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  • provisions of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (for brevity the Act).
  • provisions contained in Section 21 and the Rule 3(3)
  • Section 44(4) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 21
  • sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule
  • Rule 3(3) of the Rules
  • sub-rule.(1) of Rule 3
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (for brevity the Act).
  • provisions contained in Section 21 and the Rule 3(3)
  • Section 44(4) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act
  • ARTICLE 227 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Sub-section (4) of Section 21
  • sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule
  • Rule 3(3) of the Rules
  • sub-rule.(1) of Rule 3
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Dipak Misra, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was elected as Pramukh of Fatuha Block under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006. Members of the Panchayat Samiti presented a requisition on 5.12.2009 seeking a special meeting to consider a No Confidence Motion. The Block Development Officer–cum–Executive Officer issued notice for a special meeting fixed for 12.12.2009. At the meeting the No Confidence Motion was moved, the appellant participated, and the motion passed resulting in the appellant being unseated. The State Election Commission thereafter notified the District Magistrate–cum–Election Officer to hold an election for the vacant post on 11.1.2010.

The appellant challenged the matter under Article 226 of the Constitution contending that the notice did not comply with Section 46(4) of the Act which requires seven clear days' notice for a special meeting; she argued that the counting method applied reduced the notice period to six days, rendering the meeting and the resulting vote invalid. The Single Judge, by an order dated 7.1.2010 in CWJC No. 18104 of 2009, refused to interfere with the resolution removing the appellant. The appellant invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent to challenge that Single Judge's order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the notice for the special meeting (issued on 5.12.2009 for meeting on 12.12.2009) complied with the mandatory requirement of seven clear days under Section 46(4) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006.
  2. Whether the appellant, by fixing the meeting date in the Panchayat register and by participating in the meeting, waived the statutory requirement of seven clear days' notice (i.e., whether a mandatory statutory requirement could be waived by the conduct of the person for whose benefit it is provided).
  3. Whether the Single Judge erred in refusing to set aside the resolution of no confidence—particularly whether the application of the doctrine of approbate and reprobate and the discussion of democratic process and loss of confidence were legally sustainable in the facts of the case.
  4. Whether the resolution and the subsequent notification for filling the post were vitiated by the alleged short notice and therefore unsustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh)

  • The Single Judge was wrong to refuse relief after recording that seven clear days' notice had not been given; a meeting convened without compliance with Section 46(4) is invalid.
  • The Single Judge erroneously applied the principle of approbate and reprobate; reliance on Sanjay Singh Som… v. State of Bihar (2002) 3 PLJR 589 was misplaced.
  • An act done in violation of mandatory statutory requirements is fundamentally null and void; the democratic process and loss of confidence argument cannot cure illegality of the meeting.
  • The Single Judge impermissibly entered into matters of policy (adult franchise), effectively legislating rather than interpreting the statute.
  • The Single Judge should have followed Jai Lal Yadav v. The State of Bihar (2004) 2 PLJR 468 (a binding precedent, according to the appellant) on the computation of seven clear days.
  • Counsel relied on Ahmed Hussain Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1984 Supp SCC 467), National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297, and Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur (2005) 1 SCC 31 to support aspects of his submissions.

State's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. K. Ravish)

  • The order of the Single Judge should be affirmed. The State relied upon Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corpn. (2008) 12 SCC 401 to support the position that waiver by conduct can affect consequences of non-compliance with notice requirements.

3rd Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Mrigank Mauli)

