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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (III of 1909), section 2(c) defines Official Assignee, section 17
  • Court.Section 17 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (Act III of 1909)
  • section 16(2)(a) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907).
  • 11 Vict., C. 23, section 29, the Insolvency Act
  • section 158 of 12 and 13 Vict., C. 106,
  • section 16(2)(a) of Act III of 1907,
  • 12 and 13 Vict., C. 106, section 153
  • section 20 of Act III of 1907,
  • section 18 and section 19
  • PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY ACT
  • section 2(c) of that Act;
  • section 2(c)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (III of 1909), section 2(c) defines Official Assignee, section 17
  • Court.Section 17 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (Act III of 1909)
  • section 16(2)(a) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907).
  • 11 Vict., C. 23, section 29, the Insolvency Act
  • section 158 of 12 and 13 Vict., C. 106,
  • section 16(2)(a) of Act III of 1907,
  • 12 and 13 Vict., C. 106, section 153
  • section 20 of Act III of 1907,
  • section 18 and section 19
  • PROVINCIAL INSOLVENCY ACT
  • section 2(c) of that Act;
  • section 2(c)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit in question was filed by two plaintiffs: the Official Receiver of the Coimbatore district (first plaintiff) and the insolvent (second plaintiff). The claim sought damages against the respondent for allowing a promissory note for Rs. 10,000 to become time-barred.

Related interim proceedings included Civil Miscellaneous Proceedings No. 2723 of 1919 (the second appellant's petition for stay of sale of the insolvent's property) and Civil Miscellaneous Proceedings No. 2724 of 1919 (a petition seeking a direction to the Official Receiver to file a suit, with the stated aim of securing that a suit be filed before 27 October 1919 to avoid limitation). An order of the District Judge of Coimbatore had refused leave to the Official Receiver to file the suit; that order was the subject of Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1919.

An order by Odgers, J. (dated 24th October 1919), and a subsequent judgment by a Bench (Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ.) in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1919 featured in the procedural history. Different judges (Bakewell, J., and Phillips, J.) treated Odgers, J.'s order as provisional or subject to the appeal. The trial judge (Phillips, J.) dismissed the suit as not maintainable without leave of the Insolvency Court. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Solicitors for respondents were noted as Short Bewes & Co. in the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether leave of the Insolvency Court (or leave of the Court under the Provincial Insolvency Act, Act III of 1907) was a precondition to the maintainability of the suit brought by the Official Receiver and the insolvent.
  2. What legal effect should be given to prior judicial orders (notably the order of Odgers, J., and the subsequent judgment of Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ.)—specifically whether those orders operated provisionally pending appeal or had the effect of prohibiting the Official Receiver from suing.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The appellants contended that the judgment of Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ., in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1919 (which construed an earlier order of Odgers, J.) should be read or construed as an order granting leave (or adopting Odgers, J.'s order in a manner operative to permit the suit).
  • The appellants also argued that leave of the Insolvency Court was not necessary for the maintainability of the suit — i.e., the absence of leave should not be a defence open to a defendant in such a suit.

Other Parties / Respondent

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments in the record provided.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lee v. Sangster English authority establishing that leave to sue by the Official Receiver is a matter between the Receiver and the Court; want of such leave is not a defence available to the defendant in the suit. The court followed Lee v. Sangster as good law (decided in 1857) and relied on it to hold that the absence of leave is not a valid defence to the defendant and that leave is essentially internal to the relationship between the Receiver and the Court.
In Re Branson Ex parte The Trustee Affirmed that Lee v. Sangster remains good law and illustrated the principle that leave is a matter between Court and Official Receiver, not a defence for defendants. The opinion refers to this case as confirming that Lee v. Sangster remains good law; it is used to support the conclusion that defendants cannot rely on lack of leave to defeat the suit.
Cochrane v. Owen Authority construing similar statutory provisions in which leave provisions were not held fatal to the maintainability of a suit when leave had not been obtained. Ramesam, J. cited Cochrane v. Owen among authorities to show that analogous provisions in other Acts were interpreted to permit suits to proceed despite the absence of leave, supporting the conclusion that lack of leave does not defeat maintainability.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion contains considered analysis by two judges (Spencer, J. and Ramesam, J.). Their reasoning proceeds in two strands: (A) analysis of the procedural effect of prior judicial orders and (B) statutory construction and the legal consequence of absence of leave.

