/omissions.

Procedurally, the Bench (Dr. B.S. Chauhan, C.J., with B.N. Mahapatra, J. concurring) considered the petition though the State raised a preliminary objection of inordinate delay (the petition being filed seven years after the date of removal).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the procedure of enrolling Candidate Peons and filling future vacancies for the post of Process Server from such an enrollment list (under Rules 71, 73 and 75 of the G.R. & C.O., Civil) is consistent with the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.
  2. Whether a person enrolled as a Candidate Peon (without advertisement or open selection) acquires a right to appointment against future vacancies, or whether such a mechanism effectively fills future vacancies without complying with constitutional requirements.
  3. Whether the petition should be dismissed on the ground of inordinate delay and laches (raised by the State), given that the petition was filed about seven years after the alleged removal from the list.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Petitioner’s) Arguments

  • Counsel for the Petitioner (Sri D.K. Misra) submitted that the Petitioner was discriminatorily removed from the list of Candidate Peons while other similarly situated persons were retained, and some of those persons were subsequently appointed as substantive Process Servers.
  • It was argued that the Petitioner made repeated representations for continuing as a Candidate Peon and for consideration for appointment, but those representations were not decided by the Learned District Judge.
  • On these grounds, the Petitioner claimed entitlement to relief (continuation as Candidate Peon and consideration for future substantive appointment).

