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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • East India Councils Act of 1861 and the Government of India Act of 1919.
  • BENGAL CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT SUPPLEMENTARY ACT
  • SECTION 11 BENGAL CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875) in section 148
  • (Sections 106 and 131(3) of the Government of India Act
  • section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Indian High Courts Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vict.
  • Act of the Indian Legislature. Section 72
  • Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872)
  • Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925,
  • sections 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. Section 11
  • section 50 of the Specific Relief Act
  • section 11 of the Local Act of 1925,
  • 1919. Clause (2) of section 65,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 72. Section 71
  • Indian Contract. Act
  • India Council Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • East India Councils Act of 1861 and the Government of India Act of 1919.
  • BENGAL CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT SUPPLEMENTARY ACT
  • SECTION 11 BENGAL CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT
  • GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
  • Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875) in section 148
  • (Sections 106 and 131(3) of the Government of India Act
  • section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Indian High Courts Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vict.
  • Act of the Indian Legislature. Section 72
  • Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872)
  • Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925,
  • sections 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. Section 11
  • section 50 of the Specific Relief Act
  • section 11 of the Local Act of 1925,
  • 1919. Clause (2) of section 65,
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • section 72. Section 71
  • Indian Contract. Act
  • India Council Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Rankin, C.J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, Girindra Nath Banerjee, was arrested on 25 October 1924 at his residence in Calcutta and was detained in Alipore Central Jail and subsequently Midnapore Central Jail. An order dated 19 January 1925 under Ordinance No. 1 of 1924 committed him to custody in Midnapore Jail. On 12 June 1926 the Government of Bengal, under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925, served on him an order directing him to proceed to Midnapore, report to the Superintendent of Police and then proceed to the police-station of a specified village to reside there under numerous restrictions (specified premises, restrictions on movement, reporting requirements, visitor restrictions, restrictions on communication and association, and limits on geographic movement). By another order dated 29 November 1926 (also under the same Act) he was directed to proceed to Canning Town police-station in the district mentioned in the opinion and to reside under similar restrictions within certain geographic limits described in that order.

At the time of his application to the High Court the applicant was not detained in jail but was subject to an order made under section 11 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925, and was obeying that order. Section 15 of that Act made disobedience of such directions an offence punishable with imprisonment for up to three years and fine.

An application for a writ of Habeas Corpus was made in the original civil jurisdiction to Mr. Justice Buckland. The learned Judge directed notice to the respondent, heard the application without issuing a Rule Nisi and refused relief on the ground that he was not satisfied the respondent had custody of the applicant sufficient to warrant directing production of the applicant’s person. The learned Judge did not decide the principal ground that the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925 was ultra vires. The matter proceeded on appeal to the Court presided over by Rankin, C.J.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there is a right of appeal against the learned Judge’s refusal to make an order (including the effect of clause 15 of the Letters Patent as amended in 1919).
  2. Whether the respondent is a person to whom a writ of Habeas Corpus could be directed in the circumstances disclosed.
  3. Whether the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925 (and related orders made under it) is ultra vires of the Local Legislature, in particular with reference to clause 4 of section 80A of the Government of India Act (i.e., whether the Local Legislature has power to make a law "affecting any Act of Parliament").

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as presented by Mr. Chatterjee)

  • The Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925 is ultra vires the Local Legislature because clause 4 of section 80A of the Government of India Act prohibits the Local Legislature from making any law "affecting any Act of Parliament." Mr. Chatterjee contended that statutes introduced into Calcutta's law (dating back to the Charter and practice of 1726) have the status of Acts of Parliament for this purpose and therefore could not be affected by a Local Act.
  • That a person ordinarily resident in Calcutta carries with him certain rights (derived from the historical application of English law in Calcutta) when he goes into the Muffasil and that those rights should protect him from the restrictions and penal consequences imposed by the Local Act.

Respondent's Arguments (as represented by the Advocate-General)

