Gurdev Singh, J. - The petitioners Surja and others are defendants in a suit brought by the respondents Gopi Nath and others seeking declaration that they were co-sharers in possession of 194 bighas 19 biswas of the land in dispute situate in village Rana Majra, and the order of the Executive Magistrate, dated 15th May, 1967, made under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code declaring the defendants-petitioners to be in possession of that property on 1st August, 1963, was ineffectual qua them. In the initial stages of the suit, an application for temporary injunction restraining the present petitioners from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession of the disputed land was made. It was asserted that the plaintiffs had been in possession of the land throughout, and the finding of the Executive Magistrate that the opposite party was in possession on 1st August, 1963, was wrong, and they had no right to disturb the plaintiffs' possession. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted this plea and granted a temporary injunction by his order dated 10th March, 1969, holding that prima facie the plaintiffs were in possession of the suit property. This finding was based on Naqsha Jim i.e., file of Burdi Bramdgi, prepared in 1966. In granting the interim injunction, the learned Subordinate Judge observed :- "The entries in this naqsha Jeem, to which presumption of the truth is attached under the law, clearly supported the plea of the plaintiff. In view of the entries in the revenue record, I feel inclined to accept the case of the plaintiffs, and it is held that prima facie they are in cultivating possession of the suit-land. In the result, this application is hereby, without prejudice to the merits of the case, accepted and the contesting defendants are restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession over the suit-land till further orders to the contrary." 2. In confirming this order, the learned Additional District Judge, to whom the appeal was taken by the contesting defendants, again mainly relied upon this Naqsha Jim and treated it as a prima facie evidence of the plaintiffs' possession. The final order passed by the Executive Magistrate under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code on 15th May, 1967, whereby it was held that the defendants (petitioners) were in possession of the land in suit on 1st August, 1963, was brushed aside by him merely observing. "There is nothing at this stage to show that after the attachment was effected in proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the defendants had obtained possession, and rather the learned counsel for the plaintiffs referred me to the copy of the Naqspa Jim prepared in the partition proceedings showing that they were in possession of the suit-land, and my attention was also drawn to the copy of the latest Girdawari to indicate that the possession was with the plaintiffs now." 3. Mr. R.S. Mittal, arguing the case on behalf of the petitioners, has, besides contending that the respondents were never in possession of the land in dispute, urged that the learned Subordinate Jude had no jurisdiction to grant the interim injunction prayed for because (1) the case was not covered by either rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code as the suit was for declaration simpliciter without there being any prayer for permanent injunction, (2) the Courts had committed a legal error in observing that Naqsha Jim, which their finding with regard to possession proceeds carried presumption of truth, and (3) the final order of the Executive Magistrate passed under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' possession, and the plaintiffs could not be permitted to urge that they were in possession of the property on 1st August, 1963, or had continued to be in possession till the date of the suit without there being any entry that the petitioners' having been dispossessed. 4. The property in dispute was admittedly the subject-matter of proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Preliminary order attaching their property in those proceedings was passed as far back as 1st August, 1963. On the conclusion of those proceedings, the Executive Magistrate in his final order made under Section 145(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code on 15th May, 1967, declared that the present-petitioners were in possession on 1st August, 1963 and thus entitled to remain in possession till evicted therefrom in due course of law. The plaintiff-respondents were forbidden from disturbing the petitioners' possession until such eviction. That order was finally upheld by this Court in Criminal Revision No. 1250 of 1967 decided on 5th February, 1969. In view of this order of the Magistrate, for the purpose of an application for interim injunction it has to be presumed that the petitioners were in possession on 1st August, 1963, and it was for the plaintiffs to prove that the defendants were dispossessed by them. Naqsha Jim, on which the Courts below had mainly relied, is a statement of Burdi Bramdgi prepared in 1966. This is not document to which presumption of truth attaches under Section 44 of the Land Revenue Act. The entries in the Khasra Girdawari, to which a vague reference is made by the learned Additional District Judge, do not carry any presumption of truth, and they cannot be accepted in view of the finding of the Magistrate in proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code that the possession of the property in dispute was with the defendant-petitioners and not with the plaintiff-respondents on 1st August, 1963, without there being any evidence of subsequent change in possession. In Ambika Thakur and others v. Emperor, AIR 1930 Pat. 611, a Division Bench of that Court ruled that a party that has been forbidden by an order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code to disturb possession of the opposite party cannot be allowed to plead that in spite of that order he is still in possession or has regained possession by force. The contention of Mr. Mittal on this point also finds support from Sewa Das v. Ram Parkash, AIR 1947 Lah. 173, where Abdur Rehman, J. held that the finding of the Criminal Court in proceedings under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code holding a particular party to be in possession of the property in dispute on the date on which the breach of peace was likely to occur within two months of that date, could not be questioned in a civil Court and that party must be held to be continuing in possession until evicted in due course of law. In this view of the matter, the learned Judge ruled that in a suit brought by the party against whom the finding with regard to his possession was given by the Magistrate, no injunction could be granted. In fact, in that case Abdur Rahman, J. went further and observed :- "It is not open, in my judgment, to a Civil Court to go behind or to question that finding, although it is open, in my view, to a Civil Court to decide that a person found or deemed to be in possession of the property had no right or title whatsoever to be or to remain in possession and to put any other person in possession if his right or title to get into possession are found for him." 5. In Brojendra Kumar Sen Gupta v. Jitendra Chandra Sen and others, AIR 1960 Assam 111 a Special Bench of that Court ruled that where an order under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code has been passed to the effect that the defendant to the suit was found in actual physical possession of the land, the question of granting injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of plaintiff would not arise, and it is only in cases where an order is passed under Section 145(4), Proviso 2, that the question of protecting the rights of the plaintiff until decision of the suit arises, by issue of injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs' possession. Admittedly, in the case before us the final order passed by the Magistrate was under sub-section (6) of Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Code and not under Section 145(4) Proviso 2. Thus, even according to this authority the plaintiff respondents were not entitled to an interim injunction. 6. The suit out of which this matter has arisen was for declaration simpliciter without any prayer for permanent injunction having been made. In Peddinti Gopalacharyulu v. Rudra Veerannu and others, AIR 1955 Andhra 142, a Division Bench of that Court held that in a suit brought by the archaka of a temple for a declaration that he had a right to remain in possession of the suit lands as long as he performed archakathvam service and that he could not be evicted from those lands, no injunction would be granted to the plaintiff to restrain the defendants from taking proceedings to recover possession of the lands in dispute, as it was inappropriate to describe such a suit as one for restraining the defendants in any manner whatsoever. In this view of the matter, the learned Judges were of the opinion that the case did not fall either under rule 1 or Rule 2 of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code, and further observed that inherent powers vesting in Courts under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code could not be invoked. This authority does support Mr. Mittal's contention that the learned Subordinate Judge had acted without jurisdiction in granting the interim injunction. 7. For all these reasons, I find that the order under revision cannot be sustained. I, accordingly, set it aside and accept the petition with costs. Petition accepted.