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citation codes
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  • S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and the applicability of S. 7(v)(b),
  • 26). Therefore, Cl. IV(A) of S. 7 of the Court Fees Act,
  • S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Cl. (iv-A) of S. 7 of the Court Fees Act
  • S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act,
  • S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act
  • Art. 44 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act
  • S. 115 of Act V of 1908
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and the applicability of S. 7(v)(b),
  • 26). Therefore, Cl. IV(A) of S. 7 of the Court Fees Act,
  • S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act,
  • Cl. (iv-A) of S. 7 of the Court Fees Act
  • S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act,
  • S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act
  • Art. 44 of the Limitation Act
  • S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act
  • S. 115 of Act V of 1908
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion concerns a civil revision petition under Section 115 of Act V of 1908 seeking revision of the order dated 27-9-1954 by the District Munsif Court, Tenkasi, in O.S. No. 131 of 1954, which was transferred from the District Munsif Court, Tirunelveli (O.S. No. 341 of 1953). The suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent for possession of his one-sixth share in certain lands along with trees and a well. The plaintiff alleged that his mother, acting as his natural guardian, executed two sale deeds during his minority in favor of the defendants for grossly inadequate prices due to undue influence and fraud by her relatives and the defendants. After attaining majority, the plaintiff sought possession and mesne profits, contending the sale deeds were voidable. The defendants contended that the suit was improperly valued and that the court lacked jurisdiction, arguing that the suit should have been valued under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, as the plaintiff was eo nomine a party to the sale deeds and thus needed to pay the higher court-fee for cancellation of the sale deeds. The lower court held that valuation under Section 7(v)(b) was correct and that it had jurisdiction. This petition challenges those findings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a plaintiff minor, made eo nomine a party to a sale deed executed by his mother and guardian, must pay court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and pray for cancellation of the sale deed, or can he bypass such alienation alleging guardian’s illiteracy, undue influence, etc., and sue merely for possession paying court-fee under Section 7(v)(b)?
  2. Whether the position differs if the mother executing the sale deed is a guardian appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act.
  3. Whether the position of a sale deed executed by the father as guardian (and not as manager of the joint family) differs from that of a sale deed executed by the mother as guardian of the minor.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The suit should be valued under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act as the plaintiff minor was eo nomine a party to the sale deeds executed by his mother, who was his natural guardian.
  • The plaintiff cannot avoid paying the higher court-fee by merely praying for possession and ignoring the need to cancel the sale deeds.
  • There is a distinction between alienations by a father as guardian and as family manager, and alienations by a mother as guardian; the latter requires cancellation and payment under Section 7(iv-A).
  • Reliance was placed on Full Bench rulings including Ghulam Hussain Sahib v. Ayesha Bibi, which held that sale deeds executed by a de jure guardian require cancellation and payment under Section 7(iv-A).

Respondent's Arguments

  • Following rulings such as Kamaraju v. Gunnayya and Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu, the plaintiff minor need not pray for cancellation of the sale deeds and can sue for possession paying court-fee under Section 7(v)(b).
  • The plaintiff’s suit is not essentially for cancellation but for recovery of possession, hence Section 7(iv-A) does not apply.
  • Argued that there is no practical difference between a father-guardian and mother-guardian in such matters.
  • Attacked rulings requiring cancellation and payment under Section 7(iv-A) as erroneous or not applicable to the facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamaraju v. Gunnayya (45 M.L.J. 240) Minor need not seek cancellation of sale deed by guardian; suit valued under Section 7(v)(b). Supported the view that court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) is not necessary when minor sues for possession ignoring sale deed.
Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816) Minor can ignore guardian’s alienation and sue for possession; Section 7(iv-A) does not apply. Reaffirmed non-applicability of Section 7(iv-A) where suit is for possession only.
Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 668) Sale deed by guardian is voidable, not void; minor must seek cancellation and pay court-fee under Section 7(iv-A). Supported application of Section 7(iv-A) where plaintiff is eo nomine party to deed executed by guardian.
Venkatakrishniah v. Sheik Alli Sahib (A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 921) Minor must pay court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) when attacking guardian’s alienation. Agreed with Doraiswami Reddiar; rejected non-application of Section 7(iv-A).
Ramaswami Iyengar v. Rangachariar (1940) 1 M.L.J. 32 (Full Bench) Distinguished decrees and sale deeds; court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) applies to decrees, but not necessarily to sale deeds. Considered by parties; court noted conflicting rulings and need for clarity.
Ghulam Hussain Sahib v. Ayesha Bibi (1941) 1 M.L.J. 800 (Full Bench) Sale deed executed by de jure guardian requires cancellation and payment under Section 7(iv-A). Supported petitioners’ argument on necessity of cancellation and higher court-fee.
Kuppuswami Gounder v. Mari Gounder (1943) 1 M.L.J. 249 Partition suit ignoring earlier deed valued under Section 7(v)(b); cancellation not necessary. Supported respondent’s view that court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) not always applicable.
Ramaswami v. Kunjammal (1950) 1 M.L.J. 408 Minor suing for possession alleging guardian’s undue influence can value suit under Section 7(v)(b) without cancellation. Relied upon by lower court and respondent; court considered correctness of this ruling.
Vaduganatha Pillai v. Raghava Iyengar (1950) 2 M.L.J. 378 Court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) applies even with guardian’s illiteracy and fraud; suit for cancellation required. Challenged Ramaswami v. Kunjammal; supported petitioners’ view.
Unni v. Kanchi Amma (14 Mad. 26) Minor need not set aside guardian’s transaction to sue for recovery of property. Foundation for view that cancellation unnecessary; relied upon by Full Bench.
Subramaniam v. Subbarao (1948) 2 M.L.J. 22 (P.C.) Minor is eo nomine party to guardian’s alienation; transaction is on behalf of minor. Supported view that minor is party and must seek cancellation under Section 7(iv-A).
Ramaswami v. Rangachariar (I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259) (Full Bench) Confirmed that if deed executed without authority, minor need not sue to set it aside but can treat as non-existent. Key precedent for allowing suit for possession without cancellation.
Venkatakrishniah v. Alli Sahib (A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 921) Reaffirmed necessity of cancellation and payment under Section 7(iv-A) for guardian’s alienations. Distinguished between guardian alienations and joint family manager alienations.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court recognized a significant conflict in the case law regarding whether a minor who is eo nomine a party to a sale deed executed by his natural guardian must pay court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and pray for cancellation of the deed, or whether he may ignore the deed and sue for possession paying court-fee under Section 7(v)(b). The Court reviewed numerous rulings supporting both positions, including Full Bench and Division Bench decisions, highlighting the irreconcilability of these authorities.

