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  • 61 of 1910, section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 92 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • provisions of the Transfer of Property Act Courts
  • Order XXI, rule 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 93 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • 61 of 1910, section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • sections 92 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act.
  • provisions of the Transfer of Property Act Courts
  • Order XXI, rule 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • SECTION 93 TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 mortgaged certain property to Naga Ayyar, who filed Original Suit No. 61 of 1910 in the Court of the Principal District Munsif of Mudura to recover sums due on the mortgage. The puisne mortgagees were impleaded in that suit, one being the present plaintiff, Nidhi. A decree was drawn up in Form 7, Appendix D of the Code of Civil Procedure which declared the amounts due to the plaintiff and to the puisne mortgagee defendant but ordered sale of the mortgaged properties only if the mortgagor did not pay the amount found due to the first mortgagee; the puisne mortgagees were given only a right to share in any surplus arising from such a sale.

One item of the mortgaged property was put up for sale in execution of the decree, but the plaintiff-decree-holder was satisfied when the amount due was paid under Order XXI, rule 89 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the sale was set aside. The property was subsequently sold by private sale to the appellant (the twelfth defendant). Because the appellant did not pay the amount found due in O.S. No. 61 of 1910 to the first respondent, the first respondent sued for recovery of the amount due to him as mortgagor.

The appellant raised various defences in the subsequent suit, chiefly that (1) the plaintiff's remedy was by executing the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1910 and not by a separate suit, and (2) the second suit was barred by res judicata. The Subordinate Judge overruled these objections and passed a decree in favor of the plaintiff; the decree was confirmed by the District Judge. The present opinion disposes of the Second Appeal against that confirmation.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, where a decree is drawn up under Form 7, Appendix D of the Code of Civil Procedure in a suit by a first mortgagee, a puisne mortgagee who was impleaded has an independent right to obtain relief (including sale or execution) if the mortgagor pays the amount due to the first mortgagee.
  2. Whether the remedy of a puisne mortgagee in the circumstances of O.S. No. 61 of 1910 is by executing the prior decree or by bringing a separate suit for recovery.
  3. Whether the subsequent suit is barred by res judicata by reason of the prior suit (O.S. No. 61 of 1910) being on the file of the District Munsif.
  4. Whether section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies so as to permit execution by the first respondent under the prior decree.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Contended that when puisne encumbrancers are made parties-defendants in a mortgage suit, a decree is passed in favour of each of the mortgagees which can be executed by that mortgagee.
  • Relied upon decisions including Govinda Taragan v. Veeran and an unreported decision in Achutha Menon v. Subramania Patter to support the contention that each mortgagee has an executory remedy under such a decree.
  • Raised procedural defences that the appropriate remedy was execution of the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1910 (rather than a separate suit) and that the subsequent suit was barred by res judicata.

Respondent's Position (as reflected in the opinion)

