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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns competing claims to money awarded as compensation for land acquired by the Government for the Imperial Bank at Rajahmundry. The appellants are fourth mortgagees of the owner of the land. The respondents are attaching creditors (including Claimants 4, 7 and 8) who had attached the land in execution of their decrees.

Key dates recorded in the opinion:

  • First respondent (fourth claimant) attached the land on 9 October 1920.
  • The appellants' mortgage was executed on 12 November 1921.
  • The award of the Collector is dated 31 July 1922 and referred the question of apportionment to the District Court.
  • Claimants 7 and 8 effected attachment in October 1922.
  • The District Judge stated that the compensation money was not received in the District Court until after October 1922.

The District Court adjudicated the competing claims and the present appeal challenges those decisions on several legal grounds under the Land Acquisition Act and provisions of the Civil Procedure Code (Code).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an attaching decree-holder is a "person interested in the land" within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act (Sections cited: Section 3(b) / Section 9 as discussed in the opinion) and therefore entitled to notice and to claim a share of compensation.
  2. Whether compensation money paid into or held by the District Court qualifies as "assets held by the Court" under Section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code so as to permit rateable distribution among multiple decree-holders.
  3. Whether an alienation made pending attachment is void as against decree-holders claiming rateable distribution under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code, and whether such claims must have been actually in process of enforcement at the time of the alienation.
  4. Whether claimants who made attachment prior to the receipt of assets by the Court are entitled to participate in rateable distribution.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • That attaching decree-holders are not "persons interested in the land" within the meaning of the Land Acquisition Act because attachment gives no legal or "real" interest in the land and therefore such decree-holders should not be treated as persons entitled to notice or to share in compensation.
  • That the compensation money did not constitute "assets held by the Court" under Section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code because the money was not realized by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree (i.e., it was not realized in execution), and therefore Section 73 should not apply to permit rateable distribution.
  • Relying on the interpretation of Section 64 (as given in Barendra Nath Mitter v. Martin & Co.), that an "enforceable" claim in the explanation to Section 64 means a claim actually "in process of enforcement" at the time of alienation; therefore a claim presented only later could not be treated as enforceable against an alienation made earlier.
  • It was also argued (attempted) that Claimants 7 and 8 were not entitled to be heard because they had not appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer.

