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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court's Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of six writ petitions arises from attempts by members of the Animal Husbandry Department Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., Visakhapatnam (the "Society") to register sale deeds executed in their favour by the Society. The Government had previously sold land measuring Ac.18.78 cts to the Society by a registered sale deed dated 30.10.2006 for Rs.11,38,06,800/-, executed by the District Collector (document No.5148/2006). The Society developed the land and allotted plots to its members (the petitioners), and the Society's sale deeds in favour of the petitioners were presented for registration before the 3rd respondent (Sub-Registrar).

The 3rd respondent refused registration by order dated 29.07.2010 on grounds including that (a) in 2007 the District Collector had instructed that the land be taken back and handed over to VUDA, (b) VUDA would allot alternate land to the Society, and (c) the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies had issued orders indicating title and possession were in dispute. The petitioners appealed under Section 73 of the Registration Act (appeal No.16/10) to the 2nd respondent, who dismissed the appeal by order dated 29.09.2010, confirming the refusal to register. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed these writ petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the registering authority validly refused registration of the sale deeds presented by the Society's President on the ground that the Government had an "implicit interest" in the land and the title/possession were in dispute, invoking Section 22-A of the Registration Act.
  2. Whether the Government could unilaterally resume lands already alienated by a registered sale deed for valuable consideration, without a court cancellation or statutory acquisition.
  3. Whether approval of VUDA (Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority) for layout approval is a prerequisite for registration of the sale deeds presented for registration.
  4. Whether the existence of alleged alternative remedies precluded the exercise of the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Sri S. Rajan)

  • Once the Government sold the land by registered sale deed (30.10.2006) for valuable consideration, it ceased to be the owner and the title vested in the Society.
  • The Society was competent to alienate the land in favour of its members; Section 22-A of the Registration Act did not apply because the land no longer belonged to the Government.
  • In the absence of any prohibition under Section 22-A, the registering authority was bound to register the sale deeds; mere registration does not itself confer title.

Respondents' Arguments (as per District Registrar/State)

  • The Government had taken back possession of the land and handed it over to VUDA on 24.01.2007 in compliance with the District Collector's orders; VUDA would allot alternate lands to the Society.
  • Transfer of immovable property by unauthorised persons cannot be registered in view of the prohibition under Section 22-A of the Registration Act; the 3rd respondent rightly refused registration.
  • There was an implicit interest of the Government in the land; it was the duty of the registering authority to safeguard the interests of the Government.
  • The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies issued a notice for considering a motion of no confidence against the Society's President; a deed executed by the President on 26.07.2010 after initiation of that proceeding could not be registered.
  • The petitioners had alternative remedies available under the Act, and therefore the writ petitions should be dismissed. (Learned Government Pleader argued Section 22-A applied to the sale deed sought to be registered on 22.07.2010.)

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thota Ganga Laxmi v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, C.A. No.317 of 2007 (Supreme Court), judgment dated 13.07.2010 Cancellation deed of a registered sale deed executed and registered without a prior court cancellation is void and non est; once a registered sale deed transfers title, subsequent cancellation cannot be effected by a private cancellation deed/registration — cancellation requires competent court action. The court relied on this authority to hold that the Government could not unilaterally resume lands sold by a registered sale deed and that any cancellation must be by appropriate civil proceedings; therefore unilateral resumption or registration of a cancellation would be void.
G. Narasaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2011 (3) ALD 635 (Division Bench) It is legally impermissible for the Registrar to refuse registration on the dictates of a person who is a stranger to the scheme of the Act/Rules and who has no control over the Sub-Registrar. The court used this decision to support the position that refusal to register cannot be based on non-statutory or extraneous directions from parties who are not empowered, and to reject the contention that VUDA approval (as a third party's dictate) justified refusal to register.
Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 The mere existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The court cited this precedent to reject the argument that availability of alternative remedies ousted the High Court's power to entertain the writ petitions under Article 226.
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1125 The power of judicial review under Article 226 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be abrogated by amendment or legislation. The court invoked this principle to reinforce that its jurisdiction under Article 226 remained intact despite the availability of alternative remedies or statutory mechanisms.
Madiga Papamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2011 (2) ALD 487 Registration of a document does not create title in the transferee and does not prevent the Government from asserting its rights or seeking appropriate remedies to claim property back in accordance with law. The court relied on this authority to observe that registration would not preclude the Government from pursuing cancellation or other remedies, and thus registration per se is not a decisive confiscation of Government rights.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in a series of logical steps, applying statutory provisions and precedents to the facts as presented in the pleadings:

  1. Validity of the 2006 sale deed: The court began from the uncontested fact that the Government sold the land to the Society by a registered sale deed dated 30.10.2006 for valuable consideration and that the District Collector had executed that sale deed. The court held that, on such alienation by registered sale deed, the Government "ceased to be the owner" and the title vested in the Society.
  2. Unilateral resumption disallowed: The court rejected the respondents' contention that the Government could unilaterally resume lands sold to the Society. It held that land alienated by a registered sale deed cannot be unilaterally resumed except in accordance with the terms of the assignment or by operation of the Land Acquisition Act; no such terms or statutory procedure were shown. The court relied on constitutional protection (Article 300-A) against deprivation of property except by law, and on Thota Ganga Laxmi to emphasize that cancellation of a registered sale deed requires proper court proceedings.
  3. Section 22-A of the Registration Act: The court identified Section 22-A as the only provision that can prohibit registration of documents relating to immovable property owned by State/Central Government when executed by unauthorised persons. The Learned Government Pleader conceded that the 2006 sale deed did not fall within clause (b) of Section 22-A(1). The court concluded that since the Government had alienated the land by a registered sale deed in 2006, it ceased to be owner and therefore Section 22-A(1)(b) had no application to the later deeds.
  4. Requirement of notification under Section 22-A(1)(e): The court observed that Section 22-A(1)(e) – which prohibits registration where the State has an "avowed or accrued interest" and has notified prohibition of registration — had not been invoked by any notification. The counter-affidavit did not refer to any notification issued under Section 22-A(1)(e). Hence, the mere assertion of an "implicit interest" by the Government could not operate as a statutory bar to registration.
  5. On VUDA approval and Section 21(4) of the Registration Act: The court held that approval from VUDA for layout sanction is not a pre-requisite for registration. It interpreted Section 21(4) to require only that a non-testamentary document contain a map or plan for registration purposes. Approval by VUDA pertains to layout sanction and construction, not to the statutory requirement for registration. The court referenced G. Narasaiah to reject a registrar's refusal to register simply on the dictates of an outside authority.
  6. Registration does not create title: The court reiterated the settled principle (citing Madiga Papamma) that mere registration of a conveyance does not create title in the transferee and does not prevent the Government from pursuing appropriate remedies in a competent Civil Court. Thus, even if registration were permitted, it would not preclude the Government from initiating suitable proceedings to assert rights.
  7. Jurisdiction under Article 226 despite alternative remedies: The court applied Whirlpool and L. Chandra Kumar to conclude that the availability of alternative remedies did not preclude exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
  8. Conclusion on impugned orders: Because Section 22-A did not apply and no statutory notification under Section 22-A(1)(e) had been produced, and because the Government could not legally unilaterally resume the land, the court found the 3rd respondent's refusal to register and the 2nd respondent's confirmation thereof to be patently illegal and without jurisdiction.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the impugned order of the 2nd respondent confirming the refusal to register and directed the 3rd respondent to consider registration of the sale deed in question, provided the document otherwise satisfies all legal requirements.

Specific orders and practical consequences (as stated in the opinion):

  • The impugned order of the 2nd respondent, confirming the 3rd respondent's refusal to register, is set aside.
  • The 3rd respondent is directed to consider registration of the document in accordance with the observations made by the court and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, the Registration Act and the Rules made thereunder.
  • The registration exercise shall be completed within two months from the date of the order.
  • All writ petitions are disposed of accordingly, and the court ordered the petitions disposed without costs.
  • The court made clear that registration does not prevent the Government from initiating appropriate proceedings before a competent Civil Court for cancellation of any prior sale deed if it chooses; registration itself does not create immutable title vis-à-vis such proceedings.

No assertion was made in the opinion that it was laying down a novel precedent beyond applying the cited authorities; the decision applied existing statutory interpretation and precedent to the facts to conclude that the registration refusals were unlawful.