  • The Advocate-General raised a preliminary objection that no appeal lay because clause 15 of the Letters Patent (as amended in 1919) restricted appeals except from the general right of appeal in criminal matters; this preliminary point bore on whether the Court could entertain the appeal at all.
  • The respondent defended the view that the orders under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act were within the Local Legislature’s powers (the opinion reports the Advocate-General's appearance in support of the respondent but does not set out further detailed submissions for the respondent in the text reproduced).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
The Indian Chief (Lord Stowell) Historical statement about the introduction of English law into Calcutta and the nature of that introduction. Used as an authoritative statement of history on how English law came to be applied within Calcutta's original jurisdiction.
Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company (Lord Brougham) Consideration of whether English statutes (e.g., Statutes of Mortmain) formed part of the law of the Supreme Court. Referred to as part of the historical material showing how English law was introduced and adopted in Calcutta.
Advocate General of Bengal v. Ranee Surnomoyee Dassee (Lord Kingsdown) Decision that the doctrine of forfeiture to the Crown for felons was not part of the English law introduced into Calcutta. Referred to illustrate limits on which English statutes/principles were adopted in Calcutta.
Maharanee of Lahore Statement that English law as to personal liberty prevails in Calcutta and beyond as a personal law for British subjects who carry it into the Muffasil. Quoted to show historical reach of English personal-liberty principles in Calcutta and their application.
Rudolph Stallmann Adverts to doubt whether Indian Legislature could abrogate the old writ of Habeas Corpus. Referred to in the context of the historical doubt about whether statutory procedure ousted the prerogative writ.
Ameer Khan (1870) Decision by Mr. Justice Norman that the High Court could issue Habeas Corpus to the Muffasil (to the Superintendent of the Jail at Alipore). Noted as an important earlier decision; the Court observed it but did not consider it decisive in light of subsequent statutory developments.
In Re Nataraja Iyer; Kochunni Elaya Nair; Erada Padinharedil Govindan Nair Decisions discussed in relation to the availability of writs and the scope of the High Court’s civil-side remedy. The opinion notes that Acts X of 1872 and X of 1875 were not apparently brought to the attention of the Judges in those cases; the Court treated earlier understandings with caution in light of statute.
Mahomedalli v. Ismailji Referenced among authorities bearing on procedure and writs. Mentioned in the historical survey; no extended application beyond noting it as part of the prior judicial landscape.
Queen v. Mears One of the cases discussing limits on the Governor-General in Council's power to make laws affecting Acts of Parliament. Considered in the survey of authorities; the Court concluded the doubts raised by such cases were unfounded for present purposes.
Empress v. Burah Another case forming part of the discussion about limits on legislative power under imperial statutes. Examined along with Queen v. Mears; used to show historical doubts which the Court rejected.
Amrita Bazar Patrika case (Sir Lawrence Jenkins C.J. and Stephen J.) Judicial views relevant to construction of old charters and writs. Used to note concurrence with the view that certain earlier constructions (e.g., Norman's in Ameer Khan) were arguable misconstructions.
Clifford and O'Sullivan Referenced for principles concerning the application of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The Court held that principles from these authorities did not govern the present case because the statutory framework had changed.
Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925 (Local Act) Local legislative source of the orders served on the applicant; sections 11–15 set out powers to give directions and penal sanctions (section 15). Central statute under challenge. The Court examined whether its provisions were ultra vires and concluded they were not void for the reasons given in the opinion.
Ordinance No. 1 of 1924 Source of earlier commitment order (19 January 1925) under which the applicant was committed to custody in Midnapore Jail. Referred to as part of the factual background; not the principal legal focus of the decision.
Government of India Act (various provisions cited: section 72, section 71, section 72E, section 80A clause 4, section 84, sections 106 and 131(3)) Statutory framework defining Local Legislature powers and limits (notably clause 4 of section 80A: Local Legislature shall not make any law affecting any Act of Parliament). The Court construed these provisions (especially clause 4 of s.80A) and rejected the contention that the Local Act improperly affected Acts of Parliament or the historically-introduced English statutes in Calcutta.
Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872; later consolidated provisions) Contains section 81 / section 82 (historic provisions about writs and limits), and the present section 491 (remedy in criminal matters by application under the Code). The Court concluded that relief of the character sought should be sought under the Criminal Procedure Code (section 491) and that statutory changes had restricted the scope of prerogative writs on the civil side for the purposes now covered by the Code.
High Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875) — section 148 Provided purposes and limitations for orders in the nature of Habeas Corpus and restricted issuance of the old writs in favour of statutory procedure. Relied on to show legislative intent to channel such relief into statutory procedure rather than the old prerogative writs; used to support the conclusion that the applicant's remedy lay in criminal procedure.
Act X of 1882 (and Schedule I) Re-enacted and repealed prior Acts while preserving limitations on restoring jurisdictions or procedures not existing on 1 January 1883. Appeared in the historical account to explain continuity of statutory control over writ-procedure.
Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act of 1925 (Act of Indian Legislature) Expressly provided that powers conferred by section 491 of the Code should not be exercised in respect of any person arrested or detained in custody under the Local Act. Used to show that statutory scheme foreclosed recourse to the section 491 remedy in certain cases and that the Local Act's enforcement had to be dealt with under the criminal-law procedures that the statute envisaged.
Indian High Courts Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c.104) — section 9 Authorized establishment of High Courts and permitted the grant of jurisdiction by Letters Patent subject to limits on original civil and criminal jurisdiction beyond Presidency towns. Referred to for the proposition that Letters Patent could qualify or limit the powers transferred from earlier Courts to the High Courts and that such matters were subject to legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council.
Letters Patent (1862, 1865) and clause 15 (as amended 1919) Instrument setting out the High Court’s jurisdiction and appeal rights; clause 15 (as amended) bears on the right of appeal from sentences or orders made by a Judge in criminal jurisdiction. Formed the basis of the Advocate-General’s preliminary objection about the right of appeal; the Court analyzed the interaction of statutory criminal procedure and the Letters Patent in relation to the appeal question.
Statute of Uses; Statute of Frauds; Magna Charta; Petition of Rights Examples of English statutes or constitutional instruments referenced in the historical discussion of which parts of English law were applied in old Calcutta. Mentioned in the historical exposition; the Court rejected the contention that their historical introduction into Calcutta meant the Local Legislature could not legislate in ways that affected matters formerly governed by them.
Indian Penal Code; Indian Contract Act; Transfer of Property Act; Specific Relief Act (s.50) Examples of later statutory codifications and replacements of erstwhile English law in India (criminal law, contract, property, specific relief/mandamus analogies). Used to show that many areas of law once governed by English statutes or common law had been replaced by uniform statutory law in India, reducing the force of arguments that the Local Legislature could not legislate in those areas.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court approached the matter in three logical parts (the questions identified above) and chose first to examine the contention that the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925 was ultra vires the Local Legislature.

