The Judgment of the Court was as follows:

Debabrata Mookerjee, J.:— This appeal by special leave is brought from an appellate order of acquittal made by the Sessions Judge of Bir-bhum.

2. The respondent Sisir Kumar Ghosh was prosecuted by the Chairman of Suri Municipality before a Magistrate at Suri under section 7/16(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. The allegations were that the respondent was a dealer in chhana who used to bring it regularly from Murshidabad and sell it at Suri market. On the 4th May 1958, a Food Inspector of the Municipality took a sample of chhana from the respondent. The sample was taken outside the railway station. A quantity of 1½ poa of chhana was purchased for the purpose of analysis and Rs. 1|2/- was paid as price. A receipt was given and the signature of the respondent was obtained on it. The sample was divided in three parts, labelled, sealed and packed in the presence of witnesses. On analysis the sample was found to be adulterated. The analyst reported that the sample contained 11.92 p.c of milk fat. The rules framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act provide that chhana prepared from cow's milk or buffalo milk shall contain a minimum of 15 p.c of milk fat. The sample was buffalo chhana. It was, accordingly, deficient in milk fat and, therefore, adulterated. The charge framed against the respondent read as follows: “That you, on or about the 4th day of May, 1958 at Suri station having previous conviction again conveyed for sale adulterated chhana and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 7/16(ii) of the Act XXXVII of 1954.” At the trial the Food Inspector who took the sample gave evidence to prove the circumstances in which the sample had been taken. There was also another witness Choton Lal by name, a Paniparah attached to the Suri railway station, who deposed in support of the charge brought.

3. The respondent pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. His defence appears to be that he was not a dealer in chhana; he denied that any sample of chhana had been taken from him and suggested that he had been falsely implicated. In his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the respondent merely averred his innocence but admitted to have been convicted and sentenced on a previous occasion under section 7 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

4. The learned Magistrate considered the evidence and came to the conclusion that the respondent had been carrying chhana for sale which was found to be adulterated. In effect the Magistrate negatived the defence case and convicted the respondent under section 7/16(ii) of the Act and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months more.

5. Upon conviction the respondent took an appeal to the Sessions Judge of Birbhum. The appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence were set aside. Hence the present appeal by special leave on behalf of the Chairman of the Suri Municipality.

6. On behalf of the Municipality it has been contended that the learned Judge misdirected himself in thinking that carrying of adulterated food for the purpose of sale is not punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. We think this contention is sound. The charge which we have read clearly indicates that the respondent conveyed for sale adulterated chhana. On the evidence there can be no doubt that the case made against the respondent was that he was actually carrying chhana when he was intercepted and a sample taken from him by the Food Inspector. The question thus arises whether carrying or conveying chhana would come within the meaning of ‘sale’ as defined in the Act.

7. Section 2 of the Act defines “Sale” in these words: “‘Sale’ with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, means the sale of any article of food, whether for cash or on credit or by way of exchange and whether by wholesale or retail, for human consumption or use, or for analysis, and includes an agreement for sale, an offer for sale, the exposing for sale or having in possession for sale of any such article, and includes also an attempt to sell any such article.” Leaving out such words of the section as are not necessary in the present context ‘sale’ means sale of any article of food for human consumption or use or for analysis and includes having in possession for sale of any such article. If, therefore, the respondent sold to the Food Inspector a sample of chhana, that would be sale within the meaning of the definition. The words of the section are wide enough to cover a forced or compulsory sale as much as voluntary sale. When the Food Inspector purchased for analysis a sample from the respondent, the sale was complete within the meaning of the Act. The definition is also satisfied even if we look at the matter from another point of view. On the case made the respondent was carrying (conveying) chhana for sale. That would obviously imply that he was having the stuff in his possession for sale. Quite clearly this would bring the transaction within the definition of sale.

8. Section 7 of the Act prohibits manufacture, sale or distribution of adulterated or misbranded food. The opening words of the section are that “No person shall himself or by any person on his behalf manufacture for sale, or store, sell or distribute any adulterated food.” The rest of the section need not be referred to. The charge against the respondent was that he was conveying or carrying for sale adulterated chhana. The definition of sale which we have just read would clearly bring the respondent's act within the mischief of section 7, provided, of course, the evidence adduced by the Municipality is believed.

