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  • Administration Act, V of 1881, and in Sect. 242 of the Indian Succession Act, X of 1886,
  • Act 20 and 21 Vict. Ch. 77 Sect. 61,
  • Administration Act, V of 1881.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Advocates
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  • Administration Act, V of 1881, and in Sect. 242 of the Indian Succession Act, X of 1886,
  • Act 20 and 21 Vict. Ch. 77 Sect. 61,
  • Administration Act, V of 1881.
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant applied for probate of a will dated 4 June 1920 executed by one Narasamma. The respondent opposed the grant of probate; she is described as the widow of the brother of Narasamma's husband. The District Judge held that it was not proved that Narasamma executed the will (nor that she was of sound disposing mind at the time) and dismissed the application for probate. The appellant appealed. The respondent did not appear to oppose the appeal; the Court appointed an amicus curiae who drew attention to authorities adverse to the appellant's contention.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondent had such an interest in the deceased's estate as would entitle her to enter a caveat and oppose the grant of probate under Section 69 of the Probate and Administration Act, V of 1881.
  2. Whether, on the evidence, the will of Narasamma was satisfactorily proved to have been executed by her and that she was of sound disposing mind at the time of execution.
  3. Ancillary question framed by the parties' dispute: whether the interest required by Section 69 must be an interest "through the testator" (i.e., derived under the testator) or may be an independent interest (for example, a right to maintenance arising independently of the testator).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondent had no interest in the estate of the deceased which would entitle her to enter a caveat under Section 69 of the Probate and Administration Act, V of 1881, and therefore was not entitled to oppose the grant of probate.
  • Implicit in this contention is the narrower construction that a caveator should claim a right to the property under the testator (i.e., claim through the testator), and a person who claims adversely to the testator is not entitled to oppose probate because the grant of probate would not affect his rights.

Respondent's Position (as presented in the opinion)

  • The respondent claimed a right to maintenance out of the income of the property devised under the will by virtue of being the widow of the undivided brother of the testatrix's husband.
  • The relationship between the respondent and the family of the deceased was not disputed in the record; the only contested point was whether that asserted claim to maintenance was the kind of interest that Section 69 contemplates for entering a caveat.

Amicus Curiae

  • Appointed because the respondent did not appear; drew the Court's attention to authorities adverse to the appellant's narrow contention about the scope of "interest" under Section 69.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
Garabini Dassi v. Pratap Chandra Shaha Held that the right to maintenance was not such an interest as would entitle a person to oppose the grant of probate. Described as "a direct authority in favour of the appellant"; acknowledged among the conflicting authorities considered by the Court.
Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass Held that a person not claiming any of the property of the testator but disputing the testator's right to deal with certain property has not such an interest in the estate as entitles him to oppose probate. Recognized as a significant (contrary) authority; the Court noted other High Courts followed or discussed it; considered in the comparative assessment of authorities but not treated as the exclusive rule.
Pirojshah Bikhaji v. Pestonji Merwanji Followed Abhiram Dass: a caveator must show some interest in the estate derived from the deceased by inheritance or otherwise. Noted as following Abhiram Dass; used in the catalogue of authorities on both sides of the issue.
Kalajit Singh v. Permeshar Singh Referenced as representing the view of the Patna High Court on the issue (the opinion records the Patna view without stating the text of that view). Mentioned as part of the landscape of conflicting High Court authorities.
Syama Charan Baisya v. Prafulla Sundari Gupta Held that although a reversioner under Hindu law has no present alienable interest, he has a substantial interest in protection or devolution of the estate and is entitled to appear and be heard in probate proceedings. Relied on to support the proposition that persons with an interest independent of claiming through the testator (e.g., reversioners) have locus to oppose probate.
In the matter of the petition of Bhobasoonduri Dabee Field J.: any person who can show that he is entitled to maintain a suit in respect of property over which probate would have effect has a sufficient interest to enter a caveat (under Sect. 242 Indian Succession Act). Quoted and used to support the broader test that entitlement to maintain a suit concerning the property confers sufficient interest to oppose probate; contrasted with narrower views.
In the matter of the petition of Hurro Lall Shaha Held that a presumptive reversioner to property with which a will deals has sufficient interest to maintain a suit and to seek revocation of probate. Noted as following Bhobasoonduri Dabee and as supporting the broader interpretation of "interest" under Section 69.
Kishen Dai v. Satyendra Nath Dutt Held that the words "interest in the estate of the deceased" in Section 69 mean "interest in the estate left by the deceased" and that a judgment-creditor who, but for the will, could have seized the property has locus to oppose probate. Adopted by Waller, J. in this opinion; treated as a precedent to be followed and relied on in construing Section 69.
Arakal Bastian Ansap v. Narayana Ayyar Held that judgment-creditors of the son of the deceased who had attached the son's interest before the application for probate were entitled to oppose the grant of probate. Cited as an example supporting the proposition that third parties with enforceable claims against portions of the estate may have locus to oppose probate.
Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Umanath Mookerjee (Privy Council) Privy Council expressed doubt whether an attaching creditor of a son's share could oppose probate, and did not give a final opinion on the point. Referred to for the limited proposition that the Privy Council did not finally decide the attaching-creditor point and expressed doubts in some circumstances.
Rahamtullah Sahib v. Rama Rau Held that a legatee under a will or a creditor of the testator did not have such an interest as to entitle him to oppose probate. Cited and discussed; the Court noted the reasoning that a creditor is ordinarily not prejudiced by probate because debts remain payable out of the estate, but also observed exceptions where fraud or danger to creditors' remedies might justify opposition.
Crispin v. Doglione Held that a foreign judgment alone, without showing the nature of the suit or the questions involved, did not prove such an interest as to allow disputing probate. Used to illustrate limits on relying solely on foreign judgments to establish locus to oppose probate.
Brinda Chowdhrain v. Radhica Chowdhrain Held that the widow of a Hindu testator leaving sons had sufficient interest to call on the executor to prove the will in solemn form; she is entitled to maintenance and may have her maintenance made a charge on the estate. Relied on to support the proposition that a widow's right to maintenance from the estate confers a sufficient interest under Section 69 to contest probate proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Overview of statutory text and comparative approach