On the construction of the phrase "for the peace and good government" used in the Government of India Act (and associated provisions), the Court held that those words confer a broad legislative power on the Local Legislature subject to the Act’s restrictions and that a court cannot test particular legislation by asking whether it is meritorious or in fact conduces to peace or good government. That broad statutory language did not furnish a ground for holding the Local Act outside legislative competence.

The principal statutory objection pressed by Mr. Chatterjee was that clause 4 of section 80A (the Local Legislature shall not have power to make any law "affecting any Act of Parliament") prevented the Local Legislature from making a law which would affect statutes originally introduced into Calcutta by historical practice (i.e., English statutes in force in 1726). The Court rejected that contention on interpretive grounds: clause 4 protects the effect of Acts of Parliament as they operate by their own force; it was not intended to freeze in amber the whole body of English statutes historically applied in Calcutta so as to prevent the Local Legislature ever altering local law merely because an old statute had been applied there by historical practice. The Court emphasized that many ancient English statutes were not adopted in Calcutta, and those that were adopted often were subsequently replaced by Indian statutory codes.

The Court relied on the history of legislative and judicial development in India (e.g., the enactment of the Indian Penal Code, Code of Civil Procedure, Code of Criminal Procedure, Indian Contract Act, Transfer of Property Act and other statutory reforms) to show that the once fragmented system of English laws applied in Calcutta had been substantially absorbed into statutory law of India. Consequently, the Local Act of 1925 could not be characterised as affecting Acts of Parliament within the protective sense of clause 4 of section 80A.

Turning to the procedural question of the availability of the writ of Habeas Corpus on the civil side of the High Court, the Court reviewed the legislative history: Act X of 1872, the High Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875), Act X of 1882 and subsequent developments culminating in the present Code of Criminal Procedure and the provision now numbered section 491. Those enactments, the Court held, had channeled relief in such matters into statutory criminal procedure and had restricted the availability of the old prerogative writs for the purposes covered by those statutory provisions.

The Court observed that the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act of 1925 (an Act of the Indian Legislature) expressly provided that the powers conferred by section 491 of the Code should not be exercised in respect of persons arrested or detained under the Local Act. Taken together with the legislative history, the Court concluded that:

  • For the purposes now covered by section 491 and by the statutory scheme, an applicant cannot choose to eschew statutory procedure and pursue the old civil-side prerogative writ in the High Court; and
  • Questions about the legality of detention under the Local Act must, if relief is to be had, be addressed within the criminal-procedure framework envisaged by statute rather than by invoking civil-side writ jurisdiction.

Finally, on the narrow factual question whether the particular respondent before the learned Judge had such custody or control over the applicant as to permit the Court to direct production, the Court examined the affidavits and evidence and concluded that it was not satisfied the respondent had custody or control sufficient to justify a direction for production. On that point the Court upheld the decision of the learned Judge.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

APPEAL DISMISSED. The Court upheld the learned Judge’s refusal to make an order for production on the ground that the respondent was not shown to have custody or control of the applicant sufficient to justify a writ of Habeas Corpus directed to him.

Additional legal conclusions and immediate implications:

  • The Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925 was not held to be ultra vires on the basis contended for (i.e., it did not impermissibly "affect" Acts of Parliament in the sense protected by clause 4 of section 80A of the Government of India Act, as interpreted by the Court in this opinion).
  • The appropriate avenue for relief in matters of this character is the statutory criminal-procedure machinery (section 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and related provisions); the old civil-side prerogative writ of Habeas Corpus is not available as an alternative for purposes covered by those statutory provisions.
  • The direct effect on the parties: the applicant was not entitled, on the material before the Court, to an order directing the respondent to produce him and the appeal was dismissed. The Court did not grant any production or other relief to the applicant.
  • The opinion resolved important questions about the interaction between historic English law introduced into Calcutta, subsequent Indian statutory codification, and the scope of Local legislative power; the Court framed its decision within the statutory and historical material rather than creating an expansive new doctrine beyond the matters discussed.

Other Formal Information Recorded in the Opinion

Bench: Rankin, C.J. (delivered the leading opinion); Majumdar, J. concurred.

Attorneys:

  • Attorney for the appellant: S.K. Dutt.
  • Attorney for the respondent: G.C. Gooding.

Note: This summary is strictly confined to the matters and language presented in the provided opinion. Sections of the opinion that are primarily historical or descriptive have been summarized only to the extent they are used in the Court's legal reasoning as reported in the text.

    Girindra Nath Banerjee And Another v. Birendra Nath Pal

    Rankin, C.J:— In this case an application was made to Mr. Justice Buckland purporting to be in the original civil jurisdiction of this Court for the issue of a writ of Habeas Corpus on behalf of one Girindra Nath Banerjee whom I will call “the “applicant”. The general circumstances giving rise to the application are these. The applicant was arrested on the 25th day of October 1924, at his the then residence No. 4-3, Malanga Lane, in the town of Calcutta. He was kept in custody at the Alipore Central Jail and afterwards, at the Midnapore Central Jail. After he had been in custody for some time an order, dated the 19th January 1925, was made under Ordinance No. 1 of 1924, that he should be committed to custody in the Midnapore Jail. On the 12th June 1926 he was served with an order made by the Government of Bengal, under the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925, by which he was directed to proceed to Midnapore to report himself to the Superintendent of Police there, to proceed afterwards direct to the police-station of a certain village in that district and to reside until further orders in that village. He was directed to reside in premises defined and approved by the Superintendent of Police, he was prohibited from leaving such premises at night or from interviewing visitors; he was also directed to report himself twice daily to the officer at the police-station. He was prohibited from receiving visits without permission and was not to converse, communicate or associate with school boys or school masters or to attend at and, meeting. He had to deliver unopened to the officer in charge of the police-station all communications sent to him by letter, telegrams or otherwise. In particular he was directed not to go beyond certain limits defined in the order. The applicant at the day of his application to this Court was the subject of another order made by Government of Bengal under the same Act, and dated the 29th November 1926. That order was similar in its terms to the one I have already referred to and it directed him in effect to go to Canning Town police-station in the district of the 24-Parganas, and to reside in premises, defined and approved by the Superintendent of Police there, the restrictions which I have already mentioned being repeated. In particular, the applicant was prohibited from exceeding certain limits defined in that order, viz., on the north Bidyadhari river, on the east Matla river, on the south Canning Town Bazar, on the west, siding line from Canning Railway Station up to Bidyadhari river.

