We are unable to agree with the Lower Courts on the question of limitation. As Benson, J., said in Kristnama Chariar v. Mangammal:
“All periods of limitation are more or less arbitrary and it is of the highest “importance that they should be laid down with clearness and certainty, and that “subtle distinctions, not warranted by the language of the Legislature, should not “be introduced by the Courts.”
Again, as Sir Bhashyam Aiyangar, J., said in the same case at page 96:
“There connot be two final decrees in such a suit one by the Court of First “Instance and the other by the Court of Appeal.”
The question of limitation ought not to be made to depend upon the other question (which is almost always a very difficult and doubtful one) whether the appeal by one of the defendants, or as regards a part of the decree of the First Court, imperils the decree passed against the other defendants, or the other portion of the decree. [See also Loke Nath Singh v. Gaju Singh]. Whether when the decree of the First Court itself consists plainly of two definitely independent decrees, the appeal against one of the two decrees would prevent time from running as regards the other decree [See Mrs. Christiana Benshawn v. Benarasi Prosad Chowdhury(3)], need not be considered for the decision of this appeal, though it should not be supposed that we agree with the decision in Mrs. Christiana Benshawn v. Benarasi Prosad Chowdhury. In the present case, the decree of the Court of First Instance was a single decree against both defendants.
As regards the right of the decree-holder on record to execute a decree, notwithstanding transfers to others who have not been recognized as decree-holders, we shall follow the decision in Silu Peda Yelligady v. Sri Raja Ravu Venkata Kumara Mahipati Surya Rao Bahadur(4), which is in favour of the right of the decree-holder on record. The Lower Court's orders are set aside and execution is ordered as prayed for. Costs of the appellant in all Courts should be paid by the respondents.
Order set aside.