Mullick, J.:— This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by one Narendra Nand Deb Goswami and by a minor named Hemangini Debi, daughter of Upendra Nand Goswami the brother of the aforesaid Narendra, for declaration to a two-thirds share in mouzah Baragaria. The plaint describes defendants 1, 2 and 3 the sons of one Janardan Pal as the principal defendants, and defendants 4, 5 and 6 as pro forme defendants. We are not concerned with Nos. 4 and 5, but the last defendant 6 plays an important part in this appeal. It appears that in 1892 Bhagbat the brother of Upendra and Narendra mortgaged Mouzah Hanabantia to Janardan Pal. Janardan got a decree upon that mortgage and in execution attached Mouzah Baragaria on 10th May, 1899, as his judgment-debt was not satisfied by the sale of the mortgaged property. On 12th May, 1899 Bhagbat, Narendra and Upendra jointly mortgaged the whole of Mouzah Baragaria to one Srimanta Lal Dutt. The execution in respect of Baragaria in Janardan Pal's decree, however, proceeded the 16 annas of that mouzah were brought to sale and Janardan obtained possession on 21st November 1899 in spite of an objection preferred by Upendra, which was disallowed on 25th July, 1899. We next find that Srimanta brought a suit upon his mortgage impleading Bhagbat, Upendra and Narendra. That suit was numbered 17 of 1914. Janardan was also added as a co-defendant. The result of that suit was that by a judgment dated 26th January, 1905 the Court held that the one-third share of Baragaria belonging to Bhagbat did not pass by the mortgage and plaintiff got a decree for the sale of the remainder of the mouzah. That decree was satisfied and Janardan continued to remain in possession of the whole mouzah. We next find the three brothers again mortgaged the whole mouzah this time to the Midnapore Zamindari Company, who obtained a preliminary decree for foreclosure upon the mortgage. The present defendants 1, 2 and 3 as the successors of Janardan thereupon brought suit No. 3 of 1911 against Bhagbat, Upendra and Narendra and the Midnapore Zamindari Company praying for a declaration that the mortgage decree in favour of the Midnapore Zamindari Company was not binding on them.
2. In that suit none of the defendants filed a written statement and an ex-parte decree was made on 21st June 1911 and when the Midnapore Zamindari Company applied to make their preliminary decree absolute the successors of Janardan objected and the Subordinate Judge excluded Baragaria from foreclosure. It appears, therefore, that since 21st November 1899 Janardan and his successors, the present defendants 1, 2 and 3, had remained in undisturbed possession of the mouzah. The present suit was brought on 18th November, 1911, that is, three days before the expiry of 12 years' limitation from 21st November 1899 for declaration of title to and recovery of possession of two-thirds of Mouzah Baragaria. Written statements were filed by defendants 1 to 3 and by defendant 6, with the result that the suit was decreed in the Court of the Subordinate Judge but dismissed on appeal by the District Judge. The present second appeal is preferred by defendant 6 as sole appellant. The first point urged by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellant is that the learned District Judge has committed an error of law in holding that the decree in suit No. 2 of 1911 operates as res-judicata against the defendants 1, 2 and 3. It will be remembered that suit was brought by the sons of Janardan Pal the present defendants 1, 2 and 3 against Bhagbat, Upendra and Narendra and the Midnapore Zamindari Company and the decree in that suit was that the preliminary decree obtained by the Midnapore Zamindari Company was not binding upon the plaintiffs, the present defendants 1, 2, and 3. There can be no doubt that an ex-parte decree can operate as res judicata. But the point is whether in that suit it was necessary for the Court to adjudicate on the title of Narendra and Upendra and to determine what was their share in Mouzah Baragaria.
