G.C Mathur, J.:— The question whether the decision of a Full Bench of this Court in Mst. Suraj Pali v. Ariya Pratinidhi Sabha A.I.R 1936 Alld. 686 F.B., holding that no revision lies from an order refusing to allow an amendment of a pleading under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C, requires re-consideration in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon A.I.R 1964 S.C 497 arose in two civil revisions before a Single Judge of this Court. In the suit, out of which Civil Revision No. 1736 of 1964 arises, the defendant had filed an application for amendment, seeking to add a plea in his written statement that the Munsif, before whom the suit was pending had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. This application was rejected by the Munsif and a revision was filed against the order of rejection. At the hearing of the revision, an objection was taken that the revision was incompetent as the order of the Munsif did not amount to a “case decided” within the meaning of Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The applicant in the revision contended that the decision in Mst. Suraj Pali's case was no longer good law in view of the wide meaning given to the words “case decided” by the Supreme Court in Khanna's case. In the suit, out of which Civil Revision No. 1739 of 1964, arises, an application was made by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint by the addition of certain new facts which hail arisen after the filing of the plaint. The application was opposed by the defendants on the ground that the amendments, if allowed, would change the nature of the suit. This amendment application was allowed by the Munsif and a revision was filed by the defendants before this Court. The opposite-parties raised a preliminary objection that the revision was incompetent as the order of the Munsif did not amount to a “case decided” whereas the applicants contended that, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Khanna's case, the order did amount to a “case decided.” In both the cases, the learned Single Judge passed the following order:—
“Let the papers of this case be laid before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for the reconsideration of the Full Bench decision in the case of Mst. Suraj Pali v. Ariya Pratinidhi Sabha.”
2. There was some controversy between counsel for the parties whether the entire cases had been referred for decision to the Full Bench or only the question regarding to the Full Bench or only the question regarding the maintainability of the revision was referred. It is desirable that the referring order should make it clear whether the entire case is referred to the Full Bench for decision or only a question or questions are referred for its opinion. In case a question or questions are referred for opinion, the question or questions should be formulated. In the present cases it appears from the orders of the learned Single Judge that he did not intend to refer the two revisions for decision to the Full Bench but only intended to refer the question regarding the maintainability of the two revisions for opinion to the Full Bench. According, with the consent of counsel for the parties, the questions referred for the opinion of the Full Bench in the two revisions have been combined into one question which may be formulated thus:—
3. Whether an order passed under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, either allowing an amendment or refusing to allow an amendment, is a “case decided” within the meaning of Sec. 115 of the Code? Learned counsel for the opposite-parties contended that the matter is concluded by a decision of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam v. Ram Autar Civil Appeal No. 506 of 1965 decided on February 7, 1967.. This case arose out of a suit for partition filed in the court of the Civil Judge, Moradabad. After the preliminary decree had been passed, the plaintiffs filed an application under Secs. 151, 152 and 153 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an amendment of the plaint as well as of the preliminary decree with respect to the description of the property which was the subject-matter of the partition suit. This application was rejected by the Civil Judge. Against his order, a revision was filed in this Court. A Single Judge of this court allowed the revision, set aside the order of the Civil Judge and allowed the application for amendment. Against the order of the learned Single Judge, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court by special leave. Two points were raised before the Supreme Court, namely, (I) that this Court had no jurisdiction under Sec. 115, C.P.C to entertain the revision and to interfere with the order the trial court as no revision was competent against the order of the trial court; and (ii) that this Court had erroneously treated the revision as an appeal and allowed the amendment rejected by the trial court. These objections were disposed of by the Supreme Court thus:—
“These grounds have certainly considerable force and we think that the ends of justice will be met by allowing the appeal and setting aside the last order of the High Court as also that of the trial court without expressing any opinion on the correctness of the above. It is appropriate that the question which is raised in this appeal should be dealt with and decided in the appeal pending in the High Court of Allahabad against the decree of the trial court.”
4. Though the Supreme Court observed that the grounds raised had considerable force, it did not say anywhere that the order of the Civil Judge did not amount to a “case decided”. It is to be noticed that the order of this Court as well as that of the Civil Judge was set aside to meet the ends of justice. The judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be read as deciding that an order allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C did not amount to a “case decided”. It accordingly does not help the opposite-parties and the question remains open for decision by this Court.
5. The question has to be decided on the true meaning of Sec. 115, C.P.C which provides:—
“115—The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate court appears—
(a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or
(b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity,
the High Court may make such order in the case as it thinks fit.”
