Bhupinder Singh Dhillon, J. - In order to correctly appreciate the points adopted by the learned counsel for the parties in this case, few facts of this case may be mentioned. 2. Kalu Mal was the original owner of the mortgaged property. He died on the 23rd of January, 1937. He was survived by two sons, Gokal Chand and Parmeshwari Dass and a widow Smt. Kalm Devi. The property in question was mortgaged with Smt. Soma Vati for a sum of Rs. 4,000/-. Smt. Soma Vati brought a suit for the recovery of the mortgage-amount by way of sale of the mortgaged property and the said suit was decreed on 28th July, 1953. In execution of the said decree, 2/3rd share of the property in question was ordered to be sold but Gokal Chand deposited a sum of Rs. 4,000/- in the Court for the satisfaction of the decree. Since Soma Vati failed to implead Smt. Kalm Devi as a party in the execution application, therefore, the Courts came to the conclusion that only 2/3rd of the property has to be auctioned and Soma Vati could not realise the mortgage money to the extent of 1/3rd. Soma Vati withdrew a sum of Rs. 3,100/- on 13th April, 1959 and her decree stood satisfied. The remaining sum of Rs. 900/- was refunded to Gokal Chand on 27th April, 1959. 3. Parmeshwari Dass further mortgaged his share in the property to Smt. Durga Devi for a sum of Rs. 2,700/- for which a suit was filed by Smt. Durga Devi against Parmeshwari Dass, Gokal Chand and Soma Vati for the recovery of the mortgage money by way of the sale of the property in question. Her suit was decreed. In the execution proceedings, Gokal Chand raised the plea that he had paid a sum of Rs. 3,100/- by way of extinction of the mortgage amount to Soma Vati in satisfaction of the decree and there was a charge on the property to the extent of half of that amount. Therefore, his plea was that he stands subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee Soma Vati. The following three issues were framed :- 1. Whether the objection petition does not lie ? 2. Whether notice under Order 21 Rule 66 Civil Procedure Code is defective as alleged by the J.D. 3. Relief. 4. The learned Subordinate Judge vide his judgment dated 5th November, 1960 came to the conclusion that Gokal Chand enjoys a charge of Rs. 1,550/- only over the property in dispute, and only rights of redemption subject to that charge is liable to be sold. Two appeals were filed against this order before the learned District Judge, Jullundur, one by Gokal Chand alleging that he had incurred expenses in defending the execution application in the previous suit brought by Soma Vati and he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 800/- on that account, the other appeal was filed by Smt. Durga Devi wherein it was contended that the finding of the learned trial Court that a charge to the extent of Rs. 1,550/- was on the property, is incorrect. The learned Lower Appellate Court dismissed both the appeals. There are now two Execution Second Appeals before me, that is, Execution Second Appeal No. 842 of 1961, filed by Gokal Chand and Execution Second Appeal No. 1137 of 1961 filed by Smt. Durga Devi, against one and the same judgment of the learned Lower Appellate Court. Hence both these appeals will be disposed of by one and the same order. 5. Mr. A.L. Bahri, the learned counsel for Smt. Durga Devi, in E.S.A. No. 1137 of 1961, raised the following points and submitted that the findings of the learned Courts below that Gokal Chand stood subrogated to the rights of Soma Vati, the previous mortgagee, and that a charge of Rs. 1,550/- on the mortgaged property subsisted, are illegal and are liable to be set aside. (a) That the original mortgage in favour of Smt. Soma Vati, for a sum of Rs. 4,000/- and Gokal chand having paid only a sum of Rs. 3,100/- therefore he had not paid the whole mortgage-amount. That was in fact a partial payment of the mortgage-money and therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, he cannot be allowed to be subrogated. (b) That Gokal Chand paid a sum of Rs. 3,100/- for the satisfaction of the decree of Soma Vati and merely by satisfying a decree there is no question of his being subrogated by the mortgagee. His contention is that the moment a decree of the mortgage-amount is passed, the mortgage extinguishes and there is no question of subrogation of the mortgage which is already extinguished by the passing of the mortgage decree. (c) That Gokal Chand was a party in the suit filed by Durga Devi. He did not raise a plea that there was a charge on the property to the extent of Rs. 1,550/- and, therefore, he could not be allowed to raise this point in the execution proceedings. (d) That there is no evidence to come to the conclusion that a sum of Rs. 3,100/- was paid by Gokal Chand from his own pocket. Therefore, the finding is wholly illegal. 6. Mr. Nayar, the learned counsel for the respondent, in this appeal, has argued that the charge of the mortgage-amount remains on the property till the decree of the mortgage-amount is not paid, and there is no question of the extinction of the mortgage. Thus his contention is that the moment the amount of Rs. 3,100/- was paid to Soma Vati, Gokal Chand stood subrogated to the rights of Soma Vati, the original mortgagee, and it was only after the payment of this amount that the mortgage was extinguished and not by merely passing of the decree. 