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  • section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
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  • section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Krishnan, J., with Waller, J. concurring)

Factual and Procedural Background

The original suit was brought by certain Vaniyars of Tiruchendur (Tinnevelly district) seeking (a) a declaration that they were entitled to enter the temple and go up to the figure of the Nandi in front of the inner shrine, and (b) an injunction restraining the trustees and others from preventing them from doing so. The Subordinate Judge decreed in favour of the Vaniyars. The trustees and others filed Appeal No. 232 of 1923 to this High Court against that decree. An application was made (by the appellants to that appeal) to Wallace, J., for a stay of execution of the decree pending disposal of the appeal; Wallace, J., refused the application. The present proceeding is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against Wallace, J.'s order refusing to stay execution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order of a single Judge refusing to stay the execution of a decree (i.e., the correct meaning of the word "judgment" in clause 15).
  2. Whether the existence of a declaratory portion of a decree (a declaration of rights) constitutes a bar to the High Court granting a stay of execution of consequential relief (such as an injunction) contained in that decree.
  3. If an appeal lies, what form of relief (if any) by way of stay of execution is appropriate pending disposal of the substantive appeal in this Court?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (trustees and others who filed Appeal No. 232 of 1923)

  • The appellants contended that if the respondents (Vaniyars) were allowed to enter the temple and go up to the Nandi pending the High Court appeal, the temple would be desecrated and, if the appellants succeed on appeal, they would be compelled to perform purification ceremonies at considerable expense.
  • They sought a stay of execution of the decree pending disposal of their appeal in this Court.

Respondents' Arguments (Vaniyars)

  • A preliminary objection was taken that no appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order refusing to stay execution of a decree: the respondents relied on authorities and practice contended to show that such Letters Patent appeals are not maintainable.
  • On the respondents' side the Court was referred to two reported cases (one being the Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayadu decision and another case, Vairavan Chettiyar v. Ramanathan Chettiyar) and to several unreported Letters Patent Appeals (Nos. 24 of 1918, 15 of 1922, 38 of 1921 and 7 of 1923) to support the position that the practice of the Court was not to allow Letters Patent appeals against orders such as the one under challenge. (The opinion notes, however, that those unreported appeals principally dealt with refusals to stay proceedings in the lower Court, not refusals to stay execution.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Section 2, Code of Civil Procedure (definition) Defines "judgment" as "the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order" (but that definition is confined to the Code itself). The Court noted the CPC definition but observed it is intended for the CPC and cannot be directly applied to the word "judgment" as used in the Letters Patent.
Desouza v. Coles Bittleston, J.: "It must be held to have the more general meanings of any decision or determination affecting the rights or the interest of any suitor or applicant." The judgment was cited as an early, expansive view of "judgment"; Waller, J. stated he would have been inclined to adopt this broader view if the question were open, though the Court ultimately followed Tuljaram Row.
The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company Couch, C.J.: defined "judgment" as "a decision, whether final, or preliminary, or interlocutory which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability." The Calcutta definition was identified as a leading, narrower view; it influenced subsequent discussion but the Court adopted the test in Tuljaram Row as authoritative in this High Court.
Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar Sir Arnold White, C.J.: test is the practical effect of the adjudication in the suit — if it puts an end to the suit or proceeding (or would do so if not complied with) it is a "judgment" within the Letters Patent; an adjudication that is merely a step towards final adjudication is not. The Court explicitly adopted this test as the correct interpretation of "judgment" in the Letters Patent and followed it as binding in this jurisdiction.
Srinivasa Iyengar v. Ramasawmi Chettiar; Kulasekara Naicker v. Jagadambal Ammal; Kanayalal Bhoya v. Paramasukdoss These decisions reflect acceptance and follow-up of the Tuljaram Row test by the Madras High Court. Cited as subsequent decisions in which Tuljaram Row's approach was accepted and followed.
Krishna Reddy v. Thanikachala Mudali Listed among cases that accepted the Tuljaram Row meaning of "judgment" in the Letters Patent. Noted as another decision of this Court following Tuljaram Row.
Gokal Chand v. Sanwal Das (Lahore High Court) The Lahore High Court accepted the Tuljaram Row view; that particular case was an appeal against a refusal to stay execution of a decree. Referred to as supportive authority for the proposition that an appeal lies from an order refusing stay of execution.
Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh (Lahore High Court) The Lahore Chief Justice considered authorities and adopted the Tuljaram Row view. Referred to as further support from another High Court adopting the Madras test.
Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayadu A decision which, according to the opinion, represents a contrary view (the Chief Justice in that case later resiled from holding appeal lay from refusal to stay execution). The Court treated this decision as not good law for present purposes and declined to follow it where it conflicted with Tuljaram Row.
Vairavan Chettiyar v. Ramanathan Chettiyar Another Bench of this Court followed the Srimantu Raja decision, but there was no discussion on the point. The Court indicated that Vairavan Chettiyar cannot be relied upon as good law on the point because it merely followed Srimantu without discussion.
Halsbury (definition of "judgment") Quoted definition: "any decision given by a Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties to a proceeding properly before the Court." Waller, J. invoked this broad statement to support the generality of "judgment" but the Court explicitly followed Tuljaram Row as the controlling test in this High Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court first addressed the preliminary objection that no appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from an order refusing to stay execution. The central analytical issue was the meaning of the word "judgment" in clause 15. The Court noted the definition of "judgment" in section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure but observed that that statutory definition applies to the code and cannot be directly transposed to the Letters Patent context.

