Sham Sunder, J. — This appeal is directed against the judgement of conviction, and the order of sentence dated 14.12.95, rendered by the Court of Special Judge, Central Bureau of Investigation, Punjab, Patiala, vide which, it convicted the accused (now appellant) and sentenced him, as under :

Name of the accused (now appellant) Offence for which convicted Sentence awarded 1 2 3 Yaspal Khanna Under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Both the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

2. The facts, in brief, are that on 04.03.93, the accused was working as Inspector T.A-II, Food Corporation of India, Chobal District, Amritsar. He was deputed at Mandi Bhakna Kalan for the kharif procurement 1992-1993, vide office order dated 31.08.92 He was also authorized to pass the bills for payment to the supliers from whom the paddy was procured. Jodh Singh, prosecution witness, was a partner of firm M/s J.H Trading Company. This firm was running the business as commission agent. In September, 1992, Yash Pal Khanna, accused, was working in Bhakna Kalan Mandi, for purchasing paddy on behalf of the Food Corporation of India. 2350 bags of paddy were sold by the firm W J.H Trading Company to the Food Corporation of India. Payment in respect of 81 bags, was not made to the firm, since the bill was not passed by the accused, in respect thereof. Jodh Singh, and Dhanwant Singh, prosecution witnesses, went to the accused on 03.03.93, and requested him, to pass the bill. The accused demanded Rs. 1000/-, is gratification, other than legal remuneration, for passing the bill. Jodh Singh and Dhanwant Singh, prosecution witnesses, protested that their firm was new, and they could not pay amount. The accused then reduced the demand to Rs. 600/-. Jodh Singh, and Dhanwant Singh, did not intend to pay gratification, other than legal remuneration, to the accused. They pretended that they were not having money, with them, and would pay the same, on the next day. The accused told them to come to Chobal, on the next day, in the Food Corporation of India, godown.