Respondents' Arguments / Court-recorded responses

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' separate pleading-by-pleading arguments; rather it records the legal positions accepted by the District Judge and the High Court and cites authorities supporting the view that attaching creditors are persons interested and that Section 73 applies broadly. The record does note factual points relied on by respondents: e.g., that attachments by Claimants 7 and 8 were prior to the date when assets came into the custody of the District Court, and that the Collector referred apportionment to the District Court (notice and referral).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Chhuttan Lal v. Mul Chand [1917] 18 P.R. 1917 Held that a person who held an agreement for sale (which creates no legal estate) was nonetheless a "person interested" under the Land Acquisition Act. Used to support the proposition that a party need not have a legal estate to be a "person interested" and to analogise that attaching decree-holders can be "persons interested" in compensation.
J.C. Galstaun v. Secretary of State [1905] 10 C.W.N. 195 Similar holding that agreement for sale confers a claim of interest sufficient to be a "person interested." Relied on alongside Chhuttan Lal to demonstrate that legal estate is not necessary to constitute a person interested for compensation purposes.
In re The Land Acquisition Act, In the matter of Pestonji Jehangir Modi [1913] 37 Bom. 76 Observed that a person may be interested in the compensation money without having an interest in the land in the legal sense. Adopted to reinforce the view that attaching decree-holders are interested persons for compensation purposes.
Sorabji Goovarji (Coovarji) v. Kala Raghunath [1912] 36 Bom. 156 Held that "assets" within Section 73 must be assets held in the process of execution (i.e., realized in execution). The court acknowledged this authority as taking a narrow view of Section 73 but contrasted it with later decisions and legislative changes in language; ultimately the court did not adopt the narrow view for the present facts.
Thiraviyam Pillai v. Lakshmana Pillai [1918] 41 Mad. 616 Dissented from the Bombay view and held that money paid into Court pending execution application was assets under Section 73 and liable to rateable distribution. Followed by the High Court in this opinion to support a broader interpretation of "assets held by the Court" under Section 73.
Ghisulal Agarwalla v. Todarmull Agarwalla A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 19 Interpreted the wide language of Section 73 to include any assets in the possession and at the disposal of the Court for satisfying a decree. Referred to as authority consistent with the broader interpretation of Section 73 adopted in this opinion.
Barendra Nath Mitter v. Martin & Co. [1921] 33 C.L.J. 7 Held that "enforceable" in the explanation to Section 64 meant "in process of enforcement" — i.e., a claim must be actually in execution to be recognized for avoidance of alienation. The court explicitly declined to follow this narrower construction, describing it as adding to the Code language not present and preferring other authorities.
Kali Kumar Saha v. Kali Prasanna Majumdar [1916] 33 I.C. 492 Held that it is immaterial whether a decree had been passed or was in process of execution at the time transfer was effected for the purposes of Section 64 application. Relied upon by the court to support the view that a decree need not have been in process of execution and that subsequent claimants who applied before assets were realized can share rateably.
Chunilal Devaji v. Karamchand Shrichand A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 241 Held under Section 64 that attachment includes claims of creditors attaching before a transfer and that it is unnecessary that the decree should have been in existence at the date of alienation. Followed and cited by the court in support of the position that Claimants 7 and 8 could share rateably despite the dates of their attachments relative to the mortgage.
Sorabji Edulji Warden v. Govind Ramji, F.N. Wadia [1892] 16 Bom. 91 Earlier decision holding that attachments and claims for rateable distribution under Section 64 should include certain subsequent execution creditors who apply before assets are realized. Described as a foundational authority relied on by later Bombay decisions and taken to support the broader construction of Section 64 adopted in this opinion.
Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar [1921] 44 Mad. 232 Authority stating that an attaching creditor acquires no charge by his attachment. Referred to in the opinion to acknowledge that attachment does not create a charge, but the court still treated an attaching creditor as a person interested in compensation.
Nachiappa Chettiar v. Subbier A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 505 Similarly records that an attaching creditor acquires no charge by attachment. Referred to alongside Chamiyappa Tharagan to support the point that attachment gives no legal charge while not denying the attaching creditor's interest in compensation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise fashion, addressing each of the main legal contentions in light of statutory language and precedent:

  1. On whether an attaching decree-holder is a "person interested":
    • The court examined the statutory definition which states that "persons interested" includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of the land under the Act.
    • It concluded that the definition expressly looks to interest in compensation rather than requiring a legal estate in the land.
    • The court relied on authorities (Chhuttan Lal, J.C. Galstaun, Pestonji Jehangir Modi) holding that equitable interests or claims to compensation suffice, and therefore held that an attaching decree-holder who seeks to satisfy his claim out of the land is "certainly interested in the compensation" and falls within the statutory definition.
  2. On whether the compensation money constitutes "assets held by the Court" under Section 73:
    • The court observed that earlier Code (1882) explicitly required assets to be "realized by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree" (Section 295 of 1882), whereas the new Section 73 omits such words and now refers simply to "assets held by a Court." The omission of the realization requirement was significant.
    • The court discussed conflicting authority: Sorabji Goovarji (narrow view requiring realization in execution) versus Thiraviyam Pillai and Ghisulal Agarwalla (broader view treating funds in Court as assets for rateable distribution).
    • Interpreting the change in language purposively, the court concluded that it is sufficient if the assets are held by the Court and may be allotted towards satisfaction of the decree; the manner of realization is immaterial.
    • Applied to the facts, the court found that the compensation money in the District Court was money of the owner held by the Court and, once the decree-holders' claims became recognized, the money must be deemed assets of the judgment-debtor held by the Court (either from receipt or at least from the date of the final award).
  3. On Section 64 and enforceability of claims at the time of alienation:
    • Appellants argued (relying on Barendra Nath Mitter) that "enforceable" in Section 64 meant claims in the process of enforcement at the time of alienation.
    • The court rejected this restrictive construction as adding words to the Code and preferred authorities (Kali Kumar Saha, Chunilal Devaji and Sorabji Edulji Warden) which permit rateable distribution to decree-holders who had made applications prior to realization, even if those applications were not in process of execution at the time of the alienation.
    • On this basis the court held Claimants 7 and 8 (who had made attachments prior to the receipt of assets in the District Court) were entitled to share rateably with the earlier attaching claimant (fourth claimant), and that the appellants' alienation was void as against these claims enforceable under attachment.
  4. On procedural/factual points:
    • The court noted the Collector's award referring apportionment to the District Court, and that the District Judge recorded that attachments by Claimants 7 and 8 were prior to the date when the assets came into Court custody. The argument that Claimants 7 and 8 had not been heard before the Land Acquisition Officer was rejected on the basis of the District Judge's findings and the referral.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is dismissed. The court ordered costs in favour of the respondents and specified separate vakil's fees for each respondent.