3. We have examined the judgment and the proceedings in that suit as well as the decree and we do not find that it was in any way necessary in that suit for Narendra and Upendra to establish affirmatively the nature and extent of their title in mouzah Baragaria. They did not appear in the suit because they were not concerned to resist the declaration that the decree of the Midnapore Zamindari Company was not binding upon the plaintiffs. There was no contest in that suit nor was it necessary to determine in that suit as between the heirs of Janardan and them what interest, if any, they had in mouzah Baragaria. In my opinion the question now at issue was not litigated and was not necessary to be litigated in that suit and, therefore, the judgment and the decree do not operate as res judicata. The next point taken on behalf of the appellant is that the learned Judge is wrong in his decision as to res judicata in another matter, namely the judgment and decree in the suit brought by Srimanta in 1904. Now in that suit the plaintiff was Srimanta the mortgagee and the defendants were Bhagbat, Upendra and Narendra on the one hand and Janardan Pal, the previous auction-purchaser on the other. It is true that the Court decided that Janardan Pal's interest in the property amounted to one-third and to that extent the mortgage was not good, but the Court nowhere decided as between Janardan on the one hand and Upendra and Narendra on the other what was the share of Upendra and Narendra in the property.
4. In order that a decision may operate ps res judicata between any co-defendants, it is necessary that there should be a conflict distinctly and expressly raised between those co-defendants and that the decision of that conflict as between the defendants should be necessary for the disposal of the suit. Here it was not in any way necessary for the Court to decide affirmatively what was the interest of Upendra and Narendra. For all that mattered to the Court, Upendra and Narendra need not have had any interest in the property at all. The Court was merely to give the mortgagee a decree upon the mortgage and to determine which of the defendants were bound by the mortgage. In my opinion, therefore, the learned District Judge was right in his decision as to res judicata in connexion with the proceedings of 1904. The appellant, therefore, Succeeds on his first and fails on his second grounds. But on behalf of the respondents various grounds have been taken for dismissing the appeal which I will now proceed to consider. The first ground is that defendant 6 is not competent to maintain the appeal. That defendant 6 has no present interest is the property is admitted, but the plaintiffs say in their plaint that they have impleaded him because they are under a contract to sell the property to him in consideration of a sum of Rupees 3,500 which they have received from him. Defendant 6 in his written statement says that he believes that the plaintiffs have a two-thirds share in the mouzah; that in this belief, by a registered agreement, he has lent Rs. 3,500 to the plaintiffs in consideration of a promise to sell their share of the mouzah to him within a certain time; and that he is entitled to have a decree in his favour for costs in the suit. The question is whether a defendant in this position is entitled to maintain an appeal. In my opinion be is not. This is a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant has neither title nor possession nor any interest in the property. We do not know even whether his right to obtain specific performance in respect of the alleged contract is still alive. But even if it is alive, I do not think that the defendant has such an interest in the property as would entitle him to maintain the appeal.
5. Is the defendant adversely affected by the decree? That is the test to be applied. In this connexion Doorga Pershad v. Radha Mohun(1) is very much in point. There a Hindu widow jointly with her sons who were the reversioners sued for confirmation of title and the suit was dismissed. She did not appeal and when the sons sought to maintain the appeal, the Court held that they only person who had a claim to the property was the widow and that the reversioners had no title so long as to give them a right of appeal against the decree. That is also the test applied in Krishna Chandra Goldur v. Mohesh Chandra Saha(2). Woodroffe, J. in delivering judgment laid down the proposition that the question where a party is aggrieved by a decree is a question of fact to be determined in each case accordingly to its peculiar circumstances. That test was also accepted in Secy. of State v. Swaminatha Koundan(3). In that case the suit was dismissed and the defendants desired to appeal on the ground that one of the findings in the suit would operate as res judicata against them. It was held that the defendants were not adversely affected by the decree itself and that they were not competent to maintain the appeal. A further ground for the decision of the Court was that the decree operated as res judicata and even if that test was applied the defendant had no grounds in his favour. Here there is no question of res judicata at all. Defendant 6 has no right of suit against defendants 1, 2 and 3, and the only question is whether he is adversely affected by the decree obtained by defendants 1, 2 and 3 against the plaintiffs. It will be observed that defendant 6 is described in the plaint is a pro forma defendant. This is not known to the law and clearly the Court's duty was to examine why this defendant had been brought upon the record. The suit being one for declaration of title and possession, the plaintiffs had no cause of action as against this defendant and be should at once have been struck out of the suit. And it would seem to follow that if be is a person who ought not to have been made defendant, he is also not a person who ought to be allowed to figure as an appellant. Indeed his case is very much weaker than that of the reversioners in Doorga Pershad v. Badha Mohun who were held incompetent to maintain the appeal.
