Ross, J.:— These are appeals by the tenants against decrees in suits for rent; and the question is as to the rate of rent. The tenants pleaded the rate recorded in the record-of-rights and the plaintiffs' claim which has been decreed, is at a much higher rate—in some cases more than double as great. It appears that after a case under section 103, Bengal Tenancy Act in the settlement proceedings, the plaintiffs brought suits for rent and these suits were determined by compromises and the decision of the present appeals turns on the question of the validity of these compromise decrees. The rate agreed to in the compromises was admittedly a rate which exceeded the khatian rate by more than 2 annas in the rupee; and the compromises were bad unless there was a bona fide dispute as to the rate of rent. And the first argument of the learned Advocate for the appellants is that there is no evidence of any bona-fide dispute about the rate of rent before the date of the compromises. He points out that the village papers which were produced by the plaintiffs relating to the years 1308 to 1318 had not been relied upon by the Courts below. But there is evidence after the compromises which affords ground for concluding that these compromises must have settled a bona fide dispute, because the tenants subsequently complied with their terms. Thus in a long series of village papers from 1319 to 1328 the collections show the compromise rates; and these papers have been believed. Moreover in the suit out of which second appeal no. 547 arises there were road-cess returns filed by the tenants which expressly referred to these compromises; and in the suit out of which second appeal no. 548 arises there were ijara deeds executed by the tenant the rate of rent in which shows that the compromises had been accepted. It is contended that these road-cess returns and ijara deeds can only bind the tenants in these particular suits. But apart altogether from the question of the collection papers which have been believed and which relate to all the suits, these road-cess returns and ijara deeds having been submitted and executed by certain of the tenants, they gave rise to an inference that the compromises were genuine compromises by the tenants as a whole.
Then it was said that the compromises were a nullity, because of the provisions of clause (3) of section 147-A, which had not been shown to have been complied with and reference was made to a decision of my own in Kunj Behary Chaudhury v. Charan Singh. I am bound to say that I now consider that decision was wrong. It followed Sarjugsharan v. Dukhit, which has subsequently been dissented from by the Calcutta High Court in Ishan Chandra v. Moomraj; and there was in fact an earlier decision by a Division Bench of this Court, which was a binding authority but which was not cited in the argument, to the opposite effect: Deolagan Singh v. Gulbansi Koer. This argument therefore fails.
The last point taken was that all the tenants were not parties to the compromises and that at the utmost there can only be a money decree against those tenants who were actual parties. Reference was made to the finding of the learned Munsif where he pointed out that in several cases the compromise decrees contained only one name whereas the khatian entry in respect of the same holdings contained several names. Now the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge in appeal is that the village papers from the year 1319 downwards show that the defendants who entered into these compromise petitions were recorded as tenants of the holdings in the landlord's collection papers and that therefore the holdings were represented by them. This is a finding of fact which concludes this argument.
The appeals must be dismissed with costs.
Das, J.:— I agree.
Appeals dismissed.