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    Thekkedath Neelu Neithiar And Another ( Petitioners). v. Subramania Moothan And Another S(S, Counter-Petitioners):

    A preliminary objection is taken to the hearing of the appeal against appellate order on the ground that no second appeal lies. The application was by the judgment-debtor to set aside the sale on various grounds. Many of them would be covered by O. 21, R. 90. There is one allegation at least which is outside its scope. That allegation is that no notice was given to defendants 5 and 23 as required by R.66, O. 21 before the proclamation was settled. It was suggested that this is a matter relating to the publication or the conduct of the sale. We do not agree with this contention. There are at least three stages contemplated by R. 66. First the settlement of the proclamation, then its publication and lastly the conduct of the sale in pursuance of it. The first of these stages is not a matter connected with the publication of the conduct of the sale. On the other hand, it is clearly anterior to both these processes. Now comes the question, as this complaint against the sale is not covered by Sect. 90, whether a second appeal lies. It has been held in Anantharama Iyer v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma, a ground for setting aside a sale may be alleged de hors R. 90; and that such an allegation would be covered by Sect. 47. It was contended by the learned vakil for the respondent, that even if the application was within Sect. 47, if it can also be brought under R. 90 of O. 21, there will be no second appeal by virtue of the prohibition contained in Sect. 104, Cl. (2). Asimaddi Sheikh v. Sundari Bibi, and Sheo Prasad Singh v. Premna Kunwar, have taken this view. Anantharama Iyar v. Kuttimalu Kovilamma, impliedly accepts this principle. However that may be, we are clear that the ground of complaint relating to the violation of R. 66 can only be considered under Sect. 47. Therefore there is an appeal and a second appeal against a decision relating thereto. We overrule the preliminary objection. On the merits, the point most pressed by Mr. Madhavan Nair is that the failure to give notice before settling the proclamation was an act of fraud which resulted in his clients being kept ignorant of the subsequent sale and that therefore they are entitled to rely on Sect. 18 of the Limitation Act to save the bar. We must say that this allegation is not clearly made, but looking to the place in which it appears, we are not satisfied that the appellant did not complain of this procedure on the part of the decree-holder as fraudulent.

    The Courts below, especially the Lower Appellate Court in dealing with the question of fraud, have relied on decisions which lay down that in order that Sect. 18 may be applied, the fraud must be subsequent to the sale and not anterior. At this stage of the case, we prefer to express no opinion on this point. In our opinion, it is necessary that the Subordinate Judge should be directed to find specifically, whether the decree-holder fraudulently failed to give notice to defendants 5 and 23 as required by O. 21, R. 66. On the return of the finding the question of materiality of the damage and its relation to the irregularity will be considered, as well as the question of law whether the fraud should be subsequent to the sale if Sect. 18 is to be applied. Finding will be submitted in six weeks and seven days are allowed for filing objections.

    In compliance with the order contained in the above judgment the Temporary Subordinate Judge of Ottapalam submitted the following

    FINDING

    “I find that the failure to give notice under O. 21, R. 66, was due to inadvertence on the part of the executing Court and that the decree-holder was not responsible for it in any way.”

    This Second Appeal coming on for final hearing after return of the findings of the Lower Appellate Court upon the issues referred by this Court for trial the Court delivered the following

    JUDGMENT

    The finding is not attacked; and therefore, accepting it, we dismiss from consideration the argument based on Sect. 18 of the Limitation Act.

    It is then contended that, as the petitioners were parties to the litigation, the article of Schedule I of the Limitation Act to be applied is No. 181, not No. 166. This is contended, with reference to the recent decision of the Full Bench in A.A.A.O No. 106 of 1917, since reported in 10 L.W, 410. But that decision dealt with a claim to apply Art. 165; and we do not think that its application and that of Art. 166 stand on the same footing or can be dealt with on similar considerations. We have not been shown reasons for restricting the very comprehensive wording of the latter to exclude the present case.

    Lastly it is urged that the sale is unsustainable on its merits, because owing to the absence of notice to petitioners of the proceedings for framing proclamation it was held without jurisdiction and is a nullity. Shyam Mandal v. Satinath Banerjeei, is referred to in this connection. But there the notice, absence of which was relied on, was one required by O. 21, R. 22 and its issue was a condition precedent to the validity of any execution proceedings. The notice referred to in O. 21, R. 66 is an incident in the course of execution proceedings, the validity of which is independent of it. Taking this view we disallow this contention also. The appeal against appellate order is dismissed with costs.

    S.SAppeal dismissed.

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    Thekkedath Neelu Nei... v. Subramania Moothan A...
    (Aug 21, 1919)