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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Verma and Yorke, JJ.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a first appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for recovery of two sums — Rs. 3,500 and Rs. 5,000 — which the plaintiff alleged had been deposited with the defendants' family banking firm on 8 July 1930 and 16 July 1931 respectively. The plaintiff relied on two “chitthi” (letters/promissory notes) signed by Durga Prasad (and in one instance also by his munim Roshan Lal) stating specified interest rates and promising payment on demand.

The plaintiff's pleaded case was that an ancestral joint family banking business ("karobar banking") had been carried on by the family of Seth Ram Chander Das (who died about 1924), then by his son Durga Prasad (who died 7 August 1931), and thereafter by certain nephews/relatives (Anand Prasad, Har Prasad and Kanti Prasad). The suit was filed on 5 July 1933 and repeatedly stated that the transactions were deposits (not loans).

The defendants denied the existence of a banking business, characterising the family as a joint zamindari family and asserting that the amounts represented personal borrowings by Durga Prasad and thus were not binding on them. The learned Subordinate Judge framed three issues, heard evidence (documentary and oral), and dismissed the suit — holding that no ancestral joint family banking business was proved, the sums were not deposited as alleged, and the debt was not binding on the defendants. The present appeal challenges that dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Was any ancestral joint family banking business carried on by Durga Prasad in 1930 and 1931?
  2. Was the money in suit deposited by the plaintiff with the said banking firm?
  3. Is the debt in question binding upon the defendants and/or are they personally liable?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff maintained that the transactions were deposits with the defendants' family bank (karobar banking), not loans, and relied on the two chitthis as evidence of deposit arrangements bearing specified interest rates payable on demand.
  • The plaintiff produced a large volume of documentary evidence and oral testimony intended to show that a banking business was carried on by the family rather than mere moneylending (len den).
  • The plaintiff argued that the defendants had account books which they failed to produce; he contended that non-production supported an inference that those books would have shown deposits and sums due to the plaintiff.
  • As an alternative, the plaintiff relied on precedent (Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay and related cases) to argue that if there were an ancestral family business of moneylending/trading then debts contracted by the family manager (karta) in the course of that business would bind the family.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The defendants contended there never was any family banking business; the family were a joint zamindari and did not operate as bankers.
  • They asserted the amounts were personal borrowings (loans) of Durga Prasad, who had a reputation as a spendthrift, and thus such borrowings were not binding on the defendants as members of the joint family.
  • The defendants denied possession of relevant account books for the years in question and resisted any inference from non-production, pointing out that the plaintiff did not follow the statutory/ procedural method (Order XI, Rules 12 & 13, CPC) to obtain production.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Foley v. Hill Origin of the common-law conception that a banker, in the ordinary course of business, honours cheques drawn upon him by depositors — used in defining “banker”. Cited (via a standard treatise) to illustrate the classical definition of “banker” and to contrast the functions of a bank with mere moneylending; court used this to frame inquiry into whether the family acted as bankers.
In re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society Authorities on what constitutes banking activity; used in defining and distinguishing banking functions. Referred to in the discussion of authoritative definitions of banking to test whether the family's activities met those criteria; the court observed that the presence of promissory notes undermined the assertion of banking operations.
Dharam Das v. Ganga Devi Consideration of Articles 59 and 60 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act and the principle that article 60 was not intended to apply to transactions regarded by law as loans. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that ordinary dealings between a native banker and customers are often loans in nature, and to show that certain limitation provisions are not applicable where transactions are loans.
Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranji Singh (Privy Council) Principle that courts should not draw adverse inferences from non-production of documents unless proper discovery procedure has been invoked; the burden lies on the party alleging non-production to take statutory steps. The court applied this principle to reject the plaintiff's argument that the defendants' alleged failure to produce account books warranted an inference that the books would have supported the plaintiff's case, noting the plaintiff had not followed Order XI rules 12 & 13 CPC.
Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay Principle that where an ancestral family carries on a trade, the managing member has implied authority to contract debts for the business and those debts may bind the family. Relied upon by the plaintiff as an alternative argument. The court reviewed the principle but held it applies only where an ancestral trading/moneylending business is proved; here, evidence did not establish such a business, so the principle was inapplicable.
Baba Din v. Bansraj Affirmation of the Raghunathji Tarachand principle regarding implied authority of the managing member where an ancestral business exists. Cited by the court as an illustration of the same principle; the court reiterated that the principle applies only if an ancestral business is established on the evidence, which was not the case here.
Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lal Illustrative authority on application of the ancestral-business principle (family business enabling implied authority). Referred to by the court as an example where the principle is applicable; used to show that the present record did not justify such a finding of ancestral business.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a stepwise analysis, tying legal principle to the evidentiary record:

