Coxe, J.:— These appeals arise out of suits for rent. The Plaintiffs claim to be the landlords of the whole property. With regard to 2 annas of it they say that they are thikadars under one Nisar Ali Khan who leased it to them for the year 1316, which is the year in suit, by a verbal agreement and that “previous to this also, temporary settlements for one year all along used to be obtained from the mutwali under a verbal agreement”. The words “all along” mean, we are imformed, the period from the year 1313. The Munsif found that a thika lease of these two annas had been given to the Plaintiffs for the year 1316. But he held that it was invalid, because it was not accompanied by delivery of possession and that there was no delivery of possession, because the Plaintiffs had been in possession of this interest of two annas from a long time before. The Plaintiff appealed to the District Judge on the ground that the finding of the Munsif that the lease was invalid was incorrect. The learned District Judge agreed with the Munsif on the strength of the decision in Sibendrapada v. Secretary of State. It was held in that case that sec. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act must be construed strictly and that it could not be presumed that there was any delivery of property when the vendee had been in possession of it for a long time before the date of the sale. It has been argued before us that was a decision under sec. 54 and has therefore no application to the present case which come under sec. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. But in my opinion there is no real or substantial difference between the terms of the two sections and if the view taken in that decision is right, it must be held that the oral lease of the two annas in 1316 was not accompanied by delivery of possession and was, therefore, invalid. This is not the view which was taken by the Madras High Court in the case of Kannan v. Krishnan(2), and I feel some difficulty in agreeing with the view of the learned Judges of the practical consequences of so strict a construction of the section. It does not appear to me, however, that this decision need be discussed further, because accepting it as a correct statement of the law, the Plaintiffs would still, in my opinion, be entitled to succeed. For if this lease of the two annas is invalid, I do not see how the Defendants can escape the effect of sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section provides that if a lessee remains in possession after the determination of the lease, with the lessor's assent, the lease is deemed to be renewed from year to year. This section has of course no application when the lessee is holding under a subsisting lease; but when the existing lease goes out, then the lessee, if he remains in possession with the assent of the lessor, is ??? to be regarded as a lessee from year to year under the section.
It has been argued that redly this was all along a lease from year to year, that, therefore, it could be made only by a registered instrument and that sec. 116 would have no application. This, however, is not the case. It is stated in the plaint and appears to be found by the Courts below, that temporary settlements for one year each have all along been given. The result of these successive leases may be very similar to the ultimate effect of a lease from year to year for the whole period, but a series of successive leases is evidently quite different from a lease from year to year. Successive leases for one year each are terminable without notice, but a lease from year to year is only terminable by six months' notice. It seems perfectly clear that in 1313 a valid lease was given to the Plaintiff by an oral lease for one year, accompanied by delivery of possession. Since then if the subsequent leases are invalid, the Plaintiffs must be regarded as entitled to the benefits of sec. 116. In this view of the case, they are entitled to the whole of the rent, and the other question raised by the District Judge does not arise, namely, whether a landlord who sues for the whole rent and fails to prove that he is the 16 annas landlord is entitled to succeed in part. All the other points have been found by both the Courts below in favour of the Plaintiffs.
The result is that the appeals and the suits must be decreed with costs throughout.
D. Chatterjee, J.:— I agree. I think that upon the facts found, sec. 116 of the Transfer of Property Act is a complete answer to the defence.
Appeal allowed.