  • The decree in Form 7, Appendix D did not direct redemption of subsequent mortgagees and authorized sale only in the event of non-payment of the sum found due to the first mortgagee; the puisne encumbrancers' declared amounts were only for enabling a share in any surplus sale-proceeds.
  • Maintained that where the mortgagor pays the sum found due to the first mortgagee, the second mortgagee cannot obtain independent relief or cause sale to enforce the amounts declared due to him under such a decree.
  • Argued (and the court accepted) that section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply because the first respondent was not entitled to execute the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1910.
  • With respect to res judicata, noted that the present suit is beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Munsif who heard O.S. No. 61 of 1910, and that a puisne mortgagee is barred by a prior suit only if his claim could have been satisfied from the surplus sale-proceeds realized under the earlier decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. Nahapiet Under a decree drawn up in Form 7, Appendix D, a second mortgagee has no right to obtain relief if the mortgagor satisfies the first mortgagee's claim; the second mortgagee is only for receiving surplus sale-proceeds or redeeming. The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a puisne mortgagee impleaded under such a decree cannot take independent action to enforce amounts if the amount due to the first mortgagee is paid.
Kissory Mohun Roy v. Kally Churn Ghose Authority concerning decrees passed on the Original Side of the High Court (distinguished on that ground). The court distinguished that decision because it related to Original Side practice of the High Court, which was not treated as governing decrees passed by mofussil courts under the Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act.
Mackintosh v. Watkins In a suit by a first mortgagee impleading mortgagor and puisne mortgagees, the mortgagor cannot be called upon to redeem subsequent mortgagee defendants; the object of impleading is to free the property from encumbrance for sale, not to enable the puisne mortgagee to obtain a decree against the mortgagor. The court cited the decision for the principle that the mortgagor is not liable to have the property sold for non-payment of dues of subsequent encumbrancers when a decree is drawn under the civil procedure regime applied in mofussil courts.
Sururjiqur Begum v. Baredakant Mitter If the amount due to the first mortgagee is paid, there can be no sale under the decree and puisne encumbrancers obtain no relief in that suit. The court used this authority to reinforce the conclusion that payment to the first mortgagee defeats the puisne mortgagee's ability to obtain sale or relief under the prior decree.
Govinda Taragan v. Veeran Related to a redemption suit; paragraph 2 of section 93 Transfer of Property Act does not deprive a plaintiff-mortgagor of the right to apply for sale in a redemption suit. The court held that this case did not support the appellant's broad contention because that case involved a redemption suit between mortgagor and mortgagee and did not raise the question of puisne encumbrancers' rights under a Form 7 decree.
Achutha Menon v. Subramania Patter (unreported) Held that a sub-mortgagee (assignee of the original mortgagee) could apply for execution of a decree in favour of his mortgagor-mortgagee and work out his rights by sale for the amount directed in that decree. The court noted this decision concerned a sub-mortgagee (an assignee) and did not support treating independent puisne mortgagees as decree-holders entitled to bring the property to sale for sums declared due to them when the decree contains no direction to redeem them.
Debendra Nath Sen v. Mirza Abdul Samed Seraji Stated that a suit by a puisne mortgagee who was a party to an earlier suit by another mortgagee can only be barred if the puisne mortgagee was in a position to have his claim satisfied from surplus sale-proceeds realized under the prior decree. The court relied on this principle to conclude that O.S. No. 61 of 1910 (on the District Munsif's file) could not render the present suit res judicata, particularly because the present suit lay beyond the pecuniary limit of the earlier forum and because the puisne mortgagee's claim could not necessarily have been satisfied from any surplus.
Platt v. Mendel (English practice) Referenced as an exposition of English practice concerning such matters of procedure and practice in chancery contexts. The court mentioned the English practice but stated it was unnecessary to consider it in the present case given the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the nature of the decree before the court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court began by examining the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1910, which had been drawn up in Form 7, Appendix D of the Code of Civil Procedure. It noted that although the decree declared the amounts due to the plaintiff and to the puisne mortgagee, it did not direct redemption of subsequent mortgagees. Sale was expressly authorized only if the mortgagor failed to pay the amount found due to the first mortgagee; the puisne mortgagees were only given a right to redeem the first mortgage or, on sale, to share in any surplus in order of priority.

The court applied precedent (notably Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. Nahapiet and Mackintosh v. Watkins) to the effect that when a decree is drawn under Form 7, Appendix D the second mortgagee is present simply to secure a right to surplus sale-proceeds or to redeem but not to obtain independent relief or to treat the decree as conferring an executory right against the mortgagor when the mortgagor satisfies the first mortgagee's claim. The court quoted and relied on the view that the object of impleading a puisne mortgagee is to enable the property to be sold free from his encumbrance, not to enable him to obtain effectively an independent decree that would compel the mortgagor to pay sums found due to him.

The appellant's reliance on Govinda Taragan v. Veeran and Achutha Menon v. Subramania Patter was considered and rejected as supporting the appellant's broader proposition. The court explained that Govinda Taragan related to redemption proceedings between mortgagor and mortgagee (not the rights of puisne encumbrancers) and that Achutha Menon concerned a sub-mortgagee (an assignee) exercising the rights of the mortgagee who had sub-mortgaged the property; neither decision established that independent puisne mortgagees are decree-holders entitled to enforce by sale sums merely declared due to them where the Form 7 decree contains no direction for their redemption.

The court further observed that sections of the Transfer of Property Act (as interpreted in prior authorities) do not provide that a mortgagor may be called upon by a decree nisi to pay to a puisne encumbrancer what may be found due to him on his mortgage; therefore the mortgagor cannot incur liability to have his property sold by reason of non-payment of the dues of subsequent encumbrancers under such a decree.

On the point of execution and section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the court found that because the first respondent was not entitled to execute the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1910, section 47 had no application.

With respect to res judicata, the court reasoned that the present suit lies beyond the pecuniary limit of the District Munsif's jurisdiction where O.S. No. 61 of 1910 was filed, and relied upon Debendra Nath Sen v. Mirza Abdul Samed Seraji to hold that a puisne mortgagee's suit is barred by a prior suit only if his claim could have been satisfied from surplus sale-proceeds realized under the prior decree. Because those conditions were not met, the prior suit did not operate as res judicata to bar the present suit.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The Second Appeal is dismissed with costs.

Direct effects on the parties:

  • The decree of the Subordinate Judge (confirmed by the District Judge) in favour of the plaintiff (Nidhi) is affirmed by this court.
  • The appellant's contentions that the plaintiff's remedy was restricted to execution of the earlier decree and that the subsequent suit was barred by res judicata were rejected.
  • The court held that the first respondent was not entitled to execute the decree in O.S. No. 61 of 1910 for the purposes alleged, and consequently section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply in the circumstances of this case.