  1. Character of the instruments and the transactions: The court examined the two chitthis (promissory notes) and found their wording (“having borrowed”, the use of “udhar lekar” in the first chitthi) and form strongly indicated that the sums were advances to Durga Prasad (i.e., loans), not deposits in a banking business. The court observed that the notes promised payment on demand and recorded an interest rate.
  2. Distinction between banking and moneylending: The court noted the established definitions of banking (citing standard authorities such as Tannan's treatise and leading cases like Foley v. Hill and In re Birkbeck) — emphasizing essential banking functions (receipt of current deposits, honoring cheques, etc.). It acknowledged that certain native banking practices (kothis) might differ from the strict definition but held that the presence of promissory notes in this case undermined the claim that the family were bankers.
  3. Assessment of documentary evidence: The plaintiff produced various documents (decrees, plaints, bonds, suits) which the court found did not, in themselves, demonstrate a banking business; at most they suggested moneylending or ordinary zamindari-related transactions. Mortgages, plaints and decrees in favour of Seth Ram Chander Das and suits founded on bonds in Durga Prasad's favour were not evidence of a banking business.
  4. Assessment of oral evidence: The court reviewed the oral testimony (seven witnesses plus the plaintiff) and accepted the Subordinate Judge's critique that these witnesses were not reliable on the crucial point of establishing a banking business; the court refused to place reliance on that oral evidence.
  5. Non-production of account books: The plaintiff's contention that defendants possessed and withheld account books was rejected. The court emphasised that where a party alleges a document in the other side's possession, the correct recourse is to seek production under the statutory/procedural framework (Order XI, Rules 12 & 13 CPC). The court relied on Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranji Singh to hold that no adverse inference should be drawn from non-production in the absence of compliance with those procedures.
  6. Applicability of ancestral-business doctrine: The plaintiff's fallback argument that, even if loans, the debts would bind the family as part of an ancestral moneylending/trading business (relying on Raghunathji Tarachand and Baba Din) was considered. The court stated that the doctrine applies only where an ancestral family business of trading or moneylending is proved. On the evidence, the court found that the family did some len den and other activities incidental to managing zamindari but that this did not establish an ancestral business of borrowing and lending sufficient to invoke the rule. The court also cited Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lal as an example where the principle applies.
  7. Conclusion from evidence: Synthesising the above, the court concluded that the transactions in question were loans taken by Durga Prasad and that the plaintiff had not proved legal necessity (i.e., that the loans were contracted in the ordinary course of an ancestral family business), partly because the plaintiff had deliberately framed the suit as one based on deposit rather than loan yet failed to establish the necessary facts for a deposit-based claim. The Subordinate Judge's factual findings (failure to prove a banking business, failure to show deposits, no personal liability of the defendants) were affirmed.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed; the judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge dismissing the plaintiff's suit is affirmed, and the appeal fails with costs.

Direct effect: The plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 3,500 and Rs. 5,000, pleaded as deposits in a family banking business, remains dismissed. The court treated the two instruments as evidence of loans to Durga Prasad and held that the plaintiff did not establish either a family banking business or an ancestral moneylending business that would render the entire joint family liable.

The opinion limits its holding to the facts and evidence before the court and applies existing authorities on (a) the distinction between banking and moneylending, (b) the consequences of non-production of documents where the statutory procedure was not followed, and (c) the narrow circumstances in which debts contracted by a family manager will bind the family. The decision thus resolves the dispute between these parties on the record without expanding legal principle beyond those established authorities.