The Court reviewed prior authorities. It summarized three strands of judicial formulations: (a) an expansive view (Desouza v. Coles) that treats "judgment" broadly as any decision affecting parties' rights; (b) a narrower statement (Calcutta case) defining "judgment" as any decision affecting rights or liabilities; and (c) the Tuljaram Row test which focuses on the practical effect of the adjudication in the proceeding — specifically whether the adjudication, by its effect, puts an end to the suit or proceeding before that Court (or would do so if not complied with).

The Court accepted Tuljaram Row as laying down the correct test for "judgment" in the Letters Patent and observed that that decision has been repeatedly followed by this Court and by other High Courts. The opinion concluded that an order refusing a stay of execution is an instance mentioned by Sir Arnold White in Tuljaram Row as one from which an appeal would lie; accordingly, the preliminary objection was overruled and the Letters Patent Appeal was held to be maintainable.

Turning to the merits, the Court stressed the usual rule that the exercise of discretion by a Judge in refusing a stay should not lightly be interfered with. However, the Court rejected the view (which it attributed to Wallace, J.) that a declaration of rights in the lower Court's judgment automatically precluded this Court from staying the injunction forming part of the decree. The Court explained that if a declaration alone were a bar to any stay, then in every case where consequential relief is granted with a declaration it would be impossible to stay execution. The Court therefore held that the declaratory portion does not preclude a stay of the injunctive relief.

Balancing the competing considerations, the Court found that hardship would be caused to the respondents if they were entirely prevented from religious worship pending a possibly prolonged appeal, but that the appellants' concern about desecration and the cost of purification (if they ultimately prevailed) was also real. The Court therefore exercised its discretion to grant a modified stay of execution: the respondents were to be permitted to enter the temple from the east up to the dhwajasthambham (just inside the gopuram) where they could view the idol and perform worship, but they were restrained from proceeding further (i.e., up to the Nandi) pending disposal of the appeal. The lower Court's order was stayed with this reservation.

As to costs, the Court directed that each party should bear their own costs of the Letters Patent Appeal and of the petition for stay.

