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  • Section 306 I.P.C but Section 304B I.P.C
  • SECTION 113 EVIDENCE ACT
  • Sections 306, 304B or 302 of I.P.C
  • Sections 437 and 439 of Cr. P.C
  • Section 439 of Cr. P.C
  • Section 306 of I.P.C
  • Section 306 I.P.C,
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  • Section 306 I.P.C but Section 304B I.P.C
  • SECTION 113 EVIDENCE ACT
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  • Section 439 of Cr. P.C
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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Application for Cancellation of Bail (State of Gujarat v. Respondent-Accused)

Factual and Procedural Background

A complaint was lodged on 7-7-92 by Navinchandra (father of the deceased Mamta) at Maninagar Police Station alleging offences under Sections 306 and 498A I.P.C. The complaint named Ashish (son-in-law) and Ansuyaben (mother-in-law) as accused. Mamta and Ashish were married on 20-2-92. Mamta visited her parents in Delhi from 15-5-92 to 5-6-92 and during that time reportedly told her father about ill-treatment and threats, including an alleged demand for Rs. 25,000 and suspicions of the husband’s illicit relations. Letters dated 22-6-92 (from Ashish) and 27/28-6-92 (from Mamta) were said to have called the parents to Ahmedabad urgently; these letters were not produced later.

On 3-7-92 Mamta died from burns. The complaint was lodged on 7-7-92 (four days after the incident). Bail timelines in the record include:

  • Bail application before the Metropolitan Magistrate was filed on 8-7-92 and rejected for lack of jurisdiction.
  • A common bail application (Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992) was filed before the Addl. City Sessions Judge; the respondent's part of that application was withdrawn as "not pressed" (dates not precisely on record but prior to 17-7-92).
  • On 17-7-92 the respondent filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 1535 of 1992 (fresh bail application). Notice was issued by Mr. Atodaria and returnable on 22-7-92.
  • On 7-8-92 Mr. Pirzada, Addl. City Sessions Judge, released the respondent on bail on terms (initially without reasons).
  • On 12-8-92 Mr. Pirzada passed a reasoned order (about 23 typed pages) explaining the decision to grant bail.
  • On 25-9-92 the State filed the present application for cancellation of bail (filed in this Court’s office on 28-9-92). This Court issued Rule on 29-9-92, returnable initially on 13-10-92 and subsequently on 21-10-92; the matter was heard later owing to vacations/backlog.
  • Meanwhile, the police filed a charge-sheet and the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the bail order dated 12-8-92 passed by the Addl. City Sessions Judge (Mr. Pirzada) should be cancelled on the procedural ground that an earlier bail application by the respondent was withdrawn as "not pressed" (which the State contends amounts to dismissal) and absent any fresh grounds or changed circumstances the subsequent bail should not have been entertained.
  2. Whether the learned Sessions Judge erred in going into a detailed appreciation of evidence at the bail stage, including drawing adverse inferences from non-production of two letters, thereby exceeding permissible judicial function at that stage.
  3. Whether the learned Judge improperly exercised discretion by relying on irrelevant considerations (such as social status) in granting bail, thereby warranting interference under binding Supreme Court authority.
  4. Whether the facts (suicide within less than five months of marriage; alleged demand of Rs. 25,000) called for raising the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act and/or attracting Section 304B I.P.C, and whether the Judge wrongly failed to consider these aspects.
  5. Whether successive bail applications on the same subject should have been placed before the same Judge in accordance with judicial-discipline principles laid down by the Supreme Court (and whether the failure to do so affected the validity of the bail order).

Arguments of the Parties

State's Arguments (as set out in the application)

  • The earlier bail application of the respondent was withdrawn as "not pressed", which amounts to dismissal; absent fresh grounds or changed circumstances within a week, the learned Judge ought not to have entertained a fresh bail application and granted bail.
  • The learned Judge should not have drawn adverse inference from the non-production of the two letters while the investigation was in progress; it was premature to penalize the prosecution for non-production.
  • There was evidence of ill-treatment sufficient to make out prima facie offences under Sections 306 and 498A I.P.C.
  • The suicide occurred within five months of marriage and therefore Section 113A Evidence Act presumption ought to have been invoked.
  • The facts suggested applicability of Section 304B I.P.C (dowry-related death), even though no FIR under 304B had been registered at that time; Section 304B could be added during trial.
  • Relying on a 1992 GLR decision (page 3), bride-burning cases warrant denial of bail; the accused charged under Section 306 should not have been granted bail given social context and rise of such offences.

