Krishnan, J. — The point taken before us in this Second Appeal for the defendant-appellant is that the plaintiff's suit is barred by Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, his only remedy being an application under that section. It was not taken in the Lower Courts but as it is a question of law arising on the facts found we have allowed it to be raised.
The facts relevant for the argument are these. One Rangan Pattar obtained a mortgage decree against the plaintiff; the properties were sold in the Court auction and one of the items was purchased by the present defendant who was a stranger to the mortgage suit and to the decree. A sale certificate was issued to him and he obtained a delivery order. In execution of that order he got possession of plots A, B and C. This was about 11½ years ago. It is the plaintiff's case that plot C alone was included in the decree and in the sale certificate, and was delivered to the defendant, and that the defendant subsequently trespassed on the plots A and B, which are the subject matter of the present suit; he now sues to recover them. The defendant pleaded that all the plots were included in the Court sale and in his certificate, and that he got possession of them all properly through Court and that he was entitled to them. The Lower Courts have found that the alleged trespass is untrue and that the plaint plots were delivered to the defendant by the Court Amin. They have however also found that plots A and B were not really included in the mortgage deed, or in the decree, or in the sale certificate, or in the delivery order, which all contained the same description of the property as to boundaries and measurements. The Amin's mistake in delivering them to the defendant arose from a mistake in the measurements in the documents and the plots really belonged to the plaintiff. Applying Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, the Lower Courts held that the plaintiff was not barred by limitation and gave him a decree for the plots.
Mr. Menon for the defendant-appellant contends that on the finding, this is a claim by the judgment-debtor under a mortgage-decree, for the recovery of property over-delivered, in execution, to the Court auction purchaser, and as such, this is a case to which Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code applies, even though the purchaser was a stranger to the mortgage suit. He urges that the present suit is thus barred by that section and should have been dismissed. If the section applies there can be no doubt that the plaintiff's claim must fail whatever the merits may be, for the suit cannot be treated as an application under the section, Cl. (2), with any advantage, as it will then have to be dismissed in limine, as barred by limitation.
To make Sect. 47 applicable, it is clear from its language that two conditions are necessary to be fulfilled. The question raised must be one relating to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree, and it must also be one arising between the parties to the suit or their representatives. On the authorities in this Court, the first condition must be held to be satisfied in this case. See Venkatachalapathy Aiyen v. Perumul Aiyen and Kathirayasami Naicker v. Ramabadra Naidu. In the latter case, the second condition was also fulfilled as the parties to the application for redelivery were the judgment-debtor on one side, and the decree-holder purchaser on the other. In the present case, we have a stranger purchaser. Mr. Menon contends that this will make no difference, that the stranger purchaser should be looked upon as the representative of the decree holder in this matter and that whether he be such representative or not, the case falls under Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code under the recent ruling of the Full Bench in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan. In the Full Bench case the question arose in three appeals, two being between one V. Pillai, a stranger purchaser in execution of a money decree on one side, and one Maya Nadan the decree-holder purchaser of some of the items under the mortgage decree on the other side and the third appeal being one between the same V. Pillai and one Subbaya Nadan, a stranger purchaser of other items, in execution of the same mortgage decree. On the question of the representative character of these stranger purchasers there was a difference of opinion between the members of the Bench. The learned Officiating Chief Justice was of opinion that the question whether such a purchaser was the representative of the judgment-debtor, or of the decree-holder depended on the nature of the question raised and on who the contesting party was. See page 124. He adopted the view stated in Krishna Bhupati Devu v. Vikrama Devu(4) that such a purchaser represented the judgment-debtor to the extent of the property purchased, and the decree-holder, so far his right to bring to sale such property in execution of the decree was concerned. So that, according to his view the purchaser in asking for delivery of possession, or in resisting redelivery, would be a representative of the decree-holder. His view on this point was, however, not adopted by the majority, who held that such a purchaser was the representative of the judgment-debtor only, and never of the decree-holder. I must follow the view of the majority on this point, whatever my own view may be. There was a considerable conflict of opinion on the point in this High Court previously, and it was to settle the question that the reference was made, and we must take the Full Bench decision as settling it. I am net therefore referring to the previous authorities.