    The applicant had been arrested and detained in jail between October 1924 and some subsequent date, but long before the date of his application to this Court he was not a person who was being detained in jail. His exact position was defined by section 11 of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925. That was an Act passed by the Local Legislature of Bengal. It was made by the Governor of Bengal under the provisions of section 72E of the Government of India Act. It was made with the previous sanction of the Governor-General under sub-section (3) of section 88 of the said Act. The terms of this enactment so far as it affects the present question are to be found in sections 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15. Section 11 prescribes that where, in the opinion of the Local Government, there are reasonable grounds for believing that any person has committed or is about to commit certain acts in the nature of offences, the Local Government, if it is satisfied that he is a member, or is being controlled or instigated by a member of any association of which the objects or methods include the doing of any such acts or the commission of any such offences, may, by order in writing give certain directions. These directions are; that he should notify his residence, report himself to the police, reside or remain in a specified area, be committed to custody in jail. The sanction attaching to such an order is that contained in section 15 of the Act. Section 15 makes it an offence to disobey any direction of such order. It says that a person who comes within its scope shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. The position of this applicant at the time of this application was, that an order directing him to do or abstain from doing certain specified things, had been made, and he was obeying that order. If he chose at any moment to disobey the order then he would have to take his chance of being arrested and put before a criminal Court. He would have to take his chance of that Court finding that under section 15 he had committed an offence which rendered him liable to imprisonment for a term which might extend to three years.

    It is important to notice that the applicant at the time of his application was not within the limits of Calcutta and the person who is said to have him in custody was a member of the police force who was not Within the limits of Calcutta. Both of these persons were at Port Canning in the district of the 21-Parganas. The only connection with Calcutta which this matter would appear to have, is that the applicant says (and it is not contradicted.) that he is a person whose ordinary residence is within the limits of this Court's original jurisdiction. The circumstance that some years ago when he was first arrested not under this Act but under a different enactment he was at that time at Calcutta, would appear to have nothing to do with this case. The circumstance that he is a person who is an ordinary resident in Calcutta may have something to do with this case. If it be true that a person ordinarily resident within the original jurisdiction of this Court although he be an Indian is clothed with certain rights given originally years ago by Parliamentary enactment to Englishmen in England and if it be true that when he goes into the Muffasil he carries those rights about with him as a kind of personal law differentiating him from ordinary Indian subjects of his Majesty who belong to the 21-Parganas, then the circumstance that he is ordinarily resident in Calcutta may be a matter of considerable importance.

    An application having been made to the learned Judge for a writ of Habeas Corpus the learned Judge in the first place directed notice to go to the respondent and without issuing a Rule Nisi heard the application in the presence of both parties—the Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the respondent. In the result he refused to make any order on the application, on the ground, that he was not satisfied that the respondent had the custody of the applicant in any sense sufficient to warrant his directing that the respondent should produce the body of the applicant before the Court. The learned Judge did not have occasion to deal with the main ground of the application. The main ground of the application before him and before us has been that the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1925, was ultra vires of the Local Legislature and on that question the learned Judge did not pronounce.

    The matter coming before this Court on appeal, the Advocate General took a preliminary objection that no appeal lay on the ground that the Letters Patent of this High Court since 1919, when clause 15 was amended, except from the general right of appeal every sentence or order made by a Judge in the exercise of Criminal Jurisdiction. Logically, therefore, there are three questions before us, first whether there is a right of appeal, secondly, whether the respondent is a person to whom a writ of Habeas Corpus could be directed, thirdly, whether or not the contention that the Act of 1925 is illegal is correct. Both the question of right of appeal and the question decided by the learned Judge are matters of some difficulty particularly the former. In order to decide the question of the existence of the right of appeal it is necessary to determine such questions as for example whether it is open to the applicant to get relief in the nature of a Habeas Corpus otherwise than under section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code.

    It appeared to us that as there are more persons than the applicant in the situation created by the Act of 1925 it was hardly consistent with the proper conduct of the public business that this question raised by him should be avoided by reason of pleas in bar directed to the particular relief claimed. If seemed to us that it would be more reasonable to examine the matter as a whole because whether this applicant has a right of appeal or not, whether or not Habeas Corpus is the correct form of remedy in this case, it must be the duty of this Court sooner or later to determine the very important question whether a certain number of people are being illegally detained under a void Act of the Local Legislature.

    I propose partly as a matter of convenience and partly for other reasons to deal first with the careful and elaborate argument of Mr. Chatterjee on the question whether or not the Act of 1925 is ultra vires of the authority which purported to make it. I would point out that in doing so, I shall treat this applicant according to the true facts of his position and not as a person committed to custody in jail. I am going to treat him as a person against whom an order has been made under section 11, who is obeying that order, and who is apprehensive that if he disobeys the order, he may either be put on his trial in a Court of law for an offence created by section 15 of the Act, or (perhaps) be made the subject of another order under section 11(f).