Implications and immediate effects on the parties (as recorded in the opinion):

  • Claimants 7 and 8 (and the fourth claimant who attached earlier) are entitled to rateable distribution of the compensation money held by the Court under Section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • The appellants (fourth mortgagees) are placed behind the earlier attaching claimant in priority and the alienation in favour of the appellants pending attachment was void as against the attaching decree-holders' claims enforceable under attachment.
  • No new broad legal principle beyond the Court's application of existing statutory language and cited authorities was expressly announced; the decision applies existing authorities to the facts and adopts a broader reading of "assets held by the Court" in Section 73 and a non-restrictive reading of "enforceable" in Section 64 for the purposes of rateable distribution.

Direct practical consequence: the compensation fund held (or treated as held) by the District Court is to be apportioned rateably among the decree-holders who had enforceable claims as identified by the Court, and the appellants' appeal against that outcome fails.

This summary is restricted to the matters and conclusions contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or inferences beyond the text.

    Sait Siva Pratapa Bhattadu (5Th Claimant), v. A.E.L Mission And Others (Claimants 4, 7 And 8),

    1. This appeal relates to the conflicting claims of the parties to money awarded, as compensation for land acquired. The appellants are the fourth mortgagees of the owner of the land and the respondents are the attaching creditors of the owner and have attached the land in execution of their decrees. The fourth claimant (the first respondent) attached the land in execution of his decree on 9th October 1920. The mortgage in favour of the appellants was executed on 12th November 1921, and the attachment by the seventh and eighth claimants (Respondents 2 and 3) was in October 1922. The award of the Collector is dated 31st July 1922, but that does not decide the respective rights of the several claimants, but referred the question to the District Court for decision. The compensation money was not received in the District Court until after October 1922, as distinctly stated by the District Judge, although an attempt has been made to show that he was wrong.

    2. The first question raised for the appellants is that the attaching decree holders are not persons 'interested in the land' within the meaning of Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, and it is contended that, in order to come within the definition, it is necessary that the party should have some legal interest in the land. The definition in the Act, however, is as follows:

    The expression, 'persons interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of the land under this Act.

    3. This definition does not seem to contemplate that a person interested need have a legal interest in the land, because it specifically alludes to interest in the compensation to be made, and it has frequently been held that a person may be interested within the meaning of the Act without holding any legal estate in the land ; and in two cases, Chhuttan Lal v. Mul Chand [1917] 18 P.R. 1917 and J.C. Galstaun v. Secretary of State [1905] 10 C.W.N. 195. it was held that a person who held an agreement for sale from the owner was a person interested within the meaning of the Act, although such agreement creates no legal estate; and In re The Land Acquisition Act, In the matter of Pestonji Jehangir Modi [1913] 37 Bom. 76 it was held that a person may be interested in the compensation money without having any interest in the land in the legal sense of the term. Here it is clear that an attaching decree-holder who seeks to satisfy his, claim out of the land is certainly interested in the compensation that has to be paid for that land, as it is a matter of considerable importance to him that a sufficient amount of compensation should be paid in order that he may be able to satisfy his decree, and I think there can be no doubt that an attaching decree-holder is a person interested in the land within the meaning of the Act.