On the first part of his contention, Mr. Menon cannot therefore succeed, as on the view above stated, his client will be a representative of the plaintiff, judgment-debtor, and the question here will thus be one between a party and his own representative. See Gour Mohun Gouli v. Dinonath Karmokar. It is how ever suggested by him, that the Full Bench did not consider the question of the representative character of the mortgage-decree-purchaser, which is the point before us, but confined itself to that of the money-decree-purchaser, and that there is a difference between the two kinds of purchasers in the matter. The last question referred to the Full Bench specifically raises the question as to the mortgagee-decree-purchaser. See p. 113, and though Oldfield, J. has not answered the question, the other judges have dealt with it and have made no distinction between the two. Taking the view of the Full Bench, regarding the money-decree-purchaser. I think no proper distinction can be made on the point between him and the mortgage-decree-purchaser. Sect. 89 of the Transfer of Property Act, under which the order absolute for sale was made in the present case, declares that, on such an order being made, the right to redeem and the security shall both be extinguished. Thereafter, there is only a right to sell the property, just as there is after attachment under a money decree. See Het Ram v. Shadi Ram, and the rights flowing from the purchaser are the same. The fact that as a matter of equity, the purchaser under a mortgage decree is allowed under certain circumstances to plead the mortgagee's right in the property purchased as a sheild has no bearing on this question.
The Full Bench however went further and held on the authority of the Privy Council decision in Prosunno Kumar Sanyal v. Kali Das Sanyal, that irrespective of any question of the representative character of the auction purchaser applicant, Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, should be applied to his case, where the question raised is one relating to execution and is one in which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor are adversely interested. Seshagiri Aiyar, J., puts it thus: “What the Courts have to see is whether issues arising for decision relate (a) to execution, (b) to deciding rival rights of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor in the subject matter. If those conditions are satisfied, the fact that others are interested in the result of the decision should not affect the jurisdiction and competency of the executing Court to deal with the matter.” On this point, the Full Bench were unanimous, and it was, I think, on the application of this view that the case between the stranger money decree purchaser, V. Pillai, and the stranger mortgage decree purchaser, Subbaya Nadan, was held to fall under Sect. 47 Civil Procedure Code, the question for delivery of property purchased in Court sale being evidently held to be one, relating to execution and one in which the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor are adversely interested. It is statedly on this view that Oldfield, J., thought it unnecessary to answer the last question referred to the Full Bench. This is made further clear by the subsequent judgment of the referring Judges reported in Veyindra Muthu Pillai v. Maya Nadan. They applied Sect. 47 to all the three cases. Except on this view, Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, could not well have been applied, in Subbayya Nadan's case, as he would be the representative, only of the judgment-debtor, V. Pillai, the other party to that application. I am unable to accept the suggestion that Sect. 47 was applied to that case by over-sight. The Full Bench as I understand them hold that the condition in Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code that the question should be one “arising between the parties” is satisfied by the question being one of a nature in which the parties to the suit are adversely interested, though the person actually raising it in any particular case against one party may not be the representative of the other party. In fact they gave an extended meaning to these words.
Applying this view to the present case, we have to see whether the question raised here is one in which the rival rights of the decree-holder and the judgment-debtor have to be decided. In the Full Bench case, the application was for delivery of properties included in the decree and purchased in Court sale. That question was treated as falling within Sect. 47, even where the purchaser was a stranger. The present case no doubt refers to property claimed by one side to be included in the decree and denied by the other side to be so included and found by the Court to be not so included. Does that make a difference? I was at first inclined to think that it did and that the decree-holder was not interested in the present controversy, as it refers to property over-delivered to the purchaser. But on further consideration, I have come to the conclusion that it is not correct. If the decree-holder can be held to be interested in the delivery of the property included in the decree to the purchaser, as was done by the Full Bench, I think we must hold consistently with that view that he is also interested in the question as to what properties that decree covered. The mistake in the boundaries in the present case is not merely in the delivery order but also in the mortgage deed and in the decree and in the sale-certificate, and if the decree, or the sale certificate had been asked to be rectified on the point, the question would clearly have arisen between the parties to the suit. The fact that it is now raised against the purchaser should not make any difference as to whether it is to be done in execution or not. It is clearly appropriate that these mistakes in execution proceedings should be rectified by the executing Court itself, and we should not put too narrow a construction on Sect. 47 and drive parties to suits for the purpose. If plaintiff in the present suit loses his property on this view, it is only due to his own laches, in delaying for so many years.
I would therefore hold Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, applies to the present case, a as the result, I will allow the Second Appeal and dismiss the suit, but, in the circumstances, without costs in any of the Courts.
Sir William Ayling, J.—I am not prepared to dissent from my learned brother's view of the meaning of the Full Bench judgments in Veyindramuthu Pillai v. Mayanadan and although they seem to me to extend the applicability of Sect. 47, Civil Procedure Code, to a decree hardly suggested by the wording of the section I feel bound to follow them.
I concur in the order proposed.
S. S.Appeal allowed.