A. Procedural effect of prior judicial orders (Spencer, J.)

  • Spencer, J. observed that paragraphs in an affidavit show that a petition sought to ensure a suit be filed before 27 October 1919 to avoid limitation; this contextualizes the parties' urgency.
  • He noted that Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1919 (appeal against the District Judge's order directing the Official Receiver not to file a suit) was not placed before Odgers, J. for disposal, and Odgers, J. did not purport to set aside the District Judge's order.
  • Accordingly, some judges (Bakewell, J., and Phillips, J.) were correct to treat Odgers, J.'s order as provisional and subject to the outcome of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal.
  • Spencer, J. criticized the Bench of Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ., for construing Odgers, J.'s order as a permanent order and for concluding that it would be "useless to dispose of the Appeal"—observing they failed to notice Odgers, J. could not set aside the District Judge's order made under jurisdiction of the Provincial Insolvency Act (Act III of 1907).
  • He emphasized that because no review of the Bench's order was sought, the court must give legal effect to that earlier order as it stands rather than speculate on the Bench's intended disposition.

B. Statutory construction and the legal consequences of absence of leave

  • Spencer, J. examined section 16(2)(a) of Act III of 1907 and the phrase "as hereinafter provided." He concluded these words qualify the word "Receiver" (which is followed by sections 18 and 19 describing types of Receivers) rather than qualifying the verb "rest" or the vesting provision itself.
  • He contrasted this with the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (Act III of 1909), where the Official Assignee is defined in section 2(c) and section 17 vests property without the qualifying phrase; the qualifier was unnecessary in 1909 because "Official Assignee" was already defined.
  • From this construction Spencer concluded that obtaining leave is a matter between the Receiver and the Court whose officer he is, and that absence of leave is not a valid defence which a defendant can raise to defeat a suit.
  • He explicitly followed English authorities (Lee v. Sangster and In Re Branson) to support the principle that leave is internal to the Receiver-Court relationship and the Official Receiver prosecutes at his own risk regarding costs (e.g., cannot charge costs to the insolvent's estate if unsuccessful).
  • Ramesam, J. reached substantially the same conclusion: he viewed the phrase "as hereinafter provided" as qualifying "Receiver" and not defeating the vesting; he cited Cochrane v. Owen, Lee v. Sangster, and In Re Branson as showing that similar statutory leave provisions were construed as not being fatal to maintainability where leave had not been obtained.
  • Both judges concluded that the want of leave did not render the suit non-maintainable vis-à-vis the defendant and that the appeal should be allowed on that ground.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Appeal is allowed. (The trial judge's dismissal of the suit for want of leave is reversed; the suit is to be restored to file and disposed of according to law.)

Direct consequences specified in the opinion:

  • The suit is directed to be restored to file and proceeded with in accordance with law (Spencer, J.).
  • The decree of Phillips, J., dismissing the suit for want of leave, is reversed and the matter remanded to the Original Side for disposal according to law (Ramesam, J.).
  • The second appellant (the insolvent) will be awarded the costs of the Appeal; costs of the suit are to be provided in the final decree (Spencer, J.); Ramesam, J. ordered that the second appellant will have the costs of the Appeal and that the costs of the first Court (trial court) will abide the result.

Broader legal implication stated by the court (as applied, not as a novel precedent): the court applied and reiterated an established principle—drawing on English authorities—that statutory provisions requiring "leave of the Court" for suits by insolvency officers are matters between the officer (Receiver/Official Receiver) and the Court, and that the absence of such leave is not a defence available to defendants to defeat the suit. The opinion follows existing authorities rather than purporting to create a new rule.