    4. The next objection relates to the enforceability of the claims of the decree-holders. The District Judge has held that the alienation in favour of the appellants pending attachment by the fourth claimant was void against him, and that Claimants 7 and 8 are entitled to come in before the alienee as persons entitled to rateable distribution. It is quite clear that an alienation made during attachment is void under Section 64, of the Civil Procedure Code, as against all claims enforceable under the attachment, and, in the explanation to that section we find that claims enforceable under an attachment include claims to rateable distribution of assets. Under Section 73, where assets are held by a Court and more persons than one have, before the receipt of such assets made applications to the Court for execution of decree against the same judgment-debtor, the assets shall be rate-ably distributed among all such persons. Claimants 7 and 8 undoubtedly come within the meaning of this section and they would be entitled to share in the distribution of the assets along with the fourth claimant who made the first attachment.

    5. The difficulty, however, arises as to whether this compensation money can be deemed to be assets held by the Court within the meaning of Section 73. Under Section 295 of the Civil Procedure Code of 1882 it was necessary that the assets should be realized by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree, but under Section 73 of the new Code there is no definite provision that the assets must be realized by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree. In the present case, it cannot be said that the money paid as compensation has, in the strict sense of the term been realized in execution of a decree, and it has been held in Sorabji Goovarji v. Kala Raghunath [1912] 36 Bom. 156 that assets within the meaning of Section 73 must be assets held in the process of execution. This view has been dissented from in this Court in Thiraviyam Pillai v. Lakshmana Pillai [1918] 41 Mad. 616 and this latter case has been followed in Ghisulal Agarwalla v. Todarmull Agarwalla A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 19. If it were necessary that the assets should be realized in the process of execution, it is difficult to understand why these words have been deliberately omitted from the new Section 73. It appears to me that it will be sufficient if the assets are held by a Court and are assets which may be allotted towards the satisfaction of the decree by the Court and that the manner in which they may have been realized is immaterial. This interpretation gives some force to the change of language in Section 73, which omits all reference to the method of realization. In the present case, the compensation money in the District Court when originally received, may be said to be money belonging to the owner in the hands of the Court in its capacity as a Court of custody, and not as Court of execution; but when the decree-holder's claim to partake in the compensation money was decided then at least the money held must be deemed to be assets of the judgment-debtor held by the Court, for they were held from the date of the Court's award subject to the claim of the decree-holder. I am, therefore, of opinion that this compensation money comes within the meaning of 'assets held by the Court' either from the date of receipt or at least from the date of the final award. Claimants 7 and 8 are entitled to come in under Section 73, if the provisions of Section 64 are also fulfilled.

    6. It is, however, argued that, under Section 64, an alienation made pending attachment is not void against the decree-holders claiming rateable distribution unless, at the time of the alienation, the claims were actually being enforced. This view has been taken in Barendra Nath Mitter v. Martin & Co. [1921] 33 C.L.J. 7. where Mookerjee, Ag. C.J. holds that the word 'enforceable' in the explanation to Section 64, must be treated as meaning 'in process of enforcement.' With all respect it seems to me to be adding something to the Code which is not there and there is a prior authority in the Calcutta High Court in Kali Kumar Saha v. Kali Prasanna Majumdar [1916] 33 I.C. 492. that the decree in respect of which rateable distribution is sought need not have been in process of execution at the time of the alienation. The same view has been held in Bombay in Chunilal Devaji v. Karamchand Shrichand A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 241. and in this latter case it was further held that it is unnecessary that the decree should have even been in existence at the date of the alienation. These cases follow the view taken in Sorabji Edulji Warden v. Govind Ramji, F.N. Wadia [1892] 16 Bom. 91. In accordance with this view, which I accept, Claimants 7 and 8 are entitled to rateable distribution along with the fourth claimant, whose claim must be preferred to that of appellant.

