Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Ayyangar 30 M. 54 : 1 M.L.T. 268 : 16 M.L.J. 479], and Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order XXXIX, Rule 2, Clause (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section ("section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
  • Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 150 and of Order IX, Rule 13
  • Clause (3), Rule 2 of Order XXXIX."
  • Section 37 of the Code of 1908,
  • Section 37 of the Code
  • Order XL VII, Rule 2
  • Order IX, Rule 18,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Ayyangar 30 M. 54 : 1 M.L.T. 268 : 16 M.L.J. 479], and Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Order XXXIX, Rule 2, Clause (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section ("section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure)
  • Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 150 and of Order IX, Rule 13
  • Clause (3), Rule 2 of Order XXXIX."
  • Section 37 of the Code of 1908,
  • Section 37 of the Code
  • Order XL VII, Rule 2
  • Order IX, Rule 18,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The proceedings arose from Original Suit No. 1230 of 1919 filed in the District Munsif's Court at Penukonda. The petitioner in the present revision (who had been the plaintiff in the original suit) obtained a decree against the respondent and others; the decree against the respondent was an ex parte decree. Subsequently, territorial jurisdiction was readjusted: the properties comprised in the decree were transferred to the jurisdiction of the District Munsif's Court of Anantapur. The respondent applied to the Anantapur Court to have the ex parte decree set aside; that Court granted the application. The present civil revision petition challenges that order, contending that only the Penukonda Court (the Court which passed the decree) had jurisdiction under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside the ex parte decree, whereas the respondent relied upon Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure to justify the Anantapur Court's exercise of jurisdiction after transfer of business.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in light of Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which gives to a Court to which the business of any other Court is transferred the same powers as the Court from which the business was transferred, "save as otherwise provided"), the District Munsif of Anantapur had jurisdiction to set aside an ex parte decree originally passed by the Penukonda Court.
  2. Whether Section 150 applies where only a part of a Court's business (a defined local area or the litigations arising out of a tract of country) is transferred, or whether it applies only where an entire Court's business is transferred (i.e., abolition and substitution of a Court).
  3. Whether the words "save as otherwise provided" in Section 150 preclude the application of that section because Order IX, Rule 13 (which authorises applications to set aside ex parte decrees to be made to "the Court by which the decree was passed") purportedly confines such applications to the Court that passed the decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Penukonda Court, being the Court which passed the decree, was the only forum competent under Order IX, Rule 13 to entertain an application to set aside the ex parte decree; the Anantapur Court had no jurisdiction to do so.
  • Section 150 should be given a restricted construction and applies only where the whole business of a Court (i.e., the entire jurisdiction) is transferred — not where there is a partial or territorial adjustment transferring only part of the business to another Court.
  • The phrase "save as otherwise provided" in Section 150 prevents its applicability here because Order IX, Rule 13 requires that an application to set aside an ex parte decree be made to the Court that passed the decree.
  • By analogy with certain rulings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2, Clause (3), where a rule mentions a forum having authority to act, the petitioner argued that jurisdiction of other forums is excluded.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The Anantapur Court obtained jurisdiction over the suit properties and the whole business relating to them by the territorial re-adjustment, and Section 150 therefore permits the Anantapur Court to exercise the same powers as the Penukonda Court, including power under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside an ex parte decree.
  • Order IX, Rule 13 is an enabling provision describing the ordinary course for applications to set aside ex parte decrees; it does not contain restrictive language excluding the operation of Section 150.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bellary Press Co., Ltd. [Mathura Das] v. Venkata Rao Decisions relating to powers of Courts other than the Court which granted an injunction to deal with breaches. Noted as an analogous decision; the Court observed it did not decide the effect of Section 150 and was of limited value on the precise point before the Court.
Jaharuddin v. Hari Charan Poddar Authorities concerning powers of Courts other than the Court which granted an injunction. Cited as analogous; the Court treated it as not directly deciding the Section 150 issue at hand.
Ottapurakkal Thazath Kuppi v. Alab Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya Relates to powers to enforce injunctions and whether courts other than the injunction-granting court may act. Referred to for the view (by Srinivasa Iyengar, J.) that where the business of one Court is transferred, the transferee Court may, under Section 150, entertain certain original applications (e.g., for attachment or arrest under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3)). The Court relied on the opinion in this Full Bench decision to support a liberal construction of Section 150.
Panduranga Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Reddi Decisions touching on powers of Courts to execute decrees of other Courts. Listed among analogous authorities concerning inter-court powers; treated as not a direct authority on the exact point but illustrative of related principles.
Ubbiah Naicker v. Ramanathan Chettiar Authorities concerning execution powers of Courts over decrees of other Courts. Referred to as similar or analogous authority; not relied upon as a direct ruling of the precise issue.
Seeni Nadan v. Muthuswamy Pillai (Full Bench) Interpretation relevant to the definition of "Court which passed a decree" for execution (Section 37 of the 1908 Code); contains observations on Section 150 covering transfer of litigations arising out of a tract of country. Regarded as settling the law in execution matters and containing an observation (Ayling, J.) that Section 150 covers transfer of litigations arising out of a tract of country; the Court relied on this observation to support application of Section 150 to partial transfers.
Sarangapani v. Narayanasami Reference to review of orders and decrees of another Judge. Mentioned as an authority touching review powers of one Judge over another's order; listed among analogous cases.
Paramananda Das v. Mahabeer Dossji Holds that only the Court that passed a decree can sanction agreements to give time to a judgment debtor under section 557a of the 1882 Code. Cited as an authority showing an instance where only the original Court could act; characterized as an analogous case and not a direct authority on the point before the Court.
Karuppan v. Ayyathorai Authority referred to when discussing limits of remedy if transferred court could not act (context of appeals under Section 96). Referred to in describing the consequence if transferred courts were held without power (i.e., leaving defendant only a general right of appeal or remedy under Section 96).
Sadhu Krishna Ayyar v. Kuppan Ayyangar Authority referred to in same context as Karuppan — remedies by appeal if transferred court had no power. Referred to for the consequence that without Section 150 applying a defendant might be left only with a general right of appeal; cited as context for interpreting Section 150 liberally.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the core textual provisions: Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which confers on a transferee Court "the same powers as the Court from which the business is so transferred," qualified by "save as otherwise provided") and Order IX, Rule 13 (which states that applications to set aside ex parte decrees may be made to "the Court by which the decree was passed," and directs that once set aside the Court shall appoint a day to proceed with the suit).