6. The section consists of two parts: The first prescribes the conditions in which the jurisdiction of the High Court arises, i.e there is a “case decided” by a subordinate court in which no appeal lies to the High Court and the second sets out the circumstances in which the jurisdiction may be exercised. There has been a conflict of view among the High Courts whether an interlocutory application is a “case” and an interlocutory order a “case decided”. In every High Court from time to time opinion fluctuated. In Buddhoo Lal v. Mewa Ram A.I.R 1921 Alld. 1 F.B, a question arose before a Full Bench of this Court whether the order of the Munsif on a preliminary issue deciding that he had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit was a “case decided” or not. It was held by the majority that the order did not amount to a “case decided”. The view of the majority was that the word “case” includes suits and other proceedings in the nature of a suit and that, where the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is invoked in a suit, the suit itself is the “case”. In this view, “case” does not include an issue or part of a case or an interlocutory application. After this decision, this Court uniformly held that an order allowing an amendment was not a “case decided” but there were conflicting decisions or the question whether an order refusing to allow an application for amendment was a “case decided” or not. This question was then raised before a Full Bench in Suraj Pali…(Plaintiff); v. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha…(Defendant).* and the Full Bench held that an order refusing to allow an application under Order VI. Rule 17, C.P.C for amendment is not a “case decided”. It was observed in this case that the word “case” could not be given such a wide meaning as to cover every interlocutory order passed by a court during the trial of a suit. But the decision of the Full Bench did not rest upon the meaning of the word “case”. It held that an order refusing an amendment must stand on the same footing as an order allowing an amendment, and that, since orders allowing amendments had consistently been held by this Court not to be “case decided”, orders refusing amendments must also be held not to be “case decided”. At the end of this judgment, there is an observation that
“Cases where the amendment comes under some other order of the Code, for example, the addition or substitution of parties, or the striking off a pleading, may amount to a case decided; but an order passed purely under O. 6, R. 17 is not.”
7. The observation, with respect, appears to be self contradictory. If an order allowing or disallowing an amendment under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C is not a “case decided,” then it is difficult to see how an order allowing or disallowing an amendment under some other provision of the Code can be a “case decided.”
8. The narrow view of the meaning of the word “case” has not appealed to all Judges in this Court. In Chhattarpal Singh v. Raja Ram I.L.R 7 Alld. 661 F.B., Mahmood, J. has observed in respect of Sec. 622, which was the equivalent of Sec. 115, in the old Code:
“The word ‘case’, as used in Sec. 622 of the Code, is no where defined; but adopting the general rule of construing statutes, I held that the word should be understood in us broadest and most ordinary sense, unless there were specific reasons for narrowing its meaning. I confess I am unaware of any such reasons…..”
9. In the case of Buddhoo Lal v. Mewa Ram, Rafiq, J. disagreed with the majority and observed:
“The word ‘case’ is large enough to include an order that deals with an issue or a question raised between the parties and the word ‘decided’ included any adjudication or judicial pronouncement on such a question or issue, irrespective of the fact whether such pronouncement determines the trial of the suit in the court making such pronouncement or not.”
10. Walsh, J., who also disagreed with the majority, observed:
“It is a ‘case’ as distinct from a suit. It certainly is so in the ordinary significance of the term. The fact that the hearing was an interlocutory one or a preliminary one, does not make it any the less a case.”
11. In later decisions, a more liberal view was taken. It was held in some cases that an order in interlocutory proceedings prior to the institution of a suit like orders granting or refusing to grant permission to sue as a pauper and an order passed in proceedings after the decision of the suit like an order on an application to set aside an ex parte decree or to set aside a dismissal for default was a “case decided”. The scope of the word “case” was further widened when it was held that, even during the pendency of a suit, orders in proceedings independent and separate from the actual trial of the suit were also “case decided”. An example of this is the decision of the Full Bench of seven Judges in Ramrichpal Singh v. Dayanand Sarup 1956 A.L.J 167 F.B. where it was held that an order under Sec. 10, C.P.C staying a suit was a “case decided”. But, even in this case, Buddhoo Lal's case was held to correctly decided. It is unnecessary to refer to other decisions of this Court or to the decisions of other High Courts, except to the decision of a Full Bench of seven Judges of the Lahore High Court in Bibi Gurdevi v. Chaudhari Mohammad Bakhsh A.I.R 1943 Lahore 65 F.B.. The decision of the Full Bench is brought out in the headnote which reads thus:—
“The word ‘case’ in Sec. 115 does not always mean the whole suit. It is of a very wide import, and means any state of facts juridically considered. This meaning is wide enough to include a decision on any substantial question in controversy between the parties affecting their rights, even though such order is passed in the course of the trial of the suit. An interlocutory order deciding a question of this kind as distinguished from purely formal and incidental order is a ‘case decided’ within the meaning of Sec. 115, but it will be open to revision only if the other conditions expressly laid down in Sec. 415 are satisfied and the order has resulted or is likely to result in such gross injustice or irreparable injury as cannot be remedied otherwise than by the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court at that stage.”