Waller, J., delivered a concurring opinion. He agreed with following Tuljaram Row (and noted, hypothetically, he might prefer the broader Desouza view if the matter were open). He emphasized the generality of the word "judgment" and expressed the view that many inter partes orders could be considered judgments, but he concurred in the result and in the modification of the stay as ordered by Krishnan, J.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The preliminary objection that no appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order refusing to stay execution was overruled. The Letters Patent Appeal was held maintainable, and the Court granted a modified stay of execution of the lower Court's decree pending disposal of the appeal in this Court. The respondents were permitted to go from the east up to the dhwajasthambham inside the gopuram to view the idol and perform worship, but were restrained from proceeding further (to the Nandi) pending the appeal. Each party was directed to bear their own costs of the Letters Patent Appeal and of the petition for stay.

Implications:

  • The Court adopted and followed the Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar test for the meaning of "judgment" in the Letters Patent — focusing on the practical effect of an adjudication in the proceeding (i.e., whether it puts an end to the suit or proceeding before the Court).
  • The Court made clear that a declaratory portion of a decree is not by itself a bar to the High Court granting a stay of execution of consequential relief; accordingly, stays of execution remain available even where part of a decree is declaratory.
  • The opinion indicates that some earlier decisions (notably Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu) cannot be treated as good law to the extent they conflict with the Tuljaram Row approach; the Court therefore adhered to existing Madras High Court authority rather than the contrary view.
  • No broader novel precedent was laid down beyond adoption of Tuljaram Row and the application of established principles to the facts; the decision resolves the practical relief to be granted in the particular circumstances by way of a modified stay and allocates costs by directing each party to bear their own costs.

This summary is prepared strictly from the text of the provided opinion. No information has been added that is not contained in the opinion itself.

    Sonachalam Pillai And Nine Others ( And Petitioners), v. Kumaravelu Chettiar And Six Others (S),

    Krishnan, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the Order of Wallace, J., sitting as a single Judge in the Admission Court, refusing to stay execution of the decree in O.S No. 2 of 1920 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Tuticorin, pending disposal of appeal No. 232 of 1923 which has been filed against that decree and which has been admitted and is now pending in this Court. The suit was brought by certain Vaniyars of Tiruchendur in the Tinnevelly district for a declaration that they were entitled to enter the well-known temple there and go up to the figure of the Nandi in front of the inner shrine, and for an injunction to restrain the trustees and others from preventing them from doing so. The suit was decreed by the Subordinate Judge in their favour, and against that decree appeal No. 232 of 1923 has, as already stated, been filed in this Court by the trustees and others.

    An application was made to Wallace, J., for stay of execution of the decree pending the disposal of the appeal and, that having been refused, this present appeal is filed against that order.

    A preliminary objection is taken to the appeal on the ground that no appeal lies under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against an order refusing to stay the execution of a decree. The decision of this question turns on the meaning to be given to the word “judgment” in clause 15 of the Letters Patent. There is nothing in the Letters Patent itself to enable one to say what the exact meaning of the term “judgment” is and what, orders would be covered by that term. The word “judgment” is defined in section 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure as meaning “the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order” passed by him. As this definition is intended for the construction of the word “judgment” as used in the Code of Civil Procedure only, it obviously cannot be applied to the word as used in the Letters Patent. The meaning of the word “judgment” in the Letters Patent has been, however, the subject matter of consideration in several reported cases. The earliest one which has been brought to our notice is the case of Desouza v. Coles(1), where at page 387, Bittleston, J., laid down that

    “It must be held to have the more general meanings of any decision or determination affecting the rights or the interest of any suitor or applicant.”

    It was again defined by Couch, C.J, in the leading judgment on the point in Calcutta in The Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Company(2), as being

    “a decision, whether final, or preliminary, or interlocutory which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability.”