    Dr. Dinakar Mogili v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others

    :

    In this batch of six Writ Petitions, the petitioners are all members of the Animal Husbandry Department Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd., Visakhapatnam (hereinafter called the “Society”). Land admeasuring Ac.18.78 cts was sold by the Government to the “Society” for Rs.11,38,06,800/- (Rupees eleven crores thirty eight lakhs six thousand and eight hundred only) and, on receipt of the consideration, the District Collector executed a registered sale deed in favour of the “Society” before the 3rd respondent vide document No.5148/2006 dated 30.10.2006. The Society claims to have developed the land thereafter, and to have laid several plots therein. The petitioners herein were allotted and sold different plots in the land purchased by the “Society” from the Government. The “Society” executed a sale deed in their favour which was presented before the 3rd respondent for registration.

    By his order dated 29.07.2010, the 3rd respondent refused to register the sale deed on the ground that, in the year 2007, the District Collector had informed the Revenue Divisional Officer to take back the land conveyed earlier to the “Society”, and hand over the same to VUDA; VUDA would allot alternate land to the “Society” from out of other lands handed over to it by the revenue department; the Deputy Registrar of co-operative societies had issued orders in ARC No.1 of 2010-11 that the title and possession of the land was in dispute; and, therefore, the document was not fit for registration.

    Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 73 of the Registration Act, vide appeal No.16/10, before the 2nd respondent who, by order dated 29.09.2010, dismissed the appeal confirming the order of the 3rd respondent. The 2nd respondent held that, since the Government was keen on taking back the land that was alienated to the society earlier, the Government had implicit interest in the land and, consequently, it was the bounden duty of the registering authority to safeguard the interests of the Government; it was a mandatory stipulation for registration that the layout should be approved by VUDA; and, since the society has not complied with the same, the sale could not be registered.

    Sri S. Rajan, Learned Counsel for the petitioner, would submit that, once the Government had sold the land for valuable consideration by way of a registered sale deed in favour of the “Society”, it ceased to be the owner of the land; the title, thereafter, vested with the “Society” which had purchased the land; the “Society” was competent to alienate the land in favour of its members including the petitioners herein; as the land no longer belonged to the Government, Section 22-A of the Act was not attracted; and, in the absence of a prohibition under Section 22-A, the registering authority was bound to register the sale deed more so as mere registration did not, by itself, confer title.

    In the counter affidavit filed by the District Registrar, the fact that the land was purchased from the Government by the Animal Husbandry Department Employees Co-operative House Building Society Ltd, Visakhapatnam is admitted. It is, however, stated that possession of land of Ac.18.78 cts, situated in Sy. No.133 of Chinagadili village, was taken back by the Government through the District Collector, Visakhapatnam; possession was handed over to VUDA by the Revenue department on 24.01.2007, in compliance with the orders of the District Collector dated 20.01.2007; VUDA, in turn, would allot suitable lands to the “Society” from other lands handed over to it by the Revenue Department; transfer of immovable property, by way of sale deeds, executed by unauthorised persons cannot be registered in view of the prohibition under Section 22-A of the Act; the 3rd respondent had rightly refused registration of the document; the Government is particular of taking back the land from the society which reveals its implicit interest; it is the bounden duty of the registering authority to safeguard the interests of the Government; the Deputy Registrar of co-operative societies had issued notice dated 22.07.2010, to the President of the society, for considering the motion of no confidence; at this stage the President, who had executed the sale deed on 26.07.2010 after initiation of no confidence motion, could not register the said document; and the Writ Petition was liable to be dismissed.

