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  • SECTION 4 A DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT 1961
  • provisions are Sections 177, 178, 179, 180 and 181(4). These provisions
  • Sections of Indian Penal Code with P.S Sarita Vihar.2.
  • provisions of Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
  • Section 181(2) of CrPC (1898)
  • person.15. Section 179
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 4 A DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT 1961
  • provisions are Sections 177, 178, 179, 180 and 181(4). These provisions
  • Sections of Indian Penal Code with P.S Sarita Vihar.2.
  • provisions of Section 156(3) of the CrPC.
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC.
  • Section 181(2) of CrPC (1898)
  • person.15. Section 179
Smart Summary

Summary of Opinion — V.B. Gupta, J. (High Court)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition under Section 482 CrPC seeks quashing of a complaint pending before the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, and consequential FIR No. 705/06 registered at P.S. Sarita Vihar. The complaint alleges that petitioners 1 & 2 obtained a housing loan (Rs. 3 lakhs) on mortgage of a property in Bangalore by making false representations about title; petitioner No. 3 was the Branch Manager and guarantor. The loan was sanctioned and disbursed by the Delhi head office after the Bangalore branch processed the file. The borrowers defaulted on EMI payments for more than two years. Subsequent scrutiny in 2003 revealed alleged forgeries and that the land allegedly mortgaged was taken over by the Government and had a water tank — facts not disclosed to the complainant, which are said to indicate dishonest intention from the outset.

The Magistrate asked the police (respondent No.2) for an action report. The police conducted a preliminary inquiry and reported that no part of the alleged offences occurred in Delhi and that all formalities and disbursement took place in Bangalore. The complainant (respondent No.3) objected to the police report, arguing the inquiry officer had no authority to determine jurisdiction and that the police should register a case where a cognizable offence is disclosed. On 29 July 2006 the Magistrate concluded cognizable offences were made out, directed the SHO Sarita Vihar to register a case against the accused under various IPC sections and investigate. The present petition challenges that Magistrate's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the criminal courts at Delhi have territorial jurisdiction to inquire into or try the offences alleged when the loan was processed/disbursed by the complainant's Delhi head office but most of the acts (applications, verification, disbursement at branch, encashment) allegedly occurred in Bangalore.
  2. Whether a petition under Section 482 CrPC is maintainable to quash the Magistrate's order directing registration/investigation where the Magistrate concluded cognizable offences were disclosed and directed the police to register a case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (summary)

  • None of the alleged offences occurred in New Delhi; the acts (entertaining borrowers, receiving applications, verification, disbursement procedures) were allegedly performed at the Bangalore branch.
  • No accused resides in Delhi and no witnesses are situated there; the complaint lacks specific averments showing any part of the offence was committed within New Delhi's jurisdiction.
  • The head office sanction and transfer of money to the branch were internal arrangements and do not confer jurisdiction on Delhi courts merely because the complainant's head office is located there.
  • The procedure adopted is not in accordance with Section 156(3) CrPC (as alleged by the petitioner) and there is an inordinate and unexplained delay between the date(s) of alleged occurrence (2001–2002) and the complaint made on 20 September 2004.
  • Relied on authorities concerning territorial jurisdiction and location of offence (several cited judgments listed in the petition).

Respondent No. 3 (Complainant) Arguments (summary)