  • The Single Judge's order is correct because the appellant herself fixed the date for the meeting in the Panchayat Samiti register and participated in the meeting; she cannot later challenge those acts.
  • The decision in Jai Lal Yadav is distinguishable on the facts and not applicable.
  • Although seven clear days' notice is mandatory, the appellant waived that requirement by her conduct and therefore cannot now assail the resolution.
  • Reliance was placed on Bibi Amna Khatun v. Zahir Hussain (AIR 1981 Patna 1 (FB)) to support the doctrine that a mandatory provision may, in certain circumstances and subject to conditions, be waived by conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sanjay Singh Som… v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.… (2002) 3 PLJR 589 Referenced by the appellant as a decision relied upon by the Single Judge (appellant contended reliance was misplaced). The opinion records the appellant's submission that the Single Judge's reliance on this decision was misplaced; the Court does not expand on its substantive application in this judgment.
Jai Lal Yadav v. The State of Bihar (2004) 2 PLJR 468 Held that seven clear days' notice (Section 44(4) as quoted in that case) is mandatory and notice must exclude the day of issuance and the day of meeting. The Court considered this precedent at length, acknowledged its legal proposition, but distinguished it on facts (in Jai Lal Yadav the petitioner had not himself fixed or taken part in the meeting); the Court declined to apply it to invalidate the present proceedings.
Ahmed Hussain Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1984 Supp SCC 467) Dealt with entitlement to pension and whether right was waived; principle concerned waiver in pension context. The Court observed that the decision concerned pensions and that its reasoning did not assist the appellant on the question whether a mandatory provision can be waived by conduct in the present context.
National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh (2004) 3 SCC 297 Concerning statutory construction; the scheme of the Act must be read as a whole. The Court noted the decision but found it not materially helpful on the distinct question of whether a mandatory statutory provision can be waived by conduct.
Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur (2005) 1 SCC 31 Held that waiver is a question of fact which must be pleaded and proved; a bald plea of waiver cannot defeat statutory provisions enacted in larger interest. The Court relied on this authority for the proposition that waiver must be established on facts and cannot be lightly assumed; the case supported the Court's approach to waiver as fact-specific.
Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C. Sharma (1988) 1 SCC 70 Explained that waiver is a question of fact and that statutory requirements enacted in public interest cannot be waived casually. The Court quoted the authority to reinforce the principle that waiver requires conscious relinquishment and is a factual determination.
Pulin Behari Lal (Pulin Elehari Lal) v. Mahadeb Dutta (1993) 1 SCC 629 Held that waiver depends on facts and requires proof of conscious relinquishment of the statutory right. The Court cited the decision to support the proposition that waiver is fact-dependent and must be demonstrated.
Bibi Amna Khatun v. Zahir Hussain (AIR 1981 Patna 1 (FB) : 1980 PUR 208 (FB)) Discussed the scope of waiver even where a statutory provision is mandatory; explained the relationship between waiver and estoppel and the conditions under which waiver may apply. The Court relied on the Full Bench reasoning to explain that waiver may apply to mandatory provisions when the right is for an individual and does not involve public interest; used to underpin the conclusion that waiver by conduct was possible in present facts.
Krishna Bahadur v. Puma Theatre (2004) 8 SCC 229 Stated that waiver is different from estoppel; waiver can be contractual and may constitute a cause of action; statutory rights may be waived by conduct subject to public-interest considerations. The Court cited this decision for the doctrinal distinction between waiver and estoppel and to support that statutory rights can, in certain circumstances, be waived by conduct.
Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corpn. (2008) 12 SCC 401 Explained the consequence of non-compliance with notice requirements and that a person may disentitle himself to equitable relief by his conduct; discussed waiver by necessary implication. The Court referred to paragraphs 28–29 to support the view that conduct of the affected party may disentitle them from equitable relief even if a procedural obligation was not complied with.
Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation (1992 Supp (1) SCC 5) Explained that waiver may be inferred from issuance of notice and non-response; a person who does not respond to a notice may be held to have waived the opportunity. The Court cited the case in support of the proposition that failure to take objection to procedural acts may amount to waiver and that a party cannot later be permitted to challenge the procedure after the scheme reaches finality.
Krishna Lal v. State of J & K (1994) 4 SCC 422 Discussed the maxim that a law made for a person's benefit may be renounced by that person and contrasted waivable private benefits with public-interest obligations. The Court referred to the decision for scholarly exposition (Maxwell, Bennion et al.) and the principle that benefits granted for private advantage may be waived while public-interest obligations generally cannot.
Vellayan Chettiar v. Government of the Province of Madras (AIR 1947 PC 197) One of several earlier authorities cited within the Court's summary of jurisprudence on interpretation and waiver. Referenced as part of the jurisprudential background summarized in Krishna Lal; used indirectly in the Court's discussion of waiver and statutory interpretation.
Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council (54 IA 338) One of the earlier authorities cited in the course of discussing statutory interpretation and waiver. Referenced as part of the background authorities collected in Krishna Lal and summarized by this Court in its discussion.
Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Shudhir Chandra Ghosh (AIR 1964 SC 1300) One of the authorities cited in connection with statutory interpretation principles. Included in the Court's survey of authorities in Krishna Lal as part of the jurisprudential context for waiver and construction of statutes.
Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619 : AIR 1971 SC 2213 Another authority referenced in the context of statutory interpretation and waiver. Referred to within the Court's discussion of precedent in Krishna Lal to illustrate principles concerning waiver and statutory rights.
Basheshar Nath v. Commr. of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan (AIR 1959 SC 149) Cited as authority on waiver and the scope of renunciation of rights made for a person's benefit. Referenced by the Court (via Bibi Amna Khatun and Krishna Lal) to support the statement that an individual may renounce a law made for his special benefit under certain circumstances.
Indira Bai (citation as in text: "Indira Bai (supra)") Addressed the test to determine whether an interest is private or public for purpose of estoppel/waiver. The Court invoked the distinction drawn in Indira Bai to explain that interests that affect public welfare are not easily to be waived, whereas private benefits may be renounced by the beneficiary.
Smt. Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P (2000 (4) M.P.H.T 69 (FB)) Full Bench decision addressing validity of notice for no-confidence meetings and the circumstances where non-compliance may not invalidate proceedings if no prejudice is caused. The Court found this Full Bench decision apposite and cited it to support the proposition that mandatory requirements may not always invalidate an action where no substantial prejudice or failure of justice occurred.
Arun Kumar Singh v. The State of Bihar (unreported decision dated 20.11.2003 in C.W.J.C No. 5326 of 2003; reported 2004 (2) PUR 367) Referenced in Jai Lal Yadav to support the view about computation of clear days and invalidity of meetings called without proper notice. Quoted within the Jai Lal Yadav exposition; the present Court distinguished Jai Lal Yadav on facts and therefore did not treat Arun Kumar Singh as dispositive here.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the statutory provisions engaged: Section 44(3) (dealing with vacancy on passing of a no confidence resolution and the procedure for calling such meetings) and Section 46(4) (requiring seven clear days' notice for a special meeting). The Court stated that on a plain reading, Section 46(4)'s requirement of seven clear days is mandatory.