The Court began its legal analysis with the text of Section 69 of the Probate and Administration Act: that the District Judge may issue citations "calling upon all persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of Administration." The opinion compares the wording to the English Court of Probate Act and to Section 242 of the Indian Succession Act, noting close similarity of intent and differences in phrasing ("claiming to have an interest" vs. "having or pretending interest").

Nature of "interest" under Section 69

The Court examined conflicting authorities about what sort of interest is required to enter a caveat under Section 69. The appellant urged a narrow rule—interest must be derived through the testator (i.e., a right to the property under the testator). The respondent asserted a right to maintenance from the estate as widow of an undivided brother of the testatrix's husband. The Court considered authorities on both sides (cases holding a narrower test and others holding a broader test, including reversioners and those who could maintain a suit concerning estate property).

Synthesis of authorities and statutory construction

Finding nothing in the language of Section 69 that required an interest to be claimed "through the testator," the Court concluded that the statutory phrase "claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased" is broad and does not necessarily confine the caveator to a title derived under the testator. The Court reasoned that, under Hindu law, interests such as maintenance (e.g., a widow of a co-parcener) or a reversionary interest may exist independently of a claim under the testator, and such persons could be driven to litigation (or otherwise suffer) if a false will were admitted to probate. The Court therefore accepted the view expressed in authorities such as Bhobasoonduri Dabee, Hurro Lall Shaha, Kishen Dai, Syama Charan Baisya and Brinda Chowdhrain that a person entitled to any portion of the estate left by the deceased, or entitled to claim maintenance from that estate, has an interest within the meaning of Section 69.

On authorities cited by appellant

The Court expressly acknowledged authorities that supported the appellant's narrower view (for example, Garabini Dassi and Abhiram Dass), but treated the decisions collectively and deduced the controlling principle that a person who stands to suffer by the grant of probate of a forged or invalid will—i.e., who can show entitlement to maintain a suit in respect of property affected by probate—has sufficient interest to enter a caveat. The opinion also noted that some authorities (including a Privy Council statement in Nilmoni Singh Deo) left certain attaching-creditor questions undecided.

Application to the facts

On the factual question whether the will had been proved, the Court reviewed the evidence put forward by the appellant and agreed with the District Judge's adverse findings. The opinion highlights several specific evidentiary shortcomings: the draft of the will was not produced; the chief witness (a sole legatee under the will) behaved in a manner that "arouse[d] suspicion" while in the witness box; the Revenue Inspector allegedly present at execution was not examined and had not attested the will; and key witnesses were relatives (P.Ws. 2 and 3). The Court noted circumstances surrounding the testatrix's death (illness, time of the purported dictation, sudden death) and observed that the appellant's evidence was "not at all satisfactory." On these factual and credibility grounds the Court found no reason to disturb the District Judge's conclusion that the will was not satisfactorily proved and that Narasamma was not shown to be of sound disposing mind at the time of execution.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED. The District Judge's dismissal of the appellant's application for probate is affirmed.