  • The branch manager (petitioner No.3) and technical executives in Bangalore were responsible for verification and recommendations, and the loan was finally approved and sanctioned from Delhi head office, with cheques/disbursements emanating from Delhi in many cases.
  • The complainant says the property did not exist, documentation is forged, addresses were false and the technical report that supported sanction was fabricated — hence the fraud was consummated against the complainant in Delhi.
  • Territorial jurisdiction of Delhi is proper because the cheating/fraud resulted in financial loss to the complainant at its Delhi head office, and money was disbursed from Delhi; therefore the Magistrate was right to direct registration and investigation.
  • Relied on authorities allowing a Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC and other supporting precedents.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
S.R. Sharma v. The State of West Bengal, 1993 Crl.L.J 831 Territorial jurisdiction where money was received/retained/misappropriated at branch office; criminal breach of trust triable where branch office is situated (as described in the opinion). The opinion cited it as supporting the principle that jurisdiction can lie where the money was received/retained — used by petitioners to argue Bangalore jurisdiction, but the Court reviewed broader statutory framework and other facts to reach its conclusion.
State v. Tavara Naika, 1959 Crl.L.J 1004 This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this case. The opinion lists the case among authorities relied upon by the petitioner; no further application detail is provided in the text.
Ramnath Sardar v. Rekharani Sardar, 1975 Crl.L.J 1139 This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this case. Cited by parties; the provided opinion does not state the specific application beyond listing the precedent.
Y. Abraham Ajith & ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai (2004) 8 SCC 100 Discussion of Section 177 and Section 178 CrPC: ordinary venue rule and exceptions; continuing offence concept and jurisdictional limits (summarised in the opinion). Quoted by the petitioners to support territorial-jurisdiction arguments; the Court considered these principles in analysing Sections 177–181 but concluded Delhi had jurisdiction in the facts of the present case.
Rajaram Pattnaik v. Indian Metal & Ferro Alloys Ltd., 1996 Crl.L.J 732 Principle under Section 181(4) CrPC that the conditions in sub-section (4) are disjunctive — any one of the listed places provides jurisdiction. Used in discussion of Section 181(4); supported the Court's reasoning that where property or consequences relate to Delhi (here, sanction/disbursement from Delhi), Delhi may have jurisdiction.
Brahmanand Goyal & another v. N.C. Chakraborty & others, 1974 Crl.L.J 1079 Dealt with Section 181(2) of CrPC (1898): criminal breach of trust is an act, not an omission; where complaint/evidence do not disclose when/where/how offence occurred, court has no jurisdiction. Cited for the proposition that the factum and locus of entrustment/conversion matter to jurisdiction; the Court considered this in assessing whether Delhi court could properly exercise jurisdiction.
Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan & another, (2006) 1 SCC 627 Magistrate may order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC; direction to register FIR for enabling police investigation is permissible (summary quoted in opinion). Relied upon by respondent No.3; the Court used this to validate that a Magistrate can direct registration/investigation and that such a direction is not illegal, supporting upholding the Magistrate's order.
Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed & Ors., 2007 III AD(Cr.) SC 185 This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this case. Listed among authorities relied upon by respondent; the Court referred more fully to the general principles about Section 482 in other cited Supreme Court authorities.
State Rep. By the CBI v. Anil Sharma, JT 1997 (7) SC 651 This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this case. Cited by respondent; no detailed application described in the provided text.
AIR 1924 All. 77 (cited passage) Statement that cheating may be tried where cheating was committed or where the loss ensued to the complainant (i.e., where complainant resides or firm is situated). The Court relied on this authority to support the proposition that if the loss ensued at Delhi (head office), Delhi courts may have jurisdiction to try the offence.
Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 47 Principles governing exercise of inherent power under Section 482 CrPC — to be exercised sparingly, not if specific Code remedy exists, to prevent abuse or secure ends of justice (quoted in opinion). Used in the Court's analysis of the maintainability of the Section 482 petition: inherent power is to be exercised sparingly and only in rare/patent illegality cases.
State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 Reiterates the limited scope of inherent power under Section 482 — to be used only where there is abuse of process or to secure ends of justice; common scenarios include quashing proceedings initiated illegally/vexatiously/without jurisdiction. Quoted to emphasize sparing use of Section 482; Court applied this to refuse interference since the Magistrate's order did not show patent illegality and investigations were at an early stage.
Aran Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P., (1999) 6 SCC 146 Illustrates that Section 482 should not be used where specific provisions/alternative remedies (e.g., statutory appeal) are available; High Court's intervening at wrong stage can be improper. Cited to support the proposition that inherent power cannot displace specific code remedies and should not be exercised where procedural alternatives remain; Court used this as part of its Section 482 analysis.
State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this case within the provided text beyond being cited in the Magistrate's order. Mentioned in the Magistrate's order as authority relied upon; the High Court noted the Magistrate relied on it when directing registration/investigation.
G.C. Nautiyal & others v. State, 2002 (62) DRJ 435 (DB) This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this case in the provided text. Quoted in the Magistrate's order; no detailed application beyond the Magistrate's reliance is described in the opinion.
Shanti Devi v. State, 2002 (63) DRJ 1 (DB) This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this case in the provided text. Listed among authorities relied upon by the Magistrate; the High Court records the Magistrate's reliance but does not elaborate further.
76 (1998) DLT 442 (DB) (citation given in Magistrate's order) This opinion did not specify the rule or principle cited from this citation in the provided text. Appears in the Magistrate's list of authorities; no further descriptive use is provided in the High Court's text.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two principal stages: first, whether Delhi courts had territorial jurisdiction; second, whether the Section 482 petition was maintainable to quash the Magistrate's order.