The pivotal legal question was whether the mandatory nature of the seven clear days' notice could be waived by the conduct of the elected Pramukh (the appellant). To address that, the Court examined authorities on waiver and its limits. The Court reviewed precedents establishing that:

  • Waiver is a question of fact requiring proof of conscious relinquishment and must generally be pleaded and established (Joginder Singh Sodhi; Shalimar Tar Products; Pulin Behari Lal).
  • There is a doctrinal distinction between waiver (a rule of conduct/contractual in character) and estoppel (a rule of evidence), and waiver may be available where the statutory right is for the private benefit of the person concerned and does not implicate public interest (Bibi Amna Khatun; Krishna Bahadur; Krishna Lal; Indira Bai).
  • Even where a statute prescribes mandatory procedures, courts have recognized exceptions: non-compliance may not invalidate proceedings if no failure of justice or substantial prejudice results, and if the party seeking relief has by conduct disentitled himself from equitable relief (Babulal Badriprasad Varma; Smt. Bhulin Dewangan).

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court relied on the appellant's own pleadings (paragraph 6 of the writ petition) in which she stated that she had fixed the meeting date in the Panchayat Samiti register for issuing the notice to convene the meeting on 12.12.2009. The Court found that:

  • The appellant herself had set the date and then participated in the meeting; such conduct amounted to an express waiver by conduct.
  • The provisions in Sections 44 and 46(4) are protective of the elected Pramukh and do not, in the Court's analysis, involve a public interest that would preclude waiver in the circumstances of this case; rather, they afford protection to the elected office-holder.
  • All members had been served with notice, had participated, and the requisite majority voted against the appellant (12 votes in favour of the motion, with three unmarked and one invalid); the Court found no substantial prejudice to the appellant arising from any technical non-compliance, and no failure of justice to justify interference under Articles 226 or 227.

The Court considered and distinguished Jai Lal Yadav (where the petitioner's factual position was different) and explained that while the legal proposition in that decision (regarding computation of seven clear days) was accepted, its factual matrix did not match the present case because in Jai Lal Yadav the petitioner had not fixed the meeting date or participated and had challenged the notice in advance. Consequently, Jai Lal Yadav was not followed on the facts here.

On that basis, the Court concluded that the appellant had waived the statutory requirement by her express conduct (fixing the date and participating) and that there was no reason to set aside the no-confidence resolution. The Court therefore declined to interfere with the Single Judge's decision.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct effect on the parties:

  • The no-confidence resolution passed on 12.12.2009 was not set aside by this Court.
  • The notification/action taken subsequent to the vacancy (including the fixing of the election date by the State Election Commission) is not disturbed by this judgment.
  • The appeal was dismissed and the Court ordered no costs ("there shall be no order as to costs").

Broader implications:

The Court applied established principles on waiver of statutory rights and distinguished the contrary factual scenario in Jai Lal Yadav. The judgment does not purport to lay down a new principle of law; rather it applies existing doctrines (waiver, approbate and reprobate, and the discretionary supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227) to the present facts and emphasizes that a mandatory provision may in certain factual contexts be treated as waived by the beneficiary's conduct where no substantial prejudice results.

Judge Shiva Kirti Singh concurred with the judgment.

    Shamshad Khatun v. State Of Bihar

    Dipak Misra, C.J:— Questioning the soundness of the order dated 7.1.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in CWJC No. 18104 of 2009 the appellant has invoked the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent.

    2. The factual matrix, as have been unfolded in the writ petition as well as in this appeal, are the appellant was elected as Pramukh of Fatuha Block under the provisions of Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 (for brevity ‘the Act’). While she was functioning as the Pramukh, the members of the Panchayat Samiti sent a requisition on 5.12.2009 for convening a special meeting for No Confidence Motion against her. On the basis of the said requisition, the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer issued notice for convening a special meeting on 12.12.2009 On the date fixed, a No Confidence Motion after being mooted was passed against the appellant. The appellant, as is evident, participated in the No Confidence Motion, which was passed against her and she became unseated. After the post fell vacant, the State Election Commission communicated to the District Magistrate-cum-Election Officer, Patna fixing 11.1.2010 for the date of election of new Pramukh. Being dissatisfied with the afore said action, the appellant invoked the ju risdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India contending, inter alia, that the notice that was issued by the Block Development Officer-cum-Executive Officer of the Panchayat Samiti fixing the meeting on 12.12.2009 does not meet the requirement as postulated under Section 46(4) of the Act as the said provi sion provides that there must be a clear seven days notice for convening a special meeting for consideration of No Confidence Motion. Structuring the said stand it was urged that the date the notice was issued, that is, 5.12.2009, was to be included and the day of meeting, that is, 12.12.2009, has to be excluded and on such exclusion, the notice period would stand re-: duced to six days which vitiates the mandatory provision as engrafted under Section 46(4) of the Act, and therefore, the vote of No Confidence passed against her is null and void and, therefore, in the ultimate eventuate, the Notification issued by the State Election Commission to fill up the post treating the same to be vacant is unsustainable.