Respondent's (State / Opposite Parties’) Arguments

  • Counsel for the State (Sri Khuntia, Addl. Government Advocate) contended that the Petition was filed after seven years from the date of the cause of action (the removal dated 10.6.1994), and therefore there was inordinate delay and laches which warranted dismissal of the petition on that ground alone.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi (1992) 4 SCC 99 : AIR 1992 SC 789 Noted that calling names from Employment Exchange may to some extent curb nepotism and corruption in public employment. Referenced as an authority on recruitment methods (showing one view about use of employment exchanges), while the opinion proceeds to consider later authorities that qualify that view.
State of Haryana v. Piara Singh (1992) 4 SCC 118 : AIR 1992 SC 2130 Even ad hoc/temporary employment should ordinarily be drawn from employment exchange unless delay cannot be tolerated; if employment exchange does not supply candidates, some appropriate method consistent with Article 16 must be followed; there must be notice calling for applications. Used to support the proposition that temporary or ad hoc appointments still require a fair procedure consistent with Article 16, including publication/notice where necessary.
Excise Superintendent Malkapatnam v. K.B.N. Visweshwara Rao (1996) 6 SCC 216 Reiterated that appointments even on temporary/ad hoc basis without inviting applications violate Articles 14 and 16; requisition from Employment Exchange alone is insufficient — open market invitation is also mandatory. Relied upon to show that merely calling names from Employment Exchange does not satisfy constitutional requirements and that open invitation from eligible candidates is required.
Union of India v. N. Hargopal (1987) 3 SCC 308 : AIR 1987 SC 1227 Earlier view reconsidered by the larger Bench in the subsequent authority (Excise Superintendent Malkapatnam). Mentioned as a case reconsidered by the larger Bench to support the clarified principle that Employment Exchange requisition alone is inadequate.
Arun Tewari v. Zila Manaswavi Shikshak Sangh (1998) 2 SCC 332 : AIR 1998 SC 331 Reiterated requirement to invite applications and follow Articles 14 and 16. Grouped with other cases to show consistent Supreme Court view that appointments must comply with Articles 14 and 16.
Kishore K. Pati v. District Inspector of Schools, Midnapur (2000) 9 SCC 405 Reiterative authority on necessity of fair recruitment process under Articles 14 and 16. Cited as part of the line of cases reaffirming the requirement of inviting applications and conducting proper selection.
Subhas Chand Dhrupta v. State of H.P (2000) 10 SCC 82 Reiteration of the principle that appointments require compliance with Articles 14 and 16. Used in the compilation of authorities showing the settled position on recruitment procedure.
Pankaj Gupta v. State of J & K (2004) 8 SCC 353 Reiterative authority endorsing the requirement of proper recruitment procedure. Noted among subsequent authorities reinforcing the rule that appointments must observe Articles 14 and 16.
Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto (2005) 4 SCC 209 : AIR 2005 SC 2103 Affirmed that open invitation and proper selection are required; Employment Exchange requisition is not enough. Cited as one of a series of cases consolidating the principle.
National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh (2006) 5 SCC 493 : AIR 2006 SC 2319 Reiterative authority on recruitment norms and compliance with Articles 14 and 16. Relied upon with similar cases to show consistent jurisprudence.
R.S. Garg v. State of U.P (2006) 6 SCC 430 Part of the jurisprudence reinforcing constitutional recruitment requirements. Included among authorities showing settled law on recruitment procedure.
Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India (2007) 4 SCC 54 Reiteration of the settled position regarding recruitment consistent with Articles 14 and 16. Cited as further support for the constitutional requirement of open and fair recruitment.
Commissioner Municipal Corporation Hyderabad v. P. Mary Manoranjani, 2008 AIR SCW 704 Reiterative authority on recruitment procedure and constitutional compliance. Added to the line of cases relied upon by the Court to underline the settled principle.
Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006) 4 SCC 1 Constitution Bench conclusion: adherence to Articles 14 and 16 is mandatory; an employee appointed without following prescribed procedure is not entitled to relief, including salary. Invoked to emphasize that non-compliant appointments may not attract relief and to reinforce the central constitutional requirement.
Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayantilal Vaghela (2006) 2 SCC 482 : AIR 2006 SC 1165 Held that appointment to any post under the State should be after proper advertisement and selection by an expert body; non-compliance violates Article 16. Used to stress that proper advertisement and expert selection are necessary elements of constitutional recruitment.
Ashok Kumar v. Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment Board (1996) 1 SCC 283 : AIR 1996 SC 976 Article 14 read with Article 16(1) means vacancies should be notified; recruitment in excess of notified vacancies is a denial; recruitment must be for notified vacancies only. Relied upon to support the proposition that filling posts beyond those advertised is impermissible and violates Articles 14 & 16.
Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 Appointments made over and above advertised vacancies were quashed; such action is improper except in rare/emergent circumstances with rational policy decision. Used to show that appointing over advertised vacancies is generally not permissible.
Prem Singh v. Haryana State Electricity Board (1996) 4 SCC 319 Requisition/advertisement can be for clear and anticipated vacancies but not for 'future' vacancies; State cannot make more appointments than advertised except in exceptional/emergent cases with a policy decision. Applied to argue that filling future vacancies from an enrollment list is not permissible as a matter of course.
Virender Singh Hooda v. State of Haryana (1999) 3 SCC 696 : AIR 1999 SC 1701 Followed Prem Singh; affirmed limits on appointing beyond advertised vacancies. Noted as a follow-up authority reinforcing Prem Singh's principle.
Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 84 Selected candidates have right to appointment only against vacancies notified during the life of the select list; empaneled candidates cannot claim right against future vacancies. Invoked to show that empanelment does not create indefeasible rights against future vacancies.
State of Bihar v. The Secretariat, Assistant S.E. Union (1994) 1 SCC 126 : AIR 1994 SC 736 Empanelment is a condition of eligibility and by itself does not create a vested right to be appointed unless rules say so; delay in selection also has implications. Used to support the statement that empaneled candidates do not acquire indefeasible rights to future appointments.
Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1997) 8 SCC 488 : AIR 1998 SC 18 Waiting list is not a source of recruitment and cannot be used as an infinite stock to fill future vacancies; using waiting list to fill future vacancies may deprive fresh eligible candidates. Applied to demonstrate the impropriety of using a waiting/enrollment list indefinitely to fill future vacancies.
Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta (1998) 3 SCC 45 : AIR 1998 SC 1021 Vacancies must be notified and filled following the statutory/specified procedure; appointments in contravention of statutory provisions are void. Invoked to show statutory procedural non-compliance renders appointments void.
Srikant Tripathi v. State of U.P (2001) 10 SCC 237 Reiterative authority on recruitment procedure and compliance with Articles 14 & 16. Cited as part of the body of case law reinforcing the settled position.
State of J & K v. Sanjeev Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 148 Reiteration of the principle that recruitment must comply with Articles 14 and 16. Included among authorities supporting the constitutional mandate for recruitment procedure.
State of U.P v. Raj Kumar Sharma (2006) 3 SCC 330 Reiterative authority affirming rules on recruitment and vacancies. Noted as another supporting authority in the consistent line of cases.
Ram Avtar Patwari v. State of Haryana (2007) 10 SCC 94 : AIR 2007 SC 3242 Reiterated the settled rule requiring compliance with Articles 14 and 16 in recruitment. Referenced among the cases showing the uniform approach of the Supreme Court.
State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Sharma (2002) 1 SCC 113 : AIR 2001 SC 2900 Where only one post was advertised and filled, the select panel ceased to exist on appointment of the first candidate; panel cannot be used to fill subsequent vacancies. Invoked to show that once the advertised vacancy is filled, the panel's utility ceases and it cannot be used to claim later vacancies.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in the following analytical steps, as recorded in the opinion:

  1. Observed the factual matrix and noted the State's plea of inordinate delay (petition filed after seven years) which alone could have been a ground for dismissal but the Court nonetheless examined the substantive legal question raised by the Petitioner (para 8).
  2. Examined the relevant rules (G.R. & C.O., Civil) — specifically Rules 71, 73 and 75 — and quoted their text. The rules provide for enrolment of Candidate Peons and state that Process Servers shall be appointed from these candidates and vacancies shall ordinarily be filled by promotion/appointment of peons and enrolled candidates (paras 5–10).
  3. Noted that the Rules do not require advertisement or specify a mode of selection for enrollment of Candidate Peons; nevertheless the Rules make appointment to future vacancies dependent on the enrollment list (para 11).
  4. Recalled the settled legal proposition that appointments to public posts generally require advertisement and a selection process consistent with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution (paras 9, 10).
  5. Surveyed an extensive line of Supreme Court authorities (detailed in the opinion) that hold:
    • that even temporary or ad hoc appointments must follow a procedure consistent with Article 16 and ordinarily be drawn with public notice or from employment exchanges only where justified;
    • that requisitioning names from employment exchanges alone is insufficient and open market invitations are required;
    • that appointments in excess of the number of vacancies advertised or using waiting lists indefinitely to fill future vacancies are impermissible;
    • that empanelment or inclusion on a select list does not, by itself, create a vested indefeasible right to appointment against future vacancies unless rules expressly provide for such a right;
    • that appointment of employees without following prescribed procedure may entitle the State to decline relief (citing Umadevi).
  6. Applied these principles to the Rules under challenge: the Court expressed concern that enrollment lists under Rules 71, 73 and 75 have no fixed tenure and could be used as an indefinite reservoir to fill future vacancies, thereby effectively permitting filling of future vacancies without the need for advertisement or open selection (paras 30–32).
  7. The Court also noted practical difficulties and inequities arising from the system: for example, a candidate peon might on occurrence of a future vacancy be ineligible due to age or other criteria at that later date; and the opinion remarked on the harsh consequence that unless a Candidate Peon is appointed as a Process Server he may receive no remuneration even if he performs work, which the Court characterized as akin to "beggar" and noted in relation to Article 23 (para 45).
  8. On the basis of the textual rules and the line of Supreme Court decisions, the Court expressed a prima facie view that the enrollment mechanism for Candidate Peons to fill future vacancies is not consonant with Articles 14 and 16 and that the validity of Rules 71, 73 and part of Rule 75 is doubtful (para 32).

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Court adopted a prima facie conclusion that the provisions in Rules 71, 73 and part of Rule 75 of the G.R. & C.O., Civil, which provide for filling the post of Process Server from enrolled Candidate Peons for future vacancies, are of doubtful validity vis-à-vis Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and therefore issued notice to the State and the High Court to show cause (paras 32–33).

