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Citation Codes
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Case Number
Advocates
  • Messrs. V. L. Ethiraj and M. C. Sridharan for the Appellant.
  • The Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Crown.
Judges
  • Wallace
  • Jackson, JJ.
Acts
  • sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
  • Messrs. V. L. Ethiraj and M. C. Sridharan for the Appellant.
  • The Public Prosecutor on behalf of the Crown.
Judges
  • Wallace
  • Jackson, JJ.
Acts
  • sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was tried before the learned Sessions Judge at Bellary. He was charged with the murder of his wife and also charged under Sections 201 and 203 of the Indian Penal Code for giving false evidence and giving false information about the murder, respectively. In the trial court the charge of murder was not pressed and the appellant was acquitted of being the actual murderer. The Sessions Judge, however, convicted him under Sections 201 and 203 on the finding that the appellant had given a false account to the village munsif and had intended to screen the real offender.

The underlying factual incidents (as recorded in the opinion) are:

  • On 12 August 1929, the deceased took food to her husband about 10 A.M.; P.W.4 saw her there and later saw the accused and his brother carrying her unconscious towards her house.
  • P.W.5 observed people in her house applying restoratives; the accused and his brother said she had been stung by a scorpion or bitten by a snake. The deceased died at 4 P.M.
  • The accused reported to the village munsif that he suspected a sting. The deceased's father (P.W.8) reported suspicions to the police; the body was sent for post-mortem.
  • The Medical Officer (P.W.1) found four contusions, three on the skull, and cerebral haemorrhage resulting from blows by sticks or stones; no signs of bite or sting were found.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the factual contention that the injuries were hidden under the deceased's hair could mean the accused did not genuinely know she had been assaulted.
  2. Whether an accused who may himself be the main offender can be convicted under Sections 201 and 203, Indian Penal Code, or whether those sections have no application to the person who actually committed the main offence (i.e., whether, unless the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not himself the murderer, he cannot be convicted under Sections 201 and 203).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as recorded)

  • Point of fact: Because the injuries were hidden under the deceased's hair, the appellant genuinely did not know that she had been assaulted.
  • Point of law: Unless the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was not himself the murderer, he cannot be convicted under Sections 201 and 203. This rests on the proposition affirmed in several High Court rulings that Sections 201–203 have no application to the person who committed the main offence.

The opinion does not contain a detailed, separate statement of the prosecution's submissions beyond the trial court's findings and the legal precedents relied upon in argument.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar Earliest pronouncement of the proposition that Sections 201–203 do not apply to the person who committed the main offence. The Court finds this pronouncement to rest on a petitio principii and critiques the reasoning; it treats the proposition as not inherently correct on the face of the statutory provisions.
Empress of India v. Kishna Cited as one of several rulings affirming the proposition that 201–203 do not apply to the main offender. Referenced as part of the line of cases following the proposition in Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar; the Court notes these rulings but subjects the foundational proposition to scrutiny.
Queen-Empress v. Dungar Cited similarly as affirming the restrictive proposition regarding Sections 201–203. Listed among cases that have followed the Kashinath Dinkar proposition; used to illustrate that the view has been commonly adopted.
Torap Ali v. Queen-Empress Cited as another example of rulings supporting the proposition that the main offender cannot be convicted under Sections 201–203. Used by the Court as a practical example of how the restrictive theory can defeat justice; the opinion refers to it as illustrative of the problem.
Emperor v. Ghonasham Cited among cases following the rule that Sections 201–203 do not apply to main offender. Included in the list of authorities; the Court notes the prevalence of such rulings.
Ramaswami Gounden v. Emperor Cited; the Court notes the High Court's pronouncement was in a parenthesis and obiter dictum. Characterised as not being a decisive ratio decidendi on the point and merely obiter in that report.
Buch v. King-Emperor Held that an accused acquitted of a crime can be convicted under Section 201 in respect of the offence "with the commission of which he is no longer charged or liable to be charged." The Court treats this decision as supporting the proposition that an acquitted or merely suspected person is not to be regarded as an "offender" for purposes of Section 201 and that conviction under Section 201 is permissible even after acquittal of the principal offence.
Teprinessa v. Emperor Reported ruling practically to the same effect as Buch v. King-Emperor. Relied upon as corroborative authority that an acquitted suspect can be convicted under Section 201.
Hanumanappa Rudrappa v. Emperor Ruling by a Bench of the Bombay High Court to the same practical effect. Used to reinforce the view that conviction under Section 201 is not precluded merely because the accused has been suspected or acquitted of the main offence.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two parallel strands: (A) factual assessment of the defence point and (B) legal analysis of the proposition that Sections 201–203 do not apply to the main offender.