    The contention of Mr. Chatterjee is based upon the terms of the Government of India Act itself. The section with which we are chiefly concerned is section 80A. By the first clause it is enacted that “the Local Legislature of any province has power, subject to the provisions of this Act, to make laws for the peace and good government of the territories for the time being constituting that province”. These words “for the peace and good government” appear in the first clause of section 71 of the Act and also in section 72. Section 71 says that the Local Government of any part of British India to which that section applies may propose to the Governor-General in Council the draft of any Regulation for the peace and good government of that part. Thereupon the Governor-General in Council may approve it and it shall have the like force of law subject to the like disallowance as if it were an Act of the Indian Legislature. Section 72 gives the Governor-General power to make Ordinances in case of emergency. The language of that section is that “the Governor General may, in case of emergency, make or promulgate Ordinances for the peace and good government of British India or any part thereof”. So that the phrase “peace and good government” applies not only to the Local Legislature but to the Governor-General's power of making Ordinances and the power of making Regulations in parts of India where there is no Legislative Council. In my judgment it is reasonably clear that these words are used because they are words of the widest significance and it is not open to a Court of law to consider with regard to any particular piece of legislation whether in fact it is meritorious in the sense that, it will conduce to peace or to good government. It is sufficient that they are words which are intended to give, subject to the restrictions of the Act, a legislating power to the body which it invests with that authority. There is nothing in that expression which can be the foundation of any reasonable argument to the effect that the Act of 1925 was outside the jurisdiction of the Local Legislature.

    Again there is in the history of the present question nothing which need detain us. It is quite true that the matters covered by the Act in question were previously dealt with by Ordinances made by the Governor-General under section 72. That in no way complicates or affects the question of law which is now before us. The Local Legislature has not purported to control or supersede any Ordinance so far as the applicant is concerned or at all.

    The main argument of Mr. Chatterjee—in my judgment the only argument upon this point which the Court requires to examine at any length—is the argument to the effect that the Act of 1925 is obnoxious to the 4th clause of section 80A. The clause runs:—“The Local Legislature of any province has not power to make any law affecting any Act of Parliament.”

    Now before proceeding to consider this matter concretely it may be well to refer to certain passages in the Government of India Act which have or may be thought to have some importance for the interpretation of clause 4. The phrase here is “affecting any Act of Parliament” and we have to consider carefully the implications of those words. It is clear enough from the second clause of the same section 80A that subject to certain sanction for special cases the Local Legislature has power to “repeal or alter as to that province” any law made by any authority in British India whether made before or after 1919. Clause (2) of section 65, which deals with the Indian Legislature, says that it shall not have power unless expressly so authorised by Act of Parliament to make any law repealing or affecting any Act of Parliament passed “after the year 1860 and extending to British India”—or certain other Acts which I need not particularly mention. Section 84 in its first clause contains this provision. “A law made by any authority in British India and repugnant to any provision of this or any other Act of Parliament shall, to the extent of that repugnance, but not otherwise, be void.”

    The question therefore is whether the power conferred by section 11 of the Local Act of 1925, to give the directions, given by the Government of Bengal to the applicant or section 15 of the said Act, which purports to make any disobedience thereof a punishable offence, are repugnant to clause 4 of section 80A, which says that the Local Legislature shall not make a law affecting any Act of Parliament. If they are, then to that extent they would be void. If they are not, then they are valid.

    Attention has been drawn by Mr. Chatterjee to the fact that the Act of 1925 was passed under section 72E, that is to say not by the vote of the Legislative Council but by certification. This circumstance has no bearing in my judgment upon the question before us. The statute in such circumstances says that the Bill shall on signature by the Governor become an Act of the Local Legislature and that the Act shall have the same force and effect as an Act passed by the Local Legislature and duly assented to. The question therefore remains whether as an Act of the Local Legislature it is intra or ultra vires.

    Now the argument by which it is sought to show that the enactment is ultra vires of the powers conferred on the Local Legislature, is as follows. It is said and quite correctly that it has long been accepted law in this province that the English Common and Statute Law as it existed in the year 1726 was applied in Calcutta, not merely to Europeans in Calcutta, but to all persons within the limits of the original jurisdiction of this Court. The history of this matter has been set out in many books of reference and it is no part of my intention to burden this judgment with an historical disquisition, but it is quite true that ever since the Charter of 1726, which established the Mayor's Court of Calcutta, it has been generally accepted that the law which prevails within the original jurisdiction began as I have stated. English Statute and English Common Law, as it stood in 1726, was “applied” to Englishmen in this town, and with certain special modifications in certain respects, which do not now matter, to the Indian inhabitants as well. But at this time Calcutta was a factory, and part of the territory over which the Mogul Emperor was the sovereign. The cases to which I will refer, as showing the nature of the introduction of the law of England as it stood in 1726, are three only. The first is the well-known judgment of Lord Stowell in the case of “The Indian Chief”, which is perhaps the most accurate of all the statements of the history of this matter. The second is the case of Mayor of Lyons v. East India Company, in which Lord Brougham delivered the judgment of the Privy Council in 1836 upon the question whether the Statutes of Mortmain were part of the law of the Supreme Court. The third is the case of the Advocate General of Bengal v. Ranee Surnomoyee Dassee, where Lord Kingsdown gave the judgment of the Privy Council, upholding the decision of Sir Barnes Peacock and other Judges and deciding that the doctrine of forfeiture to the Crown of the properties of persons who are felons of themselves was no part of the law of England which had been introduced into or received in Calcutta. Now those three cases are sufficient to show the nature of the introduction of the English law. In Blackstone's Commentaries and other books there was much learning as to what happened when Englishmen went out and settled in uninhabited countries and as to what happened in the case of conquered or ceded territories. The cases I have referred to are important as showing this that the introduction of English law into the factory of Calcutta and its position after Calcutta had ceased to be a factory and the English Crown had obtained rights of sovereignty is not a case within any of these principles. Calcutta was not the plantation or settlement of an uninhabited country nor in 1726 was it a country conquered from or ceded by the Moguls. The position was that there being a factory of the English in a territory which had a sovereign of its own, that sovereign permitted the introduction of English law within the limits of the factory and that introduction in the end extended not merely to Europeans themselves but to those who associated themselves with Europeans and became part of the inhabitants of the place. In the case of the Mayor of Lyons and of Ranee Surnomoyee, the question is discussed in the Privy Council of the basis that one has to see how much of the English law was introduced by the practice of the place and with the sanction of the sovereign.