Direct consequences and immediate procedural steps imposed by the Court:

  • The Court issued notice to the State of Orissa (through its Law Secretary) and to the High Court of Orissa (through its Registrar General) to show cause why the provisions contained in Rules 71 and 73 and the part of Rule 75 concerning filling Process Server posts from enrolled Candidate Peons should not be declared ultra vires Articles 14 and 16. A reply was directed to be filed within three weeks (para 33).
  • The matter was listed for further hearing on 10.2.2009 at 2.00 P.M (para 34).
  • The opinion records that Justice B.N. Mahapatra agreed with the conclusions (para 35).

Broader implications noted by the Court (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The Court indicated that the practice of using an undated enrollment list to fill future vacancies raises constitutional concerns (Articles 14 & 16), practical inequities (eligibility changing over time), and the potential for creating an "immortal" list that could deprive fresh applicants of opportunities (paras 30–32, 24–31).
  • The Court did not pronounce a final adjudication declaring the rules ultra vires in this opinion; instead, it issued notice to consider the question of validity further. Thus, no final precedent was declared by this order — the matter was set down for further hearing after responses are filed.

Net effect on the parties: The petition was not dismissed on the preliminary ground of delay; instead, the Court has opened the question of the constitutional validity of the impugned rules by issuing notice to the relevant authorities and fixed the matter for further hearing, thereby keeping alive the substantive challenge brought by the Petitioner.

    Santosh Kumar Sahu v. District Judge

    Dr. B.S Chauhan, C.J:— This Writ Petition was filed on 3.4.2001 seeking a direction to the Opposite Parties to allow the Petitioner to continue as Candidate Peon and to consider his case for regular appointment on the post of Process Server whenever vacancy occurs in future.

    2. The facts and circumstances giving rise to the case are that Petitioner applied for the post of Candidate Peon and in pursuance of the intimation dated 27.12.1993 issued by the Registrar, Civil Courts, Kalahandi-Nuapada, Opposite Party No. 2, the Petitioner appeared in the written test held for the said post. After having been duly selected, the Petitioner vide letter dated 2.2.1994 was directed to appear before the District Judge, Kalahandi, Nuapada, Opposite Party No. 1 on 11.2.1994 for interview (Annex. - 1). Petitioner also passed the medical test and submitted two character certificates for being enrolled as a Candidate Peon. Petitioner was enrolled as a Candidate Peon vide Order Dated 21.2.1994 and attached vide Order Dated 26.4.1994 (Annex.-3) to the office of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Dharamgarh. Petitioner was relieved from Bhawanipatna and was directed to join at Dharamgarh on 1.5.1994 and he joined therein. Petitioner had not been permitted to work as his name has been removed from the list of candidate peons vide Order Dated 10.6.1994 He made several representations to continue as Candidate Peon, but in vein. Other similarly situated persons have been continuing as Candidate Peons. Hence this Writ Petition.

    3. Sri D.K Misra, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner has submitted that Petitioner has been discriminated by removing his name from the list of Candidate Peons, while other similarly situated persons have been retained and subsequently some of them have been appointed as Process Server in substantive capacity. Petitioner made several representations but the same have not been decided by the Learned District Judge. Thus, he is entitled for the relief sought.

    4. On the contrary, Sri Khuntia, Learned Addl. Government Advocate has opposed the petition contending that the name of the Petitioner has been removed the list of Candidate Peons in June 1994, but he filed the petition after expiry of seven years in 2001. Thus there has been inordinate delay on his part in filing the petition. The petition is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone.

    5. However, taking into consideration the submissions made by Sri Misra that the Petitioner has been deprived from regularization as a Process Server as per the provisions of the General Rules and Circular Orders of the High Court of Judicature, Orissa (hereinafter called GR & CO.) (Civil), we have examined the Rules which confer certain right of appointment on a person who had been appointed without advertisement, without there being any vacancy in existence just to be considered against a future vacancy in substantive capacity as process server.

    6. Rules 71, 73 and 75 applicable in the case read as under:—

    “71. Candidate Peons - The Nazir shall keep a register of candidates for filling up leave and permanent vacancies. These candidates will be enrolled under orders of the Judge-in-charge of Nazarat and their number shall not exceed 15 per cent of the total strength of permanent peons employed at any station subject to the minimum of one candidate.

