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Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This is an appeal against an order passed by the District Judge of East Tanjore under Section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act declaring that the properties forming the subject matter of this appeal would vest in the Official Receiver for the benefit of the creditors.

The dispute concerns about 68 acres and odd of property which belonged to one Chinnaswami Naidu, who died leaving a will (Ex. A). By that will the testator called upon his son (Gopalakrishnan) to construct a choultry, install and worship the family deity there, meet the charity and worship expenses from the income of the properties, and permit the family to utilise the balance of the income for family purposes. The son later became insolvent.

The appellants (children of the insolvent) contend that the properties are trust properties (i.e., absolutely dedicated to the deity/trust); the Official Receiver and the creditors contend that the properties belonged to the insolvent but were subject to a charge to carry out the limited trust described in the will. The principal procedural question is whether the properties are trust properties excluded from the insolvent estate or are part of the estate and therefore vest in the Official Receiver for the benefit of creditors.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, upon proper construction of the will (Ex. A), the properties were absolutely dedicated to a trust (and thus excluded from the insolvent estate) or were properties of the insolvent burdened only with a trust to carry out the charity and worship described in the will.
  2. Whether, if the properties are only burdened with a trust and not absolutely dedicated, they would vest in the Official Receiver and be available for the benefit of creditors (and relatedly whether any precedent, notably Bishen Chand Basawat v. Nadir Hossein, prevents sale or attachment).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The terms of the will demonstrate an intent to create an absolute dedication to a trust: the son is enjoined to build a choultry, install the Kula Deivam for family worship, and conduct a charity to be maintained from the income of the properties.
  • The pattas for the schedule properties are directed to be transferred in the name of the deity worshipped in the choultry, which indicates an absolute gift to the deity/trust.
  • The last sentence of the will—making a special provision that the son shall inherit all other properties—shows the testator intended to provide for the son by other means and thereby dedicate the schedule properties to the deity.
  • The appellants relied on earlier decisions (including Bishen Chand Basawat v. Nadir Hossein) to argue that the properties are free from liability to attachment and sale by the Official Receiver.

Respondents' (Official Receiver / Creditors') Arguments

  • The properties were given to the son with a charge to carry out the trust; the dominant intention of the testator was to provide for the family, with the charity being of subsidiary importance.
  • Although the pattas were to be transferred in the name of the deity, the enjoyment of the surplus income by the family cuts down any effect of an absolute dedication.
  • The reliance on Bishen Chand Basawat was rejected by the court as distinguishable because that case involved properties treated as absolutely dedicated trust properties, unlike the present will.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mujibunnissa v. Abdur Rahim (1900) LR 28 IA 15; ILR 23 A 233 The general test: determine whether the effect of the deed/will is to give the property in substance to charitable uses or to the testator's family. The court applied this test as the governing principle for construing Ex. A to decide whether the properties were dedicated to charity or intended for the family.
Sonatun Bysack v. Sreemutty Juggutsoondree Dossee (1859) 8 MIA 66 Even if a will purports an absolute gift in favour of an idol, the surrounding terms may show the testator contemplated distribution of profits to the family; the substance, not form, determines dedication. Used to support the view that apparent absolute gifts may be cut down by terms providing for family enjoyment of surplus income.
Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee (1879) LR 6 IA 182; ILR 5 C 438 A gift for worship with a direction that the surplus should be utilised by the family results in the property being burdened with a trust, not absolutely dedicated, even if heirs have no power of alienation. The court relied on this reasoning to hold that similar surplus provisions point away from an absolute dedication and towards a burdened estate.
Har Narayan v. Surja Kunzmri (1921) LR 48 IA 143; ILR 43 A 291 A will stating that property shall be considered the property of an idol but allowing surplus to be used by heirs indicates no absolute gift to the idol. The court cited it to support the proposition that provisions for heirs' use of surplus negate an absolute dedication.
Jadu Nath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ramji (1917) LR 44 IA 187; ILR 39 A 553 Where the dominating purpose and intention shown in the document is to create a trust, a trust will be recognised even if the deed contains provisions for the grantor's heirs. Referenced (with Ramanandan Chettiar) as cases relied on by the appellant; the court considered the principles but distinguished the present will on its facts.
Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) LR 44 IA 21; ILR 40 M 116; 32 MLJ 101 Similar to Jadu Nath Singh: documents whose dominating purpose is to create a trust may be held to create absolute trusts despite ancillary provisions for heirs. Noted as cases the appellants relied upon; the court assessed these authorities but found the facts of the present will showed a contrary dominating purpose (family provision).
Bishen Chand Basawat v. Nadir Hossein (1887) LR 15 IA 1; ILR 15 C 329 Authority in which properties were treated as absolute trust properties and thus not liable to attachment (as read in that case). The court distinguished this case, holding that the present will did not make properties absolute trust properties and therefore Bishen Chand Basawat did not prevent vesting in the Official Receiver.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded from a textual construction of the will (Ex. A) and application of the established test: determine whether the effect of the will is to give the properties in substance to charitable uses or to the testator's family.

