Kulwant Sahay, J.:— (after stating the facts as set out above, proceeded as follows): The only question is as to whether the suit is barred by limitation.
The determination of this question depends on the determination of the status of the mahanth of a math. The property admittedly was endowed property and belonged to the math. The question as regards the true position of a mahanth of a math in relation to the properties belonging to the math or to any idol in the math has been considered in a number of cases. His position has been expressed variously in various decisions. Sometimes his position is described as that, of a life-tenant, sortie times as that of a trustee, in some cases he is described to hold the position of a guardian of a minor, and in some cases he is described as a corporation sole. The question, however, was considered by the Privy Council in a very recent case in Sri Vidya Varuthi Tirtha Swamigal v. Balusami Ayyar and it was held that the mahants of maths, called by whatever names, are only the managers or custodians of the institution and that in no case is any property conveyed to or vested in them; nor are they “trustees” in the English sense of the word, although they are answer-able as trustees in the general sense for maladministration. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that the position of a mahanth of a math was that of a life-tenant. This view was taken by the Madras High Court in Vidyaporna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami where the learned Judges observed that the mahanth is, as he would be described in England, a “corporation sole” having an estate for life in the permanent endowments of the math and an absolute property in the income derived from offerings, subject only to the burden of maintaining the institution; but in a later Full Bench decision of the same Court in Kailasam Pillai v. Natraja Thambiran it was held that it could not be predicated of the head of a math that, as such he holds the math properties as a life-tenant or trustee. The view taken in Vidyaporna Tirtha Swami v. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami was disapproved of by the Privy Council in the case of Sri Vidya Varuthi Tirtha Swamigal v. Balusam Ayyar referred to above. The learned Subordinate Judge was wrong in his view that the position of each succeeding mahanth was that of a life-tenant.
The question; as to whether each succeeding mahanth gets a fresh start of limitation from the date of his succession as mahanth was directly raised and considered in several cases. In Nilmony Singh v. Jagabandhu Roy, Bannerji, J., after considering the position of a mahanth of a math, held that although it is true that an idol holds a property in an ideal sense, and its acts relating to any property must be done by or through its manager or shebait, yet that does not show that each succeeding manager gets a fresh start as far as the question of limitation is concerned on the ground of his not deriving title from any previous manager. The succeeding shebaits were considered as forming a continuing representation of the idol's property. In Damodar Das v. Lakhan Das it was held by the Privy Council, affirming the decision of the High Court at Calcutta, that the property vested not in the mahanth but, in the legal entity, the idol, the mahanth being only its representative and manager and that the title of a transferee from the mahanth became adverse to the right of the idol and of the senior chela as representing that idol and that the suit brought by the successor or that chela was barred by limitation. In Madhusudan Mandai v. Radhika Prasanna Das it was held by Mookerjee and Beachcroft, J.J, that the effect of a lease granted by a shebait in excess of his authority is not to give each succeeding shebait a new cause of action for setting aside the alienation, and adverse possession commences from the date of the original disposition of the property and is not interrupted by the death of the original shebait and the succession of the new shebait, and that case succeeding shebait does not get a new start, for the purpose of limitation.
It is clear from these authorities that the plaintiff in the present case could not get a fresh start for the purposes of limitation from the date of his succession as mahanth. The possession of the transferee became adverse to the institution from the date of the transfer upon the finding that the transfer was without any legal and justifying necessity; but even assuming that his possession was permissive during the lifetime of the vendor Ram Kishun Gir, the cause of action in any event accrued on the death of Ram Kishun Gir, and it is admitted that Ram Kishun Gir died more than twelve years before the suit. The succeeding mahanths represented the institution completely and the defendant did acquire a title by adverse possession for more than twelve years not only from the date of his purchase but also from the death of the vendor.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the decision of the learned Subordinate Judge cannot stand. The result is that the appeal is decreed. The decree of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and that of the Munsif restored. The appellant is entitled to his costs.
Mullick, J.:— I agree.
Appeal decreed.