Jurisdiction analysis:

  1. The Court examined the factual matrix in the complaint, the police's preliminary status report and the statutory provisions governing territorial jurisdiction (Sections 177–181 CrPC, with emphasis on Section 181(4)).
  2. The Court summarized the statutory rules: Section 177 prescribes the ordinary rule (trial where offence committed); Section 178 contains exceptions (uncertainty, part in different places, continuing offence, several acts in different places); Sections 179 and 180 permit trial where an act or its consequence occurs within local jurisdiction; Section 181(4) allows trial where any part of the property which is subject of offence was received, retained or required to be returned/accounted for.
  3. The Court noted the principle (cited from AIR 1924 All.77) that cheating may be tried either where the cheating was committed or where the loss ensued to the complainant (where complainant/firm is situated).
  4. Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Court emphasized that the registered/head office of the complainant is at Delhi and that the loans were finally sanctioned and disbursed from Delhi. On that basis, the Court concluded Delhi had jurisdiction to try the complaint — the financial consequence/loss to the complainant and the sanction/disbursement connection to Delhi were sufficient to sustain Delhi's territorial jurisdiction, notwithstanding that many processing acts occurred in Bangalore.
  5. The Court expressly held that under these circumstances the Magistrate was not bound to accept the police status report that denied Delhi nexus; the Magistrate's conclusion that cognizable offences were made out and that investigation was required could be sustained.

Maintainability of Section 482 petition:

  1. The Court then considered the scope of inherent power under Section 482 CrPC, relying on the Supreme Court precedents (Madhu Limaye, Navjot Sandhu, Hamida and related authorities) emphasizing that Section 482 is to be used sparingly, in rare cases, to correct patent illegality or miscarriage of justice, and not where there is an alternative statutory remedy.
  2. The Court observed that the Magistrate's order recorded commission of cognizable offences and directed police registration/investigation; the case was at an early stage and investigations had not been completed. Given the jurisdictional conclusion and the early stage of proceedings, the Court found no patent illegality or miscarriage of justice warranting exercise of inherent power.
  3. Therefore, the Court held the petition under Section 482 CrPC was not maintainable and dismissed it.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition under Section 482 CrPC is DISMISSED. The High Court found that the Delhi court has territorial jurisdiction to try the offences alleged, and there was no patent illegality in the Magistrate's order directing registration and investigation.

Implications / Consequences:

  • Direct effect: The Magistrate's order directing the SHO Sarita Vihar to register a case and investigate (for offences under various IPC sections as listed in the Magistrate's order) stands and investigation may continue.
  • Procedure: The Court declined to exercise inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC at this interlocutory stage because the matter is at an initial stage of investigation and the Magistrate's order did not disclose patent illegality.
  • Precedential impact: The Court applied established principles on territorial jurisdiction (Sections 177–181 CrPC) and the established jurisprudence limiting Section 482's exercise. The opinion does not purport to lay down any new legal principle; it applies existing authorities to the facts at hand.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or interpretations not present in that text.

    Parbhakar & Ors v. State Of Delhi Nct Of Delhi

    V.B Gupta, J.— The present petition has been filed under Section 482 CrPC, seeking quashing of complaint case, filed in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi and consequential FIR No. 705/06 under various Sections of Indian Penal Code with P.S Sarita Vihar.