    3. The learned Single Judge took note of the statutory provisions, the pleadings in paragraph 6 of the writ petition by which the appellant had fixed the date for convening the meeting in the Register of Panchayat Samiti and her participation in the special meeting wherein the vote of No Confidence was passed and the result f the meeting to the effect that out of 16 elected Members, three votes were found unmarked, one was found invalid and 12 Members voted against her and the conduct of the appellant which invited the wrath of the principle of approbate and reprobate expressed the view that the resolution passed against the appellant did not deserve to be interfered with. It is apt to note the learned Single Judge has also referred to the concept of democratic process of adult franchise and the concept of loss of confidence of the House to bolster his view.

    4. Mr. Shambhu Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant assailing the pregnability of the order of the learned Single Judge has raised the following contentions:—

    (a) The order passed by the learned Single Judge is totally indefensible inas much as after recording a finding there has been no seven clear days notice, he has declined to interfere with the resolution passed by the Panchayat Samiti by which the appellant was unseated.

    (b) The learned Single Judge has erroneously applied the principle of approbate and reprobate which is not applicable to the case at hand and the reliance placed by him on the decision Sanjay Singh Som… v. The State Of Bihar & Ors.…, (2002) 3 PLJR 589 is absolutely misplaced and thereby the order passed by him becomes vulnerable.

    (c) When the meeting itself is illegal because of violation of the mandatory provisions of the Act, the result of meeting would not rectify the defect and attracting the concept of democratic process and the loss of confidence of the House in an elected candidate is wholly unwarranted inasmuch as an act unless done in accord with the requirement of the statute is fundamentally null and void.

    (d) If the order of the learned Single Judge is appositely scrutinized it would be clear as day that he has not adverted to the statutory spectrum in proper perspective and has entered into the realm of adult franchise to incorporate a new concept which only the legislature can do. In essentiality, the learned Single Judge has entered into the realm of legislation which is impermissible in law.

    (e) The learned Single Judge should have been guided by the decision rendered in Jai Lal Yadav v. The State of Bihar, (2004) 2 PLJR 468 which is a binding precedent in The field, of notice and the resultant concomitant and should not have opined that the appellant is precluded to challenge her own action.

    5. Mr. Singh, learned counsel for the appellant, to buttress his submissions has placed reliance on Ahmed Hussain Khan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1984 Supp SCC 467; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297 & Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur., (2005) 1 SCC 31.

    6. Mr. K. Ravish, learned counsel for the State supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge. He has commended us to the decision rendered in Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corpn., (2008) 12 SCC 401.

    7. Mr. Mrigank Mauli, learned counsel appearing for the 3rd respondent resisting the aforesaid submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant has canvassed the following proponements:—

    (i) The order passed by the learned Single Judge is impeccable since the appellant on her own showing had fixed the date of the meeting to 12.12.2009 and taken a chance to participate in the meeting, she cannot take a summersault to challenge the same.

    (ii) The decision rendered in Jai Lal Yadav (supra) is not applicable to the factual scenario and is distinguishable.

    (iii) Though there is mandatory requirement for giving seven clear days notice, yet the appellant by her own conduct has waived the same and, hence, the order passed by the learned single Judge withstands studied scrutiny.

    8. Mr. Mauli, learned counsel, to bolster/his submissions, has placed reliance on the decision in Bibi Amna Khatun v. Zahir Hussain, AIR 1981 Patna 1 (FB)[: 1980 PUR 208 (FB)].

    9. To appreciate the rival submissions raised at the Bar it is seemly to refer to Section 44 of the Act. The said provision deals with resignation and removal of Pramukh and Up-Pramukh. Subsection (3) of Section 44 which is relevant for the present purpose is reproduced as under:—

    “44(3).(i) A Pramukh/Up-Pramukh of the Panchayat Samiti shall be deemed to have vacated his office forthwith if a resolution expressing want of confidence in him is passed by a majority of the total number of elected members of the Panchayat Samiti at a meeting specially convened for the purpose.

    The requisition for such a special meeting shall be presented to the Pramukh in writing with a copy to the Executive Officer of the Panchayat Samiti, by not less than one third of the total number of members elected directly from the territorial constituencies of the Panchayat Samiti. The Executive Officer shall immediately bring the requisition to the notice of the Pramukh. The Pramukh shall convene such meeting on a date falling within 15 days of such requisition. If the Pramukh fails to call the special meet-ing, the Up-Pramukh or one third of the total number of directly elected members may fix a date for such meeting and require the Executive Officer to give notice to the members and to take such action as may be necessary to convene the meeting. The Executive Officer shall necessarily issue such notice in time and convene the meeting. No such meeting shall be postponed once the notice for the same has been issued. No quorum shall be required for the special meeting convened to discuss no confidence motion.

    (ii) No confidence motion shall not be moved against the Pramukh or the Up-Pramukh within the first two year period of their tenure.

    (iii) If the motion of no confidence brought against the Pramukh or the Up-Pramukh or both is once rejected, no fresh motion of no confidence against the Pramukh or the Up-Pramukh or both, as the case may be shall be brought before the Panchayat Samiti within a period of one year from the date of uch rejection of the motion.