    72. xxx xxx xxx

    73. Appointment of process-servers - No process - server shall be appointed except from these candidates.

    74. xxx xxx xxx

    75. Vacancies have to be filled in - Vacancies occurring at any Judgeship shall ordinarily be filled up by promotion and appointment respectively of peons and enrolled candidates attached to that Judgeship.”

    7. The aforesaid Rules did not provide that Candidate Peon shall be enrolled after facing regular selection after advertisement of the vacancies. However, once a person is enrolled as a Candidate Peon, he becomes entitled for being appointed as Process Server in substantive capacity. According to Rule 75 whenever vacancy on the post of Process Server occurs in future in the concerned District Judgeship, the same shall be filled up from the enrolled Candidate Peons attached to that Judgeship.

    8. The question requires serious consideration. Though this petition could be dismissed only on the ground of delay and laches as the same has been filed after seven years of the cause of action from the date of removal of the name of the Petitioner from the list of Candidate Peons.

    9. It is settled legal proposition that for every post, there has to be advertisement and the post should be filled up by following the procedure which is in conformity with the requirements of Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Rules do not provide for any advertisement or any mode of selection for enrollment of Candidate Peons. However, the Rules make it mandatory that whenever any vacancy occurs on the post of Process server, the same shall be filled up from the list of Candidate Peons of the District concerned. Such procedure amounts to filling up of the future vacancy, i.e, which occurs subsequent to the enrolment of candidate peons.

    10. It is settled legal proposition that appointment to any public post is to be made by advertising the vacancy and any appointment made without doing so violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered.

    11. In Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi, (1992) 4 SCC 99 : AIR 1992 SC 789, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that calling the names from Employment Exchange may curb to certain extent the menace of nepotism and corruption in public employment.

    12. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, (1992) 4 SCC 118 : AIR 1992 SC 2130, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:—

    “Thirdly, even where an ad hoc or temporary employment is necessitated on account of the exigencies of administration, he should ordinarily be drawn from the employment exchange unless it cannot brook delay in which case the pressing cause must be stated on the file. If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employment exchange, some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly.”

    13. Any appointment made even on temporary or ad hoc basis in violation of the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India is not permissible, and thus void as the appointment is to be given after considering the suitability and merit of all the eligible persons who apply in pursuance of the advertisement.

    14. In Excise Superintendent Malkapatnam, Krishna District, A.P v. K.B.N Visweshwara Rao, (1996) 6 SCC 216, the larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier Judgment in Union of India v. N. Hargopal, (1987) 3 SCC 308 : AIR 1987 SC 1227, wherein it had been held that insistence of requisition of names from employment exchanges advances rather than restricts the rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, and held that any appointment even on temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting application is in violation of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and even if the names of candidates are requisitioned from Employment Exchange, in addition thereto it is mandatory on the part of the employer to invite applications from all eligible candidates from open market as merely calling the names from the Employment Exchange does not meet the requirement of the said Articles of the Constitution. Same view has been reiterated in Arun Tewari v. Zila Manaswavi Shikshak Sangh, (1998) 2 SCC 332 : AIR 1998 SC 331; Kishore K. Pati v. District Inspector of schools, Midnapur, (2000) 9 SCC 405 and Subhas Chand Dhrupta v. State of H.P, (2000) 10 SCC 82. Therefore, it is settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates and if any such appointment has been made or appointment has been offered merely inviting names from the Employment Exchange that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

    15. A similar view has been reiterated in Pankaj Gupta v. State of J & K, (2004) 8 SCC 353; Binod Kumar Gupta v. Ram Ashray Mahoto, (2005) 4 SCC 209 : AIR 2005 SC 2103; National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 493 : AIR 2006 SC 2319; R.S Garg v. State of U.P, (2006) 6 SCC 430; Ashok Kumar Sonkar v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 54; and Commissioner Municipal Corporation Hyderabad v. P. Mary Manoranjani, 2008 AIR SCW 704.

    16. In Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court came to the conclusion that adherence to the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India is a must in the process of public employment and an employee who has been appointed without following the procedure prescribed by law, is not entitled for any relief, whatsoever, including the salary.