    2. The brief facts of the case, as per the allegations made in the complaint/FIR, are that Vishwanatha Tantri(petitioner No. 3), Branch Manager of the complainant company in October/November, 2000, recommended to the complainant company, house loan of Rs. 3 lacvs of petitioner No. 1 and 2 as applicant and co-applicant for the purpose of construction of a house, situated at site No. 153, kh. No. 80/2A, H.L.No 153, Kothapur Village, Uttarhalli Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore. It was induced by petitioner No. 1 that the property in question stands in his name. On the assurances given by petitioners 1 & 2 that they have good title over the property and it was a good mortgage, the head office asked the Branch Manager to get executed the relevant documents by them. Accordingly, the documents were executed and petitioner No. 3 was the guarantor to the loan agreement. The complainant company from Delhi sanctioned and disbursed the loan amount of Rs. 3 lacs. The petitioner No. 1 and 2 had to pay monthly EMI for 15 years but they did not pay the same for more than 2 years.

    3. In the midst of 2003, the complainant started scrutinizing its portfolio with ICICI and to the utter shock and surprise of the complainant company, the extent of illegalities and forgeries and fraud committed by the accused, which started unearthing were beyond imagination. In the instant case, the property in question has been taken over by the Government and there exist water tank on the said land. The petitioners 1 & 2 never disclosed this fact to the complainant despite the fact that they mortgaged the same land to the complainant company and thus the present petitioners had dishonest intention from the very beginning for committing the alleged offences.

    4. The complaint was filed before the Court of Magistrate and the Magistrate decided to call for an action report from the respondent No. 2. Respondent No. 2, on the directions of the court, made a preliminary inquiry into the complaint and submitted the report stating that no part of the alleged offences had taken place at Delhi.

    5. The complainant/respondent No. 3 herein filed reply of the status report taking exception to the report pleading that the Inquiry Officer had no authority to decide the question of jurisdiction and it was the duty to register a case if complaint discloses commission of a cognisable offence.

    6. Vide order dated 29th July, 2006, the court of Magistrate accepted the plea of respondent No. 3 noting that there was commission of cognisable offence and the respondent No. 3 was not in a position to pursue the complaint by itself and thorough investigation was required to bring the truth to the surface and directed respondent No. 2 to register the case against the petitioners and other accused in the complaint and investigate the matter thoroughly and file a report.

    7. Being aggrieved with the order dated 29th July, 2006, passed by the Magistrate, the present petition has been filed by the petitioner.

    8. It has been contended by learned counsel for petitioner that on the basis of the complaint and the material produced by the respondent No. 3, it is apparent that none of the alleged offences took place at New Delhi and none of the accused resides in New Delhi nor any witness is at Delhi. Further, no specific averment has been made by the complainant in the complaint as to how any part of the offence was committed within the jurisdiction of the court at New Delhi. The entire acts starting from entertaining the borrowers, receiving applications for grant of loan, verifying and scrutinising, genuineness of the same and preparation of disbursement notes etc. were only allegedly committed in the Bangalore Branch of the complainant. It was only after the entire job was completed in the Bangalore Branch of respondent No. 3 that the loan was sanctioned from Delhi head office. The sanction at the head office and transfer of money to the Branch for disbursement of loan was purely an internal arrangement between the head office and the Branch and even payment of loans was also made to the borrowers in Bangalore and repayment by way of post dated cheques was also collected at Bangalore. Merely because respondent No. 3 has its head office in New Delhi, it would not mean that the Delhi court has got the jurisdiction. The procedure adopted in the complaint case is not in accordance with the provisions of Section 156(3) of the CrPC. Moreover there is inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR as the date of occurrence of the alleged offence is some time of the period from 2001 to 2002 whereas the complaint was made to the Police on 20th September, 2004 and this delay has not been explained. So the order dated 29th July, 2006, passed by the learned Magistrate is illegal and without jurisdiction and the same is liable to be quashed.

    9. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner has cited the following judgments:—

    (i) S.R Sharma v. The State of West Bengal and another, 1993 Crl.L.J 831 --- In this case while dealing with the question of territorial jurisdiction, as per section 181(4) of crpc, where the offence of criminal breach of trust was committed and the money was received, retained and misappropriated by the accused at place where branch office was situated. It was held that—

    accused was not liable to account for, at the head office and Court at place of branch office has jurisdiction to try the offence.