9. The learned Sessions Judge observed that he agreed with the contention put forward before him on behalf of the respondent that the conveying of adulterated food by itself or for the purpose of sale had not been made an offence under section 7 of the Act. In our view the learned Judge was wrong and we think the provisions of the Act which we have read make it clear that carrying (conveying) or having in possession for sale any adulterated food is liable to be punished for infringement of section 7 of the Act. If the learned Judge held that mere having in possession was not an offence under the Act, we would have agreed with him but he clearly held that carrying or conveying, that is to say, having in possession adulterated food even for the purpose of sale was not an offence.

10. As we have said, the words actually used in the charge framed were “Conveyed for sale”. Obviously what was intended to be said was that the respondent carried for sale adulterated chhana. The evidence made the position clear and the respondent could have been left in no doubt as to what he had been charged for. The Food Inspector deposed that the respondent regularly brought chhana from Murshidabad and sold it at Suri. The meaning of the word ‘convey’ in the context in which it has been used seems to be clear. In the Oxford Dictionary the word is said to mean “To transport, carry, take from one place to another.” We think therefore that the learned Judge erred in holding that carrying of adulterated food even for the purpose of sale was not an offence punishable under the Act. We have seen that the definition of sale is quite comprehensive. It includes having in possession for sale any article of food. There can be no question on the evidence if believed that the respondent was carrying for sale adulterated chhana.

11. On behalf of the respondent it has been contended that the evidence is wholly insufficient to warrant the conclusion that the chhana was being carried for sale or that the respondent was a dealer in chhana. We do not think that this contention is sustainable. The Food Inspector deposed that the respondent regularly brought chhana from Murshidabad and sold it at Suri. In cross-examination it was suggested to the witness that the respondent did not sell chhana. The witness repelled this suggestion. He cited specific instances of sale of chhana by the respondent to named persons. Of course, one of those sales took place in 1957. We do not agree that the prosecution was obliged to call persons to prove that they had, at the time of taking the sample, purchased chhana from the respondent. If it was intended to be urged that the respondent was not a dealer in chhana or that the stuff that was being carried on the day in question was not for sale, the respondent might have said so in his examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Except a bare suggestion made in the cross-examination of the Food Inspector, there is no material on the record on which we can reasonably arrive at the conclusion that the respondent did not deal in chhana or that the stuff on the present occasion was not intended for sale but was meant for private consumption. It was then argued that specific questions were not put to the respondent by the Magistrate under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure so that the respondent was deprived of the opportunity of explaining that he was never a dealer in chhana and, in any event, on the present occasion the chhana was not meant for sale. It is true that no specific question to that effect was asked by the Magistrate, but whether that omission caused any real prejudice would be a question of fact depending on the circumstances of the case. The allegations in the present case were simple enough. The respondent had the benefit of legal assistance at the trial and there can be no question of prejudice accruing to him for failure to ask specific questions. If he wanted to assert that he was never interested in the business of selling chhana or that at any rate the chhana which he had been carrying on the day in question was not intended for sale, nothing was easier for him than to say so. He did not choose to make any statement to that effect and we can only characterise the criticism relating to the so-called inadequate examination under section 342 of the Code of Criminal Procedure as a belated criticism which does not carry conviction.

12. The argument that the respondent did not deal in chhana was sought to be re-inforced by reference to the evidence of P.W 2 Choton Lal who stated in course of his cross-examination that he had not seen the accused selling chhana. We have to read this statement in the context of the entire evidence of the witness. He said that on the occasion when the sample was taken, there were about 4|5 chhana-walas with 4|5 baskets of chhana. He came to the place when the sample phials were being filled in. He then added that he did not see the accused selling chhana. This fugitive statement upon which reliance has been placed that the witness had not seen the accused selling chhana cannot possibly support the contention that the respondent had nothing to do with the business of selling chhana. The exact words used by the witness “I did not see the accused selling chhana” might well mean that he had not seen the respondent in the act of selling personally. If we read the witness's evidence in chief, it becomes quite clear that the witness meant to assert and actually said that the respondent regularly brought chhana by train and sold it at Suri market. Truncated portions of the evidence cannot possibly be depended upon in aid of any particular conclusion. The evidence has to be read as a whole. We, accordingly, negative the contention that the respondent did not carry chhana for sale on the occasion, nor are we prepared to hold that the evidence is insufficient to establish that he was a dealer in, chhana.