3. On 04.03.93, Jodh Singh, and Dhan prosecution witnesses, went to the Vigilance Office, and met Tarlok Singh, Vigilance Inspector, there. They narrated to him, that the accused who was a public servant, was demanding gratification, other than legal remuneration, from them, for passing the bill, in respect of 81 bags of paddy. Tarlok Singh, Vigilance Inspector, recorded the statement of Jodh Singh, prosecution witness, exhibit PW7/1. After admitting the same to be correct, Jodh Singh, signed it. Inder Pal Singh, was joined as a shadow witness. He was introduced to complainant Jodh Singh. Jodha Singh, complainant, produced six currency note each of Rs. 100/- denomination, before Tarlok Singh, Vigilance Inspector. Phenolpathelein powder was applied to the currency notes numbers of the tainted currency notes were noted down in the memo PW3.A. After satisfying that complainant Jodh Singh, had no other money with him, the tainted currency notes were entrusted to him. He was directed to hand over the tainted currency notes, to the accused, on demand. Inder Pal Singh, shadow witness, was directed to follow Jodh Singh, complainant, hear the conversation between him (Jodh Singh), and the accused, and after the aforesaid amount of gratification, other than legal remuneration, was demanded and accepted by the accused give signal to the raiding party. Tarlok Singh, Vigilance Inspector, appended his endorsement underneath the statement of complainant Jodh Singh and sent the same, for the registration of case. First information report, copy whereof is exhibit PW8/1, was registered in Police Station Chobal. Demonstration with regard to mixing of phenolpathelein powder, in the solution of water and sodium carbonate, and changing of its colur, into pinkish, was given to Jodh Singh, Dhanwant Singh, and Inder Pal Singh. The raiding party then proceeded to Chobal in a Zypsy. Jodh Singh, complainant, and Inder Pal Singh, shadow witness, were sent to the Food Corporation of India godown. The remaining members of the raiding party stood at some distance, concealing heir presence, and waited for the requisite signal. On enquiry made by Jodh Singh, and Inder Pal Singh, it was told that the accused had gone to Chobal bus stop. Therefore, they went to bus stop Chobal, where the accused was found present, at a Dhaba. The remaining members of the raiding party stood at some distance, from the Dhaba, concealing their presence. Jodh Singh, prosecution witness, requested the accused, to pass his bill. The accused, however, demanded Rs. 600/-, as gratification, other than legal remuneration, from Jodh Singh, complainant. Jodh Singh, on demand, by the accused, handed over the tainted currency notes of Rs. 600/-, as gratification, other than legal remuneration, to him. The accused counted the aforesaid amount, and put the same, in the front side pocket of his pant (trousers). The accused signed the bill of Jodh Singh, in token of gratification other than legal remuneration. He handed over one copy of the bill to Jodh Singh, prosecution witness, and on the other copy, he got their (Jodh Singh's and Dhanwant Singh's) signatures, and kept the same, with him. Inder Pal Singh, shadow witness, watched the transaction and gave the requisite signal to the other members of the raiding party. Tarlok Singh, Vigilance Inspector, and the other members of the raiding party, on receiving the requisite signal, raided the accused. The accused was apprehended by Tarlok Singh, Vigilance Inspector. The Vigilance Inspector disclosed his identity to the accused. A glass of water was arranged, in which, sodium carbonate was mixed. Then the hands of Inder Pal Singh, shadow witness, were got washed in it. The colour of the solution did not change. Thereafter, the hands of the accused were got washed, in the solution, as a result whereof, the colour of the solution turned into pinkish. The solution was preserved in a nip P1, duly sealed, and taken into possession, vide recovery memo PW3.D, attested by Jodh Singh, Inder Pal Singh, Dhanwant Singh, and Pinder Singh, Vigilance Inspector. Tarlok Singh, Vigilanc Inspector, offered his search to the accused, but he did not opt for that. Thereafter, the Vigilance Inspector, searched the accused, and recovered six tainted currency noes of Rs. 100/- denomination each, from the front side pocket of the pant (trousers) of the accused. The numbers of the tainted currency notes were compared with the numbers, already noted down in the memo, and the same tallied. The tainted currency notes P2 to P7, were taken into possession, vide recovery memo PW3.C Further personal search of the accused was conducted, and memo of the recovered articles, exhibit PW3.E, was prepared. The pant (trousers) P9 of the accused was then got taken off, and its pocket was got washed, in a freshly prepared solution of water and sodium carbonate, as a result whereof, its colour turned into pinkish. The solution was preserved in a nip P8, and duly sealed. The aforesaid articles, were taken into possession, vide recovery memo PW3.C. The Vigilance Inspector, prepared the site plan, showing the place of recovery exhibit PW9/1. Copy of the bill which was given to the complainant, by the accused, after passing it, was taken into possession. The statements of the witnesses were recorded by the Vigilance Inspector. The accused being Central Government employee, the investigation was transferred from State Vigilance Bureau, to the Central Bureau of Chandigarh. Sh. C.S Shimal, Sub Inspector, Central Bureau of Investigation, conducted the investigation, after obtaining permission of the Court exhibit PW3/2. The Central Bureau of Investigation, registered the first information report, copy whereof, is exhibit PW10/1, on the basis of the first information report, already registered, in Police Station Chobal. R.K Pachnanda, Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation, conducted the investigation. Sanction to prosecute the accused was obtained, from the Senior Regional Manager of the Food Corporation of India. The aforesaid nips, were sent for chemical analysis to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Punjab, Chandigarh, which gave its report exhibit PA. In the said report, the contents of the aforesaid nips, were found to be of sodium carbonate and phenol-pathelein powder. After the completion of investigation, the accused, was challaned.

4. On his appearance, in the Court, the accused was supplied the copies of documents, relied upon by the prosecution. Charge under Sections 7 and 13 (i) (d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was framed against the accused, to which he pleaded not guilty, and claimed judicial trial.

5. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined Ajit Kapoor, Assistant Manager, Food Corporation of India (PW1), Constable Gurcharan Singh (PW2), Inderpal Singh, shadow witness (PW3), Subhash Chander, Sub Inspector (PW4), A.K Khuller, Technical Assistant Grade - 1 (PW5), Jasbir Singh, Assistant Manager Procurement, Food Corporation of India (PW6), Jodh Singh, complainant (PW7), Ram Parkash, Moharrir Head Constable (PW8), Tarlok Singh Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance (PW9), and C.S Shimal, Sub Inspector, Cental Bureau of Investigation (PW10). Thereafter, the Public Prosecutor for the Central Bureau of Investigation, closed the prosecution evidence.

6. The statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was recorded. He was put all the incriminating circumstances, appearing against him, in the prosecution evidence. He pleaded false implication. It was admitted by him that he was promoted on 04.03.93 and appointed as Inspector, TA-II, Food Corporation of India, by Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India, New Delhi, vide his order, and since then, he was deputed to work, as such, at Mandi Bakhna Kalan. He denied that he demanded and accepted gratification, other than legal remuneration, in the sum of Rs. 600/-, from complainant Jodh Singh, as a motive, for passing the bill of 81 bags of paddy amounting to Rs. 15654.81 It was also denied by him that the amount of gratification, other than legal remuneration, was recovered from him. It was further stated by him, that the sanction accorded, in this case, was illegal, on the ground, that Sh. Survesh Kaushal, Senior Regional Manager, was not the competent authority, to appoint and remove him. He further stated that the sanction accorded by the incompetent authority, being illegal, the entire trial stood vitiated, and as such, he was entitled to acquittal. It was further stated by him, that he had filed a complaint, against one Kulwinder Singh, as a result whereof, he was dismissed from service of the Food Corporation of India. Said Kulwinder Singh is the sister's son of Dhanwant Singh, the alleged Manager of M/s J.H Traiding Company, Mandi Blakna Kalan. It was further stated by him, that the prosecution did not examine Dhanwant Singh.

7. The accused examined Kailash Chand, Assistant Manager, Food Corporation of India (North), New Delhi (DW1), Gurmit Singh, A.G - II, Ministerial, Food Corporation of India, Amritsar (DW2), and Om Dutt, A.G 1 (PP) Food Corporation of India, Amritsar (DW3), in his defence. Thereafter, the accused closed the defence evidence.

8. After hearing the Counsel for the parties, and, on going through the evidence, on record, the trial Court, convicted and sentenced the accused, as stated above.