12. This decision correctly lays down the scope of the word “case” and is in accord with the decision of the Supreme Court in Khanna's case.
13. In Khanna's case, a suit for money had been filed by Dillon against Khanna in the court of the Subordinate Judge at Delhi. On the pleadings of the parties, issues had been framed including an issue whether the suit was maintainable and whether the plaintiff was entitled to institute the suit. This issue was tried as a preliminary issue and the Subordinate Judge held that the suit was not maintainable. He, however, did not pass any decree dismissing the suit. Against the order of the Subordinate Judge, a revision was filed before the Punjab High Court which entertained the revision, set aside the order of the Subordinate Judge and directed the suit to be heard and disposed of according to law. Against the order of the Punjab High Court, Khanna took an appeal to the Supreme Court. The main question, which was canvassed before the Supreme Court, was whether the order of the Subordinate Judge deciding an issue in the suit was a “case decided” or not. The Supreme Court held that it was. The Supreme Court specifically overruled the decision of the Full Bench of this Court is Buddhoo Lal v. Mewa Ram. The decision of the Supreme Court may be summarised thus:—
14. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Sec. 115, C.P.C is analogous to its jurisdiction of issuing writs. “Case” is a word of comprehensive import. It cannot be equated with a suit alone but includes part of a suit also. An interlocutory order, which has a direct bearing on the rights of the parties, is a “case decided” within the meaning of Sec. 115, C.P.C even though it does not finally dispose of the suit.
15. An order under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C allowing an amendment or refusing to allow an amendment would be a “case decided” as it fulfills all the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court. Such an order was amendable to the jurisdiction of the High Courts to issue high prerogative writs. It has a direct bearing on the rights of the parties. In fact, it directly affects the rights of the parties. Though this Court has held that an order on an interlocutory application made prior to the institution of a suit or after its decision and on an interlocutory application in proceedings independent and separate from the trial of the suit is a “case decided”, it has refused to treat an order passed on an interlocutory application during the trial of a suit as a “case decided” on account of the decision in Buddhoo Lal's case. Now that the Supreme Court has over-ruled Buddhoo Lal's case, the view of this Court has lost its validity. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court, the decision of the Full Bench in Suraj Pali…(Plaintiff); v. Arya Pratinidhi Sabha…(Defendant).*, must be held not to have laid down the law correctly.
16. To hold that an order under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C is not a “case decided” would result, in many cases, in denying relief to parties where it is most needed and in the perpetuation of gross injustice. The party aggrieved will have to wait till the suit is decided on merits after taking evidence and then raise the question in appeal. If its contention is correct, then the appellate court will set aside the order of the trial court on the amendment application and remand the case for a fresh trial. This will result in unnecessary delay and expense to both the parties. Even though an order allowing or refusing an amendment is a “case decided”, this Court will not interfere unless the conditions laid down in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sec. 115, C.P.C are satisfied and the order has resulted or is likely to result in such gross injustice or irreparable injury as cannot be remedied except by interference at that stage. Most of the other High Courts have also taken the view that an order under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C is a “case decided”; see Sukumar Chatterjee v. Kiran Chandra Mitter A.I.R 1964 Cal. 439., Narayan Sonaji Sagne v. Sheshrao Vithoba A.I.R 1948 Nag. 258 F.B., Shah Shantilal Chunilal v. Shah Shantilal Fulchand A.I.R 1963 Gujrat 195., Damodara Sastry v. Nilgiri Sanjiviah A.I.R 1955 Mysore 141. and Pathikonda Gopala Rao v. Nagiri Pedda Kitamma A.I.R 1956 Andhra Pradesh 138..