    (ii) State v. Tavara Naika, 1959 Crl.L.J 1004

    (iii) Ramnath Sardar v. Rekharani Sardar, 1975 Crl.L.J 1139

    (iv) Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another, (2004) 8 SCC 100 - In this case respondent No. 2 (wife of one of the appellants) filed a complaint in the Court of the Magistrate alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Magistrate directed the police to investigate the case. After investigation, the police filed the charge-sheet. When the matter stood thus, the appellants filed an application under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court alleging that the Magistrate concerned had no jurisdiction even to entertain the complaint even if the allegations contained therein were accepted in toto as no part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the court concerned. The complaint itself disclosed that after 15.4.1997, the respondent left the place N (where she was residing with her appellant husband) and came to the city C. Since all the alleged acts as per the complainant took place at N, the Courts at C did not have the jurisdiction to deal with the matter. On the other hand, respondent 2 submitted that the offences were continuing in terms of Section 178(c) CrPC and, therefore, the court at C had jurisdiction to deal with the matter.

    Allowing the appeal, the Apex Court held that—

    Section 177 CrPC reiterates the well established common-law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which are alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in Section 178 CrPC. A significant word used in Section 177 is “ordinarily”. Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in CrPC. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand.

    (v) Rajaram Pattnaik v. Indian Metal and Ferro Alloys Limited, 1996 Crl.L.J 732 - In this case while dealing with the principles of Section 181(4) CrPC, it has been laid down that a condition/requirement prescribed under sub-section (4) are disjunctive. Court at any one of the places mentioned in said conditions/requirements would have jurisdiction to try such offence.

    (vi) Brahmanand Goyal and another v. N.C Chakraborty and others, 1974 Crl.L.J 1079, while dealing with Section 181(2) of CrPC (1898) it was held that—

    An offence of Criminal Breach of Trust is not triable at a place where neither the factum of entrustment nor the positive act of conversion had taken place because such offence always consists in an act and not an omission. Where the complaint and the evidence of the complainant do not disclose when, where and how such an offence has been committed, the court receiving the complaint has no jurisdiction to proceed, with the case.

    10. On the other hand, it has been contended by learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that petitioner being the Branch Manager of respondent No. 3, along with technical executives were responsible for verifying and scrutinising the genuineness of the borrowers and after duly complying with the formalities, they were required to recommend the cases to the head office for approval. The loan was approved and sanctioned from Delhi office of respondent No. 3 which was first transferred to Delhi from Bangalore Branch and the cheques prepared in Bangalore were given to borrowers/accused in their names. In many cases cheques were issued directly from Delhi office. It is further contended that in the present case, the property did not exist at all and all the documents like sale deed etc. are forged and fabricated and the borrowers had given wrong addresses. The technical report, on the basis of which loan was sanctioned and disbursed from Delhi office, is a manufactured document. The alleged issue of territorial jurisdiction is totally misplaced as respondent No. 3 has been cheated/frauded in Delhi of crores of Rupees by all the accused including the petitioner and all the money has been disbursed from Delhi head office of the complainant and as such Delhi has territorial jurisdiction to try the offences under various provisions of Indian Penal Code. Thus the present petition is not maintainable and liable to be dismissed. In support of the contentions, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 has cited the following judgments:—

    (i) Mohd. Yousuf v. Afaq Jahan(SMT) and another, (2006) 1 SCC 627 : 2006 (86) DRJ 390 [SC]—In this case the Apex Court has held that—any Judicial Magistrate, before taking cognizance of the offence, can order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC. But if he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. For the purpose of enabling the police to start investigation it is open to the Magistrate to direct the police to register an FIR. There is nothing illegal in doing so. After all registration of an FIR involves only the process of entering the substance of the information relating to the commission of the cognizable offence in a book kept by the officer in charge of the police station. Even if a Magistrate does not say in so many words while directing investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC that an FIR should be registered, it is the duty of the officer in charge of the police station to register the FIR regarding the cognizable offence disclosed by the complainant because that police officer could take further steps contemplated in Chapter XII CrPC only thereafter.

    (ii) Hamida v. Rashid @ Rasheed & Ors., 2007 III AD(Cr.) SC 185

    (iii) State Rep. By the CBI v. Anil Sharma, JT 1997 (7) SC 651

    11. The relevant portion of status report filed by the Police before the court of Magistrate of P.S Sarita Vihar read as under:—

    “As per contents of the complaint and physical enquiry it revealed that the alleged persons managed to get loan amount from Maharishi Housing Development Finance Corporation Ltd. Branch at Bangalore, Karnataka. Alleged persons submitted application for loan at the said branch at Bangalore alongwith required documents and completing all the formalities. The guarantor was also produced by the alleged persons at the above said office of the company and the land against which the loan was sanctioned also falls at Bangalore, which the site was got inspected by the technical executive of the said company. The papers were received at the head office of the company at A/14, Mohan Co-operative Industrial Estate, Mathura Road, New Delhi for the final orders. Thereafter the loan was sanctioned and the cheques were sent to the branch office at Bangalore for disbursement to the party and the party/alleged persons managed to get the cheques and got it encashed at Bangalore.