9. Feeling aggrieved, the instant appeal, was filed by the appellant.

10. I have heard the Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence, and record of the case carefully.

11. The Counsel for the appellant, at the very outset, submitted that the sanction accorded, in this case, for launching prosecution against the accused was not (sic) by a competent authority. He further submitted that the Zonal Manager of the Food Corporation of India (North), was the competent authority to remove the accused from service. He further submitted that the Zonal Manager, did not accord the sanction, but in the instant case, exhibit PW1/1, sanction was accorded by Survesh Kaushal, Senior Regional Manager, who was not the competent authority to remove the accused from service. He further submitted that since the sanction exhibit PW1/1 as accorded by an incompetent authority, the entire trial, stood vitiated, but the trial Court, did not take into consideration this significant aspect of the matter, as a result whereof, it fell into a grave error, in recording conviction and awarding sentence. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appeared to be correct. Ajit Kapoor, Assistant Manager Vigilance, Food Corporation of India, appear as PW1, and identified the signatures of Survesh Kaushal, on sanction PW1/1. Exhibit D4, shows that the accused was promoted to the post of Technical Assistant - II, from the post of Technical Assistant - III. Service conditions of the accused, at the relevant time, were governed by the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations 1971. It is evident from appendix 2, attached to these Staff Regulations, that the appointing and the removing authority of category III employees, to which the accused belonged, was the Senior Regional Manager/Regional Manager. The competent disciplinary authority, according to these Staff Regulations, was also the Senior Regional Manager. Since the Senior Regional Manager was described as the appointing as well as disciplinary authority of class III category employees, to which the accused belonged, he was competent to accord sanction. Not only this, the Counsel for the respondent, also placed reliance on F.C.I & ors v. Sone Lal, 2005 (4) SCT 717 (SC), Civil Appeal No. 6808 of 2005 (@ S.L.P (Civil) No. 10452/2004, decided by the Apex Court, on 14.11.05, in support of his contention, that the Senior Regional Manager, was competent to accord sanction, being the appointing and disciplinary authority of the accused. The perusal of the facts of the aforesaid Civil Appeal, shows that one Sone Lal, who had been promoted as Technical Assistant, Grade I, was compulsorily retired from service. The order compulsorily retiring him from service was passed by the Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India. This penalty was imposed upon him under Regulation 56 of The Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, as applicable to the present case, He challenged that order, on the ground, that the Zonal Manager, who promoted him to the post of Technical Assistant, Grade I, could only compulsorily retire him, and the order passed by the Senior Regional Manager, was illegal. The High Court accepted his plea and set aside the order. An appeal was preferred by the Food Corporation of India. In the aforesaid appeal, it was held by the Apex Court, that Technical Assistant, Grade I, is a Class III category post. It was further held that the Senior Regional Manager, was The appointing authority of Technical Assistant, Grade I, which was a group of category III post, and could impose penalty including the major penalty and the High Court erred in setting aside the order passed by the Senior Regional Manager, holding that he was not competent to award the aforesaid punishment. Ultimately, the Civil Appeal referred to above filed by the Food Corporation of India, was accepted, and the order was held to be legal and valid. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid appeal, is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. Under these circumstances, by no stretch of imagination, it could be said that the order according sanction, was not passed by a competent authority. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stand rejected.

12. The Counsel for the appellant, however, placed reliance on Baij Nath Parsad Tripathi v. The State of Bhopal and another and Sudhakar Dube v. The State of Bhopal and another, AIR 1957 SC 494, K. Devassia v. State Of Kerala., (2006) 10 SCC 447, P.A Mohandas v. State of Kerala, (2003) 9 SCC 504, Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.K Sehgal and another, 1999 (4) RCR (Criminal) 615 : (1999) 8 SCC 501., M.W Mohiuddin v. State Of Maharashtra., (1995) 3 SCC 567 and State Inspector Of Police, Vishakhapatnam v. Surya Sankaram Karri., 2006 (4) RCR (Criminal) 53 : 2006 (3) Apex Criminal 87 : (2006) 7 SCC 172, in support of his contention, that once the sanction accorded was found to be illegal, the trial would be vitiated leading to the acquittal of the accused. There is no dispute, with the proposition of law, laid down, in the aforesaid cases. However, the facts of these cases are clearly distinguishable, from the facts of the instant case, and, as such, no help can be drawn, by the Counsel for the appellant therefrom. In Baij Nath Prasad Tripathi's and Sudhakar Dube's cases (supra), it was held that the trial without sanction was null and void. It was further held that subsequent trial with proper sanction, was not barred. In K. Devassia's case (supra), the Secretary (Vigilance), was not competent to accord sanction. In those circumstances, it was held that conviction recorded by the Court, on the basis of such an illegal sanction was not sustainable and ultimately, the appellant was acquitted. In P.A Mohandas's case (supra), the sanction had been accorded by an authority, on a particular date, when it was not competent to accord the same. It was, thus, held that the sanction was without jurisdiction, and trial stood vitiated. In Central Bureau of Investigation's case (supra), it was held at the question with regard to want of valid prosecution could not be taken into consideration for the first time at the appellate or revisional stage, especially when, such a question was not agitated, in the first instance, in the trial Court, in view of the purview of Section 19(3)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In M.W Mohiuddin's case (supra), it was held that if, in the first instance, the appellant was appointed by the Commissioner and later on he was absorbed in the other department, and was working under the control of the Chief Auditor, the latter was the competent authority to accord sanction. In State Inspector of Police, Vishakhapatnam's case (supra), it as held that if the sanction is accorded by person not authorized in law, the same can be said to be without jurisdiction and would be a nullity. It was further held that the trial and conviction were liable to be vitiated, on account of this reason. In the aforesaid cases, the sanction was accorded not by the competent authority, but by an authority, lower in rank, or other than the competent authority. It was, in these circumstances, held that once the sanction for launching prosecution against the accused, was illegal and invalid, the conviction based on the same was liable to be set-aside. However, in the instant case, as stated above, as per the Food Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1971, governing the terms and conditions of service of the accused, at the relevant time, Senior Regional Manger, was the appointing and disciplinary authority of Category III posts, to which category, the accused belonged. In this view of the matter, in the instant case, the sanction, having been accorded by a competent authority, the ratio of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authorities, is of no avail to the appellant. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

13. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the very basis of the case of the prosecution did not exist at all. He further submitted that according to the prosecution story, the gratification other than legal remuneration, was paid by complainant Jodh Singh, in exchange of signing of bills, by the accused, as well as, handing over the same to him, at the spot. He further submitted that according to the prosecution story, the money and the bill had mutually exchanged. He further submitted that the said story stood falsified, as the bill was not recovered from the complainant, but from the accused. He further submitted that had the bill been given to the complainant, in exchange of bribe money, by the accused, then the same would have been recovered from him (complainant) and not from him (accused). He also submitted that the bill which was recovered bore the signatures of DM and AM. He further submitted that the bill could only be signed by the DM and AM, after the signatures on the same had been appended by the accused. He further submitted that how the signatures of DM and AM existed on the bill, without the signatures of the complainant. He further submitted that, on account of this reason, it could be said, that the entire story was fabricated, just with a view to falsely implicate the accused. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. Jodh Singh, PW7, is the complainant, in this case. From his statement, it was proved, that the accused demanded gratification, other than legal remuneration, in the sum of Rs. 600/- and accepted the same, for the purpose of passing his bill, in respect of 81 Wheat bags amounting to Rs. 15654.81 It was further proved from his statement that on demand, the tainted currency notes were paid to the accused, which he put in the front pocket of his pant. He further stated that the accused then signed the bill and handed over the same to him (complainant). Inderpal Singh, Junior Assistant, Zila Parishad, Amritsar, PW3, who acted as shadow witness stated that the accused then signed the bill and handed over the same to Jodh Singh, complainant, he was also present there. From the statement of Inderpal Singh, it was proved that the accused accepted the bribe money, and thereafter he gave the requisite signal. It was also proved that the bribe money was recovered from the pocket of the pant of the accused by Tarlok Singh, PW9. The number of the currency notes, which were recovered from the accused, were compared with the numbers already mentioned in the memo and the same tallied. The ocular version was duly corroborated by the handwash of the accused, which turned into pinkish; and pocket-wash of the accused, which also turned into pinkish. Further corroboration was provided to the ocular version, through the report of the Chemical Examiner, exhibit PA, according to which, the hand-wash and the pocket-wash of the accused were physically and chemically analyzed, as a result whereof, the same were found containing the sodium carbonate and phenol-pathelein. It was further opined that phenol-pathelein and sodium carbonate when put in water, the colour turns into pinkish. The accused, however, failed to explain, as to how, his hand-wash and pocket-wash turned into pinkish, and as to how, the tainted currency notes which were a short while ago, with the complainant, came into his possession. Jodh Singh, complainant, PW7, stated that, after accepting the bribe money, the accused signed the bill in token of passing the same and he handed over the same to him (complainant), and on the other copy, he (accused) obtained his signatures, and that of Dhanwant Singh, and kept the same with him. It was, under these circumstances, that carbon copy of the bill was found in possession of the accused. It was taken into possession vide memo PW3.B from the accused. The bill, which was handed over to the complainant was taken into possession vide memo PW3.E, at the spot. In Roop Singh v. State of Punjab, 1991 (3) RCR (Criminal) 103 : AIR 1991 SC 1125, it was held that where the accused was not able to explain the presence of phenolphthalein powder, on his hands, his conviction, under the relevant Sections was legally sustainable. In State Of Punjab v. Raj Kumar, 1988 (1) RCR (Criminal) 639 : AIR 1988 (SC) 805, it was held that if bribe is taken, and given as a motive or reward, for doing or fore-bearing to do official act, the offence is complete, whether the public servant has the requisite capacity to do it, or not. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, is rejected.

14. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that Dhanwant Singh, prosecution witness, was not intentionally examined by the prosecution and, as such, an adverse inference, could be drawn that had he been examined, he would not have supported the case of the prosecution. It is, no doubt, true that Dhanwant Singh, was not examined by the prosecution, yet that does not mean that the case of the prosecution became doubtful. It was not necessary for the Public Prosecutor for the State, to examine each and every witness, to prove his case. It was also not required of the Public Prosecutor for the State, to multiply the number of witnesses to prove a particular fact, Since the Public Prosecutor for the State, thought that the evidence produced by him, was sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution, he did not think it proper to examine Dhanwant Singh. It is the quality rather than the quantity of evidence that is of significance. Similar principle of law was laid down in Swaran Singh and others v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 (SC) 2304. Non-examination of Dhanwant Singh, therefore, did not affect, in any way, the merits of the case. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

15. No doubt, it was the case of the accused that he got dismissed Kulwinder Singh, sister's son of Dhanwant Singh, and on account of that reason, he was having grudge against him (accused), and got him falsely implicated. It was merely a plea, which was taken by the accused, in his statement, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but, no evidence, was produced by him, to substantiate the same. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

16. Some discrepancies, in the statements of the prosecution witnesses, were pointed out, by the Counsel for the appellant. He submitted that on account of the occurrence of those discrepancies, in the statement of the prosecution witnesses, their evidence could not be said to be credible. He further submitted that according to Inderpal Singh, PW3, Jodh Singh etc. went in their own car, while the other members of the raiding party went in government Zypsi. According to him, Jodh Singh, complainant, and Dhanwant Singh, were present, in the office of the Vigilance staff. Gurcharan Singh, Constable, PW2, made a statement that he did not see Dhanwant Singh, in the office of Vigilance staff. Another discrepancy pointed out by the Counsel for the appellant, was to the effect, that the Constable was called at 10.30 AM, and he was asked to take ruqa for the registration of the case. All these discrepancies, in my opinion, could be said to be very insignificant. The mere fact that the case of the prosecution suffers from some minor and insignificant inconsistencies, and discrepancies, did not mean that the same did not stand proved. While scrutinizing the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, what the Court is to take into consideration is, as to whether their evidence, conforms to the substratum of the prosecution case or not. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, in this case, conforms to the substratum of the case. The discrepancies, in this case, are minor and insignificant. The same did not shake the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. It is a matter of common experience, that every witness, present at the time of raid, and recovery cannot give an identical version, as to what happened, due to the lapse of time, when their statements are recorded after a long time of the incident. In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State Of Gujarat. Crimes VII-1983 (2) SC 232, the following observations were made by the Apex Court :

(i) “By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a photographic memory and to recall the details of an incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the mental screen.

ii) Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is over-taken by events. The witness could not have anticipated the occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned to absorb the details.

iii) The powers of observation differ from person to person. What one may notice another may not. An object or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind, whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.

iv) By and large people cannot accurately recall a conversation and reproduce the very words used by them or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be a human tape recorder.

v) In regard to exact time of an incident or the time duration of an occurrence, usually people make their estimates by guess work on the spur of the moment, at the time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters. Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which varies from person to person.

vi) Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.

vii) A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be overawed by the Court atmosphere and the piercing cross-examination made by the Counsel and out of nervousness mix up facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account of the occurrence witnessed by it perhaps-perhaps it is a sort of a psychological defence mechanism activated on the spur of the moment.”