The court approached the problem as one of statutory construction and of reconciling a general transfer-of-business provision (Section 150) with the specific wording of Order IX, Rule 13. It observed that:

  • Decisions cited by parties on analogous points (relating to injunctions, execution, attachment and review) do not provide direct authority deciding whether a transferee Court can itself entertain an application under Order IX, Rule 13 to set aside an ex parte decree; many of the cited authorities were analogous only.
  • Section 150 should not be given a narrowly restricted construction. The petitioner's contention that Section 150 applies only when the entire business of a Court is transferred (i.e., abolition and substitution) was rejected: the text of Section 150 contains no compulsion to that narrow interpretation, and the Full Bench observation in Seeni Nadan (Ayling, J.) supports applying Section 150 to transfers of defined local areas or tracts of country.
  • The phrase "save as otherwise provided" in Section 150 does not, in the Court's view, displace Section 150 here because Order IX, Rule 13 is an enabling rule prescribing the ordinary course for the setting aside of ex parte decrees and does not contain explicitly restrictive language excluding the transferee Court from acting. The rule states what is to be done in the ordinary course but does not declare that the Court which passed the decree is the only Court that can set it aside.
  • Analogies drawn from certain Order XXXIX rulings were considered and the Court relied on the Full Bench observation in Ottapurakkal (Srinivasa Iyengar, J.) that where business is transferred one may entertain original applications (e.g., for attachment or arrest under Order XXXIX, Rule 2(3))—supporting a construction that transferee Courts with the same powers may act.
  • Practicality and the remedial consequences were weighed: to hold transferee Courts without power in such situations could leave a defendant against whom an ex parte decree was passed by an abolished Court without any adequate remedy beyond a general right of appeal — an outcome the Court found undesirable and inconsistent with the object of Section 150.

On these bases the majority reasoning (as expressed in the opinion) was to adopt a liberal construction of Section 150 together with Order IX, Rule 13 and to hold that, where the whole business of one Court within the local area in which the suit properties are situated has been transferred to another Court, the transferee Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application to set aside an ex parte decree originally passed by the transferor Court.