The Court distinguished transactions involving properties belonging solely to the minor from those involving joint family properties where the minor is only a member. It held that where the guardian executes a deed concerning the minor’s individual property, the minor is eo nomine a party and must seek cancellation of the deed and pay court-fee under Section 7(iv-A). In contrast, where the transaction concerns joint family property, the minor can ignore the transaction and sue for possession under Section 7(v).

The Court rejected the argument that a father’s alienations as guardian (distinct from his role as family manager) need not be cancelled before relief can be obtained. It held that the rule applies equally to sale deeds executed by the father as guardian.

The Court emphasized the practical consequences of allowing minors to ignore sale deeds executed by guardians without cancellation: it would discourage bona fide purchases of minors’ property, harming minors in the long run. The Court thus advocated a uniform rule requiring cancellation and payment under Section 7(iv-A) in such cases to provide certainty and fairness.

Due to the conflicting precedents and the importance of the issue, the Court directed the matter be referred to a Full Bench for authoritative resolution of the questions presented.

Following the Full Bench’s opinion, which affirmed the necessity of paying court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) and seeking cancellation of the deed when the minor is eo nomine a party, the Court allowed the civil revision petition and remitted the matter for reassessment of valuation and jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

The Court held that a minor who is eo nomine a party to a sale deed or other document of alienation executed by his natural or legal guardian must sue for cancellation of such deed and pay court-fee under Section 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. It is insufficient for the minor to sue merely for possession and pay court-fee under Section 7(v)(b). This applies equally to deeds executed by the father as guardian, not just the mother.

The direct consequence of this holding is that the suit in question was improperly valued and the lower court lacked jurisdiction. The civil revision petition was allowed, with costs, and the suit valuation was to be reassessed accordingly. No new precedent beyond the application of existing case law was set, but the Court ordered a Full Bench reference to resolve the conflicting authorities and provide uniform guidance to lower courts on this recurring issue.

    Sankaranarayana Pillai And Another v. Kandasamia Pillai

    (Petition (disposed of on 4-4-1956) under S. 115 of Act V of 1908 praying the High Court to revise the order of the Dt. Munsif Court, Tenkasi, dated 27-9-1954 in O.S. No. 131 of 1954 and O.S. 341 of 1953, Dt. Muusif Court, Tirunelveli.)

    This is a petition by the defendants in O.S. No. 131 of 1954 on the file of the District Munsif, Tenkasi, to review the findings of the District Munsif on issues 6 and 7 in the suit. Those issues run as follows.

    Issue 6: Whether the suit is not properly valued and correct court-fee not paid?

    Issue 7: Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit?