17. I would accordingly answer the question framed by us in the affirmative and hold that an order passed under Order VI, Rule 17, C.P.C, either allowing an amendment or refusing to allow an amendment, is a “case decided” within the meaning of Sec. 115 of the Code.
18. B.D Gupta, J.—I fully agree with all that brother G.C Mathur, J. has said in his opinion and answer the question framed by us in the affirmative.
19. K.B Asthana, J.—I agree with the answer proposed by brother G.C Mathur and have nothing to add.
20. S.N Katju, J.—I agree that the question should be answered in the affirmative.
21. A.K Kirty, J.—In Mst. Suraj Pali v. Ariya Pratinidhi Sabha three learned Judges of this Court constituting a Full Bench had held that the refusal to allow an amendment of a pleading is not a case decided within the meaning of Sec. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, no revision lies from the order of refusal. The converse case, viz., whether permitting amendment of a pleading would or would not be a case decided was not referred to that Full Bench but in giving his decision on the question referred, Sulaiman, C.J with whom the order two learned Judges agreed, observed as follows:—
“Thus the word “case” could not be given such a wide meaning as to cover every interlocutory order passed by a Court during the trial of a suit. Now if a case within the meaning of Sec. 115, Civil P.C is started as soon as an application for the amendment of a pleading is made then the case would be decided when final orders on that application are passed, no matter whether the application is allowed or disallowed. There would be an anomaly in holding that if the application is allowed the case is not decided, but if it is not allowed the case is decided. If the filing of the application was the commencement of a new proceeding or a case, then the case must necessarily be decided if the application is allowed. But it has been held consistently by this Court that when an application for amendment has been allowed no case can be said to have been decided so as to be made the subject of a revision to this Court. The cases laying down that no revision lies from orders merely allowing or disallowing amendments which are to some extent matters of discretion seem to have laid down the correct law.”
22. Another Full Bench of this Court in Buddhoo Lal v. Mewa Ram had previously held that “case” in Sec. 115, Civil Procedure Code means the whole suit and “case decided” means final adjudication of the disputes between the parties in the suit and that, therefore, the finding or decision on an issue in the suit would not be a case decided.
23. In 1955 a Full Bench of seven Judges of this Court before whom the correctness of the decision in Buddhoo Lal v. Mewa Ram was questioned endorsed the decision as correct. That case, however, was directly overruled by the Supreme Court of India in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon.
24. In the aforesaid case of Major S.S Khanna v. Brig. F.J Dillon, the trial court had given its decision on a preliminary issue holding that the suit was not maintainable. The suit, however, was not finally disposed of. The order holding that the suit was not maintainable was set aside by the Punjab High Court on a revision under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure being filed by the plaintiff. The jurisdiction of the High Court to set aside the trial court's order was challenged by Khanna on the following grounds:—
(i) That the order do not amount to “a case which has been decided” within the meaning of Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure;
(ii) That the decree which may be passed in the suit being subject to appeal to the High Court; the power of the High Court was by the express terms of Sec. 115 excluded; and
(iii) That the order did not fall within any of the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sec. 115.”
25. The true meaning of Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, on which the validity of the argument turned, was considered by the Supreme Court. The order of the trial court deciding the preliminary issue was held to be a “case which has been decided” revision under Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure. The order of the Punjab High Court was upheld.
26. On the basis of the exposition of Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure by the Supreme Court in Khanna's case and in particular of the phrase “case which has been decided” an argument appears to have been raised before a learned Single Judge of this Court that the decision of the Full Bench in Mst. Suraj Pali's case was no longer good law. The learned Single Judge in two cases (C.R No. 1736 of 1964 and C.R No. 1739 of 1964) being of opinion that Mst. Suraj Pali's case needs to be reconsidered in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Khanna's case referred the matter to a larger Bench. The matter thus has come before this Bench. In C.R No. 1736 of 1964 the revision application is directed against an order refusing to permit amendment of the written statement and in C.R No. 1739 of 1964 it is directed against an order allowing amendment of plaint. Therefore, it is necessary to consider and decide whether an order either permitting or refusing to permit an amendment of pleading is or is not a “case which has been decided” within the meaning of Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure.