    And this definition was approved of by Markby, J. Since then, the meaning of the term has again been considered by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar. There, the then learned Chief Justice, Sir Arnold White, was of opinion that the definition given by Bittleston, J., went too far and that the one given by the. Calcutta High Court was too narrow, and he himself laid down the test to be applied to decide whether any particular order amounted to a judgment or not within the meaning of the Letters Patent, as follows, at page 7:—

    “The test seems to me to be not what is the form of the adjudication but what is its effect in the suit or proceeding in which it is made. If its effect, whatever its form may be, and whatever may be the nature of the application on which it is made, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding so far as the Court before which the suit or proceeding is pending is concerned, or if its effect, if it is not complied with, is to put an end to the suit or proceeding, I think the adjudication is a judgment within the meaning of the clause.”

    And he added

    “An adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit is not, in my opinion, a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.”

    Following this latter part of the definition as to what is not a judgment, he held in the particular case before him, which was one of an appeal against an order refusing to frame an issue, that no appeal lay, and that view was adopted by the Full Bench. Krishnaswami Ayyar, J., who sat with the learned Chief Justice, also agreed with the view taken by him as to the meaning of the word “judgment” and with the order proposed by him; Ayling, J., the third Judge in the Full Bench, merely contented himself by saying that he agreed that the answer to the question, referred for disposal, should be in the negative. He did not discuss the question as to what amounted to a judgment at all. This ruling has been since accepted by this Court as correctly laying down the meaning of the word “judgment,” and has been cited and followed in several subsequent decisions; see, for example, the cases in Srinivasa Iyengar v. Ramasawmi Chttiar, Kulasekara Naicker v. Jagadambal Ammal, Kanayalal Bhoya v. Paramasukdoss(3), and Krishna Reddy v. Thanikachala Mudali(4). It has been brought to our notice that the same view has been accepted and followed by the Lahore High Court in Gokal Chand v. Sanwal Das(5), which, it may be rioted, was an Appeal against a refusal to stay the execution of a decree, and also in Ruldu Singh v. Sanwal Singh(6), where the learned Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court has considered the authorities and has adopted the view of the Madras High Court as to the meaning of the word “judgment” in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar(7). The learned Chief Justice elaborately discussed all the cases on the point and, as his judgment has been followed, as stated above, by this High Court since then, I think it only right that we should adopt the same definition. In explaining his meaning, the learned Chief Justice has referred to a number of instances in which he thought an appeal would lie, and one of the instances he mentions in his judgment is an order refusing a stay of execution. He says at page 8

    “I should be prepared to hold that an appeal lay from an order refusing a stay of execution”;

    and he has resiled from his view to the contrary in Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayadu, to which he was a party. No doubt, when the learned Chief Justice said that an appeal lay from an order refusing a stay of execution, in the Full Bench, case, his observation was, in a sense, in the nature of an obiter dictum; nevertheless we are bound to follow it and we cannot treat the case Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayadu, as good law. The case Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Malliharjuna Prasada Nayadu, as pointed out to us, has been for lowed in Vairavan Chettiyar v. Ramanathan Chettiyar by another Bench of this Court, but in that case there is no discussion whatever on the point in issue as that case merely follows Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Mallikarjuna Prasada Nayadu, and if I am right in thinking that Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Malliharjuna Prasada Nayadu, is no longer good law, Vairavan Cheitiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, cannot be accepted as good law.

    On the respondents' side, besides the two cases, Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Durga Prasada Nayadu v. Srimantu Raja Yarlagadda Malliharjuna Prasada Nayadu, and Vairavan Cheitiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar, above referred to, our attention was drawn to a number of unreported Letters Patent Appeals, namely, Nos. 24 of 1918, 15 of 1922, 38 of 1921 and 7 of 1923 and it was contended that it was the practice of this Court not to allow Letters Patent Appeals against orders such as the one before us. But all those cases, on a reference to them, will be found to be cases where stay of proceedings in the lower Court was refused; they did not deal with stay of execution at all. Those cases stand on a different footing altogether, for they fall under the second part of the definition of the Chief Justice quoted above, namely, that

    “an adjudication on an application which is nothing more than a step towards obtaining a final adjudication in the suit is not, in my opinion, a judgment within the meaning of the Letters Patent.”