    The suit was filed by the plaintiff-respondent for possession of his one-sixth share in the plaint 1 and 2 schedule lands including the trees and the well on them. The plaintiff's mother and guardian had executed two sale deeds in respect of the plaint schedule properties. Ex. B.1 dated 8th January 1938, was a registered sale deed for Rs. 750 executed by the plaintiff's mother, Pachaivadivammal, as natural guardian of the plaintiff, in favour of the first defendant and others. Ex. B.2 was a sale deed executed on the same day, by the same lady as natural guardian of the plaintiff, for Rs. 750 in favour of the 2nd defendant. Within three years of his attaining majority, the plaintiff filed the suit for recovery of possession of his one-sixth share in the plaint schedule properties from the defendants, for mesne profits from the date of the plaint till the date of recovery of possession, at Rs. 580 per annnum, and for costs. He alleged that his father died in 1937 leaving him behind as his only son, that he was aged five years at the time, that his mother Pachaivadivammal was not well-acquainted with wordly affairs, that she did not know the price or value of the properties and that she was not even in the habit of going out of the house. Her brother, one Kandaswami Pillai, and her father; one Namasivayam Pillai, were said to have taken advantage of the plaintiff's minority and his mother's ignorance of worldly affairs, and made the plaintiff's mother execute the two sale deeds in favour of the defendants for grossly inadequate prices though the properties were at least worth Rs. 3000 at that time. Kandaswami and Namasivayam were said to have colluded with the defendants and caused two sale deeds to be effected for Rs. 1500 by deceiving the plaintiff's mother and exercising undue influence over her. The first defendant is said to be a brother of the plaintiff's maternal uncle, Kandaswami Pillai. The plaintiff alleged that, after attaining majority and ascertaining about the fraud played on his mother by her designing brother and father, he asked, the defendants to deliver to him the plaint schedule properties. But the defendants did not do so. So, he filed the suit. He valued the suit for jurisdiction and court-fee at Rs. 1038-3-0, under S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act. The suit was first filed in the District Munsif Court, Tirunelveli, as O.S. No. 341 of 1953. Then it was transferred to the District Munsif's Court, Tenkasi. It was after the transfer to that Court that issues 6 and 7 were framed. It was contended by the defendants that the plaintiff ought to have valued the suit under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, as he had to get rid of an insuperable obstacle to his prayer for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule properties, namely, the two sale deeds to which he was eo nomine a party and he could not avoid paying court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) by simply not asking for the cancellation of the two sale deeds, Exs. B.1 and B.2, executed by his mother, by by-passing them, and by asking for mere possession of the properties, and by valuing the suit under S. 7(v)(b). It was agreed by both the parties before the lower Court, and was also held by the lower Court that if the suit were to be valued under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court-Fees Act, it would be beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of that Court, as the suit value would be over Rs. 3000. That is also conceded here. So, the finding on issue 7 would automatically follow the finding on issue 6. The contention of the defendants in the lower Court that at least the market value of one-sixth of the plaint schedule properties should have formed the basis for valuation as parts of survey numbers would be involved when awarding the one-sixth was rejected by the lower Court and was rightly not pressed before me. On the main point as to whether S. 7(iv-A) would apply, many rulings were cited by both sides before the lower Court. These rulings were somewhat irreconcilable, including Bench rulings. After discussing them, the lower Court finally held that the ruling of Chandra Reddi, J., in Ramaswami v. Kunjammal (1950) 1 M.L.J. 408), would be the ruling applicable to the facts of this case, and that court-fee need not be paid under S. 7(iv-A) as the mother and guardian, who executed the sale deed making the minor eo nomine a party, to it was there was also an illiterate woman inexperienced in life and was influenced and deceived by her brother to alienate the property for a very low consideration. Chandra Reddi, J., held, in that case, that it was not necessary for a minor in such cases to pray for cancellation of the sale deed to which he was eo nomine a party and to pay court-fee under S. 7 (iv-A) and that it was sufficient for him to value the suit under S. 7(iv)(b). The lower Court held, on issue 6, that the valuation of the suit under S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act was correct and the court-fee paid was correct. Consequently it held, on issue 7, that it had jurisdiction to try the suit. Hence this civil revision petition.

    I have perused the entire records, and heard the learned Counsel on both sides. It has become obvious to me, after hearing them, that they are right in urging that there are weighty rulings in favour of the view that in such cases court-fee ought to be paid under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, and also equally weighty rulings holding that in such cases court-fee need be only paid under S. 7(v)(b) and that, as some of the rulings are Division Bench rulings and even Full Bench rulings it is necessary to settle the conflict once for all by referring the matter to a Full Bench, as it is a matter of common occurrence and the lower Courts should not be left under any doubt regarding the court-fee and jurisdiction in such cases.

    I shall now briefly mention the rulings on either side. For the view that court-fee need be paid only under S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act, and the plaintiffs need not ask for cancellation of the sale deeds executed by their guardian during their minority even though they were eo nomine parties to such sale deeds, there is, first of all, the ruling of a Bench of this Court consisting of Ramesam, and Coleridge, JJ., in Kamaraju v. Gunnayya (45 M.L.J. 240 = 18 L.W. 233). It was held there that in a case of private sale of a minor's property by his mother and natural guardian, making the minor eo nomine party, the minor had got right to avoid it, and need not ask for its cancellation. The following observations are relevant in the context.

    “A judicial sale has to beset aside so far as the persons who are parties to the sale are concerned, and, if not set aside, it will be binding on them, for ever. Here, we have not got to do with a judicial sale but with a private sale. The first defendant has got the right of avoiding it. By selling the property to the plaintiff, on the footing that the sale by the mother was not binding on him, he has chosen to avoid it, and the result of it is that from his point of view he has got a complete title. The title, no doubt, will only be effective if the Court ultimately finds that the sale by the mother is not binding on him. But, contingent on that event, he has got a complete title, and this title is not a bare right to sue, and is therefore assignable.”

    No doubt, at the time the suit concerned in that case, namely, O.S. No. 78 of 1920 was filed. S. 7(iv-A) had not been enacted (it was enacted only in 1922) and therefore there was no need for the learned Judges to hold that court-fee need not be paid under S. 7(iv-A). But, as S. 7(iv-A) will apply only to cases where the plaintiffs have to ask for the cancellation of a sale deed, the ruling in question will be in favour of the non-applicability of S. 7(iv-A) and the applicability of S. 7(v)(b) to such cases, as Mr. Natesan has urged.

    The next ruling in favour of this view is that of a Bench of this Court consisting of Ramesam and Jackson, JJ., in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816). In that case, the learned Judges observed as follows:

    “It has been held in a long series of cases beginning with Unni v. Kanchi Amma (14 Mad. 26), [see also Kanarasu v. Gunnayya (45 M.L.J. 240 = 18 L.W. 233)], that a minor has not got to set aside the transaction by a guardian in suing to recover the property. He can ignore the transaction and merely pray for possession. That being so, he does not seek cancellation of the instrument. In this respect, his position is different from that of an adult executing the document himself, as pointed out in Unni v. Kanchi Amma (14 Mad. 26).