A. Factual analysis

The appellant's factual contention — that because the injuries were hidden under the deceased's hair he could not have known she had been assaulted — was rejected. The Court reasoned that, given the evidence that the woman had been assaulted, the appellant's story that she cried out that she had been stung could not be true; instead she must have cried out that she was being beaten and the appellant must have known that.

B. Legal analysis

  1. The appellant relied on a line of authority (beginning with Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar) that asserted Sections 201–203 of the IPC do not apply to the main offender. The Court reviewed that proposition and found that the ratio decidendi of Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar had not been examined and seemed to rest on a petitio principii.
  2. The Court examined the statutory framework: on their face Sections 201 and 203 require that an offence has been committed and that the accused gave false information about it (with the added intention to screen the offender in the case of Section 201). The Court noted Sections 44 and 45(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (regarding duty to give information) do not in terms exclude the offender himself, and that the qualification of a legal duty to give information is relevant mainly to Section 202 but does not appear as a requirement in Sections 201 or 203.
  3. From the textual and structural view, the Court could not see an inherent bar denying application of Sections 201–203 to the main offender. It acknowledged, however, the practical point that courts in practice will not generally convict a person both of a main offence (e.g., murder) and of concealing or falsifying evidence of that same offence.
  4. The Court articulated the practical difficulty if the restrictive proposition were accepted absolutely: it would permit the main offender to escape conviction under Sections 201–203 merely because he was the offender of the main crime, thereby allowing a more successful concealer of the crime to avoid additional liability while mere witnesses remain punishable.
  5. The Court distilled the true principle, as it saw it: there is no legal bar to convicting the main offender under Sections 201–203; but in practice a court will not generally convict an accused of both the main offence and the concealment offences. Crucially, if the main offence is not established against the accused, he may properly be convicted under Sections 201 and 203.
  6. On the question of sentencing under Section 201, the Court emphasised that the relevant inquiry is what offence the accused knew or had reason to believe had been committed (i.e., one must treat the accused, for this purpose, as a stranger to the crime). On the evidence the Court found only that the accused knew someone had struck his wife and that she died; it could not be concluded that the accused knew the person who struck her had the intention to kill.
  7. The Court concluded that the offence which the accused knew had been committed was at least grievous hurt (punishable under Section 325 with imprisonment up to seven years). Under Section 201 the maximum sentence is one-fourth of the sentence for the offence the accused intended to screen; thus the maximum for Section 201 in this case would be one-fourth of seven years = one year and three months (1.75 years). The Sessions Judge's sentence of five years was therefore excessive.
  8. Applying these legal and sentencing principles, the Court reduced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for one year.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The Court held that the conviction under Sections 201 and 203, Indian Penal Code, was not illegal and that there was no misjoinder in charging the accused alternatively with the main offence and with offences under Sections 201 and 203. The Court further held that, on the evidence, the accused could be convicted under these sections because the commission of the main offence (murder) was not established against him.

The Court therefore upheld the conviction under Sections 201 and 203 but altered the punishment. The core ruling on sentence is emphasized as follows:

Sentence reduced: the appellant's sentence was reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year.

Implications:

  • The opinion clarifies that there is no absolute legal bar to convicting the main offender under Sections 201–203, though in practice courts will seldom convict an accused both of the principal offence and of the offences of concealing or giving false information about that offence.
  • The direct effect on the parties is that the appellant's conviction under Sections 201 and 203 stands, but his sentence has been reduced to one year rigorous imprisonment. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new binding precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Court; it does, however, critically examine earlier authorities and articulate the Court's view of the correct principle.
N. R. R. Sentence reduced.
Show full summary ...

    Chinna Gangappa, In Re.