On the merits of the particular application to set aside the ex parte decree, the Court examined the record evidence concerning service. The notice of suit purportedly had been effected by affixture at the outer door of the respondent's residence; the sister's information was that the respondent had gone to a village in Mysore. The respondent's affidavit stated he did not know of the ex parte decree until he attended the Taluk office on 27th March 1920. That statement stood uncontradicted in detail. The trial on affidavit included no application to take oral evidence or cross-examination; the plaintiff filed no affidavit and left it to his Vakil to file an argumentative statement denying the defendant's affidavit. On that factual record the Court concluded there was good reason to set aside the ex parte decree.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that, applying a liberal construction to Section 150 and Order IX, Rule 13, the District Munsif of Anantapur had jurisdiction to entertain and grant the respondent's petition to set aside the ex parte decree. The civil revision petition challenging the Anantapur Court's order was dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Anantapur Court's order setting aside the ex parte decree was sustained; the civil revision by the petitioner was dismissed with costs. The ex parte decree was thus set aside on the record facts (defective service by affixture, uncontradicted affidavit of non-notice, timely application by respondent).
  • On statutory interpretation: The opinion adopts and records a liberal construction of Section 150 so as to allow transferee Courts (including where defined local areas are transferred) to exercise the same powers as the Court from which the business was transferred, unless an express and restrictive provision displaces that general rule. The Court rejected a restrictive reading that Section 150 applies only to entire transfers of Court business.
  • Precedential note in the opinion: The Court described the case as one of first impression on the precise point and therefore placed emphasis on statutory construction and on analogous Full Bench authority (Seeni Nadan, Ottapurakkal) rather than on a direct prior ruling on the exact issue.

This summary is confined strictly to matters expressly stated in the provided opinion and does not add any information beyond the opinion's text.

    J.V. Ranganatha Rao v. Hanumantha Rao

    1. Section 150, which appeared for the first time in the Civil Procedure Code of 1908, provides for a Court to which the business of any other Court is transferred having the same powers as the Court from which the business is so transferred. But this useful provision is qualified by the words "save as otherwise provided," and the question in the case before us is whether the wording of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is such as to take away the power of a Court that has territorial jurisdiction over the subject-matter of a suit to set aside an ex parte decree passed by another Court that originally tried the suit.

    2. That rule declares that applications to set aside ex parte decrees may be made to the Court by which the decree was passed. It goes on to state that on making an order setting aside the ex parte decree the Court shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.

    3. Our attention has been drawn to reported decisions which relate to the powers of Courts other than the Court which granted an injunction to deal with a breach thereof: Bellary Press Co., Ltd. [Mathura Das] v. Venkata Rao 8 Ind. Cas. 7 : 21 M.L.J. 829. 8 M.L.T. 374 : (1910) M.W.N. 631, Jaharuddin v. Hari Charan Poddar 22 Ind. Cas. 439 : 18 C.W.N. 470 and Ottapurakkal Thazath Kuppi v. Alab Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya 34 Ind. Cas. 58 : 39 M. 907 : 3 L.W. 430 : 30 M.L.J. 523 : 19 M.L.T. 314 : (1916) 1 M.W.N. 328, also to decisions touching similar powers of Courts to execute the decrees of other Courts: Panduranga Mudaliar v. Vythilinga Reddi 30 M. 537 : 17 M.L.J. 417 : 2 M.L.T. 466, ubbiah Naicker v. Ramanathan Chettiar 22 Ind. Cas. 899 : 37 M. 462 : 26 M.L.J. 189 : (1914) M.W.N. 235 : 1 L.W. 251, Seeni Nadan v. Muthuswamy Pillai 53 Ind. Cas. 213 : 42 M. 821 : 37 M.L.J. 284 : 26 M.L.T. 223 : (1919) M.W.N. 640 : 11 L.W. 63 and to review the order and decrees of other Judge: Sarangapani v. Narayanasami 8 M. 567 : 3 Ind. Dec. (N. s.) 389. There is also an authority Paramananda Das v. Mahabeer Dossji 20 M. 378 : 7 M.L.J. 89 : 7 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 269 for holding that only the Court that passed a decree can sanction agreements to give time to a judgment debtor under section 557a of the code of 1882. The above are merely analogous cases, and no direct authority on the point before us has been cited.