    Therefore, Cl. IV(A) of S. 7 of the Court Fees Act, does not apply. We do nor agree with the decision in Alagam Aiyangar v. Srinivasa Aiyangar (1925 M.W.N. 777 = 22 L.W. 515).

    In such cases, it is proper that the plaintiff should not add unnecessary prayers to confuse the Court and himself. When such prayers are unnecessary it is best to expunge them. In the present case, the plaintiff is willing to expunge the words in prayer 1 from the words “setting aside.” If he does so, the court-fee paid by him is enough.”

    In other words, the learned Judges held that even when the plaintiff had added a prayer to set aside the sale deed to which his guardian had made him eo nomine a party, such prayer was unnecessary, and should be struck out , as there was no need for him to set aside such a sale deed.

    But the curious thing is that in spite of such a strong assertion in favour of the non-applicability of S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and the applicability of S. 7(v)(b), the very next year, Venkatasubba Rao J. in Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 668), held that in a case where a mother and guardian had executed a release deed on behalf of her minor sons making them eo nomine parties to the deed, court-fee should be paid under S. 7(iv-A) and not under S. 7(v)(b). He remarked:

    “The question to be decided is: are the plaintiffs bound to get the release deed set aside? If they are the form of the plaint may be disregarded for, in substance, the relief claimed is one for cancellation. The transaction was entered into by the mother of the plaintiffs as their guardian. Can it be said that such a transaction is an absolute nullity? In my opinion, Art. 44 of the Limitation Act clearly applies. I am not now concerned with cases which have held, that in the case of alienations by managing members of a Hindu coparcenery it is unnecessary to get the transaction set aside. The case relied upon by the lower Court Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816) is a case of this description. In the present case, I am not called upon to consider whether this decision is correct or not. The alienation in question was made by the mother of the plaintiffs, their guardian under the Hindu law. In such a case, the transaction is voidable, and not void. Then again, the question does not arise whether Art. 44 does or does not apply to an alienation by an unauthorised person. In this case, the complaint in short is that an authorised guardian effected an unauthorised transfer . An alienation by a guardian must be regularly set aside. See Madugula Latchiah v. Mukkalinga (17 M.L.J. 228), Muthukumara Chetti v. Anthony Udayan (29 M.L.J. 617), Kandasami v. Irusappa (33 M.L.J. 309 = 41 Mad. 102), and Arumugam Pillai v. Ambalam (A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 425 = 13 L.W. 416). I am therefore, disposed to read the plaint as if it contains a prayer for the cancellation of the release deed.”

    After quoting the wording of S. 7(iv-A) he continued:

    “Can there be any doubt that a said deed comes Within the terms of this section?”

    Mr. Natesan, for the plaintiff-respondent, urged that Venkatasubba Rao J. made a mistake in thinking that the ruling of the Bench in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816), was a case of an alienation merely by the father and managing member of a Hindu coparcenary and asserted that it was by the father as the guardian of his son . He urged that in principle there could be no difference between a father-guardian and mother-guardian of a minor son, especially among the Hindus where the father is the preferential guardian of the minor son, having priority over the mother. He referred to the ruling and showed that the Bench in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816), held that even in a case of sale deeds executed by a father-guardian there was no need to ask for cancellation of the sale deed and pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) and that it was enough for the minor, when he had become a major to ask for possession by paying court-fee under S. 7(v)(b) ignoring the sale deed.

    In Venkatakrishniah v. Sheik Alli Sahib (A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 921 = 48 L.W. 277), Wadsworth J. agreed with the view of Venkatasubba Rao J. and held that where an alienation was clearly made by the lawful guardian of the plaintiff making him eo nomine a party, the plaintiff had necessarily to attack hat alienation as an essential preliminary to any prayer for the recovery of possession, and must pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) and cannot evade doing so by filing a suit for mere recovery of possession and paying court-fee under S. 7(v)(b). He too held that the decision in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramnlu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816), could not be relied on for paying court-fee under S. 7(v)(b) and avoiding the payment of court-fee under S. 7(iv-A). He reaffirmed this view in Vellayya Kumar v. Ramaswami Konar ((1939) 2 M.L.J. 400 = 50 L.W. 248). He observed at page 402 thus:

    “My attention has not been drawn to any decision which throws any real doubt on the general proposition that when a person seeks to establish title which cannot be established without removing a decree or an instrument to which he is himself a party then, whatever be the garb in which he dresses his suit its substantial character must be a suit for the cancellation of the decree or instrument; but if the establishment of his title is being impeded by the effect of a transaction between other parties he cannot legitimately ask for the cancellation of that transaction but can only ask for a declaration that, so far as he is concerned, it is not binding.”