So keeping in view the observations, extracted above, when the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, is appreciated, only one and one conclusion, that can be arrived at, is that, the same does not suffer from the discrepancies and inconsistencies, which are abnormal. Their evidence, therefore, could not be disbelieved and discarded due to such minor discrepancies. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, that on account of the aforesaid discrepancies and inconsistencies, the case of the prosecution became doubtful, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.

17. The Counsel for the respondent submitted that statutory presumption under Section 20 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, could be drawn, against the accused, as the tainted currency notes were recovered from the pocket of the pant worn by him, and it was for him, to explain, as to how, the same came into his possession, which were a short while ago, in the possession of the complainant. He further submitted at the accused failed to furnish any explanation, in this regard. The submission of the Counsel for the respondent in this regard, appears to be correct. In Tarlok Chand Jain v. State of Delhi, AIR 1977 SC 666, a case, relating to Section 5(1) and (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, the question, with regard to the interpretation and scope of Section 4 (1) now Section 20(1) arose before the Apex Court, wherein, it was held as under :—

“The degree and the character of the burden of proof which Section 4(1) casts on accused person, to rebut the presumption raised thereunder, cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof, which under Section 101, Evidence Act, rests on the prosecution. While the mere plausibility of an explanation, given by the accused in his examination under Section 342 Cr.P.C may not be enough, the burden on him to negate the presumption may stand discharged if the effect of the material brought, on the record, in its totality, renders the existence of the fact presumed improbable. In other words, the accused may rebut the presumption, by showing a mere preponderance of probability, in his favour; it is not necessary for him to establish his case, beyond a reasonable doubt. AIR 197 S.C 773, followed.

The sole purpose of the presumption under Section 4(1) is to relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving a fact which is essential ingredient of the offences, under Section 5(1) and (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and Section 161 Penal Code. The presumption, therefore, can be used in furtherance of the prosecution case and not in derogation of it. If the story set up by the prosecution inherently militates against or is inconsistent with the fact presumed, the presumption will be rendered sterile from its very inception, if out of judicial courtesy, it cannot be rejected out of hand as still-born.”

The plain reading of the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid case, reveals that the accused can rebut such presumption by leading evidence, or from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. It is, no doubt, not necessary for him, to establish his case, to rebut such statutory presumption, operating against him, under Section 4(1) of the Act (now under Section 20 (1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988), beyond a reasonable doubt. In the instant case whatever explanation was furnished by the accused, in his statement, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, has been discussed above, and the same has been found to be not satisfactory. Non-examination of Dhanwant Singh, prosecution witness, by the prosecution has been held to be of no consequence. No evidence was produced by the accused that on his recommendation, Kuwinder Singh, sister's son of Dhanwant Singh, was dismissed from service. The demand and acceptance of gratification, other than legal remuneration, by the accused, was proved from the cogent, and convincing evidence, produced by the prosecution. The statutory presumption under Section 20(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, remained unrebutted. The unrebutted statutory presumption strengthened the truthfulness of the prosecution case.

18. No other point, was urged, by the Counsel for the parties.

19. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, are based on the correct appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point. The same do not warrant any interference. The same are liable to be upheld.

20. For the reasons recorded above, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is dismissed. The judgment of conviction and the sentence, rendered by the trial Court, are upheld. If the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds shall stand cancelled.

21. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, shall take necessary steps to comply with the judgment, with due promptitude, keeping in view the applicability of the provisions of Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and submit compliance report, within two months.

22. The District & Sessions Judge, is also directed to ensure that the directions, referred to above, are complied with, and the compliance report is sent within the time frame, to this Court.

23. The Registry is directed to keep track that the directions are complied with, within the stipulated time. The papers be put up within 10 days, of the expiry of the time frame, whether the report is received or not, for further action.

Appeal dismissed.