Broader implications:

  • The decision applies established authorities on the effect of a Form 7, Appendix D decree: a puisne mortgagee impleaded in such a suit normally has only contingent rights to redeem or to share in any surplus upon sale ordered for non-payment of the first mortgagee's decree, and does not acquire an independent executory decree against the mortgagor when the amount due to the first mortgagee has been paid.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it follows and applies existing case law to the facts before the court. If the opinion addresses no novel rule, the practical consequence is limited to the affirmance of the lower courts' judgment in this particular dispute.

    Vedavyasa Ayyar v. Madura Hindu Labha Nidhi Co., Limited

    Kumaraswami Sastri, J.:— The twelfth defendant is the appellant. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 mortgaged certain items of property to one Naga Ayyar who filed Original Suit No. 61 of 1910 on the file of the Court of the Principal District Munsif of Mudura to recover the sum due on his mortgage. He impleaded the puisne mortgagees, one of whom was the present plaintiff Nidhi. A decree was passed in Form 7, Appendix D, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The amounts due to the plaintiff in the suit and the puisne mortgagee defendant were declared but the sale of the mortgaged properties was ordered only in case the defendant did not pay the amount found due to the plaintiff and the only right given to the puisne mortgagees was to share in the surplus if any arising out of the sale. One of the items of property was brought to sale in execution of the decree but the plaintiff-decree-holder was satisfied as the amount due was paid under Order XXI, rule 89, of the Code of Civil Procedure and the sale set aside. The property was sold by private sale to the appellant. As he did not pay the amount found in O.S No. 61 of 1910 to be due to the first respondent herein he sued for the recovery of the amount due to him as his mortgagor. Various defences were raised, the chief of which were (1) that the remedy of the plaintiff was by executing the decree in O.S No. 61 of 1910 and not by separate suit and (2) that the second suit was barred-, the matter being res judieata. The Subordinate Judge overruled the objections raised and passed a decree which was confirmed by the District Judge.

    I am of opinion that the decision of the lower Courts is right. No doubt the present plaintiff Nidhi was a party to O.S No. 61 of 1910 as a puisne encumbrancer and the amount due to it was ascertained. The decree however did not direct redemption of the subsequent mortgagees and expressly authorized sale only in case the amount due to the first mortgagee was not paid within the time limited. The only right given to the puisne encumbrancers was the right to redeem the first mortgage and on sale to share in the surplus sale-proceeds in order of priority.

    In Sarat Chandra Roy Chowdhry v. Nahapiet(1), the effect of a decree drawn up under Form 7, Appendix D, of the Code was considered and Pugh, J., was of opinion that there was no right conferred on the second mortgagee to get any relief at all if the mortgagor satisfied the first mortgagee's claim. He observed:

    “In my view therefore under the Code the second mortgagee is there simply for the purpose as indicated by Brett and Mookekjee, JJ., in Mackintosh v. Watkins of receiving any surplus sale-proceeds or of redeeming and that he cannot take any independent action and treat the decree as in other respects in his favour.”

    Referring to Kissory Mohun Roy v. Kally Churn Ghose(2) the learned Judge distinguished the case on the ground that it related to a decree passed as in the Original Side of the High Court and in Mackintosh v. Watkins Brett, J., took the view that the practice and procedure followed on the Original Side was not to govern decrees passed by Courts in the mufassal which were governed by the Civil Procedure Code and the Transfer of Property Act.

    In Mackintosh v. Watkins it was held by Brett and Mookerjee, JJ., that in a suit by a first mortgagee impleading the mortgagor and the puisne mortgagees the mortgagor cannot be called upon to redeem the subsequent mortgagee defendants and that they are not entitled to have the property sold for non payment of the sums due to them. Brett, J., observed that

    “the object of impleading the puisne mortgagee was to enable the properly to be sold free from his encumbrance, and not to enable him to practically obtain a decree against the principal defendant without bringing a suit properly framed for the purpose.”

    The learned Judge was also of opinion that such a procedure would be opposed to the provisions of Chapter III of the Court Fees Act, Mookerjee, J., was of opinion that sections 86 to 89 of the Transfer of Property Act

    “do not provide that the mortgagor may be called upon by the decree nisi to pay to a puisne encumbrancer who has been joined as a party-defendant what may be found due to him on his mortgage; the mortgagor therefore cannot incur the liability to have his property sold by reason of non-payment of the dues of the subsequent encumbrancers.”