7. Secondly, the learned counsel contended that the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable to the State of Punjab as such but the principles of equity, justice and good conscience as are incorporated in the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act, are fully applicable. Therefore, his contention is that even if the partial payment of the mortgage-amount was made, even then on the principles of equity, justice and good conscience, Gokal Chand is entitled to the sum of Rs. 1,550/- because he had earlier paid this amount for Parmeshwari Dass. 8. The learned counsel further contended that from the documentary evidence it was established that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was deposited by Gokal Chand and a sum of Rs. 900/- remained as balance after the satisfaction of the decree of Smt. Soma Vati, and it was withdrawn by Gokal Chand. 9. I have given careful consideration to the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties. In support of the first point, the learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. A.L. Bahri, has relied on Raja Janaki Nath Roy and another v. Raja Pramatha Nath Malia and others, AIR 1940 Privy Council 38. This was a case from Calcutta in which the Privy Council held that the person claiming to be subrogated to the rights of a mortgagee must pay the entire amount of the incumbrance in question. The learned counsel has also relied on Rai Bahadur Madhoram Sand and others v. Rai Bahadur Kirtya Nand Sinha and others, AIR 1944 Privy Council 96. This was again a case from Patna. He has further relied on Simla Banking and Industrial co. Ltd. v. Firm Luddar Mal Khushi Ram and others, AIR 1959 Punjab 490.. 10. It may be mentioned that in the two cases decided by the Privy Council, referred to above, one case was from Calcutta and the other was from Patna where the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act are applicable and because the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act at the face of it, makes it incumbent that the person concerned should pay the whole mortgage-amount before he can be subrogated, therefore, there is no escape from the conclusion arrived at in these authorities. As far as Simla Banking and Industrial Co.'s case (supra) is concerned, it may be seen that in that case in para 12 of the judgment the learned Judges held that the right of subrogation under Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act can only be available to a person other than the mortgagor. Therefore, even if Shri Salig Ram had paid off the entire money to Badri Dass, he would have been deemed to be a mortgagor and on making the payment even, he could not have reaped the benefit of Section 92 and therefore, no question of subrogation could arise. In para 11 of this judgment some remarks are made which are in the nature of obiter dicta and the facts of the case are quite different from the facts of the present case. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Nayar, on the other hand, has relied on Ganeshi Lal v. Jyoti Prasad and another, AIR 1949 East Punjab 254, for the proposition that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act are not in force in Punjab and Sections 82, 92 and 100 are not in terms applicable, but the principles underlying in these sections being the principles based on equity, justice and good conscience, are applicable. In that case their Lordships held that there is no principle of equity, justice and good conscience on the basis of which a person who is entitled to be reimbursed in respect of which a person who is entitled to be reimbursed in respect of certain payment is entitled to claim in a Court of Law not only the amount he paid, but also the benefits which he gained by redeeming a previous mortgage. Thus their Lordships indirectly held that a mortgagee on the principles of subrogation is entitled to get the mortgage-amount alone which he paid. This case was taken to the Supreme Court and the decision of their Lordships is reported as Ganeshi Lal v.Joti Parshad, AIR 1953 Supreme Court 1. The Supreme Court confirmed the plea that the provisions of Transfer of Property Act are not applicable and confirmed the view taken by the High Court, and their Lordships observed that such a mortgagor stands in the mortgagee's shoes only to the extent of getting reimbursed from the co-mortgagors for their shares in the amount actually paid by him and not for the full amount due on the mortgage on the date of redemption. 12. Similar view was taken in Janardhan Bhagwan Dass v. Sham Lal Nand Lal and others, AIR 1959 Punjab 170 by a Division Bench of this Court. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the strict provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable in the case of Punjab and, therefore, the case decided by the Privy council, referred to above by the counsel for the appellant, are not applicable to the facts of the present case, and Simla Banking and Industrial Co's case (supra), is also does not lay down the law as the remarks made in para 11 of the judgment are in the nature of obiter dicta and in para 12 of that judgment the learned Judge held that even if the whole amount would have been paid by Shri Salig Ram, even then he could not be subrogated. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents relied in Munna Lal and others v. Chunni Lal, AIR 1945 Allahabad 239, a full Bench decision of the High Court, in which it was held that where a person redeems a prior mortgage or pays the decree on such mortgage, he acquires the same rights as the prior mortgagee and must enforce the priority under the prior mortgage within 12 years of the amount secured by the prior mortgage becoming due. The full Bench took the view that even if a decree of a mortgagee is satisfied by a person, he is deemed to have redeemed the prior mortgage. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the moment a decree of the mortgage-amount is passed, the mortgage is extinguished, is not correct. It may take a different form but the fact remains that the charge remains on the property mortgaged till the decree is satisfied. 14. As far as the question of not having taken the plea in the suit is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that he was merely a proforma defendant in the suit and the plaintiffs suit was that a mortgage-amount to the extent of Rs. 2,700/- was taken by Parmeshwari Dass and, therefore, there was no occasion for the counsel to have raised any plea at that time. The contention is that supposing the value of the property is about Rs. 10,000/- and the charge claimed by the plaintiff Smt. Durga Devi was to the extent of Rs. 2,700/-, therefore, it was open to Gokal Chand to have thought that his charge is also safe, therefore, he need not have raised any plea in that suit. 15. The learned counsel for the respondents further contended that the evidence led in the case conclusively proved that it was Gokal Chand who paid a sum of Rs. 3,100/- was not proved to have been paid by Gokal Chand, is not of any substance. 16. I have considered the contention of the learned counsel for both sides and have also gone through the authorities referred to by the learned counsel for the parties and am of the opinion that the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant must be rejected. As far as the first point is concerned, suffice it to say that the provisions of Section 92 of the Transfer of Property Act are not applicable in Punjab in terms. Therefore, the proviso to Section 92 that there shall be no right of subrogation if the earlier mortgage-amount is not paid in full, is not strictly applicable to the case. The only thing which has to be seen is that the principles of equity, justice and fair play are brought into play as and when a case of this nature arises. The authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant in the Privy Council cases relate to the cases outside the State of Punjab and the authority referred to in Simla Banking and Industrial Co's case (supra) not applicable to the facts of the present case. In that case the learned Judge came to the conclusion that even if Shri Salig Ram would have paid the whole amount he could not be subrogated because he had attained his rights of the mortgagor. 17. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that this was a case of satisfaction of the execution of a decree and not for the redemption of the mortgage, is also without any force. The two authorities relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in Rabnath Bakhsh v. Ganesh Prasad and another, AIR 1920 Oudh 253 and Lutar Ram and others v. Lal Ranjit Singh and others, AIR 1924 Oudh 85 run counter to the full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Munna Lal's case (supra). In my opinion the correct law has been laid down by the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. The charge of the mortgage remains on the property mortgaged till the mortgage decree is satisfied, and the view that the moment a decree is passed the mortgage extinguishes, is not the correct position in law. The charge may assume a different shape but the property is not relieved till that charge is satisfied by way of execution of the decree. 18. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Gokal Chand did not raise this plea in the suit filed by Smt. Durga Devi, is also without any force for the simple reason that this question is a mixed question of fact and law. This question was never raised before the learned Lower Appellate Court and it cannot be allowed to be raised in the Execution Second Appeal. It was open to Gokal Chand to have thought that the property in dispute was worth about Rs. 10,000/- and in that case it was pointless for him to have raised any plea in the suit thinking that his charge was well safe even if the suit filed by Durga Devi was decreed. 19. As regards the 4th contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that there is no evidence to prove that it was Gokal Chand who paid the sum of Rs, 3,100/- to the satisfaction of the decree. This is again without any merit. The Nazir was examined in the Court who clearly stated that a sum of Rs. 4,000/- was deposited by Gokal Chand in the Court and after the sum of Rs, 3,100/- was paid to Smt. Soma Vati, decree-holder, the remaining amount of Rs. 900/- was again withdrawn by Gokal Chand. The presumption is that a person who deposits the amount in Court, deposits the same from his own pocket. There is no evidence led by Smt. Durga Devi to show that this amount was not deposited by Gokal Chand and some contribution was made by Parmeshwari Dass. Thus in my view, there is no merit in this appeal and the same should be dismissed with costs. 20. Now, I take up E.S.A. No. 842 of 1961. The learned counsel for Gokal Chand, Mr. Nayar, argued that there was evidence to show that a sum of Rs. 80/- was paid by Gokal Chand for defending the previous suit between Smt. Soma Vati on one side and Parmeshwari Dass and Gokal Chand on the other. But the learned counsel could not refer to any such evidence led in the case. Faced with this situation the learned counsel did not press this point any further. 21. I have gone through the judgment of the learned Courts below and I find that the learned Courts have rightly arrived at the conclusion that no sum has been proved to have been incurred by Gokal Chand and, therefore, the charge on the property was only to the tune of Rs. 1,550/-. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is also dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.