    If there is one more elaborate way of going wrong, open to this Court, than another, it is to argue from the analogy, of the Colonial Laws Validity Act, and from considerations of that kind. The plantation of places in Australia may be cases where, from the moment of the settlement, the English settlers from the first carried with them their own law because the sovereignty of the Crown of England went with them. That is not the case with Calcutta. English Common Law and Statute Law as, in 1726 was not imported in to Calcutta by virtue of any right of sovereignty in the British Crown nor by virtue of the fact that Englishmen at International law or otherwise carried with them their own statutes but because by the sanction and permission of the sovereign of the place, the community was allowed to practice its own law and to introduce in part the laws to which they had been accustomed. These laws were applied even to Englishmen only in part and only with adaptation to the local circumstances. It was on those propositions that the cases to which I have referred were decided.

    Now the argument of Mr. Chatterjee is that the 4th clause of section 80A, which says that the Local Legislature has no power to make a law affecting any Act of Parliament, prevents it from making any law which would affect the operation of any of the statutes, prior to 1726, which were introduced into the area of Calcutta at the time when the Mayor's Court Charter was first granted. I am of opinion that argument distorts the meaning of the 4th clause of section 80A. Such a clause as that is doubtless wider than the mere provision that the Local Legislature shall not have power to repeal an Act of Parliament and the word “affect” may cover any interference with the will of Parliament as expressed in a statute. But what clause 4 of section 80A refers to and preserves from interference is the effect of an Act of Parliament by its own force as a determination of the will of Parliament with reference to a particular subject matter. It may well be that it guards against any possibility that a Local Legislature might attempt to interfere with the operation of Acts of Parliament that do not technically extend to India. But it cannot be construed as meaning that because in 1726, when there was no other law the Courts in Calcutta, adopted the law that prevailed at home, subject to many modifications, therefore any part of that law, so introduced, which originated in statute as distinct from Common Law cannot be interfered with by the Local Legislature. In my judgment that would be giving an extraordinary meaning to a very simple phrase appearing in an enactment which is concerned to delimit the jurisdictions of Local Legislatures under Parliament.

    The Statute of Uses, the Statute of Frauds, and various other statutes were observed in old Calcutta; other statutes were not. It is quite true that with reference to the criminal law the Courts endeavoured to put into practice English statutes and principles and English procedure including, of course, the procedure and principles which safeguard the personal liberty of the subject. So far as the criminal jurisdiction is concerned I apprehend that they did that in the case of persons accused of committing crimes within the limits of Calcutta whether they were inhabitants of Calcutta or whether they were inhabitants of the Muffasil. So late as 1848, it was stated in the case of Maharanee of Lahore that “the English law as to personal liberty does prevail in Calcutta as to all its inhabitants. Beyond the local limits of Calcutta the English law on this subject is the personal law of a class, viz., British subjects, which they carry with them. The Common Law of England, which gives the right to this writ, has been introduced in Calcutta with the general body of the English law.”