13. The learned Judge seems to have thought that the sale of adulterated chhana by the respondent to the Food Inspector has not been satisfactorily established. We have not been able to appreciate the finding reached by the Judge in this behalf. He seems to have held that the evidence in this regard was very “shaky”. The only ground in support of this conclusion is that the sale of chhana to the Food Inspector depended upon the evidence of the Food Inspector alone, and since the Food Inspector was the de facto prosecutor, that evidence required in the Judge's view to be corroborated. In other words, the learned Judge was not prepared to rely upon what he called the uncorroborated testimony of the Food Inspector. It passes our comprehension that the learned Judge should have been inclined to distrust the evidence of the Food Inspector for no valid reasons. He is an officer of a public body charged with the maintenance of public health. That apart, there is nothing inherently improbable or absurd in the Food Inspector's testimony which would entitle the Judge to refuse to accept it. The Food Inspector's evidence was not in the nature of accomplice evidence so that the Judge might have insisted on some kind of corroboration. It is not the law that a fact cannot be proved by the evidence of a single witness. If there is nothing intrinsically unbelievable in the evidence of a particular witness, the court can well rely upon his testimony and find the facts deposed to by him as proved. We have not been able to discover anything in the evidence of the Food Inspector which would entitle us to distrust his testimony.

14. The learned Judge then held that the quantity of chhana said to have been sold by the respondent was very small and that there was no evidence as to the total quantity which the respondent carried on the occasion. We fail to appreciate how this could be a ground for distrusting the prosecution evidence. Absence of proof of the total quantity of chhana carried on the particular occasion cannot, by itself, lead to the inference that the respondent was not a dealer but only a consumer. If the chhana which the respondent carried was meant for private consumption and not for sale, he might have said so. That apart, we think the abstract question of the quantity of the stuff carried on a particular occasion, is wholly irrelevant to the question which properly arises for decision in a prosecution under the Food Adulteration Act. When, for instance, a milkman carries a pint of milk to his customer and on the way he is confronted by the Food Inspector who buys a part of the milk which on analysis is found to be adulterated, it would be no answer to say that since the quantity of milk that was being carried on the occasion was small, it must necessarily lead to the conclusion that the person charged was not a dealer in milk. The mere fact that there is no evidence in the present case as to the total quantity of chhana carried on the occasion out of which the sample was taken by the Food Inspector, can be no ground for thinking that the respondent was not a dealer in chhana or that he did not carry chhana for the purpose of sale. If the evidence of Choton Lal has any meaning, it implies that there were on the occasion 4|5 chhanawalas with as many baskets of chhana. A plain reading of this evidence would suggest that chhana was being carried in baskets by 4|S persons and the unit in which it was being carried was a basket. On the evidence we have no manner of doubt that the stuff was being carried for sale.

15. It has been argued that in the circumstances disclosed the case against the respondent has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. We have examined the evidence ourselves and are persuaded that the Municipality has been able to establish quite satisfactorily the charge brought against the respondent. In our view, there is no scope for reasonable doubt in this case.

16. The report of the analyst clearly indicates that the chhana was deficient in milk fat. It has only 11.92 p.c of such fat whereas under the rules it ought to have at least 15 p.c That the stuff was adulterated there can be no doubt whatever.

17. We have been reminded that this appeal being directed against an order of acquittal, we should be very slow in disturbing it. We have considered the matter with care and we think that there are compelling reasons for our interference in this case. The learned Judge's conclusions are wrong not only on facts but the constructions put on the relevant provisions of the Food Adulteration Act seem to be completely erroneous. This appeal is not by a private individual; it is by a Municipality charged with the duty of preserving public health and the question involved is a question of public importance.

18. We find on the evidence that the charge brought against the respondent has been established. He was charged with having been previously convicted of an offence under the Act.

19. He did not contest that he had been so convicted. In the circumstances, we hold that the conviction made by the Magistrate in this case was quite justified on the evidence and the learned Judge on appeal misdirected himself in setting aside the conviction and sentence.

20. We, accordingly, allow the appeal, set aside the order of the learned Judge and restore that of the learned Magistrate convicting the respondent under section 7/16(ii) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act.

21. As regards the sentence imposed by the Magistrate, we think it was slightly harsh. We, accordingly, reduce the sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment passed by the Magistrate to rigorous imprisonment for one year. The sentence of fine of Rs. 2,000/- imposed by the Magistate, in default rigorous imprisonment for six months more is upheld.

D.N Das Gupta, J.:— I agree.

S.K.B