    Mr. Natesan urged that the above decisions of Venkatasubba Rao J. and Wadsworth J. are wrong and impliedly overruled, as a Full Bench of five Judges consisting of Lionel Leach C.J., Pandrang Row, Abdur Rahman, Krishnaswami Aiyangar and Patanjali Sastri JJ. in Ramaswami Iyengar v. Rangachariar((1940) 1 M.L.J. 32 = 51 L.W. 11), has held that, though court-fee must be paid under S. 7(iv-A) in respect of decrees passed against the plaintiff in suits in which he had been eo nomine impleaded as a party, with regard to other transactions like sale deeds, whether the plaintiff is made a party or not , the position is different. At page 41 it is observed thus:

    “The other transactions of the first defendant, whether the plaintiff is made a party thereto or not, stand on a different footing. He is not bound under the substantive law by which he is governed, to sue for a declaration or cancellation in respect of any of them.”

    Mr. Mani, for the petitioners urges that these remarks would apply only to a case where the sale deeds are executed by a father manager and guardian. He further urges that though a father is guardian of his minor sons, and even the preferential guardian under Hindu Law, when he is also the manager of the joint family, his capacity as a manager overshadows his rights as a guardian, and he will be presumed to have executed the sale deeds only as a father-manager and not father-guardian, and so, the minor sons, when they attain majority, need not ask for cancellation of the sale deeds executed by him as the father-manager and guardian. But the position, he said, would be different regarding the sale deeds executed by a mother and legal guardian. He relied on the ruling of a Full Bench of this Court, consisting of Lionel Leach C.J. and Mockett and Krishnaswami Aiyangar JJ. in Ghulam Hussain Sahib v. Ayesha Bibi ((1941) 1 M.L.J. 800 = 53 L.W. 650), where it has been observed that in a case of sale by a de jure guardian (though not by a de facto guardian) the plaintiff, who has been made eo nomine a party to the sale deed, seeking possession must ask for the cancellation of the sale deed and pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) and that he must do so even with regard to a sale deed executed by a Court guardian without obtaining the sanction of the Court. Mr. Mani urged that though in that case the mother-guardian who executed the sale deed in which the minor was eo nomine a party happened to be a Court guardian, appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act, the same rules world be applicable to the natural mother guardian in the present case, though she is not appointed as a guardian under the Guardian and Wards Act.

    Mr. Natesan relied on two later rulings of single Judges for the view that court-fee need be paid only under S. 7(v)(b). One of the rulings was that of Kuppuswami Aiyar J. in Kuppuswami Gounder v. Mari Gounder (1943) 1 M.L.J. 249 = 56 L.W. 158). It was held in that case by the learned Judge that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to sue for setting aside the partition of 1938 effected by his father, and that he need not value the suit under S. 7(iv-A) and that he could value the suit as one for partition ignoring the previous partition as not binding on him. He followed the rulings in Kamaraju v. Chanduri Gunnayya (45 M.L.J. 240 = 18 L.W. 233) and Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816) and dissented from the ruling of Venkatasubba Rao J. in Doraiswami Reddiar v. Thangavelu Mudaliar (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 668), as it was of a single Judge, apparently overlooking the fact that the ruling of the Bench in Kamaraju v. Chanduri Gunnayya (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 668) was given before the enactment of S. 7(iv-A).

    The other ruling relied on by Mr. Natesan was that of Chandra Reddi J. in Ramaswami v. Kunjammal (1950) 1 M.L.J. 408). The learned Judge held that where the plaintiff alleged that his mother and natural guardian under the Hindu law was an illiterate woman, inexperienced in life, and was influenced by her brother to alienate his properties for a very low consideration in his favour making the plaintiff minor eo nomine a party, it was sufficient for the plaintiff to value the suit under S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act, and that he need not pray for the cancellation of the sale deed and pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. Mr. Mani attacks Chandra Reddi J's decision as erroneous. He has pointed out that in a later decision of this Court in Vaduganatha Pillai v. Raghava Iyengar (1950) 2 M.L.J. 378 = 63 L.W. 830), Satyanarayana Rao J. relied on the Full Bench decision in Mir. Ghulam Saheb v. Aiyesha Bibi (1941) 1 M.L.J. 800 = 53 L.W. 650) and held that in such a such a case in spite of the guardian's alleged illiteracy, fraud etc., court-fee ought to be paid under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, though in the particular case before him, the plaintiff was eo nomine a party to a decree and not merely to the sale deed.

    It is obvious from all this that there is a lot of conflicting views in reported decisions regarding this matter, as urged by the learned Counsel on both sides. My own view is that wherever a minor has been made eo nomine a party to a sale deed or other instrument by his legal guardian (and not by a mere family manager) and seeks to avoid it, and get possession of the lands which have passed to the alienees, he must pray for setting aside such sale deed and pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. There must be some uniformity regarding these matters which cannot be left to be decided in each case according to the opinion of the presiding Judge. A general rule that persons who are eo nomine parties to the decree, or sale deeds effected by their natural or legal guardians, should pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) will make it simple to work, and will not operate any grave injustice. It will also make for general convenience and may ultimately be for the benefit of the minors themselves. If every minor can ignore the sale deeds executed by his legal guardians for his benefit, and claim possession from the alienees paying merely court-fee under S. 7(v)(b), without praying for the cancellation of the sale deeds, it is obvious that very few people will be willing to purchase the properties of minors from their guardians at reasonable prices, and the minors will be the sufferers ultimately. There is a presumption that alienations by legal or natural guardians like a mother will be prima facie for the benefit of the minors, though, of course, the minors can get them set aside by showing that they were vitiated by fraud, undue influence, coercion, etc., paying proper court-fee under S. 7(iv-A).