Key steps in the court's reasoning, as set out in the opinion, were:

  1. Examination of the terms of the will showing (a) directions to build a choultry and install the family deity, (b) a direction that the pattas for Schedule A properties be transferred in the name of the deity, and (c) a provision that the son and his heirs shall enjoy the properties "without alienating the properties in any manner" while paying sircar cist and conducting the charity, and that the balance of the income be utilised for family purposes.
  2. Detailed consideration of Schedule C (the charity): the court described the charity's requirements (a resident brahmin to be given 39 kalams of paddy annually, feeding brahmins on specified days, maintenance of a watershed/water provision, yearly tiling and repairs, and replacement of the brahmin if negligent). The court concluded these obligations would not consume a considerable portion of the income.
  3. Application of authorities: the court applied the cited Privy Council decisions and similar cases to emphasise that the effect/substance of the instrument controls—if surplus enjoyment by the family is contemplated, an absolute dedication is unlikely.
  4. Assessment of the overall scheme of the will: although pattas were directed to be transferred in the deity's name, the explicit provision permitting the son and his heirs to enjoy the surplus income, and to distribute it among heirs, showed the maintenance of the charity was subsidiary and the dominant intention was to provide for the family.
  5. The court found that the appellant's contention that the last sentence (that "Gopalakrishnan shall inherit all my other properties") showed an intention to dedicate the schedule properties absolutely was not satisfactorily demonstrated: it was not shown what properties had been given to Gopalakrishnan by that provision.
  6. On the point of whether the properties are immune from attachment under Bishen Chand Basawat, the court read that precedent as relating to truly absolute trust properties; because the present will did not create absolute trust properties, that precedent did not preclude vesting in the Official Receiver.

From these steps the court concluded that the dominating purpose of the will was to provide for the testator's family, and that the charity and worship obligations were of subsidiary importance; therefore the properties were not absolutely dedicated to a trust but were properties burdened with a trust.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The appeal is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • The court held that the properties covered by the will are not absolutely dedicated to a trust but are properties of the insolvent burdened with a trust to carry out the limited charity and worship obligations specified in the will.
  • As a direct consequence of that characterization, the properties may vest in the Official Receiver for the benefit of the creditors; appellants cannot exclude these properties from vesting in the Official Receiver on the basis asserted.
  • The court distinguished authority relied upon by the appellants (notably Bishen Chand Basawat) as involving absolute trust properties; because the present will does not create such absolute dedication, that authority does not prevent vesting in the Official Receiver.
  • No broader new precedent or departure from the cited principles was announced; the decision turned on construction of the will and application of established tests and authorities to the facts of this case.

    Ramappa Naidu And Another (Petitioners 2 And 3). v. Lakshmanan Chettiar And Others S (S).

    1. This is an appeal against an order passed by the District Judge of East Tanjore under Section 4 of the Provincial Insolvency Act declaring that the properties forming the subject matter of this appeal would vest in the Official Receiver for the benefit of the creditors.

    2. The dispute relates to about 68 acres and odd of property which belonged to one Chinnaswami Naidu. He died leaving a will in favour of his son in which, generally speaking--' we will refer to the contents of the will in detail later--he called upon his son to maintain a choultry and-carry on in it the worship of their family deity, meeting the expenses from the income of the property, with liberty- to utilize the balance of the income for family purposes. His son became an insolvent. The children of the insolvent, the appellants before us, maintain that these properties are trust properties, while the Official Receiver and the creditors contend that the properties belonged to the insolvent with a charge for carrying out the trust mentioned in the will. If the properties are dedicated to a trust absolutely, it is clear that the Official Receiver cannot claim them; on the other hand, if the properties are only burdened with a trust, they would vest in the Official Receiver for the benefit of the creditors. The question for our decision is whether the properties covered by the will, Ex. A, are trust properties, or whether they are properties belonging to the insolvent with a charge for carrying out the trust mentioned in the will.