    (iv) No confidence motion against the Pramukh or Up-Pramukh or both, as the case may be, shall not be brought during the last six months of the term of the Panchayat Samiti as mentioned in Section 39(1) of this Act.

    (v) Such reasons/charges, on the basis of which no confidence motion has to be moved against the Pramukh or Up-Pramukh, shall be clearly mentioned in the notice of meeting called to consider the no confidence motion.

    (vi) As soon as the meeting called under this section begins, the presiding member of this meeting shall read out the motion on which the meeting has been called to consider before the members present and declare it open for discussion. Any discussion on the motion shall not be adjourned.

    (vii) During discussion, opportunity shall be given to the Pramukh/Up-Pramukh against whom no confidence motion has been moved for his defence before the Panchayat Samiti. The motion shall be put to vote on the same day after discussion and shall take place by secret ballot in the prescribed manner.

    (viii) In case of no confidence motion against a Pramukh, the meeting shall be presided by the Up-Pramukh; in case of motion against Up-Pramukh by the Pramukh and in case of motion against both Pramukh and Up-Pramukh, by any member elected from among the members of the Panchayat Samiti present in the meeting.

    In case of the post of Up-Pramukh being vacant or his absence from the meeting convened for discussion on no confidence motion against the Pramukh or the post of Pramukh being vacant or his absence from the meeting convened for discussion on no confidence motion against the Up-Pramukh, as the case may be, shall be presided over by any member elected from amongst the directly elected members from the territorial constituency of the Panchayat Samiti present in the meeting.”

    10. Section 46 of the Act deals with convening of meeting of Panchayat Samiti. Sub-section (4) of Section 46 of the Act being relevant for the present purpose is reproduced below:—

    “46(4) Ten clear days' notice of an ordinary meeting and seven clear days' notice of a special meeting specifying the time at which such meeting is to be held and the business to be transacted thereat shall be sent to the members and affixed at the office of the Panchayat Samiti. Such notice shall include in case of a special meeting any motion or propositipn mentioned in the written request made for such meeting.”

    11. On a reading of the aforesaid provision there can be no scintilla of doubt that the said provision is mandatory. There has to be notice of seven clear days.

    12. The fulcrum of the matter is whether the appellant by her own conduct has waived the mandatory requirement commanded by the Statute. Before we dwell upon the factual arena we may refer to the citations upon which reliance has been placed by Mr. Singh. Learned coun sel has drawn inspiration from paragraph 22 of the decision rendered in Ahmed Hussain Khan (supra). In the said case, their Lordships were dealing with the right to receive pension under the Pension Rules and, in that context, their Lordships ex pressed the view that the right to receive pension in the facts of the said case had not been waived as the same having not been established. Thus, the said decision does not render any assistance to the proposition put forth by Mr. Singh.

    13. In Swaran Singh (supra), their Lordships have held to construe a statute, the scheme of the Act has to be taken into consideration and, for the said purpose, it has to be read as a whole and then chapter by chapter, section by section and word by word. In the present case we are concerned with the proposition whether a mandatory provision can be waived. Therefore, we are disposed to think the said decision does not aid or assist the stand put forth by Mr. Singh.

    14. In Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur., (2005) 1 SCC 31, a two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with the stand taken as regards waiver on the part of the landlady by her own conduct. Their Lordships expressed the view that waiver is a question of fact which must be expressly pleaded, clearly proved and no such plea had been raised by the tenant or by the sub-tenant. Their Lordships further held a bald plea of waiver cannot defeat statutory provision made in larger interest. In that context their Lordships referred to the earlier decisions rendered in Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. v. H.C Sharma, (1988) 1 SCC 70 and Pulin Elehari Lal v. Mahadeb Dutta, (1993) 1 SCC 629. In Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. (supra) the Apex Court has expressed the views as follows:—

    “13. Everyone has a right to waive and to agree to waive the advantage of a law made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his individual capacity. We are, however, in this case unable to agree. Firstly, in this case there was no case of waiver. Waiver is a question of fact which has to be tested by facts and evidence. There was no conscious relinquishment of the advantage of any statute. No court has gone into this fact. It does not seem to have been urged before the High Court also. Apart from this, in this requirement of the statute which is in the public interest there cannot be any question of waiver of a right, dealing with the rights of the tenants or the landlord.”

    15. In Pulin Behari Lal (supra) it has been held as follows:—

    “6….… Waiver is a question of fact which depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the case of waiver of any provisions of the statute it is necessary to prove that there was conscious relinquishment of the advantage of such provisions of the statute…….…”

    16. In this regard we may fruitfully refer to the decision in Bibi Amna Khatun (supra) wherein the majority speaking through Hari Lal Agrawal, J. (as His Lordship then was), expressed the view as under:—

    “8. In my opinion, simply because the second part of Section 11A is mandatory in nature, will not rule out the application of the principle of ‘waiver’, if once the correct scope of this maxim is appreciated and understood. Although the desired assistance was not rendered at the Bar, I have taken some pains to examine the proposition in its true perspective with reference to the facts of the present case.