    I cannot, however, agree with Mr. Mani that in regard to a sale deed executed by a father as guardian of his minor son, the plaintiff need not pray for setting aside that sale deed and can pay court-fee under S. 7(v)(b) ignoring the sale deed, and ask for mere possession. It seems to me that the father, as a guardian is in a stronger position, under the Hindu Law, than the mother as guardian, though as manager of the family and head of the coparcenary, his alienations can bind the other coparceners including his sons only if they are proved to be for family necessity or benefit. Sons asking for partition against a lather need not specifically ask for setting aside such alienations.

    But the matter has not been uniformally decided under the rulings cited aboved on the simple test of eo nomine or not. Often the father as manager and the father as the guardian have been bundled together, and the father's capacity as manager alone has been taken into account for this purpose. It is necessary to clearly lay down a rule as to the court-fee payable in such cases of alterations by legal guardians of minors making the minors eo nomine a party. Of course, alienations which are attacked as bogus and nominal will stand on a different footing, as they can always be ignored, as unreal, but alienations which are admitted to be real, though fraudulent and for low consideration, stand on quite a different footing.

    I therefore direct the papers to be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice to constitute a Full Bench to decide the following questions:

    1. Has the plaintiff who as a minor, has been made eo nomine a party to a sale deed or other document of alienation by his mother and guardian to pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and to pray for the cancellation of the sale deed expressly or impliedly and pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act, or can he ignore and by-pass such alienation alleging illiteracy, ignorance, lack of worldly knowledge, undue influence, coercion, etc., and pray for mere possession of the lands paying court-fee under S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act? Will it make any difference if the mother executing the sale deed making him eo nomine a party is a guardian appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act?

    2. Is the position of a sale deed executed by a father of the minor, as guardian of the minor son and not as manager of the joint family and head of the coparcenary, any way different from the position of a sale deed executed by the mother as guardian of the minor?

    (In pursuance of the aforesaid Order of Reference, the Court delivered the following):

    OPINION (Delivered by Govinda Menon, J.)

    The following questions have been referred to a Full Bench by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J.:

    “1. Has the plaintiff who as a minor, has been made eo nomine a party to a sale deed or other document of alienation by his mother and guardian to pay Court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and to pray for the cancellation of the sale deed expressly or impliedly and pay court-fee under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act or can he ignore and by-pass such alienation alleging illiteracy, ignorance, lack of worldly knowledge, undue influence, coercion etc., and pray for mere possession of the lands paying court-fee under S. 7(v)(b) of the Court Fees Act? Will it make any difference if the mother executing the sale deed making him eo nomine a party is a guardian appointed under the Guardian and Wards Act?

    2. Is the position of a sale deed executed by a father of the minor as guardian of the minor son and not as manager of the joint family and head of the co-parcenary, any way different from the position of a sale deed executed by the mother as guardian of the minor?”

    As the order of reference deals exhaustively with the facts which have given rise to the reference as well as the decided cases cited before him no further elaboration of factual details is necessary and we can straightaway proceed to discuss the legal points urged before us. At the very outset it is necessary to differentiate between transactions regarding properties which belong to the minor as his own and those in which he is interested as a member of a joint family where either his father or any other relative happens to be the kartha or head. In the latter case where a document is executed on behalf of the family he is only a component part in the entity which has a legal status and a persona and therefore such a transaction cannot be deemed to be by the minor individually as such; but in the former case where the person who executes the document is the father or the manager of the joint family the mere fact that he purported to execute it also as the guardian of the minor would not make it obligatory on the minor to have it cancelled before obtaining relief on the footing that it is not binding on him. But where the transaction is on behalf of the minor and is entered into by the guardian then the question arises as to whether in order to obtain relief the minor has to get the document cancelled. The law as laid down in Unni v. Kunchiamma (14 Mad. 26), and approved by the Full Bench in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar (I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259 at 279 = 51 L.W. 11 (F.B.), is well settled and is to the following effect:

    “If a person not having authority to execute a deed or having such authority under certain circumstances which did not exist, executes a deed, it is not necessary for persons who are not bound by it, to sue to set it aside, for it cannot be used against them. They may treat it as non-existent and sue for their right as if it did not exist.”

    We are in this case concerned with an alienation of property belonging to the minor by his guardian and the question to be considered is what is the proper court fee payable in such a matter. Is it necessary for the minor to seek for a cancellation of the document and pay court fee under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act or would it be sufficient if he ignores the transaction and seeks possession of the property and values the suit under S. 7(v) of the Act.