    Official Receiver Of Coimbatore v. D.D. Kanga

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Spencer, J.:— It is evident from paragraphs 15 and 16, of the affidavit that accompanied both Civil Miscellaneous Proceedings No. 2723 of 1919, the second appellant's petition for stay of the sale of the Insolvent's property, and Civil Miscellaneous Proceedings No. 2724 of 1910, the petition for a direction to be given to the Official Receiver, Coimbatore, to file a suit against the respondent in this Appeal for damages on account of his action in allowing the promissory note for Rs. 10,000 to become time barred, that the purpose of the latter petition, was to get a suit filed within October 27th, 1919, after which date a suit upon that cause of action would have been out of time.

    Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1919, wherein the order of the District Judge of Coimbatore directing the Official Receiver not to file a suit was appealed against, was not placed before Odgers, J., for disposal, nor did that learned Judge purport to deal with the District Judge's order. I consider therefore that Bakewell, J., who dealt with an application for stay of proceedings in the suit pending the disposal of Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1919, and Phillips, J., who tried the suit, were right in regarding Odgers, J.'s order as a provisional order subject to the result of the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal.

    The learned Judges (Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ.) who heard the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal observed that the order of Odgers, J., was in force and that they could not interfere with it in the proceedings before them. They next went on to say that in these circumstances it would be useless to dispose of the Appeal and to dismiss it. Apparently they failed to notice that Odgers, J., could not and did not set aside the District Judge's order, refusing leave to sue, an order that was passed by him as a Court exercising jurisdiction under the Provincial Insolvency Act—vide the expression “by leave of the Court” in section 20 of Act III of 1907, the enactment then in force, and the definition of “Court” in section 2(1)(g).

    They also seem to have overlooked the fact that the result of the Bench dismissing the Appeal would be to leave the District Judge's order prohibiting the Official Receiver from suing in full force and effect. I have no doubt that their intention was to give full effect to Odgers, J.'s order and that this result might have been attained by allowing the Appeal instead of dismissing it.

    But no attempt has been made by the parties to gee the order on the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal reviewed by the Bench that passed it, and so we are bound to give it the legal effect that it has, instead of being guided by what we may think the learned Judges intended to do.

    On the second point, which is, that no leave was necessary for the institution of this suit, I am unable to follow the opinion of the learned Judge of the Court who tried this suit in treating the words “as hereinafter provided” in section 16(2)(a) of Act III of 1907, as qualifying the word “rest.” I think that they qualify the word “Receiver” that immediately precedes them, seeing that the following sections, 18 and 19, provide for two kinds of Receivers, one appointed by the Court for the particular insolvency and others appointed by the local Government for certain local areas. In the absence of a Receiver of either of these classes, the insolvent's property, upon an order of adjudication being made, vests in the Court.

    Section 17 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (Act III of 1909) which deals with the vesting of the insolvent's property in the Official Assignee, does not contain the words “as hereinafter provided.” They were not needed because no doubt could arise as to the officer designated by the words “Official Assignee” an expression defined in section 2(c) of that Act; whereas there is no definition in the Provincial Insolvency Act of the word “Receiver” till we come to section 18.

    I think that the obtaining of leave is a matter between the Receiver and the Court whose officer he is, and that it is not a valid defence to the suit which a defendant can raise to say that leave of the Insolvency Court has not been obtained. I would follow the English Law as laid down in Lee v. Sangster(1) which although decided in 1857 appears from In Re Branson Ex parte The Trustee(2) to be still good law. As between the Court and the Official Receiver, there was no reason for withholding leave, as the assets of the insolvent's estate were not risked by the snit. The Official Receiver is not the sole plaintiff in the present suit, and it was made a condition precedent to the granting of leave by Odgers, J., that the co-plaintiff who is the insolvent himself, should find security for Rs. 1,500 for the defendant's costs in the suit.

    As appellants succeed on this point, the Appeal must be allowed and the suit is directed to be restored to file and disposed of according to law. The second appellant will get his costs of this Appeal. Costs of the suit will be provided in the final decree.

    Ramesam, J.:— The suit out of which this Appeal arises was filed by two plaintiffs. The second plaintiff is an insolvent and the first plaintiff is the Official Receiver of the Coimbatore district, in whom the properties of the insolvent were vested under section 16(2)(a) of the Provincial Insolvency Act (III of 1907). It was dismissed by our brother Phillips, J., on the ground that it was not maintainable without leave of the Court and no leave had been obtained. The plaintiffs appeal.