    4. In matters of execution, the law must now be regarded as settled by, the definition of the expression "Court which passed a decree" in Section 37 of the Code of 1908, and by the Full Bench judgment in Seeni Nadan v. Muthuswamy Pillai 53 Ind. Cas. 213 : 42 M. 821 : 37 M.L.J. 284 : 26 M.L.T. 223 : (1919) M.W.N. 640 : 11 L.W. 63. Applications to get a review of judgment have been peculiarly restricted by Order XLVII, Rule 2 permitting them to be made only to the Judge who personally passed the decree or made the order when they are based upon other grounds than the discovery of new and important matter or the existence of a clerical or arithmetical error, The use of the words "the Court" granting injunction" was not considered by Srinivasa Iyengar, J., in Ottapurakkal Thazath Kuppi v. Alabi Mashur Koyanna Koyi Kunhi Koya 34 Ind. Cas. 58 : 39 M. 907 : 3 L.W. 430 : 30 M.L.J. 523 : 19 M.L.T. 314 : (1916) 1 M.W.N. 328 or by Krishnaswamy Iyer and Munro, JJ., in Bellary Press Co., Ltd. [ Mathura Das] v. Venkata Rao 8 Ind. Cas. 7 : 21 M.L.J. 829. 8 M.L.T. 374 : (1910) M.W.N. 631 to be an obstacle to a Court, to which the general business of another Court is transferred, dealing with applications to enforce injunctions through the powers given them under Sections 150 and 36, the objection in the last named decision being only to the transfer of an application from the Court which had express power to deal with it.

    5. The case thus being one of first impression we must put a reasonable construction on the words of the Code. It is one thing to say that an application made to the Court that passed the decree or order should not be transferred to another Court which has by transfer acquired jurisdiction to deal with further proceedings in the connected suit; it is another thing to argue that where the whole business of one Court has been transferred to another Court, the expression "the Court by which the decree was passed" is so definite and precise as to create an exception to the general rule introduced by Section 150.

    6. To adopt the latter argument is in effect to leave a defendant against whom an ex parte decree has been passed by a Court, which is afterwards abolished, without any remedy beyond a general right of appeal against the final decree [vide Karuppan v. Ayyathorai 9 M. 445 : 3 Ind. Dec. (n.s.) 705 and Sadhu Krishna Ayyar v. Kuppan Ayyangar 30 M. 54 : 1 M.L.T. 268 : 16 M.L.J. 479], and Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    7. The direction at the end of this rule that upon setting aside an ex parte decree the Court shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit would be, as my learned brother pointed out, meaningless if such application were to be disposed of by Courts which had ceased to have jurisdiction over the suit itself.

    8. I would, therefore, place a liberal construction on the wording of Section 150 and of Order IX, Rule 13 and hold that the District Munsif of Anantapur had jurisdiction to deal with this petition.

    9. As to the merits, the service of notice of suit purported to be by affixture to the outer door of the respondents' residence, the information given by his sister being that he had gone to a village in Mysore. The statement in his affidavit that he did not know till he attended the Taluk office on 27th March 1920 that an ex parte decree had been passed against him stands uncontradicted in detail. There appears, thus, to have been good reason for ordering the ex parte decree to be set aside. The civil revision petition is dismissed with costs Krishnan, J.

    10. The main question for our decision in the revision petition is one of jurisdiction regarding the setting aside of an ex parte decree.

    11. The petitioner before us, who was the plaintiff in Original Suit No. 1230 of 1919 on the file of the District Munsif's Court of Panukonda, obtained a decree against the respondent and others, the decree against him being an ex parte decree. Subsequently, there was a re-adjustment of territorial jurisdiction between that Court and the District Munsif's Court of Anantapur as the result of which, all the properties included in the decree were transferred to the jurisdiction of the latter Court. Consequently, the respondent applied to that Court to get aside the ex parte decree against him and that Court has granted his prayer. The revision is against that order and ft has been contended before no, that the Penukonda Court, as the Court which passed the decree, was the only Court competent to act under Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the decree and that the Anantapur Court had no jurisdiction to do so. That rule, it is true, authorises an application to the Court that passed the decree but the respondent relies upon Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure as extending the power to act under that rule to the Anantapur Court in the present case, as the whole business of the former Court within the local area in which the suit properties are situate, has been transferred to the latter Court and be contends Section 150 applies.