    3. The answer to this question depends upon the correct construction of the. will, Ex. A. It runs in the following terms : "On the site which is situate to the north of- my shop and house and for which I have performed the manai muhurtham ceremony, my son Gopalakrishnan, shall with the stones, tiles and timber in my possession, construct a choultry spending an amount to the extent of Rs. 400 from and out of the out-standings set out in Schedule A, and instal in the aforesaid choultry the picture of Sri Gopalakrishnan, now kept and worshipped by me in the house as Kula Deivam (family deity). The monyam, the karnam and the tahsildar will be pleased to transfer the pattas for the nanja, punja, etc., properties of the value of Rs. 8,300 set out in Schedule A in the name of the said deity Gopalakrishnaswami after my death, and my son Gopalakrishnan and his heirs from generation to generation according to the rule of primogeniture, shall, without alienating the properties in any manner enjoy them paying sircar cist therefor, and, conduct the charity mentioned in Schedule C and utilise the balance of the income for family purposes. if there be several heirs to my son, the seniors shall enjoy the aforesaid properties and after deducting the amount for charity and sircar cist, distribute the balance of the income amongst the heirs according to their shares, and shall never divide the properties. No one except the heirs shall be entitled to ask for an account of the said income. My daughter Janaki and her husband Rangaswami Naidu shall after my death enjoy with all rights the immoveable property of the value of Rs. 800 set out in Schedule B as stridhanam property. The balance of Rs. " 500 remaining after deducting Rs. 400 for the construction of the choultry out of Rs. 900, the amount of outstandings set out in Schedule A, shall be invested in the name of the said Gopalakrishnaswami and shall be augmented by my son and his heirs. If there be, by act of Providence, no income for the payment of sircar cist, the said sircar cist shall be paid from and out of the accretions of the aforesaid amount. In case my son or his heirs, owing to their negligence, fail to augment the income and pay the sircar cist, efforts shall be made for payment out of the amount so as to prevent the land being brought to sale by the sircar. My son Gopalakrishnan shall inherit all my other properties". The nature of the charity mentioned in Schedule C will be referred to later.

    4. The properties set out in the schedule consist of 61 acres. 85 cents of nunja lands, 2 acres 17 cents of punja lands, 3 acres, 40 cents of maniam lands, 6 houses, about 12 tamarind trees, 189 cocoanut trees and 177 palm trees. Mr. Venkatachariar argues that the following features of the will conclusively show that the properties referred to in it are trust properties:

    (1) The son is enjoined to build a choultry, to instal the Kula Deivam in it for the purpose of family worship, and to conduct a charity, meeting the expenses from the income of the properties, (2) the pattas for the schedule properties are directed to be transferred in the name of the deity worshipped in the choultry, and (3) the last sentence in the will makes a special provision that his son Gopalakrishnan shall inherit all his other properties. It will have been noticed that the will contains an important provision regarding the enjoyment of the surplus income; it states that the testator's son and his heirs

    "from generation to generation according to the rule of primogeniture shall without alienating the properties in any manner enjoy them, paying sircar cist therefor, and conduct the charity mentioned in Schedule C and utilise the balance of the income for family purposes"
    ; and provision is also made for the management and distribution of this balance of income among the heirs. This feature is pointed out by the respondent as showing that the real intention of the testator in making the gift was to make a provision for his family, though he called upon his son to conduct the charity and the worship out of the income of the properties. We have to construe all these clauses together and come to our conclusion as, to whether the properties covered by the will are properties dedicated to trust absolutely, or whether they are only properties belonging to the insolvent burdened with a trust of carrying out the charity mentioned in the will.

    5. Various cases have been brought to our notice with reference to the construction of the will. In all these cases, the decisions turned upon the construction of the terms of the document in each case. In Mujibunnissa v. Abdur Rahim (1900) LR 28 IA 15 : ILR 23 A 233; at p : 242 : 11 MLJ 58 (PC), Lord Robertson said.:

    Their Lordships have, however, considered the question whether, assuming it to have been registered, the deed is, according to its terms, a valid deed of waqf. It will be so if the effect of the deed is to give the property in substance to the charitable uses. It will not be so if the effect is to give the property in. substance to the testator's family.