Implications:

  • The Court construed Section 69 of the Probate and Administration Act to include persons who have an interest in the estate left by the deceased, including rights to a portion of the estate or rights to maintenance, even where that interest is not derived strictly "through the testator."
  • The Court accepted the principle (drawn from the authorities examined) that a person who can show that he or she is entitled to maintain a suit in respect of property over which probate would have effect possesses a sufficient interest to enter a caveat and oppose probate proceedings.
  • On the specific facts of this case, the Court agreed with the District Judge's factual findings that the will was not satisfactorily proved; consequently the appellant's application for probate was properly dismissed.
  • The opinion resolved the controversy between conflicting authorities by endorsing the broader construction of "interest" (as reflected in several precedents), while acknowledging the existence of contrary authorities; the Court applied that broader approach for purposes of this case.
K. V. S. — Appeal dismissed.

    Jamni Hanumantha Rao v. Aratala Latchamma

    The appellant applied for the probate of the will of one Narasamma, dated 4th June, 1920, the grant of probate was opposed by the respondent who is the widow of the brother of Narasamma's husband, and the District Judge held that it was not proved that Narasamma executed the will and dismissed the application.

    Mr. Jagannadha Doss for the appellant raises the contention that the respondent was not entitled to oppose the grant of probate as she had no interest in the estate of the deceased so as to be entitled to enter caveat under Sect. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act, V of 1881. As there is a conflict of authority on this point and as the respondent has not appeared to oppose the appeal, we asked Mr. Anantha Aiyar to appear as amicus curiae and we are thankful to him for bringing to our notice the cases opposed to the contention of the appellant. Under Sect. 69.

    “In all oases it shall be lawful for the District Judge, if he thinks fit, to issue citations calling upon all persons claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased to come and see the proceedings before the grant of probate or letters of Administration.”

    What is the nature of the interest which a person should have in order to entitle him to enter a caveat? The contention of the appellant is that the person who enters a caveat should claim a right to the property under the testator, and if he claims the property adversely to the testator he is not entitled to oppose the grant of probate, for his right would not be affected by the grant of probate or letters of administration with the will annexed. The respondent claims the right to maintenance out of the income of the property devised under the will as she is the widow of the undivided brother of the testatrix's husband. The relationship is not denied, and the only question is whether the claim to maintenance against the property devised by the will, granting that the allegation of the respondent is true, would entitle her to oppose the grant of probate. In Garabini Dassi v. Pratap Chandra Shaha(1) it was held that the right to maintenance was not such an interest as would entitle a person to oppose the grant of probate. This is a direct authority in favour of the appellant. In Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass(2), it was held by a Bench of the Calcutta High Court that:

    “a person not claiming any of the property of the testator but disputing the right of the testator to deal with certain property as his own has not such an interest in the estate of the testator as entitles him to come in and oppose the grant of probate.”

    The learned Judges observe at page 52.

    “The term” (meaning interest in Sect. 69) “does not necessarily refer to any particular property, but to the claim of any person to succeed by inheritance or otherwise to any portion of the estate of the deceased by reason of an interest, not on an adverse title to the testator to any particular property, but in the estate itself, whatever that may consist of; the form of the caveat too would seem to show that the person who enters a caveat admits that the particular property forms a portion of the estate of the testator, but objects either to the execution of the will or to the proposed manner of dealing with any portion of the estate.”

    The learned judges declined to follow the two previous decisions of the same Court, in In the mutter of the petition of Bhobosoonduri Dabee and In the matter of the petition of Hurro Lall Shaha. The case in Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass(3) has been followed by other High Courts. In Pirojshah Bikhaji v. Pestonji Merwanji(4) it was held following Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass that a person who wishes to come in as the caveator must show some interest in the estate derived from the deceased by inheritance or otherwise. The Patna High Court takes the view in Kalajit Singh v. Permeshar Singh(5).