27. If some basic ingredients—the existence of which would constitute a “case which has been decided” can be culled out from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Khanna's case, then, in my opinion, it will neither be necessary nor expedient to embark upon a probing mission which may be set with blind alleys or bewildering labyrinths. The matter before us then can be sifted for the limited purpose of determining whether those basic ingredients are present or not. If they are then without anything more, an order allowing or refusing amendment of pleading can unhesitatingly be held to be a case which has been decided. If they are not then it may be difficult to hold that the decision in Mst. Suraj Pali's case in toto is no longer good law in virtue of the Supreme Court's decision in Khanna's case. The two separate but concurring judgments of the Supreme Court in Khanna's case happily do provide us with some determinative basic ingredients or call them if you consider more appropriate positive guiding rules. Before adverting further to Khanna's case, an examination as to how the matter was dealt with by the Full Bench in Mst. Suraj Pali's case appear to be necessary.
28. In Mst. Suraj Pali's case the opinion of the Full Bench does not appear to have been based upon by independent examination and analysis of Sec. 115 of the Civil Procedure Code itself, nor upon a revision of the various reported decisions of the various High Courts on the subject. Except one case Hevanchal Kunwar v. Kanhai Lal 1909 12 O.C 405. (decided by Judicial Commissioner's Court Oudh) all other cases considered were of this Court only, and, apparently, the opinion, if I may say so with respect, was only a formulation of the ratio deduced from those cases. As far as orders allowing applications for amendment of pleadings are concerned, the law, in so far as this Court is concerned, was accepted as settled that they were not cases decided and were not revisable under Sec. 115, C.P.C Indeed, it was mentioned that the learned counsel for the applicant had not been able to cite any case in which a revision was allowed from an order where an amendment had been permitted. Yet there existed reported decisions of other High Courts holding that such an order would be a case decided under Sec. 115, C.P.C (see A.I.R 1932 Mad. 542; 89 I.C 782). Presumably therefore, the question was considered in the light of previous decisions on the point of this Court only.
29. The passage already quoted from the judgment in Mst. Suraj Pali's case would clearly show that logically the position when an order is passed allowing amendment of pleading was considered to be the same as when an order is passed disallowing amendment of pleading. If allowing amendment of pleading gives rise to a case decided, it was said, it would be anomalous to hold that disallowing amendment of pleading would not. It may be that the expediency or desirability of doing away this anomalous position acted as the final determining factor in reaching the conclusion that no revision would lie from orders merely allowing or disallowing amendments, being to some extent matters of discretion. It is pertinent to interpose here a query as to why such orders are not cases which have been decided within the meaning of Sec. 115, Code of Civil Procedure, the answer plainly furnished is: because they are to some extent matters of discretion.
30. That the passing of certain interlocutory orders may result in cases which have been decided has perhaps never been and, to my mind, cannot be disputed. It is also implicit in the observation in the judgment in Mst. Suraj Pali's case that every interlocutory order cannot be a case decided. Yet interlocutory orders eluded complete categorisation into two distinct identities—those which will be cases decided and those which will not—at the hands of generations of Judges. A case could be said to have started with the filing of an application for amendment of a pleading. That case could also be said to have been decided when an effective order either allowing or disallowing the application is passed. There is no apparent difficulty thus far. But as soon as you proceed to take the final step in the process of bringing it within the expression “case which has been decided” in Sec. 115 of the Code you face doubt and difficulty. You turn to Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code and on ultimate unalysis it appears that allowing or disallowing amendment of pleading is not really a matter of jurisdiction but is largely a matter of judicial discretion of the court. You, therefore, conclude that the order would be a misfit in the setting in which the phrase “case which has been decided” occurs in Sec. 115 of the Code, and that being to some extent a matter discretion it would not come within the ambit of that phrase. This is how the mind of Sulaiman, C.J to me appears to have worked. Yet, if I may say so with utmost respect, the learned Chief Justice overshot the mark, which he had himself fixed, when recording his final opinion in an unqualified language that no revision lies from an order refusing to allow (for that matter also allowing) an amendment of a pleading.
31. Reverting back to Khanna's case it seems necessary and appropriate to remember at the very outset that “Sec. 115 of the Code consists of two parts, the first, prescribes the conditions in which jurisdiction of the High Court arises i.e there is a case decided by a subordinate court in which no appeal lies to the High Court, the second, sets out the circumstances in which the jurisdiction may be exercised. But the power of the High Court is exercisable in respect of any case which has been decided.” “The meaning of the expression ‘case’ must be sought in the nature of the jurisdiction conferred by Sec. 115 and the purpose for which the High Courts were invested with it.”