    Gordhan Das v. Anand Prasad

    Verma and Yorke, JJ.:— This is a first appeal by the plaintiff in a suit for the recovery of two sums of Rs. 3,500 and Rs. 5,000 alleged by the plaintiff to have been deposited by him with the banking firm of the defendants' family on the 8th July, 1930, and the 16th July, 1931. The plaintiff alleged that on each occasion he was given what he called a “chitthi” or letter signed by the then manager of the family business, Durga Prasad, stating the interest on the first deposit as 0-10-6 per mensem and that on the second deposit as 0-11-0 per mensem. According to the plaintiff's case there had been a banking business (karobar banking) in the family of the defendants from the time of their grandfather Seth Ram Chander Das, who died about the year 1924. It was alleged that after the death of Seth Ram Chander Das this business was managed by his son Durga Prasad, who died on the 7th of August, 1931, leaving a widow Mst. Bhupi Kunwar, defendant No. 4. Plaintiff further alleged that this business was continued by the defendants Anand Prasad, Har Prasad and Kanti Prasad, of whom Kanti Prasad is a minor and Har Prasad deaf and dumb, sons of Jyoti Prasad, Durga Prasad's brother, who had died in 1923, predeceasing his father Seth Ram Chander Das. The suit was filed on the 5th July, 1933, and it was definitely and clearly, in a series of different paragraphs of the plaint, alleged that the claim was based on deposit and not on loan. The object of this allegation in, the plaint is entirely free from doubt. If there was in the family of Seth Ram Chander Das, Durga Prasad and the present defendants a banking business, then no question would arise of legal necessity or of any of the points which ordinarily arise in cases of loan, whereas prima facie, as the suit contained a reference to two chitthis, which by appearance are promissory notes, the suit should have been an ordinary money suit based on loans taken by Durga Prasad. To avoid the necessity of proving legal necessity the suit was carefully framed as a suit in which no plea of absence of legal necessity would be open to the defendants.

    On behalf of the defendants a number of pleas were taken. It was contended that there never was any banking business of the family. It was said that the family of Seth Ram Chander Das, his sons and grandsons was a joint family which possessed joint family property in the shape of zamindari. As regards these two amounts evidenced by the promissory notes it was said that these were not deposits but personal borrowings by Durga Prasad, who, it was said, had been a spendthrift and had found himself in a position of freedom from restraint upon the death of his father Ram Chander Das and had proceeded to incur numerous debts. It was pleaded that these being personal borrowings of Durga Prasad, even if taken by him as manager of the family estate, they were not binding upon the defendants.

    The learned Subordinate Judge framed three issues:

    (1) Was any ancestral joint family banking business carried on by Durga Prasad in 1930 and 1931 (the years in which these two transactions took place)?

    (2) Was the money in suit deposited by the plaintiff with the said banking firm?

    (3) Is the debt in question binding upon the defendants and/or they are personally liable?

    He dealt with the first two issues together and he held that the plaintiff had completely failed to establish that Durga Prasad was carrying on any joint family banking business in 1930 and 1931, and he also held that the money in suit was not deposited with Durga Prasad in connection with any joint family banking business. On the third issue he held that the debt in question was not binding upon the defendants and that they were not personally liable.

    Before dealing with the arguments in the case we think it necessary to emphasise the fact that, the plaintiff's case, deliberately so stated by him, was that the family of Seth Ram Chander Das, his sons and grandsons had a joint family business which was a banking business in which members of the public used to make deposits of money. The phrase “karobar banking” is used in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the plaint, and in paragraph 3 of the plaint it is said that “The banking business continued for the benefit of the members of the family and all the members were benefited thereby. Other persons also considered this business as reliable and firm, and people used to deposit their money with the defendants' on interest.” In paragraph 4 it is said that the plaintiff too reposed much confidence and had reliance on the banking business of the defendants and consequently he also deposited money with the joint family of the defendants. He should of course have said “in the defendants' bank”, but there is no room for doubt about the nature of the claim which was being made.