    17. In Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayantilal Vaghela, (2006) 2 SCC 482 : AIR 2006 SC 1165, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the appointment to any post under the State can only be made after a proper advertisement has been issued inviting applications from eligible candidates and holding of selection by a Body of Experts, and any appointment made without following the procedure, would be in violation of the mandate of Article 16 of the Constitution of India.

    18. Therefore, it is evident that any appointment made without advertising the vacancy cannot be held to be in conformity with the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India and is a nullity.

    19. In a regular selection it is not permissible to fill up the vacancy over and above the number of vacancies for the simple reason that it would amount to filling up of the vacancies which came into existence subsequent to the advertisement.

    20. In Ashok Kumar v. Chairman, Banking Service Recruitment Board, (1996) 1 SCC 283 : AIR 1996 SC 976, the Supreme Court held as under:—

    “5. Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution enshrines fundamental right to every citizen to claim consideration for appointment to a post under the State. Therefore, vacant posts arising or expected should be notified inviting applications from all eligible candidates to be considered for their selection in accordance with their merit. The recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies is a denial and deprivation of the constitutional right under Article 14 read with Article 16(1) of the Constitution……… Boards should notify the existing and excepted vacancies and the Recruitment Board should get advertisement published and recruitment should strictly be made by the respective Boards in accordance with the procedure to the notified vacancies but not to any vacancies that may arise during the process of selection”.

    (Emphasis added)

    21. In Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers' Association v. State of Gujarat, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quashed the appointments made over and above the vacancies advertised holding that such an action was neither permissible nor desirable for the reason that it would amount to ‘improper exercise of power’ and only in a rare and exceptional circumstance and in emergent situation, this rule can be deviated from and it can be done only after adopting policy decision based on some rational as the authority cannot fill up more posts than advertised as a matter of course.

    22. In Prem Singh v. Haryana State Electricity Board, (1996) 4 SCC 319, the Apex Court observed as under—

    “…. The selection process by way of requisition and advertisement can be started for clear vacancies and also for anticipated vacancies but not for future vacancies. If the requisition and advertisement are for a certain number of posts only, the State cannot make more appointments than the number of posts advertised State can deviate from the advertisement and make appointments on the posts falling vacant thereafter in exceptional circumstances only or in an emergent situation and that too by taking a policy decision in that behalf.”

    (Emphasis added).

    23. The said Judgment in Prem Singh was followed with approval by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Virender Singh Hooda v. State of Haryana, (1999) 3 SCC 696 : AIR 1999 SC 1701.

    24. In Union of India v. Ishwar Singh Khatri, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 84, the Court held that selected candidate have right to appointment only against ‘vacancies notified’ and that too during the life of the select list as the panel of selected candidate cannot be valid of indefinite period. Moreover, empaneled candidates “In any event cannot have a right against future vacancies.” In State of Bihar v. The Secretariat, Assistant S.E Union, 1986, (1994) 1 SCC 126 : AIR 1994 SC 736, the Apex Court held that “a person who is selected does not, on account of being empaneled alone, acquire any indefeasible right of appointment. Empanelment is at the best a condition of eligibility for purposes of appointment, and by itself does not amount to selection or create a vested right to be appointed unless relevant service rules say to the contrary.” In the said case as the selection process was completed in five years after the publication of the advertisement, the contention was raised that the empanelled candidates deserved to be appointed over and above the vacancies notified. The Hon'ble Supreme Court rejected the contention observing that keeping the selection process pending for long and not issuing any fresh advertisement in between, may not be justified but offering the posts in such a manner would adversely prejudice the cause of those candidates who achieved eligibility in the meantime.

    25. In Surinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 8 SCC 488 : AIR 1998 SC 18, the Apex Court held as under:—

    “A waiting list, prepared in an examination conducted by the Commission does not furnish a source of recruitment. It is operative only for the contingency that if any of the selected candidates does not join then the persons from the waiting list may be pushed UP and be appointed in the vacancy so caused or if there is some extreme exigency the Government may as a matter of policy decision pick up persons in order of merit from the waiting list. But the view taken by the High Court that since the vacancies have not been worked out properly, therefore, the candidates from the waiting list were liable to be appointed does not appear to be sound. This practice, may result in depriving those candidates who became eligible for competing for the vacancies available in future. If the waiting list in one examination was to operate as infinite stock for appointment, there is danger that the State may resort to the device of not holding the examination for years together and pick up candidates from the waiting list as and when required. The Constitutional discipline requires that this Court should not permit such improper exercise of power which may result in creating a vested interest and perpetuating the waiting list for the candidates of one examination at the cost of entire set of fresh candidates either from the open or even from service Exercise of such power has to be tested on the touchstone of reasonableness it is not a matter of course that the authority can fill up more posts than advertised.”