Respondent-Accused's Arguments (Mr. N.M. Amin, Advocate)

  • Cancelling bail is different from denying bail; the Supreme Court in Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat (1984) means bail can be cancelled only on specific post-release misconduct such as tampering with evidence or absconding; the State has not alleged such misuse by the respondent.
  • The learned Judge's reasoned order (12-8-92) should be respected; subsequent statements (recorded on 7-9-92) do not bolster the State’s case — they show the complainant later suggested letters might have been torn or destroyed, which the respondent argues indicates fabrication or ulterior motive.
  • The police investigation is complete and charge-sheet has been filed; the Magistrate has committed the case to Sessions. Given passage of time (more than four months) and no allegation of misconduct after release, the Court should not cancel bail.
  • The respondent complied with bail conditions; there is no material to show he misused his liberty after release.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in this Case
Smt. Shyama Devi v. State of West Bengal, 1987 (2) Crimes 325 (Calcutta High Court) Cited by the Addl. City Sessions Judge in his order (as authority relevant to bail decision). The Addl. City Sessions Judge referenced this case when granting bail; the High Court (B.J. Shethna, J.) noted the reference but found the lower Judge did not explain applicability and the higher court considered it not applicable on the facts before it.
Ranchhodbhai (Division Bench of this Court) [no full citation provided in text] Referred to by the Addl. City Sessions Judge in his bail order (authority relied upon for bail reasoning). The High Court observed the lower Judge cited Ranchhodbhai but did not discuss how its facts applied; the High Court found those decisions not germane to the facts here.
1990 (2) GLH (UJ) page 11 (Division Bench judgment of this Court) Principle: presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be raised without evidence on record (as referred to by the Sessions Judge). The Sessions Judge relied on this authority; the High Court held the judge misapplied it because the cited decision involved very different facts (suicide after 10–12 years of marriage) and therefore Section 113A did not apply there — not comparable to the present facts.
Shyamdutt Upadhyay v. State of Gujarat, 1992 (1) G.L.R. page 121 : (1992 (1) GLH 258) Principle: withdrawal/not pressing of a bail petition amounts to dismissal; subsequent entertaining of the same relief without fresh grounds is inappropriate. The High Court relied on this authority as directly supporting the procedural ground for setting aside the subsequent bail: because the earlier application was withdrawn as not pressed, the Sessions Judge ought not to have entertained and granted a fresh bail application absent change in circumstances.
Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State of Gujarat, (1984) 1 SCC 284 : A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 372 Principle (as relied upon by defence): cancellation of bail is appropriate only if the accused misuses liberty after release (e.g., tampering with evidence, absconding). The defence cited this case to argue bail should not be cancelled here; the High Court acknowledged the authority but found State had other valid grounds (procedural and merits) to cancel bail notwithstanding the absence of post-release misconduct.
State of Andhra Pradesh v. R.V. Rayanim, (1990) 1 SCC 433 : AIR 1990 S.C. 626 Supreme Court held interference is warranted where bail is granted on irrelevant considerations (e.g., status or influence) irrespective of nature of accusation and materials. The High Court applied this precedent to conclude the Sessions Judge had granted bail on irrelevant considerations (social status, career impact) and therefore interference to quash that bail order was justified.
Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, (1987) 2 SCC 684 Principle: successive bail applications on the same subject should, as a matter of judicial discipline, be placed before the same Judge to avoid conflicting orders and forum-shopping. The High Court relied on this precedent (and related decisions) to criticize the practice in the instant case where the subsequent bail application was decided by a different Judge, noting that judicial discipline required placement before the same Judge if available.
State of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 605 ; 1990 SCC (Cri) 126 Reaffirmed the principle that successive bail applications should be placed before the same Judge; change in facts must be substantial to justify a different decision by a different Judge. The High Court cited this authority to support the proposition that the subsequent bail application here should have been placed before the same Judge who earlier rejected the bail, absent a substantial change in circumstances.
Arvindkumar J. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, 1990 (1) G.L.R 623 : (1992 (2) G.L.H 442) Applied principles regarding seriousness of offences under Sections 306 and 498A and judicial caution in granting bail. The High Court cited this local authority to reinforce the view that bail in such serious offences should not be lightly granted and that courts must be careful in exercising their discretion.
1992 (1) G.L.R. page 3 (unnamed case cited in the State's grounds) Referenced in State's grounds regarding the social context of bride-burning cases (argument that these offences call for denial of bail). The State cited this GLR authority to argue against bail in bride-burning/bride-burning-like cases; the High Court noted the State's reliance on such authorities as part of its broader argument opposing bail.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in two principal strands: procedural infirmity and merits.

Procedural Analysis

  • The Court found that the respondent's earlier bail application had been withdrawn as "not pressed" before Mr. Atodaria (Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992). The High Court treated such withdrawal as amounting to an order of dismissal (as supported by Shyamdutt Upadhyay v. State of Gujarat).
  • On that basis the High Court held that absent any fresh ground or change in circumstances, the Sessions Judge should not have entertained and decided a subsequent bail application on merits. The learned Judge (Mr. Pirzada) failed to consider this procedural bar in his reasoned order dated 12-8-92.
  • The Court further held that successive bail applications ought, as a matter of judicial discipline, to be placed before the same Judge if available (citing Shahzad Hasan Khan and Buddhikota Subha Rao). Here, the subsequent bail application was disposed of by Mr. Pirzada though Mr. Atodaria had earlier issued notice and fixed a return date — the High Court considered that practice improper absent substantial change in circumstances.