32. What then are the determinative basic ingredients or positive guiding rules about which I have already spoken. They are:
(1) A proceeding or part of a proceeding inclusive of a suit or part of suit in a civil court subordinate to the High Court;
(2) Such proceeding or part of proceeding is capable of being disposed of separately and independently by a definite finding, decision or order;
(3) The finding, decision or order has a direct bearing on the rights of the parties and affects their rights and obligations directive;
(4) The finding, decision or order may also concern or arise out of a matter of procedure if it has a direct bearing on the rights of the parties;
(5) The finding, decision or order prejudicially affects the rights of the parties by its own force or by its necessary consequential effect.
(6) The finding, decision or order terminates a part of the controversy involving a matter of jurisdiction.
33. The principal matter which now needs consideration is whether and, if so, to which extent orders allowing or refusing amendment of pleadings fulfill the aforesaid requirements so as to come under the phrase “case which has been decided” in Sec. 115 of the Code. Plaints and written statements which constitute pleadings are documents over which the parties themselves have complete control. They may make therein any or all averments which may appear to them to the necessary, appropriate or expedient either to support a claim or to contest a claim. Once however, these documents are filed in the Court, the parties cease to have control over them. Nothing therein can be added to, deleted or altered unless permitted by the Court. The power to grant such permission has been expressly conferred on the Court under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code. It is a very wide power and its exercise is dependent on the judicial discretion of the Court. It is this discretionary nature of the power that creates the real obstacle in the way of holding that an order allowing or disallowing amendment of a pleading gives rise to a case decided so to be revision under Sec. 115 of the Code. The filing of an application for amendment of a pleading gives rise to a ‘case which is decided’ as soon as an order allowing or dismissing it is passed. Be it so, but one may pertinently enquire. What is the controversy involving a matter of jurisdiction decided thereby? How has it a direct bearing on the rights of the parties or affected their rights and obligations directly? The required answers are hard to find. Yet to hold that under no circumstances will an order allowing or disallowing an amendment of a pleading give rise to a case decided so as to be revisable under Sec. 115 of the Code might result in defeating the object and purpose of the section itself. I find it difficult to accept this extreme view although I find it also logically difficult to subscribe to the view that all orders allowing or disallowing amendment of a pleading will be cases decided and revisable under Sec. 115 of the Code. I may here refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court in which it has been held that even where very wide words have been used in statutes conferring rights of appeal from every order or decision made or given in proceedings arising thereunder they would exclude interlocutory orders which are merely procedural or do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. See Shankerlal Aggarwala v. Shankerlal Poddar A.I.R 1965 S.C 507. and The Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Gokul Chand A.I.R 1967 S.C 799 at 800.. Thus, I do not find it possible to hold that every interlocutory order passed or every finding or decision given in a proceeding in a court subordinate to the High Court will constitute a case which has been decided so as to be revisable under Sec. 115 of the Code.
34. The only matter which now remains to be considered is when and under what circumstances an order either allowing or dismissing an application to amend a pleading will be a case decided and revisable. The basic ingredients and the guiding rules furnished by Khanna's case are not exhaustive or rigid. There is room for elaboration. By way of sequel thereto it seems permissible to propound that the order, finding or decision may also potentially have a direct bearing on the rights of the parties and further that they by their own force either create or eliminate a question of jurisdiction. Therefore, the key to the solution in determining whether an order allowing or disallowing an application for amendment of a pleading will be a case decided is to be sought in the nature of the amendment sought, its direct or likely impact on the rights and obligations of the parties concerned and its immediate or potential effect on the Court's jurisdiction. If the application for amendment of pleading answer to the description affirmatively order granting it or dismissing it may give rise to a case which has been decided and be revisable under Sec. 115 of the Code. If the application does not do so, the order granting or dismissing it will not give rise to a case decided revisable under Sec. 115 of the Code.
35. I am, therefore, of opinion that every order granting or dismissing an application for amendment of pleading will not give rise to a case decided revisable under Sec. 115 of the Code. An order allowing or disallowing an application for amendment of pleading may, however, give rise to a case decided revisable under that section if the amendment sought has or is likely to have a direct bearing on the rights and obligations of the parties and affects or is likely to affect the jurisdiction of the Court. To this extent the decision in Mst. Suraj Pali's case can, in my opinion, be said to be no longer good law.
36. By The Court—The opinion of the majority of Judges constituting the Full Bench is that an order passed under Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, either allowing an amendment or refusing to allow an amendment, is a “case decided” within the meaning of that expression in Sec. 115, C.P.C
37. Let the revision be now listed, with this opinion, before the learned single Judge concerned.
Question answered.