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  • Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1157. Rule 13
  • Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960,
  • rule 13 of the rules. 3.)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1157. Rule 13
  • Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960,
  • rule 13 of the rules. 3.)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion — Janatha Talkies (Pallavaram)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition under Article 226 seeks revision of a writ of certiorari calling for records of the Board of Revenue, Commissioner of Land Revenue, Land Reforms and Settlement of estates, Madras in B.P. Rt. 4578-L dated 15th September 1970 and quash the order therein.

Janatha Talkies at Pallavaram (a cinema theatre exhibiting cinematographic shows) originally belonged to Batcha Sahib who died on 25th August 1960. After his death, his widow and petitioners 1, 4 and 5 leased out Janatha Talkies (and another cinema called Noorjahan Talkies) to the first respondent. The lease for Janatha Talkies expired by efflux of time on 3rd September 1970.

When the first respondent applied to renew the licence to exhibit cinematographic shows, the District Collector of Chingleput, by order dated 2nd September 1970, rejected the application on the ground that the first respondent did not prove lawful possession of the cinema theatre beyond the expiry of the lease. On appeal, the Board of Revenue set aside the Collector's order, considered both merits and questions of law, held that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960, was applicable (a statement the court regarded as wrong), relied also on the Supreme Court decision in Uttamchand v. Smt. Lalwani (A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716), and concluded that the respondent's possession could be recognised as lawful in the public interest and granted renewal of the licence. The present writ petition challenges that Board order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the possession of the first respondent of the cinema house and the equipment after expiry of the lease can be characterised as "lawful possession" within the meaning of Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1157.
  2. Whether, if possession after expiry of lease is not lawful under Rule 13, the licensing authorities have jurisdiction to grant or renew a licence on considerations of public interest and equity.
  3. Whether this Court should, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, interfere with the discretionary decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal (here, the Board of Revenue/licensing authority) that has renewed a licence after being prima facie satisfied of entitlement to possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as summarised in the opinion)

  • Mr. Parasaran, counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the respondent's possession of the cinema house and equipment on and after expiry of the lease could not be characterised as "lawful possession" for purposes of Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1157.
  • He argued that Rule 13 requires documentary proof to satisfy the licensing authority that an applicant who is not the owner is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment; possession after lease expiry was neither lawful nor authorised and therefore the licensing authorities lacked jurisdiction to grant a licence on a priori considerations of public interest or equity.

Respondent's Position / Preliminary Objection (as summarised in the opinion)

  • The respondent (through its counsel) took a preliminary objection that when a quasi-judicial tribunal vested with the power to grant licences disposes of proceedings in light of the facts and circumstances, the discretion exercised by it (particularly where it grants a licence) should not be lightly interfered with by this Court under Article 226.
  • The Board of Revenue had also taken the position that so long as the respondent did not voluntarily hand over the premises and equipment and there was no court order compelling surrender, such possession cannot be held to be unlawful; the Board emphasised public interest considerations and that proceedings under the Cinematograph Act cannot be substituted for civil proceedings for recovery of possession.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Uttamchand v. Smt. Lalwani, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 Used by the Board to support the proposition that the dominant intention may be to lease out the cinema house together with the site. The court noted the Board's reliance on Uttamchand but indicated that the Board's statement about applicability of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was a wrong statement of law; however, the court recognized that the "dominant intention" principle governs characterisation of leases (see the court's propositions).
Om Prakash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police, Madras (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 Authority considering intervention where licensing authority refuses or grants licence; principle that the court would not ordinarily direct the authority to issue a licence, and that where the authority has renewed a licence the court would not interfere. The court relied on and adopted this principle as binding. It observed that if the licensing authority had actually renewed the licence in favour of the applicant, the court would not have interfered. Applying this, the court discharged the rule nisi and dismissed the writ petition.
Yeshwant Singh v. Jagadish Singh, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 620 This opinion cited the case among authorities relied on by counsel; the text does not state a distinct rule from this case beyond its inclusion in the body of precedents considered. The opinion lists this decision among those from which general propositions about composite leases and dominant intention are derived; no separate, specific application beyond that summary is set out in the opinion.
Messrs Isherdas Sahib and Bros v. Rajeswara Rao (1968) 2 M.L.J. 233 Cited among the authorities; the opinion notes that in decisions cited by the Board the equipment did not belong to the applicant, and therefore the Board's reliance was not apt in that factual context. The court considered the line of authorities to extract general propositions about when a lease is composite and the consequences for possession; the opinion does not set out a discrete separate application for this specific report beyond those propositions.
W.P. 1640 and 1641 of 1968 (decisions of this Court referred to) The Board referred to these writ petitions; the opinion records that certain decisions of this Court (including these) were considered by the Board. The court treated these authorities as part of the judicial material from which it distilled propositions (e.g., on composite leases and the dominant intention test); the opinion does not provide additional detail about individual application beyond the distilled propositions.
W.P. 1640 and 1941 of 1968 (as separately mentioned in the opinion) The opinion references these writ petitions in the catalogue of decisions relied upon; the specific rule cited from these writs is not separately articulated in the text. The court noted these cases in the chain of precedent supporting the general principles about composite leases and licensing; no distinct separate application is described in the opinion.
W.P. 572 of 1970 Mentioned among the authorities referred to by counsel; the opinion does not specify the precise principle taken from this decision. The decision is listed among precedents from which the court drew general propositions; the opinion does not elaborate any specific application unique to this case.
W.P. No. 608 of 1959 (observations of Balakrishna Ayyar J.) Quoted/relied upon in Om Prakash Gupta to the effect that lessors' remedy for possession is by filing a civil suit and that owners should not bypass ordinary civil courts. The court accepted and referred to the principle that where a civil suit for eviction exists, owners should pursue such remedy rather than bypass civil courts; this contributed to the court's refusal to interfere where a civil suit (C.S. 99 of 1970) for eviction had been filed and was pending.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeds from the facts, statutory/regulatory requirements and the relevant judicial authorities, and it is presented in a series of distilled propositions which the court states emerge from the cited precedents. The court:

  1. Examined Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1157, which requires documentary evidence to satisfy licensing authorities that an applicant who is not the owner is in lawful possession of the site, building and equipment. The petitioners contended that possession after expiry of the lease cannot be lawful for this purpose.
  2. Reviewed the Board of Revenue's order which set aside the Collector's rejection of the licence renewal and concluded the respondent's possession was lawful; the court observed that the Board treated the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960, as applicable (a statement which the court described as wrong), and that the Board relied on the Uttamchand decision and public interest considerations.
  3. Synthesised the precedents into five propositions (as set out in the opinion):
    • (1) The dominant intention of the parties governs whether a lease of a theatre (with or without equipment) is a lease of the building only or a composite lease including ancillary equipment.
    • (2) If leases of theatre and equipment are severable, the leases are interpreted by the deeds; after expiry of an equipment lease, continued possession of the equipment cannot be lawful possession under Rule 13.
    • (3) If the lease is a composite lease (both theatre and equipment), such a lease falls outside the purview of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 18 of 1960, and upon expiry the lessee should be deemed in juridical possession of the composite subject matter until lawfully evicted by due process.
    • (4) In case of a composite lease, if a quasi-judicial tribunal with authority to grant licences grants one in the public interest after being prima facie satisfied of the applicant's entitlement to possession, the High Court will not ordinarily interfere under Article 226 unless the tribunal's order is manifestly perverse, unjust or unreasonable.
    • (5) If the lessor has availed an alternative remedy by initiating a regular civil action for eviction against a holding-over lessee, it would be improper for the High Court by way of writ relief to create a stalemate that keeps the theatre and equipment out of use pending civil litigation.
  4. Applied these principles to the facts: the court treated the lease in the instant case as a composite lease; the lessors had instituted civil proceedings (C.S. 99 of 1970) for eviction and appointment of a Receiver, which were pending and reported ready for hearing. Given the pendency of the civil action and the settled principle in Om Prakash Gupta (that the court would not interfere where the licensing authority had renewed a licence), it was not proper for the High Court to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by petitioners.
  5. Consequently, adopting the binding principle from Om Prakash Gupta and the outlined propositions, the court concluded that intervention through Article 226 was not appropriate in the circumstances even though the Board's statement about the applicability of the Madras Buildings Act was regarded as incorrect by the court.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSITION:

The Court discharged the rule nisi and dismissed the writ petition. There was no order as to costs.