    (Emphasis added).

    26. In Kamlesh Kumar Sharma v. Yogesh Kumar Gupta, (1998) 3 SCC 45 : AIR 1998 SC 1021, the Apex Court similarly observed as under:—

    “As per the scheme of the Act and the aforesaid provisions, for each academic year in question, the management has to intimate the existing vacancies and vacancies likely to be caused by the end of the ensuing academic year in question. Thereafter, the Director shall notify the same to the Commission and the Commission, in turn, will invite applications by giving wide publicity in the State of such vacancies. The vacancies cannot be filled except by following the procedure as contained therein. Sub-Section (1) of Section 12 has incorporated in strong words that any appointment made in contravention of the provisions of the Act shall be void. This was to ensure to back-door entry but selection only as provided under the said Sections.”

    (Emphasis added).

    27. Similar view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Srikant Tripathi v. State of U.P, (2001) 10 SCC 237; State of J & K v. Sanjeev Kumar, (2005) 4 SCC 148; State of U.P v. Raj Kumar Sharma, (2006) 3 SCC 330; and Ram Avtar Patwari v. State of Haryana, (2007) 10 SCC 94 : AIR 2007 SC 3242.

    28. In State of Punjab v. Raghbir Chand Sharma, (2002) 1 SCC 113 : AIR 2001 SC 2900, the Apex Court examined the case where only one post was advertised and the candidate whose name appeared at Serial No. 1 in the select list joined the post, but subsequently resigned. The Court rejected the contention that post can be filled up offering the appointment to the next candidate in the select list observing as under:—

    “With the appointment of the first candidate for the only post in respect of which the consideration came to be made and select list prepared, the panel ceased to exist and has outlived its utility and at any rate, no one else in the panel can legitimately contend that he should have been offered appointment either in the vacancy arising on account of the subsequent resignation of the person appointed from the panel or any other vacancies arising subsequently.”

    29. Any appointment made beyond the number of vacancies advertised, is without jurisdiction, therefore a nullity, inexecutable and unenforceable in law.

    30. More so, the enrolment list prepared under these rules does not come to an end as no tenure has been fixed for its survival. However, the select list prepared for regular selection of clerks in the District Court has a life of one year. Under what circumstances, the enrolment list is being used as a reservoir to fill up the vacancies, on the post of Process Server, whenever it occurs in future. Thus, the list becomes immortal, i.e, it will have a life till it stands exhausted. More so, the question would arise as to whether on the date of occurrence of vacancy, whether enrolled candidate peons fulfil other eligibility criteria including that of maximum age for being appointed as process server.

    31. More so, it is also shocking to learn that unless a candidate peon is appointed as a process server, he does not get any remuneration even if he works as it amounts to “beggar” prohibited under Article 23 of the Constitution.

    32. In view of the above, we are of the prima facie view that the enrolment of candidate peons for being appointed for casual works and to fill up the vacancy on the post of process server, whenever it occurs in future is not in consonance with the mandate of the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and thus validity of the aforesaid provisions, i.e, Rules 71, 73 and 75 contained in G.R & CO., Civil, Volume - 1 become doubtful.

    33. In view of the above, we issue notice to the State of Orissa, through its Law Secretary and the High Court of Orissa through its Registrar General to show cause why the provisions contained in Rules 71, 73 and part of Rule-75 to fill up the post of process server from enrolled candidate peons be not declared as ultra vires. The reply may be filed within three weeks.

    34. List this matter for further hearing on 10.2.2009 at 2.00 P.M

    35. B.N Mahapatra, J.:— I agree.

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