    7. The appeal must, therefore, be dismissed with costs ; separate vakil's fee for each respondent.

    Odgers, J.

    8. This appeal raises questions under the Land Acquisition Act. The Government acquired for the Imperial Bank certain lands and houses in Rajahmundry, and the question arises as to who is entitled to participate in the money paid as compensation for the acquisition. The appellants before us represent the fourth mortgagee. The first question is whether the attaching creditors represented by Claimants 4, 7 and 8 take precedence over the fourth mortgagee. The fourth claimant, as attaching creditor, was prior in time to the fourth mortgagee, but the attachments of the seventh and eighth claimants are subsequent, and the question arises whether by Section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code they are entitled to priority over the fourth mortgagee so as to give them a right to rateable distribution. It should be noted that the claims of the seventh and eighth claimants were made prior to the receipt of the assets in the lower Court, as the Acquisition Officer, by his order of the 31st July 1922, left the question of the apportionment of the compensation to the decision of the District Court and also the amount of compensation to be deposited therein. Some attempt was made to argue that Claimants 7 and 8 were not entitled to be heard as they had not appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer. In his letter, dated 25th September 1922, the Land Acquisition Officer refers the case to the District Judge for adjudication and the District Judge in his award, dated 27th January 1923,'states that "the various claimants have been referred to the Court." He also states it is admitted as a fact that the attachments by Claimants 7 and 8 were prior to the date when the assets came into the custody of the District Court. There is therefore nothing in that point.

    9. The first serious point urged for the appellants is that an attaching creditor is not a person interested under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act. The definition of 'a person interested' includes all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act and in Section 9, Sub-section 2, notice is to be given and the notice shall require " all persons interested in the land to appear personally, etc...to state the nature of their respective interests in the land." In Section 10(1) the Collector may require, etc." a statement containing as far as may be practicable the name of every other person possessing any interest in the land." On the strength of these quotations it is argued that as an attachment of land gives no interest in the land, or what in the English Law is called real interest, the attaching creditor is not a person interested in the land within the meaning of the sections quoted of the Land Acquisition Act. It is to be observed that in the definition a person interested includes a person claiming an interest in the compensation and it is to my mind perfectly clear that an attaching creditor-does this ; for it is obviously to his advantage that his debt should be paid out of the sum deposited in Court as compensation for the acquisition of his debtor's land. By Section 91(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, a judgment, creditor of the mortgagor, who has obtained execution by attachment of the mortgagor's interest, is allowed to redeem. That is to say, he stands in the position of the mortgagor with regard to an equitable interest in the property, i.e. the right of redemption. It is urged by the appellants here-that this is an exceptional right and does not thereby confer on a judgment-creditor an interest in the land. That an attaching creditor acquires no charge by his attachment, scarcely needs authority : See Chamiyappa Tharagan v. Rama Ayyar [1921] 44 Mad. 232 and Nachiappa Chettiar v. Subbier A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 505 In Chhuttan Lal v. Mul Chand [1917] 18 P.R. 1917 it was held that a person who entered into a valid agreement for the purchase of land which under the Transfer of Property Act gives no interest in the land itself is a person interested within the meaning of Section 3(b). In In re The Land Acquisition Act, In the matter of Pestonji Jehangir Modi [1913] 37 Bom. 76 Macleod, J. as he then was, observed that it is quite possible that a person may be interested in the compensation money without having an interest in the land in the legal sense of the term. 1; therefore, think that the objection, that an attaching creditor is not a person interested under Section 3(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, cannot be maintained.

    10. By Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are to apply to proceedings under the Act save in so far as they may be inconsistent.

    11. The next point is that Section 73 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply, because the compensation money has not come into Court as the result of an attachment, so that there are no assets held by the Court within the meaning of the section. The words of the Code of 1882, Section 295, ran:

    Where the assets realized by sale or otherwise in execution of a decree.