    The first point argued is that the judgment (dated 12th April 1920) of Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ., in Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 272 of 1919, on Appeal against the order of the District Judge of Coimbatore refusing to grant leave to the Official Receiver to file this suit is, or—what amounts to the same thing—should be construed as an order granting leave. In that judgment, their Lordships construe a previous order by Odgers, J., (dated 24th October 1919) not as an interlocutory order intended to operate till the disposal of the Appeal, but as a permanent order which would remain in force after the disposal of the Appeal. This construction of the order of Odgers, J., is binding on the parties and on us, even if we are inclined to take a different view of it. But this is not enough for the appellants. It was necessary that the order of the District Judge should have been modified by the High Court in Appeal. The learned vakil for the appellants contends that the order, of their Lordships should be construed as an order, adopting the order of Odgers, J. If it were possible I would adopt such a construction. But I confess that the language of their Lordships “it would be useless to dispose of the Appeal and it is dismissed” presents considerable difficulties in my way. If it were necessary for us to dispose of the case on this point, I would adjourn the Appeal to enable the appellants to apply for a review of the order of Oldfield and Seshagiri Ayyar, JJ. But I do not further deal with this point, as I am clear the Appeal must be allowed on the second ground, viz., that the leave of the Court is not necessary for the maintainability of the suit.

    Section 20(d) of the Act authorizes the Receiver to institute a suit with “leave of the Court.” The consequences of the want of leave are not stated. Similar provisions in other Acts have been construed as not being fatal to the maintainability of the suit, if leave is not obtained [vide Cochrane v. Owen on 11 Vict., C. 23, section 29, the Insolvency Act formerly in force in the Presidency towns; Lee v. Sangster on 12 and 13 Vict., C. 106, section 153 and In Re Branson Ex parte The Trustee on 46 and 47 Vict., C. 52. The reason given in these cases is that leave is a matter between the Court and the Official Receiver and the want of leave cannot be relied on by the defendants in a suit. The Official Receiver prosecutes the suit at his own risk in the matter of costs and cannot charge them on the insolvent's estate if he loses. It is said that these cases do not govern the matter before us as the vesting under Act III of 1907 is qualified, as section 16(2)(a) provides that the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Court or in a Receiver as hereinafter provided. It is contended that the effect of the words “as hereinafter provided” is to make the vesting subject to the provisions of section 20 which provide for leave of the Court and that if leave of Court is not obtained, there is no vesting; whereas in the other enactments, the vesting was “absolute.” But as my learned brother pointed out in the course of the arguments, the term “Receiver” does not occur in the prior sections of the Act—not even in section 2 containing definitions and occurs for the first time in section 16 without any explanation. ‘The provisions for the appointment of Receivers and Official Receivers are contained, in section 18 and section 19 and these words “as hereinafter provided” (following the word “Receiver”) are intended to draw the attention of the reader to these sections “and, in my opinion, have nothing to do with section 20. In the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act (III of 1909), section 2(c) defines Official Assignee, section 17 directs that the property of the insolvent shall vest in the Official Assignee and section 63 provides for suits by the Official Assignee with the leave of the Court. The absence of the words “as hereinafter provided” in section 17 is due to the fact that the Official “Assignee” has been defined in section 2(c) unlike “Receiver” in Act III of 1907. In my opinion the words “as hereinafter provided” qualify “Receiver” and not the verb “shall vest”; and there is no distinction in principle between the policy of all these enactments. The language of section 158 of 12 and 13 Vict., C. 106, is stronger as it used the words “with the leave of the Court, first obtained, upon application to such Court but not other wive.” I do not see any reason why the cases above cited should not apply to the Act of 1907. The Appeal is therefore allowed, the decree of Phillips, J., is reversed, and the case remanded to the Original Side for disposal according to law. The second appellant will have the costs of the Appeal. The costs of the first Court will abide the result.

    Solicitors for respondents: Short Bewes & Co.

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    Comments

    Official Receiver Of Coimbatore v. D.D. Kanga
    (Oct 19, 1921)