Merits Analysis

  • The High Court concluded that Mr. Pirzada exceeded the proper role of a bail court by undertaking detailed appreciation of the prosecution evidence at the investigation stage. Although the Sessions Judge acknowledged that a bail court should not analyze evidence, he nevertheless proceeded to evaluate prosecution witnesses and to form conclusions adverse to the prosecution.
  • The Sessions Judge drew an adverse inference from the non-production of two letters (22-6-92 and 27/28-6-92). The High Court held it was improper to assess this matter at the bail stage and that the judge's approach was wholly wrong.
  • The Sessions Judge also relied on the accused's social status and career considerations (potential adverse effect on career) in deciding bail. The High Court cited State of Andhra Pradesh v. R.V. Rayanim to observe that granting bail on such irrelevant considerations warrants interference; the impugned order was thus set aside for reliance on irrelevant factors.
  • The High Court emphasized facts relevant to presumptions and dowry-death provisions: the deceased committed suicide within less than five months of marriage and there was an allegation of demand for Rs. 25,000. The High Court held these facts could attract Section 113A (Evidence Act) and Section 304B I.P.C, or at least required careful consideration rather than dismissal at the bail stage. The Sessions Judge failed to apply his mind to these aspects.
  • The Court expressly rejected the Sessions Judge's reliance on a local Division Bench decision (1990 (2) GLH (UJ) p.11) distinguishing that decision's facts (suicide after 10–12 years of marriage) from the present facts. The High Court found that reliance misplaced.

Disposition of Conflicting Procedural Contentions

  • The defence contention that bail cancellation requires post-release misconduct (citing Bhagirathsinh Judeja) was considered, but the High Court found independent procedural and substantive errors in the grant of bail sufficient to justify cancellation even without allegations of tampering or absconding.
  • The passage of time (more than four months) and filing of charge-sheet/commitment to Sessions were considered not to preclude interference if the original bail order was found to be bad in law and on merits.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The High Court allowed the State's petition and set aside the bail order. The impugned order dated 12-8-92 passed by the learned City Sessions Judge (Mr. Pirzada) releasing the respondent-accused on bail was quashed and set aside. The bail granted to the respondent-accused was cancelled; a non-bailable warrant was ordered to be issued and the Investigating Officer was directed to ensure immediate arrest pursuant to that warrant. The request for a three-week stay on the operation of the order was rejected.

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  • The respondent's bail is cancelled and a non-bailable warrant is to be issued for his arrest; the Investigating Officer is directed to see to immediate arrest under that warrant.
  • The Court refused a temporary stay of the cancellation request by defence counsel, holding such a stay would nullify the effect of cancelling bail.

Broader Implications and Guidance

  • The Court admonished subordinate courts to exercise discretion under Sections 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. with care and caution, especially in serious offences such as Sections 302, 304B and 306 I.P.C., and not as a matter of course.
  • The judgment reinforced the principle of judicial discipline: successive bail applications on the same subject should ordinarily be placed before the same Judge (if available) to avoid conflicting orders, forum-shopping and abuse of process.
  • The Court emphasized that bail courts should not undertake trial-like appreciation of evidence at the investigation stage and should avoid drawing definitive inferences that are properly for trial.

Administrative Note: The Rule in the petition was made absolute and the petition was allowed.

    State Of Gujarat v. Ashish B. Gandhi

    B.J Shethna, J.:— This Application is filed by the State of Gujarat for cancelling the bail order dated 12-8-92 passed by Mr. S.M Pirzada, learned Addl. City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad in Criminal Mis. Application No. 1535 of 1982 releasing the respondent-accused on bail for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of I.P.C

    2. Complainant-Navinchandra, father of the deceased Mamta, lodged the complaint on 7-7-92 before the Maninagar Police Station against (1) his son-in-law Ashish, and (2) Ansuyaben-mother-in-law of deceased Mamta, which was registered by the police for the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of I.P.C Ansuyaben is also the cousin of the complainant, i.e daughter of his natural aunt. Thus, the parties were not only known to each other but also closely related to each other. The marriage of deceased Mamta and Ashish took place on 20-2-92 at Ahmedabad. Complainant Navinchandra is resident of Delhi. After the marriage, for the first time Mamta went to Delhi at her parent place on 15-5-92 and stayed there upto 5-6-92 for about 20 days. At Delhi she told her father (complainant) that she was tortured by the accused by saying that she was not modern and forward, that she did not know proper English, that she also did not know how to cooking. She was asked to arrange for Rs. 25,000.00. She also stated to her father that her husband is having illicit relations with other woman and, therefore, also she was ill-treated by her husband. It is also stated in the complaint that on 22-6-92 accused Ashish had written a letter to the complainant and called his in-laws to come immediately by the first available train to Ahmedabad and he also asked them not to try to contact him either on phone or by letter. Thereafter, a letter dated 27 or 28 June addressed by the deceased Mamta was received by the complainant by which she had asked her parents to come immediately to Ahmedabad and to take her away by giving any excuse. She also stated in that letter that the she was mentally tortured by the accused and efforts were made to give her divorce. Thereupon, the complainant contacted Mamta on phone. At that time accused Ansuyaben-mother-in-law of deceased told him that there was nothing serious. And, therefore, he did not go to Ahmedabad immediately and they thought they would go to Ahmedabad at their convenience. But on 3-7-92 he received a telephonic message from Shri Vinodbhai Shah - maternal uncle-in-law of deceased Mamta that Mamta died due to bums injuries, so they shall come to Ahmedabad as early as possible. On that very day they left for Ahmedabad and after making proper inquiry about the incident on 7-7-92, i.e after four days of the incident, the complainant lodged the complaint against his son-in-law and mother of his son-in-law for the aforesaid offences before the police.