Implications

  • The immediate effect is that the Board of Revenue's order setting aside the Collector's rejection and granting renewal of the licence was not quashed by this Court; the writ petition challenging that order was dismissed.
  • The court endorsed and applied the principle (from Om Prakash Gupta and related authorities) that where a quasi‑judicial licensing authority has renewed a licence after being prima facie satisfied about entitlement to possession—particularly in the context of a composite lease and where civil proceedings for eviction are pending—this Court will generally not interfere under Article 226 unless the tribunal's order is manifestly perverse, unjust or unreasonable.
  • The opinion records that the Board's statement regarding the applicability of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was incorrect, but the court nevertheless declined to grant the writ on discretionary and prudential grounds because of the pending civil remedy and the binding authority cited.
  • The judgment does not purport to lay down a new, general rule beyond the application of existing precedents and principles summarised in the opinion; the decision's practical consequence is limited to the parties before the Court (i.e., dismissal of the petition and maintenance of the Board's order).

This summary is confined to and strictly reflects only the matters and language set out in the provided opinion.

    B. Abdul Gaffoor Sahib And Others v. Messrs. Pals Theatres, Lessees Of Janatha Talkies, Pallavaram By Partner S.S Palanlappan & Ors.

    (Prayer: Petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying the High Court to revise a writ of certiorari calling for records of the Board of Revenue, Commissioner of Land Revenue, Land Reforms and Settlement of estates, Madras in B.P. Rt. 4578-L dated 15th September 1970 and quash the order therein.)

    Janatha Talkies, Pallavaram, is a theatre exhibiting cinematographic shows. It was originally owned by one Batcha Sahib. He died on 25th August 1960. After his death, his widow and petitioners 1, 4 and 5 leased out the theatre along with another cinema house called Noorjahan Talkies in Saidapet in favour of the first respondent. The present petition, however, concerns itself with Janatha Talkies at Pallavaram, Saidapet Taluk, Chingleput District. According to the petitioners, and it may be stated that it is common ground, the lease of the theatre, building, talkie equipment, projectors, machineries, etc., leased out as above to the first respondent, expired by efflux of time on 3rd September 1970. When the first respondent applied for a renewal of the licence to exhibit the cinematographic shows in the theatre, the District Collector of Chingleput, by order dated 2nd September 1970, rejected the same on the ground that the first respondent did not prove lawful possession of the cinema theatre, beyond the date of the expiry of the lease. On appeal to the Board of Revenue, the order of the District Collector was set aside the Board dealt with both the merits as well as some questions of law as understood by it and ultimately come to the conclusion that the order of rejection of the application for licence to run the shows in the cinema theatre by the Collector was cot sustainable and granted such a renewal of the C form licence in favour of the first respondent in its order, the Board referred to certain decisions of our court and in particular W.P. 1640 and 1641 of 1968 and was of the view that the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, was applicable and therefore the possession of the first respondent should be deered to be lawful, I may at once state that this it a wrong statement of law, as I would presently indicate. The Board also relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Uttamchand v. Smt. Lalwani A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 and was of the view that the dominant intention was to lease out the cinema house with the site. Alternatively, however, it considered the issue whether the possession of the first respondent on and after the date of the expiry of the lease was lawful. Whilst reviewing this position, it observed that so long as the first respondent did not hand over the building and equipment to the petitioners voluntarily and so long as there was no order or court compelling the first respondent to surrender the building and equipment, such possession cannot be held to be unlawful. The Board also expressed that, be the provisions of the Cinematographic Act sad the rules are mainly intended to be applied in public interest, a proceeding taken under the said Act cannot be substituted for civil proceedings by parties for recovery of possession of their property. Ultimately the Board was of the view that it would be in public interest to recognise such possession of the first respondent as lawful possession and set aside the order of the Collector. It is as against this order, the present writ petition has been filed.

    Mr. Parasaran, learned counsel for the petitioners, vehemently contends that in do sense the possession of the cinema house and the equipment annexed thereto and situate within the cinema house by the first respondent can be characterised as lawful possession within the meaning of Rule 13 of the Madras Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1157. Rule 13 provides that if an applicant for the licence Is not the owner of the site, building and equipment, he shall, to the satisfaction of the licensing authority, produce documentary evidence to show that he is in lawful possession of the site building and equipment. In this context, it is submitted that on and after the date of the expiry of the lease, the possession of the cinema house and the equipment with the first respondent is neither lawful nor authorised. If, therefore, such possession is not lawful possession within the meaning of Rule 13 of the rules, then the licensing authorities have no jurisdiction to grant a licence on apriori consideration and on the ground of public interest and equity. The learned counsel for the respondent, however, took up a preliminary objection which appears to be formidable that in cases where a quasi judicial Tribunal vested with the power to grant licence of the kind in question disposes of the proceedings before it in the light of the facts and circumstances disclosed before it, then such a discretion exercised by it, if it is a case of a grant, ought not to be lightly interfered with by this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India.