    He held that if the mortgagor-defendant pays to the plaintiff-mortgagee what may have been found due to him, the property was not liable to be sold under the decree in the suit at the instance of the second mortgagee. In Sururjiqur Begum v. Baredakant Mitter the same learned Judge was of opinion that if the amount due to the first mortgagee was paid there can be no sale, of the mortgaged properties and the puisne encumbrances would obtain no relief in the suit.

    It is contended for the appellant that in a mortgage suit when puisne encumbrances are made parties defendants there 13 a decree in favour of each of the mortgagees which can be executed by him and reliance has been placed on Govinda Taragan v. Veeran and the unreported decision in Achutha Menon v. Subramania Patter(3). I do not think these decisions support the broad propositions contended for. The former case related to a suit for redemption of a mortgage and it was held that paragraph 2 of section 93 of the Transfer of Property Act did not take away the right from the plaintiff-mortgagor to apply for a sale. The learned Judges, after discussing the right of the mortgagor and mortgagee, observe that in some cases provisions for sale may be as much for the benefit of the mortgagor as for the benefit of the mortgagee and that

    “where a decree is imperative there is no reason why the decree should not be regarded as passed or the benefit of all the parties to the suit.”

    They thought there was no reason for holding that any of the parties to the suit who would be benefited by the sale cannot apply for the enforcement of the decree. It should be observed that the suit was between mortgagor and mortgagee and no question arose as to the rights of puisne encumbrancers. The decree was for redemption and the only question was whether it was open to the plaintiff in a redemption suit to apply for sale under sections 92 and 93 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the present case there is nothing in the decree directing the mortgagor to pay off the subsequent mortgagees. The decree no doubt declared the amount due to them but this was only with the view of enabling them to share in the surplus, should the property be sold owing to non-payment of the sum due to the plaintiff who was the first mortgagee. The right of the subsequent mortgagees under the decree drawn up according to Form 7, Appendix D of the Code of Civil Procedure is contingent on the property being brought to sale for non-payment of the sum found due to the plaintiff-??? and the decree cannot be read a decree directing the mortgagor to redeem such of the ??? encumbrances within the time limited for redeeming the first mortgagee and to entitle the puisne encumbrancer on default to bring the property to sale for non-payment not of the sum decreed due to the first mortgagee but to each of them. The ??? that can be said is that if the first mortgagee not some reason or other does not apply for sale in spits of the fact that be has not been paid, the other mortgagees can apply for sale in order to work out the rights to share in the surplus if any. The quite different from their applying to sell the property to discharge the amount declared due to each of then. If the mortgagor pays off the amount for which alone a sale in default of payment was, directed, it is default to see how under the express terms of the decree each puisne encumbrancer can come forward and ask for sale. No time is fixed in the decree for redeeming them. There is no direction in the decree directing the mortgagee to pay them any amount and the right to share which is dependent on there being a sale and a surplus after paying off the plaintiff-mortgagee cannot he enforced if for any reason the sale cannot take place at the instance of the plaintiff. Reference has been made to the English practice us set out in Platt v. Mendel and Daniel's Chancery Practice, but it is unnecessary to consider whether having regard to the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act Courts in India can pass a decree directing plaintiff to redeem each of the puisne mortgagees and direct a sale at the instance of each of them in case of his failure to do so. No such decree has been passed in the present case. In Aahutha Menon v. Subramania Patter the sub-mortgagee applied to enforce the decree in favour of his mortgagor who was the mortgagee from the owner of the property. All that was held was that he was entitled to apply for execution and to work out his rights by the sale of the property. The sale was to be for the amount directed in the decree to be paid by the original mortgagor to the mortgagee who in turn sub mortgaged the property to the defendant. There is nothing in the judgment which suggests that puisne mortgagees should be treated as decree holders entitled to bring property to sale in default of payment of that sura declared to be due to them, though the decree contains no direction that they should be redeemed or that property should be sold in default of payment of the sums declared to be due to the puisne mortgagees. The sub-mortgagee is an assignee of the original mortgagee and his being allowed to work oui his rights by doing what his mortgagor could have done would not confer similar rights on third parties claiming on their own right.

    As the first respondent was not entitled to execute the decree in O.S No. 61 of 1910, section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no application.

    As regards the question of res judicata the present suit is beyond the pecuniary limit of the jurisdiction of the District Munsif. O.S No. 61 of 1910 which was on the file of the District Munsi's Court; cannot render the present suit res judicata. Moreover, as pointed out in Debendra Nath Sen v. Mirza Abdul Samed Seraji, a suit by a puisne mortgagee who is a party to a prior suit by another mortgage can only he barred if the puisne mortgagee is in a position to have his claim satisfied from the surplus sale-proceeds realized in execution of the decree on the prior suit.

    The Second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    Phillips, J.:— I agree.

    N.R

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    Comments

    Vedavyasa Ayyar v. Madura Hindu Labha Nidhi Co., Limited
    (Aug 27, 1918)