    The words of Sect. 69 are ‘claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased’. There is nothing in the wording of the section to show that the caveator should claim interest through the testator. All that is necessary to entitle a person to enter caveat is to claim interest in the estate of the deceased. The words ‘interest in the estate do not necessarily convey the idea that the interest should be claimed through the testator. If that was the intention of the legislature, the clause could have been differently worded so as to make the meaning clear. In India under the Hindu Law, the widow of a co-parcener is entitled to maintenance and if a person disposes of the property as his self-acquisition in favour of the legatees the widow of a co-parcener will be driven to the necessity of filing a suit against the executor or legatee and proving that it is joint family property. A person claiming to be the undivided brother of the testator claims an interest not through the deceased but independently of him. Can he enter a caveat on the ground that the property devised is the joint property of himself and the testator? It has been consistently held that a reversioner is entitled to oppose the grant of probate. In Syama Charan Baisya v. Prafulla Sundari Gupta it was held by Mookerji, J., and Chapman J., after an examination of the authorities:

    “that although a reversioner under the Hindu Law has no present alienable interest in the property left by the deceased he has substantial interest in the protection or devolution of the estate and as such is entitled to appear and be heard in a probate proceeding,”;

    See also Akhileswari Das v. Haricharan Mirdha. Can it be said that a reversioner claims through the testator? If the principle of law enunciated in Pirojshah Bikhaji v. Pestonji Merwanji and Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass is correct, a reversioner who does not claim through the testator cannot oppose the grant of probate. A Hindu will may contain a power to adopt. A reversioner who has interest in preventing the estate from going to a third person by reason of a forged will containing a power to adopt is entitled to protect the estate from going to strangers. If a reversioner who has no present interest in the estate is entitled to come in and oppose the grant of probate it is difficult to see how a person who claims right to maintenance from the estate devised by the testator is not entitled to oppose the grant of probate. Under the English law the personal estate is his absolute property and nobody has any right to it till he dies. But under the Hindu Law a widow has the right to claim maintenance and the widow of an undivided co-parcener is entitled to maintenance if the property devised is joint family property, the reversioner is entitled to see that the reversion is not endangered. In the matter of the petition of Bhobasoonduri Dabee, Field J., after very exhaustive examination of the authorities held that under Sect. 242 of the Succession Act any person who can show that he is entitled to maintain a suit in respect of property over which probate would have effect, possesses a sufficient interest to entitle him to enter a caveat and oppose the grant. In that case the testator left his widow and two sons and purported to give the entire property to his widow for her life and after her death to his two sons. A mortgagee of the son's share and a decree-holder against the other son opposed the grant of probate. Both the judges who heard the case (White and Field JJ.) held that the mortgagee of the son's share was entitled to oppose the grant of probate as by the will they would be left without a remedy.

    In the Court of Probate Act 20 and 21 Vict. Ch. 77 Sect. 61, the wording is:

    “Others having or pretending interest in the personal estate affected by a will should be cited or amended and may be permitted to become parties or intervene for their respective interests.”;

    A portion of that section is practically copied in Sect. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act, V of 1881, and in Sect. 242 of the Indian Succession Act, X of 1886, with slight modifications. Instead of the words ‘having or pretending interest in the personal estate’ the wording in the Indian enactments is ‘claiming to have an interest.’ Field J., observed at p. 471:

    “As to the test of what constitutes a sufficient interest to entitle any particular person to be made a party, according to the view which I have already stated, I think it comes to this; that any person has a sufficient interest who can show that he is entitled to maintain a suit in respect of the property over which the probate would have effect under the provisions of Sect. 242 of the Indian Succession Act.”

    The learned judges who decided Abhiram Dass v. Gopal Dass differed from In the matter of the petition of Bhobasoonduri Dabee on the ground that the rule laid down by Field J., was not adopted by White J. Though White J., did not lay down the rule in such broad terms as Field J., yet he held that the mortgagee of the son's share was entitled to oppose the grant of probate of the father's will. In In the matter of the petition of Hurro Lall Shaha, it was held that a presumptive reversioner to property with which a will deals has a sufficient interest in the property to entitle him to maintain a suit in respect of such property and that he is entitled to maintain a case for the revocation of probate. The learned Judges followed the decision in In the matter of the petition of Bhobasoonduri Dabee. In Kishen Dai v. Satyendra Nath Dutt a bench of the Calcutta High Court held that:

    “the words ‘interest in the estate of the deceased’ in Sect. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act mean ‘interest in the estate left by the deceased’ and that a judgment-creditor who but for the will would in execution of his decree have a right to seize the property or that share of it which should descend to his debtor and who alleges that the will has been set up for the purpose of defrauding the creditors is a person claiming an interest in the estate of the deceased and as such has a locus standi in opposing the grant of the probate of the will.”