6. I am quite satisfied, therefore, that defendant 6 is not competent to maintain the appeal. I will next refer to the question of limitation. Learned Counsel for the respondents reminds us that the property now in suit was attached by Janardan and that Upendra's objection to the attachment was dismissed on 15th July, 1899, and contends that the present suit is barred under Article 11 of the Lim. Act, having been brought more than one year after the attachment. It appears, however, that there was no investigation into the merits of the objection and according to the decisions of the Courts in India the order dismissing the objection was not an order made under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to make Article 11 applicable. The next ground taken in regard to limitation is that as the sale in execution of Janardan's decree took place more than one year from the institution of the present suit, Article 12 applies and the present; plaintiffs are not competent to ask for recovery of possession without first setting aside that sale. Reliance is placed upon the case of Malkarjun v. Narhari(4). On the other hand the respondents rely upon Moti Lal v. Karrabuddin(5), but in the latter case the sale was held to be a nullity and, therefore, a suit for recovery of possession lay within 12 years of the dispossession. In my opinion the principle on which Malkarjun's case proceeded would apply to this case, if it could be established that the present plaintiffs are bound by Janardan's sale. Now that sale was not held in their presence and they can only be bound by it if Janardan was their representative. That depends on the question whether Bhagbat was the karta of any joint family of which they were members. Upon this point there is no clear finding by the learned District Judge and I am unable to see that it has been conclusively determined that Bhagbat was their representative. Indeed if Bhagbat was infact the karta of the joint family there is an end to the suit apart from any question of limitation, because then Janardan's auction-purchase would pass the 16 annas of Mauza Baragaria, and, therefore, also the right and interest of Upendra and Narendra.
7. The respondents, therefore, fail on all the points except that of maintainability, in regard to which I have held that defendant 6 is not entitled to maintain the appeal. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is dismissed with costs.
8. Jwala Prasad, J.:— I agree. This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiffs for declaration of their title to and for recovery of possession of two-thirds share in Mauza Baragaria. The suit has been dismissed by the lower Court, it being held that the plaintiffs' interest in the property was sold in a public auction and purchased by the ancestor of the principal defendants 1, 2 and 3 in 1899 and that the plaintiffs have failed to prove any subsisting title to the property in suit. The plaintiffs have not preferred any appeal from the decree of the Court below dismissing their suit. Defendant 6 only has appealed. He was named in the plaint as a pro forma defendant, on the allegation that he advanced Rs. 3,500 to the plaintiffs in lieu of which the plaintiffs had executed a registered agreement for the sale of their interest in the property in his favour.
9. The deed of agreement in favour of the defendant-appellant confers upon him no interest in the property beyond a contract by the plaintiffs for the sale of the property. Under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, a contract for the sale of a property does not of itself create any interest in or charge on the property itself. The appellant, therefore, has no interest in the property in suit. The decision of the case or the result of the present litigation cannot in any way affect the appellant. His claim is at best to bring a suit for a specific performance of the contract or for damages against the plaintiffs. No person has a right of appeal from a decision unless his interest is pre-judicially affected by it. The appeal by defendant 6 is, therefore, incompetent. As has already been said, the plaintiffs who are solely affected by the decision of the Court below have not preferred any appeal. This is sufficient to dismiss the present appeal and I do not think there is any necessity for me to give my views regarding the other questions raised in the appeal and disposed of by the decision of my learned brother. I, therefore, agree Shat the appeal should be dismissed.
V.S/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.