    9. The essence of waiver is ‘estoppel’ and where there is no ‘estoppel’, there can be no ‘waiver’, the connection between ‘estoppel’ and ‘waiver’ being very close. But in spite of that, there is an essential and fundamental difference between the two and that is that whereas estoppel is a rule of evidence, waiver is a rule of conduct. The accepted connotation of ‘waiver’ is that to constitute waiver there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right or the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of an existing legal right and a conduct which warrants an inference of the relinquishment of a known right or a privilege (see, AIR 1959 SC 149).

    There is, however, a tendency to mix up ‘waiver’ and ‘estoppel’, as a single idea, although the one has apparently reference to a man's conduct and the other to the legal consequence of that conduct. The principle underlying both these maxims is the same, namely, that a party will not be permitted to approbate and reprobate or, in other words, to blow hot and cold, in respect of the same matter. This is the underlying principle behind the maxim ‘waiver’.

    I may now refer to a few authorities where the application of waiver has been considered, in order to bring home my point of view. The principle that has been decided by those authorities, if I may briefly put it here, is that where a right or privilege guaranteed by law rests in the individual and is primarily intended for his benefit and does not infringe the right of others, it can be waived provided such waiver is not forbidden by law and does not contravene any public policy. This principle was recognized by this Court also in the case of Sashibhusan Prasad Singh v. Dalip Narain Singh (AIR 1936 Pat. 75) and then again in the case of Jogendra Missir v. Ramnandan Singh (AIR 1968 Pat. 218). The Supreme Court also in the case of Basheshar Nath v. Commr. of Income-tax, Delhi and Rajasthan (AIR 1959 SC 149) made a similar observation. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edition (1962) at page 376, has also enunciated the same principle for applying this principle of estoppel.”

    17. In this context we may profitably refer to Krishna Bahadur v. Puma Thea tre, (2004) 8 SCC 229, wherein it has been held as follows:—

    “9. The principle of waiver although is akin to the principle of estoppel; the difference between the two, however, is that whereas estoppel is not a cause of action; it is a rule of evidence; waiver is contractual and may constitute a cause of action; it is an agreement between the parties and a party fully knowing of its rights has agreed not to assert a right for a consideration.

    10. A right can be waived by the party for whose benefit certain requirements or conditions had been provided for by a statute subject to the condition that no public interest is involved therein. Whenever waiver is pleaded it is for the party pleading the same to show that an agreement waiving the right in consideration of some compromise came into being. Statutory right, however, may also be waived by his conduct.”

    18. In Babulal Badriprasad Varma v. Surat Municipal Corpn., (2008) 12 SCC 401, the Apex Court has held in paragraphs 28 and 29 as follows:—

    “28. We would, however, assume that it was obligatory on the part of the State to serve a special notice upon the appellant. The question, however, would be: what would be the consequence of non-compliance therewith visa-vis the conduct of the appellant him-, self?”

    “29. A person may waive a right either expressly or by necessary implication. He may in a given case disentitle himself, from obtaining an eq-uitable relief particularly when he allows a thing to come to an irreversible situation.”

    19. In Jaswantsingh Mathurasingh v. Ahmedabad Municipal Cor poration, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 5, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court while deal ing with the principle of the waiver has expressed thus:—

    “14. The principle of waiver connotes issuance of notice and non-response thereto. Everyone has a right to waive an advantage or protection which law seeks to give him/her. Undoubtedly, if a notice is issued and no representation was made by either the owner, tenant or a sub-tenant, it would amount to waive the opportunity and such person cannot be permitted to turn round, after the scheme reaches finality, to say that there is non-compliance of sub-rules (3) and (4) of Rule 21. It would amount to putting premium on dilatory and dishonest conduct.”

    20. In Krishna Lal v. State of J & K, (1994) 4 SCC 422, the Apex Court after referring to the earlier, decisions rendered in Vellayan Chettiar v. Government of the Province of Madras, AIR 1947 PC 197; Bhagchand Dagadusa v. Secretary of State for India in Council, 54 IA 338; Dhirendra Nath Gorai v. Shudhir Chandra Ghosh, AIR 1964 SC 1300; Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam† , (1971) 1 SCC 619 : AIR 1971 SC 2213 has expressed the view as follows:—

    “20. Having seen the pronouncements of judicial fora, we can now inform ourselves as to the view of the reputed authors on interpretation of stat-utes as well as administrative law. We may start with what has been stated in Maxwell's The Interpretation of Statutes. This aspect has been dealt at pages 328-330 (12th Edn.) and it has been stated that if the benefit be for the protection of an individual in his private capacity the same can be waived. To illustrate, reference has been made about waiver of the benefit of the Limitation Act. This is on the maxim of law “Quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto”, meaning “an individual may renounce a law made for his special benefit”. Maxwell then says that if the benefit be one which has been imposed in public interest there can be no waiver of the same.”

    “21. Craies in his Statute Law has opined the same, as would appear from what has been stated at page 269 of 7th Edn. By drawing attention to the aforesaid maxim, it has been observed that if the object of a statute is “not one of general policy, or if the thing which is being done will benefit only a particular person or class of persons, then the conditions prescribed by the statute are not considered as being indispensable”. To illustrate this principle, it, has been stated that if the statutory condition be imposed simply for the security or the benefit of the parties to the action themselves, such condition will not be considered as indispensable and either party may waive it.”