    The appellant has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Bellary under Sect. 201, Indian Penal Code, for giving false evidence about the murder of his wife in order to screen the real offender, and also under Sect. 203 for giving false information about the murder. He was also himself charged with the actual murder of his wife, but was acquitted on that. The facts of the case briefly were:—

    On the 12th August, 1929, at about 10. A.M the deceased woman took food to her husband. P.W 4 saw her there. He next saw her being carried in an unconscious state by the accused sod his brother towards her house. P.W 5 saw people in her house applying restoratives to her, while the accused and his brother were giving out that the woman had been stung by a scorpion or bitten by a snake. She died at 4 P.M The accused himself made the report to the village munsif (P.W ft), saying that he suspected that she had been stung. The woman's father (P.W 8) was suspicious and reported to the police who sent the body for post mortem. The Medical Officer, P.W 1, found on the body four contusions three of them on the skull, and on dissecting he found there had been cerebral haemorrhage. He was of opinion that that was the result of blows by sticks or stones on the head. He found no signs or symptoms of poisonous bite or sting.

    The charge of murder was not pressed against the accused in the trial court, and the learned Sessions Judge held that the evidence did not prove that it was the accused who inflicted the injuries on his wife He held, however, that he must have known who inflicted them on his wife and that his story to the village munsif was a false one, intended to screen the real offender. He therefore, convicted him under Sects. 201 and 203, Indian Penal Code.

    The learned Counsel for the defence raises a point of fact and a point of law. The point of fact is that as the injuries on the woman were hidden under her hair the accused did not genuinely know that she had been assaulted. But we do not think that there is any substance in this. For, the woman having been assaulted, the accused's story that she cried out she had been stung cannot be true. She must have cried out that she was being beaten and accused must have known that.

    The point of law is that unless the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that accused was not himself the murderer he cannot be convicted under Sects. 201 and 203. This rests upon a proposition, affirmed in several rulings of various High Courts, that Sects. 201 to 203, Indian Penal Code, have no application to the person who actually committed the main offence mentioned in the sections, and that the person who committed the main offence cannot be himself found guilty of causing evidence of that offence to disappear or of giving false information about it. The earliest pronouncement on this point was in 1871 in a case Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar , and this ruling has been followed, mostly without discussion or comment as if the proposition were self-evident, in various other cases: c.f Empress of India v. Kishna , Queen-Empress v. Dungar (3), Torap Ali v. Queen-Empress (4), Emperor v. Ghonasham (5). The only pronouncement of this High Court on this subject which has been traced, is in a parenthesis and obiter dictum at page. 277 of Ramaswami Gounden v. Emperor (6). Nowhere is the ratio decidendi of Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar , examined. It seems to us to rest on a petitio principii. The reason given is that “as there is no law now which obliges a criminal to give information which would convict himself, it is evident that Sects. 202 and 203 could not apply to a person who committed that offence, that is, the offence which he knew had been committed.” Obviously if there is no law to that effect then Sects. 202 and 203 will not apply. The question rather is whether Sects. 201 to 203 do not embody such a law. On the face of them there is nothing to show that they do not apply to the main offender himself. Sect. 44 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is the generic section relating to the duty of persons to give information about grave offences including murder, and Sect. 45 (d) of that Code which lays on any owner or occupier of land the duty of giving information regarding the occurrence in his village of any sudden or unnatural death, do not in terms exclude the offender himself. These sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be relevant in a case under Sect. 202, Indian Penal Code, where it is necessary that the accused should be legally bound to give information regarding the offence; but even this qualification does not appear under Sect. 201 or 203. What is required there is merely that there should have been an offence and that the accused has given false information about it, with the added intention in the case of Sect. 201, Indian Penal Code, of screening the offender. We cannot therefore see wherefrom comes the proposition which is the foundation of Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar that there is no law which obliges a criminal to give information which would convict himself. There is such a law in the case of grave offences and sudden deaths, and in theory the offender himself could be convicted for breach of that law under Sects. 201 to 203, Indian Penal Code. In practice, no doubt, if he has been convicted of the offence itself, no court will think it worth while to convict him also under Sects. 201 to 203, Indian Penal Code. If the proposition laid down in Reg v. Kashinath Dinkar is carried to its logical conclusion it would appear that it is improper to try an accused person, as the present accused has been tried, in the same trial under both Sects. 302 and 201, Indian Penal Code because a perfect defence to Sects. 201 would be a plea and proof that he himself was the murderer, and an accused would be entitled to say that the plea he proposes to make to the charge under Sect. 201 will depend on whether he is acquitted or convicted of the principal offence; and that to call upon him to plead to the charge under Sect. 201 before and until he knows what the verdict on the murder charge is, would be to deprive him of his legitimate defence. It would also in a case where the Court regards proof of his complicity in the actual offence is insufficient to establish his guilt, compel the Court to let him go free, even though it is satisfied that he gained his acquittal on the main offence by his own concealment of the traces of the crime. This was exactly what happened in Reg v. Kashinath Dinkar and it is hardly compatible with justice that the actual offender should escape conviction under Sects. 201 to 203 because he is the actual offender in the main crime while those who merely witnessed it but gave false information about it are punishable under Sects. 201 and 203. This means that the more successful a criminal is in concealing his own offence the more the law will assist him in escaping justice altogether, and unless the Court holds without reasonable doubt that the accused did not take part in the murder the Court is bound to give him the benefit of doubt and acquit him of offences under Sects. 201 to 203. The case reported in Torap Ali v. Queen-Empress is another practical example of how justice is defeated by such a theory of the law.