    3. When the accused were arrested is not borne out from the record of this case. But it seems that they must have been either arrested on 7th or 8th as on 8-7-92 they have filed bail application before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, Ahmedabad for releasing them on bail, which was rejected by the learned Magistrate on the ground that he had no jurisdiction.

    4. Now, before deciding this application a few material events are required to be stated, which are as under:

    (1) The present accused alongwith his mother Ansuyaben-co-accused filed a common bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992 before the Court of learned Addl. City Sessions Judge. That application was filed on what date is not borne out from the record. However, it must have been filed any time prior to 17-7-92 because Criminal Misc. Application No. 1535 of 1992, was filed by the present respondent-accused for releasing him on bail on 17-7-92 wherein it is stated that earlier bail application being Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992 was withdrawn as not pressed from the Court of Mr. R.M Atodaria, learned Addl. City Sessions Judge. It also appears from the record that Mr. Atodaria, learned Addl. City Sessions Judge had granted bail to accused Ansuyaben in that Criminal Misc. Application No. 1451 of 1992. However, the order passed by Mr. Atodaria, learned Judge releasing the accused Ansyuabcn on bail and dismissing the bail application of the accused Ashish as not pressed, is also on the record of this case. Be that it may.

    (2) On 17-7-92, as stated above, the respondent-accused Ashish filed fresh Criminal Misc. Application No. 1535 of 1992 again before the leaned Judge Mr. Atodaria. In that application it was stated that his bail application was not pressed as on that day the post-mortem notes were not available. On 21-7-92, Mr. Atodaria, learned Judge issued notice to P.P and made it returnable on 22-7-92.

    (3) On 7-8-92, Mr. Pirzada, learned Addl. City Sessions Judge released the accused Ashish on bail on certain terms and conditions without assigning reasons.

    (4) On 12-8-92, learned Judge Mr. Pirzada passed a reasoned order running into about 23 typed pages, which is under challenge in this application by the State.

    (5) On 7-9-92, further statement of the complainant came to be recorded wherein he has stated that two letters (1) dated 22-6-92 addressed by the accused Ashish, and (2) dated 27 or 28 June, 1992, addressed by the deceased Mamta, are not traceable because either they must have been tom by somebody or went in “Pasti”. Therefore, he is unable to produce those letters before the police.

    (6) This present Application for cancellation of bail is dated 25-9-92, which is filed in the office of this Court on 28-9-92. On 29-9-92, this Court issued Rule and made it returnable on 13-10-92. On 13-10-92, fresh notice of Rule was issued and it was made returnable on 21-10-92. However, this matter could be heard only today. Mr. N.M Amin, learned Advocate, appeared for the respondent-accused in this case.

    (7) Meanwhile, charge-sheet is filed, as stated by learned Advocate Mr. Amin. And, the learned Magistrate has also committed the case to the Court of Sessions against the accused.

    5. At this stage it would be proper to set out the reasons recorded by the learned Judge Mr. Pirzada for releasing the respondent-accused on bail, which are as under:

    (1) On page 13 in para 8 of his order he has considered non-production of two letters by the complainant, (i) dated 22-6-92 written by accused Ashish, and (ii) dated 27 or 28 June 1992 written by deceased Mamta to the complainant, till 7-8-92 (though that reasoned order is dated 12-8-92). At page 14 after discussion he held that at this stage it is a matter of debate whether the fact regarding those letters can be believed or not.

    (2) At page 14 para 9, though he has stated that at the stage of deciding bail application it is not proper for the court to analyse or discuss the evidence, even then he has come to the conclusion; “But at the same time necessary evidence in form of statements is required to be appreciated”, as he was of the opinion that “otherwise now can the court reasonably exercise discretion?” He has also come to the conclusion that as the Sessions Judge he has the same powers, which the High Court has under Section 439 of the Cr. P.C and even though the offence is punishable with death or life imprisonment in such offences also, even if there is a prima facie case, the Sessions Judge can exercise his judicial discretion in favour of the accused for releasing him on bail.

    (3) After observing as aforesaid, at page 15 para 10 he has discussed the following circumstances for releasing the accused on bail:

    (i) Aforesaid two letters are not produced by the complainant in spite of the repeated opportunities given to him to produce the same.

    (ii) The incident took place in the house of the accused between 9.0 a.m to 9.30 a.m on 3-7-92. At that time the accused Ansuyaben and Ashish were out of their house, as Ansuyaben had gone to School to attend her duty as Head-Mistress at 6.30 a.m and Ashish had reached the site for attending his duty as Supervisor. He was informed at his office on phone that his house was set on fire due short circuit.