    “22. Crawford in his Interpretation of Laws takes the same view as would appear from pages 540-542 (1989 Reprint) The learned author while quoting the aforesaid maxim states at page 542 that requirement like giving of notice may be waived as the same is intended for the benefit of the person concerned.”

    “23. We may also refer to the views expressed by Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation (1984), wherein this aspect has been dealt with at pages 27 et seq and it has been stated that if the performance of statutory duty be one which would come within the aforesaid maxim, the person entitled to the performance can effectively waive performance of the duty by the person bound. As an illustration mention has been made (at page 29) of decisions in Toronto Corpn. v. Russell and Stylo Shoes Ltd. v. Prices Tailors Ltd. wherein it was held that a duty to give notice of certain matters can be waived by the person entitled to notice, if there is no express or implied indication that absence of notice would be fatal.”

    “24. H.W.R Wade's name is well known in the world of administrative law. He has dealt with this aspect at page 267 of the 6th Edn. of his treatise wherein he has quoted what Lord Denning, MR said in Wells v. Minister of Housing and Local Government which is as below:—

    “I take the law to be that a defect in procedure can be cured, and an irregularity can be waived, even by a public authority, so as to render valid that which would otherwise be invalid.”.

    21. In this context we may refer with profit the decision in Indira Bai (supra) wherein the Apex Court while drawing a distinction between private and public in-, terest has expressed thus:—

    “5….….The test to determine the nature of interest, namely, private or public is whether the right which is renunciated is the right of party alone or of the public also in the sense that the general welfare of the society is involved. If the answer is latter then it may be difficult to put estoppel as a defence; But if it is right of party alone then it is capable of being abnegated either in writing or by conduct…………………”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    22. The present factual expose has to be appreciated on the touchstone and anvil of aforesaid pronouncements. As is demonstrable, the petitioner in paragraph 6 of the writ petition has stated as fol lows:—

    “6. That the petitioner has fixed the date for convening the meeting for consideration of no confidence against her in the Register of the Panchayat Samiti for issuing the notice by the Executive Officer for 12.12.09”

    23. From the aforesaid it is perceived that she herself had fixed the date of meeting. The meeting as fixed was held on 12.12.2009 She participated in the meeting and took a chance. Thus, fixing of the meeting by the appellant and participation in the meeting would tantamount to waiver by express conduct. If the provisions contained in Sections 44 and 46(4) of the Act are read appositely there can be no shadow of doubt that they provide a protective umbrella to the elected Pramukh. Thus, the same does not Contravene any public policy. It does not involve any public interest. As we perceive the scheme and anatomy of the provisions of the Act, it is, in fact, basically a protection to the elected candidate. In this regard a Full Bench decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Smt. Bhulin Dewangan v. State of M.P, 2000 (4) M.P.H.T 69 (FB), is apposite to refer. The Full Bench while dealing with the validity of notice calling a meeting of no confidence under M.P Panchayat (Gram Panchayat Ke Sarpanch Tatha Up-Sarpanch, Janpad Panchayat Tatha Zila Panchayat Ke President Tatha Vice-President Ke Virudh Avishwas Prastav) Niyam, 1994 speaking through D.M Dharmadhikari, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as follows:—

    “15. The general rule is that noncompliance of mandatory requirement results in nullification of the Act. There are, however, several exceptions to the same. If certain requirements or conditions are provided by statute in the interest of a particular person, the requirements or conditions, although mandatory, may be waived by him if no public interest are involved and in such a case the act done will be valid even if the requirements or conditions have not been performed. This appears to be the reason for learned C.K Prasad, J. in Dhumadhandin v. State of M.P [1997 (1) Vidhi Bhasvar 49] which was followed by R.S Garg, J., in Mahavir Saket v. Collector, Rewa (1998 (1) JLJ 113] for holding that mere non-compliance of first part of the rule in fixing a meeting beyond the prescribed days of the motion of no confidence would not invalidate the whole proceedings. In case of Dhumadhandin (supra), the Sarpanch did not question the validity of the notice calling the meeting of no confidence and in fact had taken chance by facing the motion. R.S Garg, J. in Mahavir Saket (supra) placed reliance on the decision of C.K Prasad, J., in Dhumadhandin (supra) to uphold the passing of the no confidence motion in the adjourned meeting as in the meeting called within the prescribed fifteen days the Presiding Officer was not available. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 permits reference of a dispute to the Collector by Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch against whom a notice of no confidence motion had been passed. The proceedings of the no confidence motion or other proceedings under the Act are also assailable in this Court as Constitutional Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. As has been construed by us, even though second part of the rule requiring dispatch of notice of the meeting to the member is mandatory, yet in every case of challenge to the proceeding of no confidence motion either before the Collector or this Court, it would still be open to the Collector or this Court to find out whether in a given case non-compliance of any part of the rule has in fact resulted in any failure of justice or has caused any serious prejudice to any of the parties. The general rule is that a mandatory provision of law requires strict compliance and the directory one only substantial. But even where the provisions is mandatory, every non-compliance of the same need not necessarily result in nullification of the whole action. In a given situation even for non-fulfillment of mandatory requirement, the authority empowered to take a decision may refuse to nullify the action on the ground that no substantial prejudice had been caused to the party affected or to any other party which would have any other substantial interest in the proceeding. This Court under Article 227 of the Constitution has also a discretion not to interfere even though a mandatory requirement of law has not been strictly complied with as thereby no serious prejudice or failure of justice has been caused. This is how various Single Bench decisions in which even after finding some infraction of the second part of Rule 3(3) of the Rules of 1994, the resolution of no confidence motion passed was not invalidated on the ground that no substantial prejudice thereby was caused to the affected parties. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the provisions contained in Section 21 and the Rule 3(3) framed thereunder. The provisions do evince an intention that a meeting of the no confidence motion be called within a reasonable period of not later than 15 days and every member has to be informed of the same seven days in advance. A notice of no confidence motion is required to be moved by not less than ⅓rd of the total number of elected members as required by first proviso to sub-rule.(1) of Rule 3 and can be lawfully carried by a resolution passed by majority of not less than ¾th of the Panches present and voting and such majority has to be more than ⅔rd of the total number of Panches constituting the Panchayat in accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act. This being the substance of the provisions under the Act and the rules, a mere non-compliance of second part of sub-rule (3) would not in every case invalidate the action unless the Collector while deciding the dispute under subsection (4) of Section 21 or this Court in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution comes to the conclusion that such noncompliance has caused serious prejudice to the affected office bearer or has ‘otherwise’ resulted in failure of justice.”