    Since the time when the laws enforced by the Courts in Calcutta were taken from England in the way to which I have referred there have been various arrangements for giving local laws to Calcutta and to other parts of India. There were the old Regulations which had to be registered by the Supreme Court. By 3 & 4 Will. 4 c. 85, Legislative powers were given to the Governor-General in Council. The chief landmarks in recent years have been the East India Councils Act of 1861 and the Government of India Act of 1919. It has to be observed that when the High Courts, in 1861, were founded to be one Court for the whole province, the introduction of such Courts was part of a much wider scheme. The Indian Penal Code, the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure date from about the same time, and I need only refer to the Letters Patent of 1862 and 1865 to show how these things went together. Since then, one by one, the territories which formerly used to be occupied by this system of English laws introduced by practice or by consent or by prerogative, have been conquered by definite provisions made by competent legislative authority in India itself. A very good instance is the Contract Act. At one time the English law of contract was applied in India; then that was changed. It was directed that the personal law was to apply to contracts and to questions of succession and family law. That matter was dealt with so far as contract was concerned by the enactment in the Indian Contract. Act of what may be called a statutory common law. In the same way English conveyancing statutes have been replaced by a general law in the Transfer of Property Act. No part of the law has been, more thoroughly covered than the criminal law. The old English law introduced in Calcutta has been superseded by the Indian Penal Code (Cf. Cl. 30, Letters Patent, 1865)7 The old principles of English practice in criminal cases have been reduced to a Code of Criminal Procedure, which now applies in the original jurisdiction of this Court. If in 1924, any ingenious inhabitant of Calcutta asked himself “How is it that I am not liable to be arrested and imprisoned save by due process of law and after access to the Courts of the country?” the answer, I conceive, would have made no reference to Magna Charta. The answer would have been that there is no warrant for any such process in the Code of Criminal Procedure and many safeguards in the Code of Criminal Procedure to protect against it. It does not matter whether one is an inhabitant of Calcutta or a comparatively unhappy inhabitant of Alipore, one's rights in this matter have been reclaimed from the old law introduced from England and they are part of the great, statutory common law of India which has now no special application to the City of Calcutta. It is to my mind therefore, in the present case, doubly wrong to maintain that Act of 1925 in this respect affects Acts of Parliament. These are matters which were at one time controlled not by Act of Parliament but by the power which determined to regulate itself by certain Acts of Parliament. They have been taken under control by the Legislature of India and from a lawyer's point of view the rights of the subject depend upon that code of law which is now common law throughout the whole country. Although that code enshrines the old principles, it cannot be contended that Magna Charta and the Petition of Rights have been affected by the Act of 1925. I do not admit it as a sound proposition of present day law, that a citizen of Calcutta who goes to the Muffasil is for any purpose of the criminal law in a different position, if he be an Indian, from any other Indian whom he meets. In my judgment the contention that Magna Charta and the other statutes, to which reference has been made, entitle this Court to hold the Act of 1925 to be ultra vires is a contention which fails.

    I propose next to consider whether the various enactments of the Indian Legislature leading tip to the Code of Criminal Procedure in its present form, have in providing a form of procedure applicable to a case of this class abolished expressly or impliedly any right there would have been in the Supreme Court to grant the high prerogative writ of Habeas Corpus. Now that question was adverted to in 1911 in the case of Rudolph Stallmann and it was adverted to in terms which were intended to cast, grave doubt upon the authority of the Indian Legislature to make any pro vision which would take away the old writ of Habeas Corpus.

    One of the learned Judges said that “if the question arose for consideration we should have to examine the principles recognised in the cases of Ameer Khan, Maharanee of Lahore and Surendra Nath Banerjee v. The Chief Justice and Judges of the High Court of Bengal.” So far as I can find, for many years past this question instead of being dealt, with and determined has been left on the basis that it was extremely doubtful whether the Indian Legislature can be supposed to have had the power of prohibiting even for certain purposes recourse to the old writ of Habeas Corpus (Sections 106 and 131(3) of the Government of India Act would seem to have removed the doubt in the case of statutes passed by the Indian Legislature after 1919).

    It does not seem to me to be possible to conduct, public business in an atmosphere of doubt maintained, after this manner upon such a point; and as we have to pronounce upon the question whether there is in this case a right of appeal, I think we are called upon to decide the question. The Indian High Courts Act of 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 104) by its 9th clause gave power to Her Majesty to set up High Courts which should have such jurisdiction, power and authority as Her Majesty may by such Letters Patent grant and direct “subject however to such directions and limitations as to the exercise of original civil and criminal jurisdiction beyond the limits of the Presidency towns as may be prescribed thereby, and save as by such Letters Patent may be otherwise directed and subject to and without prejudice to the legislative powers in relation to the matters aforesaid of the Governor-General of India in Council the High Court to be established in each Presidency shall have and exercise all jurisdiction and every power and authority whatsoever in any manner vested in any of the Courts in the same Presidency abolished under this Act at the time of the abolition of such last-mentioned Courts.” That was section 9 of the Act and it plainly authorised Her Majesty under the Letters Patent to put qualifications to the extent to which the powers of the old Courts should come down to the High Courts and it likewise made this very matter subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council. The Letters Patent of 1865 were issued under additional powers conferred by 28 Vict. c. 15 (Cf. section 6 thereof) and carried out these directions. Both by clause 44 and by other clauses (see clause 38 in particular) it was expressly provided that the provisions of the Letters Patent were to be subject to the legislative powers of the Governor-General in Council.

    The matter which has given rise to difficulty is apparently this that in the Bast India Council Act of the same year there was a provision in section 22 that the Governor-General in Council shall not have the power of making any laws or Regulations which shall repeal or in any way affect “any provisions of any Act passed in this present session of Parliament” etc. This provisions gave rise to discussion in two cases Queen v. Mears and Empress v. Burah. An examination of these decisions and of the statutes and Letters Patent convinces me that the doubts thrown upon the power of the Indian Legislature prior to the Government of India Act to make enactments which should modify the exercise by the High Court of the powers previously possessed by the Supreme Court are unfounded. I see no reason whatever for holding that the old writs or forms of procedure were put beyond the reach of the Indian Legislature.