    (iii) Deceased closed the door from inside the house and committed suicide in her room by pouring kerosene on her body.

    (iv) On 20-2-92 marriage took place between deceased Mamta and accused Ashish. Thereafter, from 15-5-92 to 5-6-92 deceased Mamta stayed at Delhi with her parents and came back to Ahmedabad. Thus, the period during which Mamta stayed with the accused at his house cannot be said to be long.

    (v) In the complaint the complainant has stated that deceased Mamta was tortured by the accused by calling her not modern and forward and by saying that she was not knowing English and not knowing cooking and also by asking her to bring Rs. 25,000/-. However, it is not borne out from the statements of Arunaben-mother of the deceased and Amit-brother of the deceased that why and for what that amount of Rs. 25,000/- was demanded, and there is nothing on record to show whether any arrangement was made by the complainant to pay the said amount and the complainant and other witnesses have also remained silent on that point in their statement.

    (vi) Complainant and accused-Ansuyaben were closely related to each other as Ansuyaben is his cousin sister, i.e daughter of his maternal uncle. The accused is the Civil Engineer and working as the Supervisor in one construction company, his younger brother is serving in Dahod Polytechnic and his mother Ansuyaben is holding a responsible post of Head-Mistress of the School and his father is Assistant Manager of a Nationalised Bank. Thus, the entire family of the accused Ashish is highly educated and well to do. Therefore, whether they will demand Rs. 25,000/- from the deceased Mamta, that story is probable or not requires consideration.

    (vii) Whether the deceased Mamta was knowing cooking or not is not borne out from the statements of the complainant and his wife Arunaben. They have not stated that she was expert in cooking. Therefore, if she was not knowing cooking well, then as per mother-in-law if sometimes she had told her about cooking and instructed accordingly, that would not lead the deceased Mamta to commit suicide.

    (4) At page 18 para 11, he has discussed the conduct of the complainant after receipt of the letters and appreciated his evidence. (Except saying in terms that the evidence of the complainant is not reliable, he has stated everything.)

    (5) At page 21 of his order he has stated that he has got discretion under Section 439 of Cr. P.C and in reasonable manner he has to exercise his jurisdiction and he is using that in favour of the accused Ashish, who himself is educated and coming from educated family and serving as Supervisor in one Engineering Firm and if no order rejecting his bail application is passed then it will adversely affect his career.

    (6) At page 22 of his order he has referred to judgment of the Division Bench of this court in case of Ranchhodbhai and also the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Smt. Shyama Devi v. State of West Bengal, reported in 1987 (2) Crimes page 325 for deciding the bail application in favour of the accused, but without any discussion as to how they are applicable. He has also relied upon the Division Bench Judgment of this court reported in 1990 (2) GLH (UJ) page 11 for coming to the conclusion that the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be raised without there being any evidence on the record to that effect.

    6. Following grounds are taken in this Application for cancellation of bail:

    (1) The first and foremost ground which is raised in this application is that once earlier bail application preferred by the respondent-accused was withdrawn as not having been pressed (in absence of fresh grounds within a period of less than one week), the learned Judge ought not to have entertained the fresh bail application. Not pressed or withdrawal of the petition amounts to dismissal as laid down by this court in a case reported in 1992 (1) G.L.R page 121 and by the Supreme Court in 1990 S.C (Crimes) 126.

    (2) The learned Judge ought not to have drawn the adverse inference for not producing two letters by the complainant as the investigation was in progress and it was too premature for the learned Judge to conclude the same at that stage.

    (3) There was evidence regarding ill-treatment meted out to the deceased Mamta by the accused and, therefore, prima facie offence is committed under S. 306 as well as S. 498A of I.P.C

    (4) The deceased committed suicide within a period of less than five months of the marriage and, therefore, presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act ought to have been raised against the accused by the learned Judge in this case.

    (5) In fact, though the police has not registered the offence against the accused under Section 304B of I.P.C and yet not submitted its report against the accused for offence punishable under Section 304B, the evidence on record suggests that Section 304B will be attracted in view of Section 113A of the Evidence Act.

    (6) In view of the judgment of this court reported in 1992 (1) G.L.R, page 3 the accused who is charged with the serious offence punishable under Section 306 of I.P.C should not have been granted bail as the “bride burning cases are on rise and it seems that brides are meant for burning and kerosene is meant for burning brides.”