    The first question in the case is whether these two sums of money were actually advanced to Durga Prasad. On that question we feel no doubt, in view of the two chitthis or promissory notes, dated Asarh Sudi 13, Sambat 1987, and Asarh doem Sudi Ekam, Sambat 1988. The wording is much the same in each. It runs: “To Messrs Hira Lal Gordhan Das. From Ram Chandra Das Durga Prasad, Saharanpur. Our compliments to you. We having borrowed” (in the second chitthi, “taken”) “Rs. 3,500 from you have credited the same to you and we shall pay interest thereon at the rate of 0-10-6” (in the second, “0-11-0”) “and shall pay the money to you on demand. Letter written on….” The first letter is signed by Roshan Lal, munim, and Durga Prasad, and the second by Durga Prasad only. Evidence has been given in support of these two promissory notes and it can hardly be doubted that these two sums were paid over to Durga Prasad. We may note that in the first of these two chitthis the words used for “having borrowed” are “udhar lekar”, which clearly suggest a loan rather than a deposit.

    On behalf of the plaintiff a large volume of documentary evidence was produced which was intended to show that a banking business was carried on and not merely that Seth Ram Chandra Das and after him Seth Durga Prasad did a certain amount of what is commonly called “len den”, that is moneylending. Learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant has taken us through a whole series of documents which, he argued, induce an inference that a banking business was carried on. We may note first that there is a broad distinction between a banking business and a moneylending business (though it is questionable whether the evidence would even be sufficient to establish that Seth Ram Chandra Das and after him Seth Durga Prasad actually carried on a moneylending “business” and did not rather do a certain amount of moneylending along with management of their zamindari and transactions in connection with, for example, grain). In this connection we have been referred to Tannan's Banking Law and Practice in India, second edition, 1933, which is said to be a standard work on banking in this country. The author remarks at page 30:

    “There being no statutory definition to guide, some of the leading writers on banking law have, from time to time, attempted to define the terms. Dr. Herbert L. Hart, author of the well known treatise ‘Law of Banking’ says (page 1): ‘A banker is one who, in the ordinary course of his business, honours cheques drawn upon him by persons from and for whom he receives money on current accounts.’ This definition is based upon the dicta given in a number of decisions beginning with Foley v. Hill(1). According to this definition the essential function to enable a person, firm or institution to be regarded as a banker or a bank is that of receiving current deposits against which cheques are to be drawn.”

    The learned author goes on to refer to some cases and particularly to In re Birkbeck Permanent Benefit Building Society(2), and to a definition given by Sir John Paget, whom he describes as another great authority. He quotes as follows from Sir John:

    “It is a fair deduction,” says Sir John Paget, reviewing the Birkbeck Building Society case and other legal decisions, “that no person or body, corporate or otherwise, can be a banker who does not (1) take deposit accounts, (2) take current accounts, (3) issue and pay cheques and (4) collect cheques crossed and uncrossed for his customers.”

    We are prepared to concede (subject to the remarks contained in a decision of this Court to which we shall refer at a later stage) that some modifications of this strict view may be necessary in dealing with the case of what we may call “native banks” of the kind which were generally called kothis. These kothis, we understand, used to keep accounts which were accepted as final by all who had to deal with them. They gave no receipts and no pass books and did not make use of cheques, but they operated more or less as bankers receiving deposits and making payments against those deposits on demand. In point of fact the very existence of the two promissory notes signed by Durga Prasad in the present case itself throws a doubt on the allegation that the defendants' family were bankers in any sense whatever. With these preliminary remarks we may come first, as learned counsel has chosen, to deal, with the evidence in that order, to the documentary evidence.

    Learned counsel refers first to two decrees in favour of Seth Ram Chandra Das, one a mortaore decree and the other a money decree. Neither of these is any indication of the existence of a “banking” business. He took us next to a number of plaints and decrees in suits instituted by Durga Prasad. In one such case the defendant had executed a mortgage in favour of the sons and grandsons of Seth Ram Chandra Das. It is true that there were a number of such plaints and decrees but the existence of such plaints and decrees which make no reference to any banking business is no indication whatever that the family of the defendants ever had anything in the nature of a “banking” business.

    Learned counsel came next to plaints instituted after Durga Prasad's death on the basis of bonds executed in his favour. He laid stress on the fact that the occupation of the plaintiff was described as moneylending, but again it can only be said that moneylending is an entirely different thing from banking and even if Seth Ram Chandra Das did some moneylending and after him his son Durga Prasad continued to do some moneylending and after their death Durga Prasad's nephews, the sons of Jyoti Prasad, continued to do some moneylending, that would not enable the plaintiff to get a decree against the defendants unless he could prove that legal necessity existed for the loans, which might of course be proved by showing that the loans were taken in the ordinary course of business. That, however, was not the case of the plaintiff who laid himself out from the very start to avoid any risk of being put to proof of legal necessity.