    16. We get some support in our conclusion on the construction of the provisions contained in the Rule from Statutory construction by Francis J. Mc. Caffrrey, 1953 Edition, Article 52, Page 110 where it stated:—

    “Where a statute regulates the time at or within which an act is to be done by a public officer or body, it is generally construed to be permissive only as to the time, for the reason “that the public interests are not to suffer by the laches of any public officer” (Looney v. Hughes, 26 N.Y 514). While The Courts are inclined to hold such provisions to be directory only as to time,. they will be read as mandatory if the nature of the act to be performed or the phraseology of the statute indicates an intention on the part of the legislature to exact a literal compliance with the requirement of time. The Courts seek to achieve a just result in not ascribing an invalidating effect to the failure of public officers to observe the, time provisions of statutes; a contrary rule would operate unfairly in prejudicing the rights of persons who have no control over the conduct of the public officer.”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    and from the following passage in. Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, Second Edition, Part-I Section 10 Page. 34:—

    “Even where the duty is mandatory, the Court will not now-a-days hold it to be contravened because of a purely, formal or technical defect. This may be described as a defect that does not materially impair the remedy intended to be provided by the enactment for the mischief to which it is directed.”

    24. Applying the aforesaid principle to the facts of the present case there can be no room for doubt that the right could be waived by the elected candidate and she has done so by her express conduct. Quite apart from the above this Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the appellant had participated in the meeting by taking a chance and 12 members voted against her. It is also apt to note all the members had been served and they had particip ted. The requisite majority had voted against her. Ergo, there is no justification or warrant to interfere in the proceeding of No Confidence Motion in exercise of the extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.

    25. We will be failing in our duty if we do not deal with the decision rendered in Jai Lal Yadav (supra) as strong reliance has been placed on it by Mr. Singh. In the said case the Secretary of the Panchayat Samiti had issued notice a out the meeting which was scheduled prio to the statutory period. The leared Single Judge in paragraph 4 has hel as follows:—

    “4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised several points to assail the notice and ultimate resolution carrying out the no confidence motion but as the writ application is to succeed on a very short point, I do not consider it expedient either to incorporate or answer the same. Undisputedly the Executive Officer had issued the notice on 5.12.2001 and the date of the meeting fixed is 12.12.2001 The meeting to consider the no confidence motion has to be considered in a special meeting. Section 44(4) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act clearly stipulates that seven clear days notice of a special meeting has to be given. In the present case seven clear days notice of the special meeting has not been given and thus the notice is vitiated on account of infraction of Section 44(4) of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. Consequently the resolution passed on such an illegal notice cannot be allowed to stand. The view which I have taken finds support from an unreported decision of this Court dated 20.11.2003 passed in C.W.J.C No. 5326 of 2003 (Arun Kumar Singh v. The State of Bihar) [reported in 2004 (2) PUR 367] wherein this Court has held as follows:—

    “Having answered this, the next question which falls for determination is as to how the period of seven clear days notice is to be calculated. It is well settled that when a statute provides for stated period of notice to be given, this requirement must be met, otherwise the meeting will be invalid. In the present case, Section 44(4) of the Act had in no uncertain term provided for seven clear days notice, which would obviously mean that the notice should be exclusive of the day on which it is issued and of the meeting. Applying the aforesaid principle, I am of the opinion, that the notice to hold the meeting is invalid in the eye of law as seven clear days notice was not given.”

    26. The legal proposition enunciated therein cannot be doubted but, a significant one, the factual matrix has to be scanned. In the said case the petitioner had filed the writ for quashment of notice whereby date and time to consider the No Confidence Motion against him was placed. The matter was subject to result of the writ petition. The said decision does not show that the petitioner himself had issued the notice or had participated in the election process without any protest. Thus, while agreeing with the proposition of law set out therein we distinguish the said decision on facts. In view of the aforesaid premises the appeal, being sans substratum, has to pave the path of dismissal and, accordingly, we so direct. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.

    Shiva Kirti Singh, J.:— I agree.

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