    Chandra Reddi, J., in Ramaswami v. Kunjammal (1950) 1 M.L.J. 408), has taken the view that it is sufficient if the plaintiff values the suit under S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act and he need not ask for cancellation of the sale deed executed by his mother as guardian and pay court-fee under S. 7(iv A) of the Court Fees Act. The learned Judge relied on the decisions in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar (I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259 at 279 = 51 L.W. 11 (F.B.), Kalianna Goundn Balasubramaniam (1946) 2 M.L.J. 459) and Kandaswami Udayar v. Annamalai Pillai (1948) 2 M.L.J. 130 = 61 L.W. 637), and followed the same. We are now asked to consider the correctness or otherwise of that judgment and in doing so we propose to refer to the conflict in case law noted by the referring Judge. On the side of the petitioners it is contended that in a transaction entered into by a guardian of a minor relating to the property belonging to the minor and in which the minor is eo nomine made a party represented by his guardian it is absolutely essential that in order to get the relief of cancellation of the document is necessary for which purpose court-fee will have to be paid under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act but where the minor is one of the members of the joint family and the transaction is by the Kartha or the other members of the family but the minor's name is added and represented by a guardian in such a case S. 7(v) of the Act can be invoked. The matter came to the forefront in the decision in Doraiswami v. Thangavelu (A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 668) by Venkatasubba Rao J. where the mother as guardian under the Hindu Law executes a release deed on behalf of the minors the release deed is not void but only voidable and as such the minors, if they complain that it is invalid, are bound to set it aside. Hence if the minors after attaining majority bring a suit praying for a declaration that the release is invalid and for an injunction their suit looking at the substance of it, must be treated as one for cancellation of the instrument and so will come under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. The learned Judge was not inclined to follow the earlier decision in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816). It is clear from the facts of this case that the alienation was by the guardian representing the minor with regard to the minor's estate and not by the manager of a joint family in which the minor is only a constituent member. The learned Judge has also referred to the fact that in S. 7(iv-A) the words “securing money” or other property are not happy. In his opinion the release deed is a document securing property and it seems to us that a mortgage or sale of properly is also one which secures money or other property. Though an argument has been addressed to us that the words of S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act are inapplicable to a case where the transaction is one of sale, mortgage or exchange and the person who impugns is a mortgagor, vendor or alienor it is difficult to say that the suit is for cancellation of a document securing money or other property but it has so far been construed in that light and it is too late in the day to question the correctness of that assumption.

    Wadsworth J. in Venkatakrishniah v. Alli Sahib (A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 921 = 48 L.W. 277) took a similar view and held that where the suit is to set aside an alienation made by the guardian of the plaintiff during his minority and for possession of the properties alienated court-fee should be paid under S. 7(iv-A). This also proceeds on the footing that the minor is eo nomine a party to the transaction and the consideration is as if the minor himself has executed it. The learned Judge refers to the decision of Venkatasubba Rao J. mentioned above and points out the difference between a case where the alienation is by the lawful guardian of the minor as such and that by a manager of a joint family of which the minor is only a member. The observations of the same learned Judge in Vellayya Konar v. Bamaswami Konar (1939) 2 M.L.J. 400 at 403 = 50 L.W. 248) are similar. A distinction is clearly made out between a case where the erstwhile minor has to remove an obstacle in his way before getting relief and one in which he could ignore and proceed as if he was not a party. Referring to the earlier case in Venkatakrishniah v. Alli Sahib (A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 921 = 48 L.W. 277), the learned Judge makes it clear that it was a case of a minor whose lawful guardian on his behalf made an alienation which the minor on attaining majority Had necessarily to get the conveyance cancelled before he could get recovery of possession of the properties alienated and that in such a case S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act applies. Though the observations of Satyanarayana Rao J. in Vaduganatha Pillai v. Srinivasaraghava Iyengar (1950) 2 M.L.J. 378 = 63 L.W. 830) related to the case of a decree to which the minor was a party represented by his guardian the principle underlying the judgment is where the transaction is by and on behalf of the individual any attempt to get over it should be by means of cancellation of the same. We are in agreement with the learned Judge. But a different line of reasoning is discernible in certain cases to the effect that even where the suit relates to the property of the minor alienated by a guardian all that he need do for impeaching the transaction is to sue to recover the property without seeking to set aside the transaction. Ramesam and Jackson JJ. in Veeraraghavalu v. Sreeramulu (A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 816), were of the view that a minor has not got to set aside the transaction by a guardian in suing to recover the property. He could ignore the transaction and merely pray for possession. That being so be need not seek the cancellation of the instrument, and, therefore, Cl. (iv-A) of S. 7 of the Court Fees Act does not apply. The authorities which the learned Judges relied on were Unni v. Kunchi Amma (14 Mad. 26), and Kamaraju v. Gunnayya (A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 322 = 18 L.W. 233), and they differed from the decision in Alagar Aiyangar v. Srinivasa Aiyangar (A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1248 = 22 L.W. 515). On looking at the facts of the case though the report of the same in the judgment is very meagre, from the printed records available in the archives of this Court, it is seen that the suit out of which the civil revision petition arose was with regard to the joint family property and was for partition of the properties. Therefore on the facts of the case the decision is correct though the observations contained in the judgment are somewhat wide and are apt to be misunderstood. Where the suit is for setting aside a partition by a minor after attaining majority and seeking a fresh partition Kuppuswami Aiyar J. in Kuppuswami Goundan v. Mart Goundan ((1943) 1 M.L.J. 249 = 56 L.W. 158), held that court-fee need be paid only under S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act relying upon the decision in Ramaswami v. Rangachariar (I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259 = 51 L.W. 11). Though it was sought to be argued in this case that the minor was represented by a guardian and the partition deed, so far as he was concerned, was one executed by the guardian and therefore there should be a prayer for cancellation and court-fee should be paid on that basis, the learned Judge did not accept the contention.

    One of the further cases where S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act was applied was Kalianna v. Balasubramania ( I.L.R. 1947 Mad. 628), in which Bell J. following the decision in Ramaswami v. Rangai chariar (I.L.R. 1940 Mad. 259 = 51 L.W. 11), took the view that a suit filed by a mother as the next friend of her three sons who belonged to a joint family (a) for a declaration that a sale deed executed by their father for himself and as guardian of his sons was not binding on them not having been executed for family necessities, (b) for partition, and (c) for recovery of the properties was in effect one for possession of the properties and the appropriate court-fee payable was under S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act. The decision in Kandaswami Udayan v. Annamalai Pillai (1948) 2 M.L.J. 130 = 61 L.W. 637), relates to an alienation by the manager in which case the minor member is only a party in his capacity as a member of the family.