    12. These words have been omitted in the present Code and the section begins : "Where assets are held by a Court." It appears to me that if meaning is to be given to the amendment it must be taken that the Legislature meant to extend the meaning of 'the word "assets" in the section and they are not, therefore, now to be regarded as confined to assets realized by sale or otherwise in execution of the decree. If the word "assets" is still to be read in its narrow sense, there is no doubt that this compensation money is not " assets." If on the other hand, assets may mean any fund held by a Court to the credit of a person, then assets may include compensation money as here. In Sorabji Coovarji v. Kala Raghunath [1912] 36 Bom. 156 it was held that the assets referred to in Section 73 are assets held in the process of execution. In "this case money was paid into Court under Order 21, Rule 55, and it was held that when money was paid into Court for this particular purpose it could not fall under the words of the section. This has been dissented from in Thiravi-yam Pillai v. Lakshmana Pillai [1918] 41 Mad. 616, where the facts were these : "The judgment-debtor obtained permission of the Court under Order 21, Rule 83, to raise money by private alienation of the property and thus pay the amount due on one of the decrees. The money was accordingly paid into Court by the alienee. It was held that the money, haying been (paid into Court pending the execution application, was assets under section 73 of the code and liable to rateable distribution. The Bombay decision is expressly dissented from. In Ghisulal Agarwala v. Todar mull Agarwala A.I.R. 1922 Cal. 19, a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court held that the natural interpretation of the wide language of Section 73 would allow assets to be applied to any assets in the possession and at the disposal of the Court for the purpose of satisfying a decree obtained against the judgment-debtor. The case in Sorabji Coovarji v. Kala Raghunath [1912] 36 Bom. 156 was referred to and the judgment in Thiraviyam Pillai v. Lakshmana Pillai [1918] 41 Mad. 616 adopted where it says the intention of the Legislature is to afford a creditor equal opportunities of obtaining a rateable advantage in the available assets of the judgment-debtor. It, therefore, appears to me, having regard to the change in the language of the section and to the authority of the Madras ruling quoted, that this compensation money may be regarded as assets within the meaning of Section 73.

    13. The third point is one raised under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code, namely, that the claims must be good and valid claims at the time when the alienation was made. The argument derives force from the judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported in Barendra Nath Mitter v. Martin & Co. [1921] 33 C.L.J. where it was held that a claim for rateable distribution cannot be recognized under Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code unless it is in actual existence at the time of the alienation and it cannot ripen into such a claim unless the necessary conditions formulated in Section 73 have been fulfilled. One of the conditions laid down in the judgment is the presentation of an application for execution before the receipt of the assets. The meaning given in the same judgment to the words "enforceable claim" in Section 64, Civil Procedure Code, therefore, is that there is no claim till there is an application. Now as against this view there is a decision in Kali Kumar Saha v. Kali Prasanna Majumdar [1916] 33 I.C. 492. also of the Calcutta High Court, where it is held that it is immaterial for the application of Section 64 whether the decree of the plaintiff had or had not been passed before the time when the . transfer was effected. And in Chunilal Devaji v. Karamohand Srichand A.I.R. 1922 Bom. 241. the Bombay High Court held following a prior decision of the same Court in Sorabji Edulji Warden v. Govind Ramji, F.N. Wadia [1892] 16 Bom. 91. that under. Section 64 when an attachment has been laid on property in execution that attachment includes not only the claims of creditors, attaching before a transfer but also includes the claims of any other execution creditors who may apply for attachment before assets are realized. The case referred to. in Sorabji Edulji Warden v. Govind Ramji, F.N. Wadia [1892] 16 Bom. 91. is the judgment of a single Judge, Mr. Justice Telang; but the judgment and the reasoning are extremely elaborate. There seems no reason to differ from this body of opinion on the strength of the opinion expressed in Barendra Nath Mitter v. Martin & Co. [1921] 33 C.L.J. 7. and until that decision has been adopted either by the Privy Council or by this High Court, I prefer to rest my judgment on this part of the case on the other, cases I have cited. I, therefore, think that the appeal fails on all points. I agree as to costs.

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    Comments

    Sait Siva Pratapa Bhattadu (5Th Claimant), v. A.E.L Mission And Others (Claimants 4, 7 And 8),
    (Dec 19, 1924)