    12. The petitioner's Vakil has put forward two contentions to exclude the applicability of Section 150 and I shall consider them separately. He first argued that the section applied only when the whole of the business of the Court with reference to the whole of its jurisdiction is transferred to another Court; or, in other words, when the Court is abolished and another is substituted for it, and not to a case of partial adjustment of jurisdiction and transfer of its business with reference to that part alone to another Court. There is nothing in the language of the section which compels us to put this restricted meaning on it: to do so would greatly reduce its scope and usefulness. No authority has been cited in favour of the restricted construction, nor is any general reason shown in support of it. On the other hand, there is as mush reason to apply the section to cases of transfer of defined local areas as to cases of transfer of the whole, jurisdiction. What little authority there is on the point, is in favour of the view I am taking, for in the Full Bench case in Seeni Nadan v. Muthuswamy Pillai 53 Ind. Cas. 213 : 42 M. 821 : 37 M.L.J. 284 : 26 M.L.T. 223 : (1919) M.W.N. 640 : 11 L.W. 63 there is an observation of Ayling, J., on page 835 Page of 42 M.[ED.] which supports it, where the learned Judge says "this Section ("Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure) certainly seems to me to cover the case of transfer of all the litigations arising out of a tract of country from one part to another." The first objection must, therefore, be overruled.

    13. The next point taken in, that the words "save as otherwise provided" in the section prevent its applicability to the present case, as it is argued that Order IX, Rule 18, requires that the application should be made to the Court that passed the decree and to no other Court. It does not say anything about other Courts and I am unable to read it as excluding the application of Section 150. The rule is an enabling one which prescribes what is to be done in the ordinary course, to get an ex parte decree set aside. It does not say that the Court that passed the decree is the only Court that can set it aside. Nor is there anything restrictive in the wording,

    14. No authorities have been cited on the precise point before us, by either side but the petitioner's Vakil has tried to argue by way of analogy with reference to certain rulings under Order XXXIX, Rule 2, Clause (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, that when a forum is mentioned in a rule as having authority to do a certain thing it must be held that the jurisdiction of every other forum in the matter is excluded and he cited the cases in Jaharuddin v. Hari Churan Poddar 22 Ind. Cas. 439 : 18 C.W.N. 470 and Bellary Press Co. Ltd. Mathura Das] v. Venkata Rao 8 Ind. Cas. 7 : 21 M.L.J. 829. 8 M.L.T. 374 : (1910) M.W.N. 631 Ind. Cas. 7 : 21 M.L.J. 829. 8 M.L.T. 374 : (1910) M.W.N. 631. It is sufficient to say that in these cases, the effect of Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not arise for decision and they are thus of little value in the present case. On the other hand, with reference to this very point, Srinivasa Iyengar, J., in his judgment in the Full Bench case in Ottapurakkal Thazath Kuppi v. Alabi Mashur Koyanna Koya Kunhi Koya 34 Ind. Cas. 58 : 39 M. 907 : 3 L.W. 430 : 30 M.L.J. 523 : 19 M.L.T. 314 : (1916) 1 M.W.N. 328 expresses a clear opinion when he says that "where the business of one Court is transferred to another, the Court to which the business is so transferred may, I think, under Section 150, entertain an original application for attachment or arrest under Clause (3), Rule 2 of Order XXXIX." That Full Bench overruled the rather extraordinary contention that, because the clause- said that the Court granting the injunction may attach the properties of or imprison in civil jail the person guilty of disobedience, even the Appellate Court had no power to take action under it. If it is kept in mind that these are enabling rules in which there are no restrictive words as there is, for example, in Order XL VII, Rule 2 under which except in certain circumstances an application for review can be made "only to the Judge who passed the decree or order" there is no difficulty in holding that the Court, given the same powers as the Court mentioned in the rules, as, for example, an Appellate Court or a Court to which the former Court's business has been transferred under Section 150 of the Code of Civil Procedure can itself exercise those powers. To hold otherwise will be, in my opinion, entirely erroneous and will defeat the very object of the Legislature in extending such powers.

    15. I have not referred to Section 37 of the Code or to cases under it, for they all refer to proceedings in execution.

    16. I agree with my learned brother that the contention that the Anantapur Court had no jurisdiction, must be overruled.

    17. The objections taken to the order of the lower Court on the merits are equally untenable. It is clear from the record that the defendant was not duly served and that his application is within time as he has sworn in his affidavit that be was not aware of the suit or of the affixture of the summons at his residence or of the existence of the ex parte decree till the 27th March, some 12 day before his application. The matter was tried on affidavit, no application being made to take evidence or to cross-examine the defendant, The plaintiff field no affidavit himself but he left it to his Vakil to file an argumentative) statement merely alleging that the defendants' affidavit could not be true. In these circumstances the District Munsif cannot be said to have acted irregularly or even wrongly in setting aside the ex parte decree.

    18. I agree that the civil revision petition fails and must be dismissed with costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    J.V. Ranganatha Rao v. Hanumantha Rao
    (Jan 11, 1922)