    7. Mr. Amin, learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused, has vehemently submitted that this Court should not cancel the bail granted in favour of the accused in this application for cancellation of bail by the State as the considerations for grant of bail and cancelling bail are totally different. He relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Bhagirathsinh S/O Mahipat Singh Judeja v. State Of Gujarat., reported in (1984) 1 SCC 284 : A.I.R 1984 Supreme Court 372 and submitted that the bail can be cancelled only if it pointed out that after the accused is released on bail he has tried to misuse his liberty by tampering with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or tried to jump the bail and would not make himself available to face the trial against him. In this case it is not the case of the State that the respondent-accused has either tried to jump the bail or tamper with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. He has also strongly relied upon the reasons given by the learned Judge in his order. He has further pointed out that after the learned Judge passed the reasoned order on 12-8-92, further statement of the complainant was recorded on 7-9-92, in which he has not tried to come out with a case that those two letters either might have been torn by somebody or might have gone in “Pasti”. This shows that the complainant has filed false complaint against the accused after 4 days of the incident, only with an ulterior motive to harass the accused. He further submitted that the investigation is over and the police has already filed the charge-sheet against the accused. Not only that but the learned Magistrate has also committed the case to the Sessions Court against the accused and, therefore, after a period of nearly more than 4 months of grant of bail it would not be proper for this court to cancel the bail granted in favour of the respondent-accused.

    8. In my opinion, the impugned order granting bail passed by the learned Addl. City Sessions Judge Mr. Pirzada is required to be set aside and the bail granted in favour of the respondent-accused is required to be cancelled forthwith firstly on the ground that once the earlier application of the respondent-accused was not pressed and the same was withdrawn, it amounts to an order of dismissal and in absence of fresh ground or change in circumstances, the accused should not have been released on bail by the learned Judge. This point is directly covered by the judgment of this court in the case of Shyamdutt Upadhyay v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1992 (1) G.L.R page 121 : (1992 (1) GLH 258). As stated earlier, it may be noted that after the bail application of the original accused was rejected by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate on 8-7-92 they had moved bail application being C.M.A No. 1451 of 1992 before the City Sessions Court, Ahmedabad, which was withdrawn as not pressed qua the present respondent-accused before the learned Addl. City Sessions Judge Mr. Atodaria, prior to 17-7-92. On 17-7-92 the respondent-accused preferred fresh bail application being C.M.A 1535 of 1992 on which learned Judge Mr. Atodaria had issued notice on 21-7-92 and made it returnable on 22-7-92. But, surprisingly the learned Judge Mr. Pirzada first only passed an order dated 7-8-92 of releasing the accused on bail on certain terms and conditions and subsequently on 12-8-92 passed the reasoned order.

    9. In that order the learned Judge has not at all dealt with the aspect of the earlier bail application having been withdrawn as not pressed by the respondent-accused. It was not open to the learned Judge to go into the merits of the case and decide the same. Because, once the earlier bail application was withdrawn it has to be presumed that all possible contentions must have been raised before the court and the court was not inclined to accept the same and release the accused on bail and, therefore, only the bail application was not pressed by the Advocate for the accused at that time. Under these circumstances, if the court has allowed to withdraw that petition it is nothing but an order of dismissal and, therefore, in absence of any change in circumstances or any fresh grounds, the learned Judge ought not to have entertained the bail application and decided the same on merits and released the respondent-accused on bail. Therefore, only on this ground the impugned order passed by the learned Judge Mr. Pirzada releasing the accused on bail is required to be set aside.

    10. On merits also the impugned order passed by the learned Judge is required to be quashed. The reasons assigned by him for releasing the accused on bail are set out by me in para 5 of this judgment. His order runs into 23 type pages. He has discussed and appreciated the prosecution case, at the investigation stage, as if he was deciding the sessions Case after the regular trial. Except stating that the evidence of prosecution witnesses is not reliable he has stated everything against the prosecution. He entered the area which was not permissible to him at this stage.

    11. It was not open for the learned Judge to raise doubts about the non-production of the two letters by the complainant. He was conscious that while deciding the bail application it was not proper for the court to analyse or discuss the evidence. He has observed in his order to this effect. But, thereafter, he has proceeded to appreciate the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as he was of the opinion that otherwise the court cannot reasonably exercise its discretion. That was a wholly wrong approach adopted by the learned Judge. Merely because the respondent-accused was away when the incident took place, that itself would not absolve the husband from the liability of offence punishable under Section 306 I.P.C, if otherwise there is enough evidence against him. In fact, the deceased committed suicide in her bed room after closing the house from inside at about 9.00 to 9.30 a.m and that too within less than a period of 5 months of her marriage. These circumstances were enough to raise presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act against the respondent-accused. Without applying his mind the learned Judge has relied upon the judgment of this court reported in 1990 (2) GLH (UJ) page 11, which was cited by the learned Advocate for the accused.

    12. It seems that he has simply relied upon the statement of the learned Advocate and he has not even cared to minutely go through that judgment. In fact, in that case the wife had committed suicide after 10 to 12 years of her marriage and in appeal this court in the facts of that case observed that Section 113 A of the Evidence Act would not apply. That is not the case here. Social status of the accused, which is heavily relied upon by the learned Judge is of little help to the accused.