    The true principle seems to be that there is no law preventing the main offender being convicted under Sects. 201 to 203, but in practice no Court will convict an accused both of the main offence and under these sections. But if the commission of the main offence is not brought home to him, then he can be convicted under Sects. 201 to 203. Therefore there is no misjoinder in charging an accused in the alternative with the main offence and under Sects. 201 and 203, Indian Penal Code, nor is there anything irregular or improper in a Judge holding, as the learned Sessions Judge has done in this case, that, while the accused is himself not free from the suspicion of being the actual murderer, he can be none the less convicted under Sect. 201 or 203. This position is not without authority, though as noted, above most of the reported cases have followed Reg. v. Kashinath Dinkar . Most of these rulings have been considered in a judgment of the Punjab Chief Court in 1903 in Buch v. King-Emperor , wherein it was held that an accused acquitted of the charge of committing a crime can be convicted under Sect. 201 in respect of the offence “with the commission of which he is no longer charged or liable to be charged” and the mere suspicion that an individual is the actual murderer or the facts that he has even had his trial and been acquitted of the offence of murder will not prevent his conviction under Sect. 201. A mere suspect or an acquitted accused is not in the eye of the law an offender within the meaning of Sect. 201. The reported ruling in Teprinessa v. Emperor is practically to the same effect, and also the ruling of a Bench of the Bombay High Court in Hanumanappa Rudrappa v. Emperor . Therefore there is no illegality in the conviction under Sects. 201 and 203.

    This does not however conclude the case. It is clear that for the purpose of calculating the punishment to be awarded under Sect. 201, it is necessary for the Court to decide, not so much what offence—the evidence of which has been concealed—has been committed as what offence the accused knew or had reason to believe had been committed. So it was necessary to believe, on the assumption that the accused did not commit the main offence because he has not been convicted of that, what offence he believed or knew to have been committed. The Court must treat him as a stranger to the crime, as one who had merely witnessed it.

    From that point of view we cannot on the evidence say that more is proved than that the accused knew that some one had hit his wife and that she had died in consequence. We are unable to conclude that he knew that the person who struck her had the criminal intention of killing her. It must have been clear however to the accused that his wife had died as a result of the blows given and that she at least suffered grievous hurt, and that is punishable under Sect. 325, Indian Penal Code, with imprisonment for seven years. Under Sect. 201 the accused is then liable to be sentenced to a maximum of one-fourth of that 7 years. The learned Sessions Judge has sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment for five years. At the most he can be sentenced to one year and three-fourths. We think that it will be sufficient if he undergoes rigorous imprisonment for one year and we reduce the sentence accordingly.

    N. R. R.Sentence reduced.

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    Comments

    Chinna Gangappa, In Re.
    (Apr 8, 1930)