    Hence, all the formalities were completed at Bangalore. So, offence of criminal/civil nature or u/s 138 of negotiable instrument act is committed in the jurisdiction of Bangalore.”

    12. The relevant portion of impugned order dated 29th July, 2006, passed by the Magistrate, read as under:-

    “It is alleged in the complaint that the accused person have obtained a loan from the complainant on the basis of forged and fabricated documents with the connivance of Branch Manager. The accused have succeeded in their Criminal Conspiracy and cheated the complainant. The complaint was made to the police but no action was taken. Ld. Counsel for the complainant relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, G.C Nautiyal and others v. State, 97 (2002) (DLT 542 (DB) : 2002 (62) DRJ 435 (DB), Shanti Devi v. State, 97 (2002) DLT 410 (DB) : 2002 (63) DRJ 1 (DB) and in 76 (1998) DLT 442 (DB).

    In view of the above discussion I am of the considered view that there is commission of cognizable offences and the complainant is not in a position to pursue the present complaint himself as a thorough investigation required to bring the truth on the surface therefore relying on the above said authorities SHO Sarita Vihar is directed to register the case against the accused person for the offences U/s 403, 405, 408, 409, 415, 416, 418, 420, 422, 423, 463, 464, 465, 468, 470, 471, 120-B etc. of IPC and investigate the matter thoroughly and filed the report.”

    13. The question to be seen is that in view of the averments made by the complainant in its complaint, whether Delhi court has got jurisdiction to try the present offences or not when admittedly the loan has been disbursed from the head office which is admittedly situated in Delhi.

    14. Relevant provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure which deal with jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries and trials have been enumerated in Chapter XIII and for purpose of the point in controversy, relevant provisions are Sections 177, 178, 179, 180 and 181(4). These provisions read as under:-

    “177. Ordinary place of inquiry and trial—Every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed.

    178. Place of inquiry or trial—

    (a) when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed, or

    (b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another, or

    (c) where an offence is a continuing one, and continues to be committed in more local areas than one, or

    (d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.

    179. Offence triable where act is done or consequence ensues—When an act is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of a consequence which has ensued, the offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction such thing has been done, or such consequence has ensued.

    180. Place of trial where act is an offence by reason of relation to other offence—When an act is an offence by reason of its relation to any other act which is also an offence or which would be an offence if the doer were capable of committing an offence, the first-mentioned offence may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction either act was done.

    181. Place of trial in case of certain offences—(4) Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.”

    15. Section 179 applies when the act (or omission) is an offence by reason of anything which has been done and of any consequence which has ensued. But where the act (or omission) is a complete offence irrespective of any consequence which has ensued, this section does not apply, and the offence is to be inquired into and tried only by the court within whose jurisdiction the act was committed (sec. 177). This section contemplates two things. The first is that the offender has done an act and the second is that a consequence has followed from such act and the offender is being tried for the offence as a result of both the act and the consequence; or, in other words, the act by him does not by itself render him liable for the offence and that it is the act coupled with the consequence which constitutes the offence and makes him liable for it. That being so, there is hardly any scope for argument that the consequence referred to in this section does not mean the consequence which is one of the ingredients of the offence, The provisions of section 179 and 180 are wide enough to enable cognizance to be taken either by a court where anything was done within the local limits of its jurisdiction, or a court, where the consequence ensued. And if the offence was completed by the act followed by the consequence, then the court where the act was committed and the court where the consequence ensued will both have jurisdiction to try the offence.

    16. It has been laid down in AIR 1924 All. 77 that—

    “the offence of cheating may be tried either at the place where the cheating was committed (where the accused resided) or at the place where the loss ensued to the complainant i.e where the complainant resides or his firm is situated”.