    In Letters Patent Appeal No. 7 of 1923, the appeal was against an order refusing an interim injunction. The learned Judges held an appeal lay. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the preliminary objection cannot stand and must be overruled, as an appeal lies under the Letters Patent against the order of a single Judge refusing stay of execution pending the disposal of an appeal or second appeal in this Court. On the merits I quite recognize that the learned Judge of this Court having exercised his discretion in refusing to stay execution, we should not interfere with such exercise of discretion unless there are strong grounds for it. But in this particular case, unfortunately, the learned Judge seems to have been led to the passing of the order that he made, by his view that there being a declaration of the rights of the Vaniyars in the judgment of the lower Court, he could not interfere with the injunction which formed part of the decree. I am unable to adopt this view, for, if it is adopted, in all cases in which a consequential relief is granted along with the declaration, it would be impossible to stay execution. It seems to me that the issue of the injunction ordered by the lower Court in the decree could be stayed by itself, and, whatever rights the decree might have declared, it would not enable the parties to enter the temple and go to the place where they want to go to. I am, therefore, of opinion that the fact of there being a declaration is no bar to this Court staying the execution of the decree.

    On the merits, I think that this is a case in which we should grant a stay with some modification of the order of the lower Court pending the disposal of the appeal here. On the one hand, the Vaniyars are anxious to enter the temple, see the deity and perform their worship, and it will be a great hardship to prevent them altogether from doing so, pending the appeal which may last for some time in this Court. On the other hand, there may be a good deal of truth in what the appellants say, viz., that, if the respondents are allowed to enter the temple and go up to the Nandi, the temple will be desecrated and they will have to perform the ceremony of purification at considerable expense, if they succeed in the appeal. I have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the respondents may be allowed to go up from the east to the dhwajasthambham in the temple just inside the gopuram wherefrom they may have a view of the idol and perform their religious worship there, but that they should not be allowed to go further pending the disposal of the appeal.

    I would, therefore, order a modified stay of execution by directing the appellants not to prevent the respondents from going up to the dhwajasthambham at times of worship and also directing them to let the respondents have a view of the idol when such worship takes place. The order of the lower Court will be stayed with that reservation.

    In the circumstances, I think the proper order as to costs is to direct each party to bear his own costs of the Letters Patent Appeal and of the petition for stay.

    Waller, J.:— I agree that we should follow Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettiar. Were the question still open to argument, I should myself be inclined to adopt the view of Bittleston, J., in Desouza v. Coles, that it is “impossible to prescribe any limits to the right of appeal founded on the nature of the order or decree appealed against.”

    The word ‘judgment’ in section 15 of the Letters Patent includes decrees and orders. Judgment is defined in Halsbury as

    “any decision given by a Court on a question or questions at issue between the parties to a proceeding properly before the Court.”

    In the Civil Procedure Code an “order” is described as the formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court which is not a decree. This description is wide enough to cover all decisions of any kind inter partes, and so the Code has provided that only certain orders can be appealed against.

    The word “judgment” as employed in section 15 of the Letters Patent is a very general term. The statute does not define it or limit its operation in any way. I venture to doubt whether we are entitled to define it or limit its operation by judicial interpretation. What has been achieved by that process is an a priori classification of interlocutory orders into interlocutory orders proper and interlocutory orders which amount to judgments. I think that all orders passed after contest inter partes are judgments within the meaning of section 15 of the Letters Patent and that, if it be desired to limit the right of appeal against certain orders, the proper method of achieving that end is by providing, as has been done in the Civil Procedure Code, that only certain orders can be appealed against.

    I agree with my learned brother that the fact that part of the decree is declaratory is no bar to a stay of execution being granted. I understand that the parties are willing to accept a stay on the terms indicated. I therefore concur in the order of my learned brother.

    N.R

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    Sonachalam Pillai And Nine Others ( And Petitioners), v. Kumaravelu Chettiar And Six Others (S),
    (Nov 16, 1923)