    This passage lays down the general test to be applied to cases of this description. Is the effect of the deed to give the properties in substance to charitable uses, or, is its effect to give the properties in substance to the testator's family? In Sonatun Bysack v. Sreemutty Juggutsoondree Dossee (1859)8 MIA 66, a Hindu gave all his properties by a will to his family idol with a direction that the properties should not be divided by his sons but that the)' should enjoy the surplus profits from generation to generation. Lord Turner, J., was of the opinion that:

    although the will purports to begin with an absolute gift in favour of the idol, it is plain that the testator contemplated that there was to be some distribution of property according as events might turn out.

    In Ashutosh Dutt v. Doorga Churn Chatterjee (1879) LR 6 IA 182 : ILR 5 C 438 (PC), a case of a gift by a lady of certain property for the support of the daily worship of an idol with a direction that the surplus, if any, should be utilised by the family, the Privy Council held that the property was only burdened with a trust and not absolutely dedicated, although there was a direction in the will that the heirs should have no powers of alienation over the properties bequeathed. In Har Narayan v. Surja Kunzmri (1921) LR 48 IA 143 : ILR 43 A 291 (PC), the Privy Council had to construe a will which contained two directions : (1) that the moveable and immoveable property of the testator shall be considered to be the property of a certain idol and (2) that the surplus after defraying the expenses of the temple and the pay of the servants shall be used by the heirs to meet their own expenses. Their Lordships' view was that by this will the testator did not intend to give the property absolutely to the idol. In Jadu Nath Singh v. Thakur Sita Ramji (1917) LR 44 IA 187 : ILR 39 A 553 (PC) and Ramanandan Chettiar v. Vava Levvai Marakayar (1916) LR 44 IA 21 : ILR 40 M 116 : 32 MLJ 101 (PC), two cases strongly relied on by the appellant, the Privy Council held, having reference to the terms of the deeds, that the dominating purpose and intention shown in the documents was to create a trust though there were provisions in the deed for the benefit of the heirs of the grantors.

    6. Applying the principles of these decisions, we think that the learned Judge has construed the will in this case correctly. It is obvious from the nature of the charity that Its maintenance will not cost any considerable sum. The details of the charity to be carried on are thus stated in Schedule C to the will "For presenting food and performing worship every day for my family deity Sri Gopalakrishnan installed in the choultry mentioned in this will, a brahmin should be made to reside therein. He should be given 39 kalams of paddy every year and the said worship must be carried on. On the Dwadasi day of each of the two fortnights of the month not less than five brahmins should be given food. As there is a chatra maniam, a watershed must be maintained in the said choultry, from 10 days before the Chitraparva to the end of the hot season and water must be served to all persons who come there. If the brahmin appointed for doing these things fails to conduct himself properly, my son Gopalakrishnan and his heirs should dismiss the said brahmin and appoint a substitute. The choultry should be retiled and repairs should be carried out every year." These are the various items on which expenditure had to be met from the income of the property already mentioned. It is obvious that the charity even if it is conducted on a lavish scale cannot consume any considerable portion of the income. We are satisfied that after meeting these expenses a very large amount of the income will be left intact for enjoyment by the family. Though the pattas of the properties in Schedule A have been transferred in the name of the deity, in our opinion, the effect of it is cut down by the provision relating to the enjoyment of the surplus by the members of the family. It was argued that the obvious intention of the testator inferrable from the last sentence of the will that "Gopalakrishnan shall inherit all my other properties" was to dedicate the properties in question to the deity, the son having been provided for in another way. But it has not been shown satisfactorily what properties have been given to Gopalakrishnan. Having regard to all the circumstances, we take the view that the dominating purpose and intention of the testator in executing the will was to provide for the members of his family. The maintenance and conduct of the charity was only of subsidiary importance. We are therefore of opinion that the properties covered by the will are not properties absolutely dedicated to a trust but are only properties burdened with a trust.

    7. It is then argued that, even so, these properties cannot be sold by the Official Receiver as they are not properties of the insolvent, being free from liability to attachment in view of the decision in Bishen Chand Basawat v. Nadir Hossein (1887) LR 15 IA 1 : ILR 15 C 329 (PC). Reading that judgment carefully we are not prepared to accept this argument. We think the properties in that case were treated as absolute trust properties, which, as we have already pointed out, cannot be said about the properties we are dealing with in this case. We are therefore of opinion that the appellants cannot succeed in excluding these properties from vesting in the Official Receiver for the benefit of the creditors.

    8. This appeal will therefore be dismissed with costs.

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    Ramappa Naidu And Another (Petitioners 2 And 3). v. Lakshmanan Chettiar And Others S (S).
    (Aug 3, 1927)