    17. Here in the present case, admittedly the registered office of the complainant company is situated at Delhi and admittedly the loans were finally sanctioned and disbursed from the head office i.e from Delhi itself. So under these circumstances, Delhi court has got the jurisdiction to try the present complaint and it cannot be said under these circumstances, the Magistrate was bound to accept the status report submitted by the Police.

    18. The next question for consideration is as to whether the present petition under Section 482 CrPC, under these circumstances is maintainable or not.

    19. Scope of Section 482 CrPC has been discussed in great detail in the decision of Hamida (supra) cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. It has been laid down by the Apex Court that—

    “It is well established principle that inherent power conferred on the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised sparingly with circumspection and in rare cases and that too to correct patent illegalities or when some miscarriage of justice is done. The content and scope of power under Section 482 CrPC were examined in considerable detail in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra., AIR 1978 SC 47 and it was held as under:—

    “The following principles may be stated in relation to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court

    (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party;

    (2) That it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice;

    (3) That it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code.”

    In State v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 (para 29), after a review of large number of earlier decisions, it was held as under:

    “29.……………..The inherent power is to be used only in cases where there is an abuse of the process of the Court or where interference is absolutely necessary for securing, the ends of justice. The inherent power must be exercised very sparingly as cases which require interference would be few and far between. The most common case where inherent jurisdiction is generally exercised is where criminal proceedings are required to be quashed because they are initiated illegally, vexatiously or without jurisdiction. Most of the cases set out herein above fall in this category. It must be remembered that the inherent power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code or any other enactment for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. This power should not be exercised against an express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Criminal Procedure Code. This power cannot be exercised as against an express bar in some other enactment.”

    In Aran Shankar Shukla v. State of U.P, (1999) 6 SCC 146 the High Court had entertained a petition under Section 482 CrPC after an order of conviction had been passed by the Sessions Judge and before the sentence had been awarded and further proceedings in the case had been stayed. In appeal this Court set aside the order of the High Court after reiterating the principle that it is well settled that inherent power is not to be invoked in respect of any matter covered by specific provisions of the Code or if its exercise would infringe any specific provision of the Code. It was further observed that the High Court overlooked the procedural law which empowered the convicted accused to prefer statutory appeal against conviction of the offence and intervened at an uncalled for stage and soft-pedalled the course of justice at a very crucial stage of the trial. The order of the High Court was accordingly set aside on the ground that a petition under Section 482 CrPC could not have been entertained as the accused had an alternative remedy of an appeal as provided in the Code. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with other decisions of this Court as the consistent view throughout has been that a petition under Section 482 CrPC cannot be entertained if there is any other specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party.

    Before parting with the case, we feel constrained to observe that in spite of repeated pronouncements of this Court that inherent power under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised sparingly with circumspection in rare cases and that too when miscarriage of justice is done, the High Court entertained the petition under Section 482 CrPC, the ultimate result whereof was that the order of bail granted in favour of the accused for an offence under Sections 324, 352 and 506 IPC enured to their benefit even after the offence had been converted into one under Section 304 IPC and also subsequently when charge had been framed against them under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. The accused did not remain in custody even for a single day nor did they approach the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate or Sessions Judge for being granted bail under section 304 or 302 ipc, yet they got the privilege of bail under the aforesaid offences by virtue of the order passed by the High Court. The dockets of the High Courts are full and there is a long pendency of murder appeals in the High Court from which this case has arisen. Ends of justice would be better served if valuable time of the Court is spent in hearing those appeals rather than entertaining petitions under Section 482 CrPC at an interlocutory stage which are often filed with some oblique motive in order to circumvent the prescribed procedure, as it the case here, or to delay the trial which will enable the accused to win over the witnesses by money or muscle power or they may become disinterested in giving evidence, ultimately resulting in miscarriage of justice.”

    20. Similarly in the present case since the Delhi court has jurisdiction to try the present criminal complaint/FIR and the case is at very initial stage and investigations are yet to be completed, I do not find that there is any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, passed by the learned Magistrate and the present petition under Section 482 CrPC, under these circumstances, is not maintainable and the same is hereby dismissed.

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    Parbhakar & Ors v. State Of Delhi Nct Of Delhi
    (Oct 24, 2007)