    13. In the case of State of Andhara Pradesh v. R.V Rayanim, reported in (1990) 1 SCC 433 : AIR 1990 S.C 626 the Supreme Court has clearly held in para 6 of its judgment that, “This court would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the lower court in granting or refusing bail but in cases where bail has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as status or influence of the person accused and regardless of the nature of the accusation and the relevancy of materials on record, this court would not hesitate to interfere for the ends of justice.” This case is, therefore, squarely covered by the aforesaid judgment of the Supreme Court. The learned Judge has granted bail on totally irrelevant considerations and regardless of the nature of the accusations and relevancy of materials on record. Therefore, this court would not hesitate to interfere with the impugned order of bail and to cancel the same for the ends of justice.

    14. Once it has come out in the statement of the complainant that the respondent-accused had demanded Rs. 25,000/- it would be a case under Section 304B I.P.C It is true that the complaint is registered against the accused under Section 306 I.P.C but Section 304B I.P.C can be added at any time during the course of the trial also. However, the learned Judge has totally overlooked that aspect. Whether the deceased was knowing cooking or not is wholly irrelevant. I fail to understand how the learned Judge has touched that aspect. The learned Judge has of course referred to the judgment of this court in Ranchhodbhai's case and also to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Shyma Devi's case. But except referring to the same he has not at all discussed their facts. How they are applicable in the facts of this case is also not stated. In fact, going through the said judgments I find that they are not at all applicable to the facts of this case. Thus, the reasons assigned by the learned Judge for releasing the accused are not germane. Therefore, the said order is required to be quashed.

    15. Mr. Amin, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent-accused, has submitted that after the accused was released on bail by the learned Judge, a period of more than four months has passed. Meanwhile the police has not only filed the charge-sheet against the accused but the learned Magistrate has also committed the case against the accused to the Court of Sessions and it is not alleged in this petition that after the accused was released on bail he has misused his liberty either by tampering with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses or by attempting to jump the bail and he has complied with all the conditions imposed by the learned Judge while releasing him on bail. Therefore, this court should not cancel the bail granted in favour of the accused.

    16. It is true that a period of more than four months has passed after the order passed by the learned Judge releasing the respondent-accused on bail. The reasoned order was passed on 12-8-92 by the learned Judge and the same order has been challenged by the State before this court on 28-9-92 on receiving its certified copy. On 29-9-92 this petition was admitted and ordered to be heard on 13-10-92. Thereafter, fresh notice of rule was issued and it was made returnable on 21-10-92. Thereafter, there was a Diwali vacation and finally this matter is heard today. In fact due to backlog of the cases this matter could not be heard early. In any case, merely because a period of four months has expired after the release of the respondent-accused on bail, that itself is not a ground for not cancelling the bail by this court, if otherwise this court comes to the conclusion that the impugned order is bad and is required to be set aside.

    17. In the same manner, merely because charge-sheet is now submitted and the case is committed to the court of Sessions against the accused and the Sessions Case is likely to commence soon, they are also no grounds for not interfering with the impugned order of bail. There are number of Sessions Cases where even though the accused are refused bail, they are not tried immediately. In such type of cases the accused who are denied bail have remained in jail some time for one year or more. But, it happens in some case in which the accused is released on bail, not only the investigation is completed early but the cases are also committed to the Court of Sessions and they are disposed of soon. This is not proper. In this case, after the respondent-accused was released on bail when one more further statement of the complainant came to be recorded, he has come out with the case that those two important letters either might have been tom by somebody or went in “Pasti”. It may be true or it may not be true.

    18. Therefore, the impugned order passed by the learned Judge has to be set aside. I have found that lower courts are very liberal in their approach while deciding bail applications of the accused persons, who are involved in very serious and heinous offences like Sections 306, 304B or 302 of I.P.C which are not only committed against the individual but also against the society as a whole. Because of that such accused persons have become fearless and have feeling that they can commit any type of serious and heinous offence but nothing is going to happen to them. They are not going to be kept in jail as the courts are there to release them on bail and once they are out on bail, the obvious result is that of acquittal at the end of trial. Thus, a bail order is the first step towards acquittal and though the Courts impose condition of not tampering with the evidence of the prosecution witnesses, in most of the cases that happens and either the witnesses do not come forward to depose against the accused or if they come before the court, they turn hostile and ultimately the accused is acquitted. Therefore, Court should not ordinarily grant bail to accused persons who are charged with aforesaid serious offences.

    19. Statute has given discretion to the court under Sections 437 and 439 of Cr. P.C to release accused persons who are charged with non-bailable offences. Thus, the discretion has been vested in the courts to release the accused on bail. When the discretion is to be exercised by the court in which it is vested, it has to exercise the same with great care and caution and not in one and all cases. It should be exercised in very good and deserving cases in favour of the accused persons, considering the overall circumstances of the case. If the court has discretion then it has to be exercised sparingly and not as a matter of course. After all, crime is a revolt against the whole society and attack on the civilization of the day. The order is the basic need of any organized civilized society. Attempt to disturb that order affects the society and the community. Law and order can effectively be maintained by punishing the criminals. A criminal can be punished only when the prosecution is able to lead evidence and prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but if the witnesses do not support the prosecution case because of fear of the accused or for any other reason, the crime would go unpunished and the criminal would be encouraged. In the ultimate analysis, it is the society which suffers. Respect for law has to be maintained in the interest of the society and discouragement of a criminal is one of the ways to maintain it. Therefore, ordinarily court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the accused persons who are charged with the offences u/Ss. 302, 304B, 306 I.P.C and other serious offences which are against the society.