    It is urged on behalf of the respondent by Mr. Natesan that in cases when a guardian purporting to act on behalf of a minor, whether it be with regard to the joint family properties of others and the minor or the properties belonging to the minor, it is open to the minor to ignore the transaction and recover possession of the properties on the footing of a void instrument in which case court-fee is payable only under S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act. He contends that in order that S. 7(iv-A) may be made applicable, it must be incumbent upon the plaintiff to seek a cancellation of the instrument and in the case of a Hindu minor when the alienation is by the guardian it is open to the minor to ignore the transaction and avoid it within three years of his attaining majority failing which the transaction becomes perfected. Such ignoring or avoiding need not necessarily be by a suit, but an unequivocal act of quondam minor to elect or avoid would be sufficient. It is further urged that the power of a guardian under the Hindu law is very limited and his alienation would be valid only under certain circumstances. It is open to the minor to go to the Court and allege that the transaction does not exist. The result of the analysis of the cases, according to the learned Counsel, is that if it is found that the document is not binding on the minor it should be as if he was not a party to the instrument at all. The cases cited at the Bacan be classified under two heads, namely, those in which the minor's properties are being dealt with by a guardian and the minor seeks a decision that such dealings are not binding on him and secondly, those in which the father or the manager of the joint family purporting to deal with the family properties acts as the guardian of the minor, who is only one of the members of the joint family. It seems to us that in the former case the minor is eo nomine a party to the transaction and he should seek to cancel the document in which case court-fee has to be paid under S. 7(iv A) of the Act. But where the minor was only a member of a joint family and the transaction is on behalf of the joint family, he could always ignore the transaction as not binding on the family and seek to recover possession. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Subramaniam v. Subbarao (1948) 2 M.L.J. 22 = 61 L.W. 441 (P.C.) in considering the question regarding the applicability of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, took the view that the minor should be deemed to be a party to the transaction eo nomine . In interpreting the word “transferor” in S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, the Judicial Committee held that where the mother and guardian of a minor enters into a contract of sale of immoveable properties of the minor to discharge the father's debts and puts the transferee in possession, the transferor in such a case, for the application of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, is the minor. The principle deducible from this case is that where the transaction is with regard to the properties of the minor, it should be deemed as if he were eo nomine a party. At page 24 we find the following observation:

    “Their Lordships think it is clear that the words ‘the transferor’ refer back to the person who contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf.”

    “Thus the act of the mother and guardian in entering into the contract of sale in the present case was an act done on behalf of the minor “and finally it was held that” the person who most aptly answers the description of “the transferor” in the sense in which these words are used in S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act “is the minor himself.”

    If the matter is looked at in this way there is no difficulty in reconciling the various cases and we do not propose to analyse at length the large body of case law cited at the Bar. The distinction between a void and voidable transaction has been brought out in a number of cases and we need only refer to a few of them: Chingacharu Vittil Sankaran Nair v. Chingacharu Vittil Gopala Menon (30 Mad. 18), Bijoy Gopal Mukerji v. Krishna Mahishi Debi (34 Cal. 329), Fakiappa Limmanna v. Lumanna Bin Mahadu (44 Bom. 742), Balireddi v. Khatipulal Sab (69 M.L.J. 458 = 42 L.W. 860), Ahkamma v. Kameswaramma (70 M.L.J. 352 = 43 L.W. 611), Bamaswami v. Govindammal (56 M.L.J. 332 = 29 L.W. 169), and Vallabhacharyulu v. Bangacharyulu (A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 449 = 45 L.W. 380). There is no doubt whatever that a transaction entered into by a guardian relating to the minor's properties is not void and if the minor does not sue to set it aside within three years, of his attaining majority it becomes valid under Art. 44 of the Limitation Act. In such a case the minor is deemed to be a party to the transaction But where the document is executed by a manager of the family and it is not binding on the family, the minor or any other member can ignore the transaction and recover possession of the property. To such a case S. 7(v) of the Court Fees Act will apply. We are here not concerned with decrees to which the minor is eo nomine a party. Our answer to the first question is that if the minor is eo nomine a party to a sale deed or other document of alienations, he must sue for the cancellation of the document under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act and it is not enough if he applies for possession under S. 7(v) of the Act; and to the second question our answer is that there can be no distinction whether the father as guardian of the minor and not as the manager of the joint family executes the deed. Even in that case also the document has to set be aside.

    (This case coming on for hearing after the expression of the above Opinion of the Full Bench, the Court, Panchapalcesa Ayyar J. delivered the following):

    JUDGMENT—(6-4-1956).

    The Full Bench has held that court-fee has to be paid in this case under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court Fees Act. Therefore this civil revision petition must be allowed, and it is allowed with half costs both here and before the Full Bench. Advocate's fee Rs. 35 here, and Rs. 50 before the Full Bench. It is not known whether the valuation under S. 7(iv-A) will come to over Rs. 5000. The learned District Munsif will assess the valuation after hearing both sides. If it exceeds his jurisdiction he will return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court.

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