    It cannot be said that a Hindu son claims through his undivided father. If the father devises his property as his self acquisition, is not the son entitled to oppose the grant of probate on the ground that it is a perjury? And it cannot be said in such a case that he claims through the father. In Arakal Bastian Ansap v. Narayana Ayyar, it was held that the judgment-creditors of the son of the deceased who had attached the son's interest in his deceased father's estate before the application for probate were entitled to oppose the grant of probate. It is contended the Privy Council in Nilmoni Singh Deo v. Umanath Mookerjee, disallowed the contention that an attaching creditor of a son's share was entitled to oppose the grant of the probate of the father's will. Their Lordships did not decide the point but only expressed a doubt. They observe at p. 28:

    “They entertain grave doubts whether an attaching creditor can do so, at least in a case which is not founded on the ground that the probate has been obtained in fraud of creditors.”;

    They give no final opinion upon it. If a testator purports to devise his property as his self-acquisition in order to defeat his undivided brother or to defeat the claim for maintenance of the widow of his co-parcener, does he not commit fraud? and is not the brother or the widow entitled to question genuineness of the will? In Rahamtullah Sahib v. Rama Rau it was held that a lagatee under a will or a creditor of the testator had not such interest as to entitle him to oppose the grant of probate. In the case of a creditor the estate is liable whether the will is genuine or not. The executor, and if there is no executor the administrator is bound to pay the debts of the testator out of the estate and the creditor will not ordinarily suffer in any way by a false will being propounded and probate thereof being obtained. There may be cases where it may be to the interest of the creditor to oppose the grant of probate if by obtaining probate unscrupulous person or a person of no means is baseless to make away with the property of the deceased and thereby defeat the creditor. If the probate proceedings are fraudulent any person who would suffer thereby is entitled to object to such proceedings. In Crispin v. Doglione, the natural son of the testator objected to the grant of probate on the ground that by the law of Portugal he was entitled to the whole of the deceased's property and that he had instituted a suit in Portugal against the executor in which he obtained a decree that he should be put into possession of the property. The declaration did not state the nature of the suit, nor the questions involved in it, nor did the judgment show that the plaintiff was in the same position as a legitimate son. The learned judges held that the foreign judgment alone did not show such an interest in the party in whose favour it was made as to entitle him to dispute the will. If the judgment of the foreign Court had given the property to him the learned judges might probably have allowed him to contest the grant of probate. In Brinda Chowdhrain v. Radhica Chowdhrain, it was held that the widow of a Hindu testator who had died leaving sons had sufficient interest to call upon the executor to prove the will in solemn form per testes. At page 494 they observe:

    “She is entitled to maintenance and if she pleases to institute a suit, to have her maintenance made a charge upon the estate of her deceased husband.”;

    The true principle deducible from the cases is that a person who is entitled to any portion of the estate left by the deceased or a right to claim maintenance from the estate of the deceased has an interest within the meaning of Sect. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act. It is not necessary that he should claim through the testator in order to enable him to oppose the grant of probate of the will of the testator. If a person is likely to suffer by the grant of the probate of a forged will or an invalid will he has sufficient interest to enter a caveat.

    The next contention is that the judgment of the learned judge is opposed to the evidence in the case. The will bears the date 4th June, 1920. The application for probate was made only in 1922. The will is said to have been executed on the day of the testatrix's death. She was ill for about a fortnight and the will is said to have been written about 8 a.m, and she died the same afternoon. Persons suffering from diabetes are as a rule in a comatic condition before death. It is said that she was able to dictate the will at 8 o’ clock, a few hours before her death and she died suddenly on account of the boil bursting. The evidence on the side of the appellant is not at all satisfactory. The draft of the will has not been produced and the chief witness for the appellant who is the sole legatee under the will is a karnam and his conduct in the box was such as to arouse suspicion. A Revenue Inspector was said to have been present at the time of the execution of the will and he was not examined in the case. It was suggested that his; presence could not be secured at the time when the case came on for hearing. If an application had been made to the learned judge he certainly would have granted an adjournment for the examination of the Revenue Inspector. The Revenue Inspector did not attest the will. This looks very suspicious. If the will is a genuine will there is no reason why the appellant should not have examined the Revenue Inspector as his witness. P. Ws. 2 and 3 are relations; and we see no reason to differ from the finding of the learned judge that it has not been satisfactorily proved that the will was executed by Narasamma or that at the time of the alleged execution of the will she was in a sound disposing state of mind.

    Waller, J.—On both points I agree. I think that the words in Sect. 69 of the Probate and Administration Act “claiming to have any interest in the estate of the deceased” are intended to bear the same meaning as the words in the English Act “having or pretending interest in the (personal) estate affected by a will” That is the view taken in Kishen Dai v. Satyendra Nath Dutt which 1 would follow.

    On the merits, I see no reason to dissent from the conclusion of the District Judge. The appeal must be dismissed.

    K. V. S.Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Jamni Hanumantha Rao v. Aratala Latchamma
    (Mar 23, 1926)