    I proceed therefore to enquire whether according to the law in India as it now stands there is or is not power in the High Court to grant the writ of Habeas Corpus at common law independently of section 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Now in 1870 in the case of Ameer Khan, Mr. Justice Norman held that the High Court could issue the Habeas Corpus outside the original jurisdiction to the Superintendent of the Jail at Alipore. In 1872 the Code of Criminal Procedure (Act X of 1872) was enacted which gave the right to European British subjects detained in custody whether within the limits of the High Court's original jurisdiction or outside those limits to apply for an order directing the person detaining him to bring him before the High Court, in other words for an order under section 81 in the nature of Habeas Corpus. Section 82 provided that “Neither the High Courts nor any Judge of such High Courts shall issue any writ of Habeas Corpus, Main prise, Dehomine replegiando, nor any other writ of the like nature beyond the Presidency towns”. This prohibition cannot in my opinion be confined to the case of European British subjects nor has this been contended before us. In 1875, the High Courts' Criminal Procedure Act (X of 1875) in section 148 set out various purposes for which an order in the nature of Habeas Corpus might be made and it gave power to the High Courts to make such orders in the case of persons within the limits of their original jurisdiction. It went on to say that “neither the High Court nor any Judge thereof shall hereafter issue any writ of Habeas Corpus for any of the above purposes”. Certain particular matters were excepted, it being stated that nothing in this section applies to a person detained under Bengal Regulation III of 1818 and Certain other Regulations. But it is quite clear that for the purposes provided for by section 148, the intention was that relief should be granted under the section and recourse should not he had to the old prerogative writs. Rules were made by this Court under section 148 of the Act (Cf. Belchambers' Rules and Orders Ed. 1880, p. 253). The subsequent history of the matter is shortly this that when the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended in 1882 the Acts of 1872 and 1875 were comprised in Schedule I as enactments repealed by section 2 “but not so as restore any jurisdiction or form of procedure not existing or followed” on the 1st January 1883 (Act X of 1882). The matter remained very:much in the same position until 1923, when a right was given to everybody within the appellate jurisdiction of this Court to make an application under section 491 of the present Criminal Procedure Code.

    The question which arises is whether for any of the purposes mentioned in what is now section 491, it is open to an applicant still to say that he will make his application independently of that section altogether for the prerogative writ of Habeas Corpus on the civil side of the High. Court. I observe that it has been stated in certain, cases that if there is to be any question of the abolition of this right then the Legislature must say so an the most specific terms. Whether that be a correct view in a matter of procedure of this kind need not be discussed for the Legislature has used the most specific terms; and it is plain that the Indian Legislature never intended that the Courts in giving relief of this character should for any of the purposes mentioned in section 491 be at liberty to act under it or under the old procedure.

    There may or may not be purposes for which Habeas Corpus is available and which are not within section 491, and for any purposes which are not within section 148 of Act X of 1875 the old writ may survive within the limits of the original jurisdiction. After all the writ of Habeas Corpus had several forms and different uses. But there is no question of applicants having a choice as to whether to be governed by the Indian statute or whether to have recourse to such rights as an historical enquiry of some difficulty might disclose as having been the law of the Supreme Court at a former time. The policy of Section 148 of Act X of 1875 is exactly the same as that of section 50 of the Specific Relief Act with regard to mandamus. It has to be remembered that one of the reasons that led to the abolition of the Supreme Court was the fact that the various jurisdictions of the Supreme Court were wrapped in a good deal of confusion. Indeed it was stated on very high authority that for one reason or another “the Supreme Courts have come to stand at last in circumstances in which it is a very hard matter to say what are their rights, their duties, or their use”. That was the language of Sir Charles Grey and Sir Edward Ryan, distinguished Judges of the Court (Hechle's Rules and Orders, Preface).

    In my judgment the right to the relief sought in this case would have been solely under the Criminal Procedure Code. This would have been an exercise of criminal jurisdiction and no appeal would be under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. But the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment (Supplementary) Act of 1925—an Act of the Indian Legislature—expressly provided that the powers conferred by section 491 of the Code should not be exercised in respect of any person arrested or detained in custody under the Local Act. The Local Act is an Act which was intended to supplement the ordinary criminal law in Bengal and the question whether or not a particular person is legally detained under it has to be dealt with, if at all, under the Code of Criminal Procedure. I do not think therefore that the principles acted on in Clifford and O'Sullivan, govern the application of clause 15 of the Letters Patent to this case. The applicant has done all he can to claim that he is entitled to a remedy on the civil side of the Court and apart from its criminal jurisdiction. If we limit him to that he would have a right of appeal at the expense of all chances of success.

    I ought here to add that Act X of 1872 and Act X of 1875 do not seem to have been brought to the notice of the Judges who took part in deciding In Re Nataraja Iyer, Kochunni Elaya Nair, Erada Padinharedil Govindan Nair or the case of Mahomedalli v. Ismailji.

    It can serve no useful purpose now to discuss the correctness of Mr. Justice Norman's decision in the case of Ameer Khan that Habeas Corpus could issue to the Muffasil, but in so far as he proceeded upon the 4th clause of the Charter of 1774, the opinion of Sundara Ayyar, J. [In Re Nataraja Iyer at pages 77 and 79] that he misconstrued that clause coincides with the views of Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J and Stephen, J., in the Amrita Bazar Patrika case.

    With regard to the question whether the respondent has been shown to have such custody or control of the appellant as would entitle this Court to direct a writ of Habeas Corpus I am of opinion that this matter lies very close to the border line. After examining the position which is disclosed by the affidavits, I am not, however, satisfied that this particular respondent is shown to have such custody or control of the applicant as would entitle the applicant to get a direction to the respondent that he should produce him before the Court. On that point I think the decision of the learned Judge must be upheld. The appeal must be dismissed.

    Majumdar, J.:— I agree.

    Attorney for the appellant: S.K Dutt.

    Attorney for the respondent: G.C Gooding.

    N.G

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