    20. Before parting with the judgment I must state that in the case of Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan, reported in (1987) 2 SCC 684, the Supreme Court has held that, “where earlier bail applications of the accused was already rejected by a Judge of the High Court, subsequent application should also have been placed before the same Judge”. The Supreme Court has further held that, “If successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders and a litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of courts time. Judicial discipline requires that such matters must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available for order.” The same view has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in its later Judgment in the case of State Of Maharashtra v. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao .. reported in 1989 Supp (2) SCC 605, 1990 SCC (Cri) 126. In that case also successive bail applications of the accused were rejected on merits. The Supreme Court held that, “once that application was rejected there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in fact situation. Change in fact situation means a substantial change which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes which are of little or no consequence. In such a situation the proper course was to direct that the matter be placed before the same Judge who disposed of the earlier applications. Such a practice or convention would prevent abuse of the process of court inasmuch as it will prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to secure an order to his liking. Such a practice would also discourage the filing of successive bail applications without change of circumstances. Such a practice if adopted would be conducive to judicial discipline and would also save the court's time as Judge familiar with the facts would be able to dispose of the subsequent application with despatch. It will also result in consistency.” Relying upon the aforesaid Judgment of the Supreme Court in Buddhikota Subha Rao's case (supra), in case of Arvindkumar J. Gupta v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1990 (1) G.L.R 623 : (1992 (2) G.L.H 442) this court has also taken same view. Incidentally at this stage it may be stated that in that case bail application was filed by the accused, who was charged with the offences punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of I.P.C Disposing of that case this Court has also observed that, “Otherwise also, such offences are on the increase and if bail applications in such serious offences are taken lightly, it will have its impact on the society”. Accordingly, the bail application of that accused was rejected by this Court.

    21. Aforesaid two decisions of the Supreme Court, (i) Shahzad Hasan Khan's case and (ii) Buddhikota Subha Rao's case, clearly lay down that judicial discipline requires that successive bail applications on the same subject must be placed before the same Judge for its disposal. In this case, as stated earlier, the earlier bail application of the respondent-accused was rejected on any date between 8-7-92 to 16-7-92. And, within a period of less than a week a fresh bail application was moved on the ground that when previous bail application was not pressed post-mortem notes were not available, before the Sessions Court on 17-7-92. It was rightly placed before the learned Judge Mr. Atodaria, who issued notice on 21-7-92 and made it returnable on 22-7-92. But for any reason it was not decided by him on that day and on 7-8-92 Mr. Pirzada heard and released him on bail and gave reasons for it on 12-8-92. In view of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court it would have been proper if the subsequent bail application was decided by learned Judge Mr. Atodaria, if he was available, and not by Mr. Pirzada.

    22. It has also come to the notice of this Court that in a bail application filed before a court by the accused persons, which was rejected by the learned Judge, separate bail application filed by the co-accused was granted by another learned Judge on same material, and those accused were released on bail. Thus conflicting orders were passed by different Judges. Judicial discipline requires that subsequent application must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available for passing orders. Such practice or convention would also prevent abuse of the process of the court. It will also prevent an impression being created that a litigant is avoiding or selecting a court to secure an order to his liking and it will maintain consistency. Otherwise the litigant would attempt before every Judge till he gets order to his liking which may shake the confidence.

    23. Therefore, the subordinate courts will see to it that subsequent bail application filed by other accused or same accused also be placed before the same Judge, who has disposed of the first bail application of a co-accused of the case, if the learned Judge is available for passing the orders. If the learned Judge, who passed the order in earlier petition is not available for few days, hearing of such bail application can wait for some time till the learned Judge is available. It is only in case in which the learned Judge has either retired or transferred to any other District or he has proceeded on long leave for more than a period of two or three months, only in such cases the subsequent bail application of other accused or same accused may be placed before other Judge.

    24. In any case, the impugned order passed by the learned Judge releasing the respondent-accused on bail in this case is required to be set aside on the ground that the learned Judge was not justified in releasing the accused on bail in absence of any change in the circumstances or fresh grounds when the earlier bail application of the respondent-accused was rejected as having not been pressed and also on the ground that on irrelevant considerations he has released the respondent-accused on bail regardless of the nature of the accusations and relevancy of materials on record. Accordingly this petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute. The impugned order dated 12-8-92 passed by the learned City Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad releasing the respondent-accused on bail is quashed and set aside. The bail, granted in favour of the respondent-accused, stands cancelled. Non-bailable warrant to be issued against the respondent-accused. I.O to see to it that the respondent-accused is immediately arrested pursuant to the non-bailable warrant. Request of Mr. Amin, learned Advocate appearing for the accused, to stay the operation of this order for three weeks from today cannot be granted because it would nullify the effect of the order of cancelling bail. Therefore, this request is rejected.

    25. Rule made absolute.

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