    [The rest of the documentary evidence was then fully discussed.]

    Reliance has further been placed on behalf of the plaintiff on the oral evidence of seven witnesses apart from the plaintiff himself. Those witnesses have been criticised in detail by the learned Subordinate Judge and we think that he has rightly refused to place any reliance upon them.

    We think that neither the documentary evidence nor the oral evidence is of the smallest service to establish that Seth Ram Chandra Das or Seth Durga Prasad or the present defendants have ever carried on any banking business. It follows that the amounts in sum cannot have been deposited with Durga Prasad as alleged by the plaintiff. There is nothing whatever in this case to indicate that with either Seth Ram Chandra Das or any members of the family there have ever been made deposits against which the depositors could withdraw money either by cheque or by any other means whenever they liked to withdraw it. On the contrary what is proved is that Durga Prasad took two loans of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 3,500 and it was for the plaintiff to establish that those loans were taken, for legal necessity and created debts by which the whole joint family including the present defendants were bound.

    Learned counsel for the respondents has referred us in this connection to a decision of this Court to which we think it desirable to refer. In Dharam Das v. Ganga Devi, a Bench of this Court had to consider articles 59 and 60 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. In discussing this matter they said that it was not easy to say to what class of cases the legislature meant article 60 to apply, but they found it unnecessary to come to a decision on the point, “holding, as we do, that it is not intended to apply to a transaction which is regarded by the law as a loan.” They went on to remark: “Now the authorities cited by the appellants clearly lay down that ordinary dealings between a native banker and his customers are in the nature of loans made by the latter to the former.” They accordingly refused to apply article 60 which provides for money deposited under an agreement that it shall be payable on demand, including money of a customer in the hands of his banker so payable, a period of three years which begins to run from the date when the demand is made.

    Learned counsel for the appellant has attempted to support his case that there was a banking business by insistence on the plea that the defendants were in possession of account books which they had failed to produce. The irresistible inference, he says, is that these account books would have shown that Ram Chandra Das and Durga Prasad after him and the defendants had a banking business which would have been apparent had these account books been produced…. Anandi Prasad defendant has denied receipt of account books from Durga Prasad and the only direct cross-examination on this point was aimed at eliciting an admission that he had produced account books before the Income-tax Officer. It is clear that Anandi Prasad was not bound to produce his account books in support of his own case if he did not think those account books to be useful or relevant evidence to prove his case, assuming of course that those account books existed. In actual fact the written statement had been filed on 14th August, 1933, and a statement was made by the defendants' counsel on 29th August that Anandi Prasad was not in possession of any bahi khatas, that is bahi khatas relating to the years 1930 and 1931 and, we suppose, earlier. The position taken up by the plaintiff was that the statement made by Anandi Prasad's counsel on the 29th August, 1933, was untrue, and on the 24th October, 1933, he made an unusual application in which he began by saying that the defendants had denied the existence of their account books. He went on to say that in fact account books had been kept and would show the money due to the plaintiff and other persons credited in those account books, and he said that was why the defendants did not want to produce them. He went on to ask that the defendants should be ordered to obtain and produce a copy of the statements and orders relating to assessment of income-tax passed against Durga Prasad and the defendants from the year 1925 up to the year 1931, the cost of which the plaintiff was ready to pay. The plaintiff of course could not himself obtain these copies from the income-tax department. For the appellant it is contended that this was a sufficient notice of demand to the defendants to produce their account books. On the other hand it has been contended on behalf of the respondents that no presumption can be drawn against a party for non-production of a document unless the party which wants that party to produce it has served upon him the necessary notice and followed the procedure prescribed by law. That procedure is laid down in order XI, rules 12 and 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it is not disputable in the present case that the plaintiff had entirely omitted to do anything of the kind. In this connection we may refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Bilas Kunwar v. Desraj Ranji Singh, where their Lordships said with reference to certain accounts not produced:

    “These books do not necessarily form any part of the plaintiff's case; it is of course possible that some entries might have appeared therein relating to the bungalow (the property in suit). But it is open to a litigant to refrain from, producing any documents that he considers irrelevant; if the other litigant is dissatisfied, it is for him to apply for an affidavit of documents, and he can obtain inspection and production of all that appear to him in such affidavit to be relevant and proper. If he fails so to do, neither he nor the court at his suggestion is entitled to draw any inference as to the contents of any such documents…. It is for the litigant who desires to rely on the contents of documents to put them in evidence in the usual and proper way; if he fails to do so no inference in his favour can be drawn as to the contents thereof.”

    In the present case if it was the plaintiff's contention that the defendants were in possession of account books which they were refusing to produce he should have taken steps in accordance with the law. Not having done so he is not entitled to ask the court to draw any inference from the non-production of those documents.

    Learned counsel for the plaintiff appellant has sought to fall back on an alternative case that this was an ancestral family business of moneylending, and it is suggested, relying upon Raghunathji Tarachand v. Bank of Bombay, that in these circumstances even if these were loans, yet being loans taken by the karta of the family and part of a series of transactions by the family, they must be treated as taken in the course of the family business of borrowing and lending money. In that case it was held by Chandavarkar, J., that

    “Under Hindu law a joint family which carries on a trade handed down from its ancestors becomes a trading family; trade being one of its kulacharas (duty or practice), it attracts to itself all the necessary incidents of trade. The rule of Hindu law that debts contracted by a managing member of a joint family are binding on the other members only when they are for a family purpose is subject to at least one important exception. Where a family carries on a business or profession and maintains itself by means of it, the member who manages it for the family has an implied authority to contract debts for its purposes, and the creditor is not bound to inquire into the purpose of the debt in order to bind the whole family thereby, because that power is necessary for the very existence of the family.”

    Reference was also made to a case of the Judicial Commissioner's Court of Oudh in which the case of Raghunathji Tarachand was followed. This is Baba Din v. Bansraj, in which it was held that:

    “Where a family carries on a business or profession and maintains itself by means of it, the member who manages it for the family has an implied authority to contract debts for its purposes, and the creditor is not bound to inquire into the finances of the business, so long as that business forms the purpose of the debts, in order to bind the whole family thereby, became the power to contract debts is incidental to the carrying on of the business, from which the family derives its means of subsistence and support.”

    In order, however, to make the principles set out in these two decisions applicable it has to be found first that there was a family business or rather, we would say, an ancestral family business of trading or money-lending involving both borrowing and lending. Incidentally the business of “len den” by no means invariably involves the assumption that the moneylender is himself in the habit of taking loans. It will be sufficient for us to say that in our judgment this principle is only applicable in cases where there is an ancestral business; vide for example the decision of this Court in Ram Nath v. Chiranji Lal. The evidence on the record does not justify a finding that there was in the defendants' family an ancestral business of borrowing and lending. In any case it is important to remember that the plaintiff's case was not that it was unnecessary to prove legal necessity, etc., because there was an ancestral moneylending business but on the ground that there was a family “banking” business. In the present case the evidence goes little further than to prove that like his father Ram Chandra Das the son Durga Prasad also did some “len den”. To sum up, the plaintiff based his case on an allegation of a family banking business. That allegation he has entirely failed to establish. He fell back on an ancestral “family” business of moneylending and that also the evidence does not establish. What the evidence does establish is that as manager of this joint family Seth Ram Chandra Das was in the habit of doing some moneylending as also some business in wheat and the like besides managing his zamindari property. That same course was followed by his son Durga Prasad who seems to have added to these activities some dealings in cigarettes and petrol. In our opinion it is quite clear that the sums alleged by the plaintiff to have been taken by Durga Prasad as deposits were in fact taken as loans and the plaintiff has not attempted to establish necessity and in fact for reasons best known to himself, very probably the reason stated in the written statement of the defendants, he deliberately avoided the responsibility of having to establish the existence of legal necessity. In our judgment the plaintiff's suit was rightly dismissed by the learned Subordinate Judge. There is no force in this appeal which accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs.

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    Gordhan Das v. Anand Prasad
    (Dec 18, 1941)