    It may not be quite necessary for me to refer to the catena of decisions cited by Mr. Parassran, learned counsel for the petitioners, excepting to note them for completion. He referred to Om Prakash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police, Madras (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 Yeshwant singh v. Jagadish Singh A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 620, Messrs Isherdas Sahib and Bros v. Rajeswara Rao (1968) 2 M.L.J. 233, W.P. 1640 and 1941 of 1968, Uttamchand v. Lalwani A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 716 and W.P. 572 of 1970. The principle is now well settled that in cases where a cinema house and the equipment tare compositely leased by the owner to a lessee, then sack composite lease is outside the purview of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960. In the decisions cited by the Board, the equipment did not belong to the applicant and therefore, Mr. Parasaran rightly pointed out that reliance on seen decision placed by the Board is not apt. But as I stated, from the judicial precedents sited by the learned counsel, the following propositions emerge:—

    1.) It is the dominant intention of the parties which should prevail in interpreting whether a lease of a cinema theatre ‘with or without equipment) is a lease of the building simpliciter or a composite) lease of both the theatre and the ancillary equipment contained therein.

    2.) If the leases of the theatre and the equipment are severable, then it is clear that the intention is as stated and recited in the deeds of lease; In such a case whatever may be said of the case of the building it cannot be said that after the expiry of the lease of the equipment, the possession of such equipment can be said to be lawful possession within the meaning of rule 13 of the rules.

    3.) If the lease is a composite one, in the sense that the lease comprised of both the cinema house and the equipment, the lease is outside the purview of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 and if the lease expired the lessee should be deemed to be in juridical possession of the composite subject matter, until duly evicted by a known process of law.

    4.) In a case of a composite lease, if the quasi judicial tribunal vested with the authority and jurisdiction to grant a licence grants the same in a public interest, after being prima facie satisfied that the applicant is entitled to the possession of the theatre and the equipment, then this court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. will not ordinarily interfere, unless the order of the quasi judicial tribunal is manifestly perverse, unjust and unreasonable.

    I may add one mere preposition—

    (5) If such an alternative remedy has been availed of by the lesser in the sense that a regular civil action has been initiated for eviction of the lessee, who holds over and continues to remain in possession of the demised property beyond the period of the lease then it would be improper for this court to interfere and grant the permit in exercise of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution to interfere and create a stalemate in the matter of the exhibition of cinematographic films in such a theatre and practically keep the building and the equipment in cold storage, until the civil suit for eviction is disposed of.

    Rajamannar C.J. In Om Prakash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 was considering a case where the licensing authority refused to issue a licence. In such circumstances, the learned Chief Justice expressed with great difficulty his inability to interfere with the discretion so exercised by the quasi judicial Tribunal, for he was of the view that the court would not be justified in directing the authority to issue a licence to the aggrieved party. But in the very same decision, relying upon the observations made by Balakrishan Ayyar J in W.P. No. 608 of 1959, which was approved later by a Division Bench of this Court, the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:

    "If in this case, the licensing authority had actually renewed the licence in favour of the appellant, we would not have interfered?"

    The learned Chief Justice observed that Balakrishna Ayyar J. pointed out that the only manner in which the lessors in such circumstances, could get possession would be by filing a suit in a competent civil court and that the owners could cot be allowed to by-pass the ordinary civil courts, while resorting to put pressure on the erstwhile tenant in an oblique way. In the instant case also, as in the other case, the lease in question is a composite one. The lessee is continuing in possession after the expiry of the lease. The lessors have filed a suit C.S. 99 of 1970 on the file of this court for eviction of the lessee. They have sought for the appointment of a Receiver as well. The proceedings are still pending and are reported to be ready for hearing as well. In these circumstances, and as pointed out by me in one of the propositions set out above, it would not be proper to exercise my discretion and make the rule nisi absolute as desired by the petitioners. As a matter of fact, the learned Chief Justice in Om Prukash Gupta v. Commissioner of Police, Madras (1960) 2 M.L.J. 50 has put this matter beyond controversy and in very strong language by stating that it the licensing authority had actually renewed the licence in favour of the aplicant, we would not have interfered. While therefore, respectfully adopting this principle, which is binding on me, I discharge the rule nisi and dismiss the writ petition. There will be no order as to costs.

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    B. Abdul Gaffoor Sah... v. Messrs. Pals Theatre...
    (Nov 25, 1970)