    As noted hereinabove, the land in question was alienated by the Government to the “Society” by way of a registered sale deed dated 30.10.2006 for valuable consideration of Rs.11,38,06,800/- (Rupees eleven crores thirty eight lakhs six thousand and eight hundred only). Once the Government, through the District Collector, had alienated these lands, and had registered the sale deed in favour of the “Society”, it ceased to be the owner of the property, and to have implicit interest in such lands, after its alienation. It defies reason that lands which, thereafter, belonged to the Society could be unilaterally resumed by the Government. Land belonging to the Government, assigned in favour of others, can be resumed in terms of the assignment, and not where land is sold/alienated for valuable consideration by way of a registered sale deed, unless the terms and conditions stipulated therein permits such resumption. No such provision has been referred to in the impugned orders or in the counter-affidavit filed before this Court. Unilateral resumption of private lands, except in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, would violate Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise, it is only if the registered sale deed dated 30.10.2006 is cancelled first, can the Government take steps for resumption of the lands thereafter. In “Thota Ganga Laxmi v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh” Judgment of the Supreme Court in C.A. No.317 of 2007 dated 13.07.2010, the Supreme Court observed:

    “ …………In our opinion, there was no need for the applicants to approach the civil court as the said cancellation deed dated 04.08.2005 as well as registration of the same was wholly void and non est and can be ignored altogether. For illustration, if ‘A’ transfers a piece of land to ‘B’ by a registered sale deed, then, if it is not disputed that ‘A’ had the title to the land, that title passes to ‘B’ on the registration of the sale deed (retrospectively from the date of the execution of the same) and ‘B’ then becomes the owner of the land. If ‘A’ wants to subsequently get that sale deed cancelled, he has to file a civil suit for cancellation or else he can request ‘B’ to sell the land back to ‘A’ but by no stretch of imagination, can a cancellation deed be executed or registered. This is unheard of in law…………”

    It is only when a sale deed is cancelled by a competent Court that the cancellation deed can be registered and that too after notice to the concerned parties. In this case, neither is there any declaration by a competent court nor was there any notice to the parties. Hence, this Rule also makes it clear that both the cancellation deed as well as registration thereof were wholly void land non est and meaningless transactions.” (emphasis supplied)

    It is only if the sale deed is cancelled in appropriate proceedings before a competent Civil Court can the Government, thereafter, resume the land. Unilateral resumption of lands which the Government had alienated earlier in favour of a Society by way of a registered sale deed for valuable consideration, and when the sale deed continues to remain valid as it has not been cancelled, is unheard of in law.

    The contention that approval from VUDA is a pre-requisite for registration does not also merit acceptance. Under Section 21(4) of the Registration Act all that is required is for a non-testamentary document to contain a map or a plan of the property comprised therein for the purposes of registration. Approval of the VUDA is required only for the purposes of obtaining sanction of a layout, and for construction thereupon, and not for registration of the sale deed in question. A Division bench of this Court in G. Narasaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2011 (3) ALD 635 (DB)held that it was legally impermissible for the Registrar to refuse registration on the dictates of a person, who was a stranger to the scheme of the Act/Rules and who has no control over the Sub-Registrar.

    With regards the contention, of the Learned Government Pleader, of an alternative remedy being available to the petitioners under the Act, it is well settled that mere existence of an alternative remedy is no bar for exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1).As held by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India AIR 1997 SC 1125,the power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is part of its basic structure. The said power cannot be curtailed or negated even by a Constitutional amendment, let alone by legislation-plenary or subordinate.

    The only provision which prohibits the Registering authority, from registering the document presented for registration, is under Section 22-A of the Registration Act. Under Section 22-A(1)(b) documents relating to the sale of property, in respect of immovable property owned by the State or Central Government if executed by persons other than those statutorily empowered, cannot be registered. On being asked whether it is the case of the respondents that registration of the sale deed by the District Collector on 30.10.2006, falls within the ambit of clause (b) of Section 22-A (1), Learned Government Pleader for Revenue would fairly state that it is not. He would submit that it is only the sale deed sought to be registered by the President of the society on 22.07.2010, in favour of the petitioners herein, which falls within the ambit of the said provision. Section 22-A(1)(b) applies only to immovable property owned by the State Government and, since the Government had itself alienated the said land by way of a sale deed in the year 2006, it ceased to be the owner of the said land and, consequently Section 22-A(1)(b) of the Act has no application thereafter.

    It is necessary to note that Section 22-A(1)(e) prohibits registration of documents pertaining to the properties in which, among others, the State Government has an avowed or accrued interest and which the State Government has, by notification, prohibited registration of. If, as contended by the respondents, the State Government has implicit interest in the said property, the only manner in which registration of documents can be prohibited is by issuing a notification under Section 22-A(1)(e) of the Act. No reference is made in the counter affidavit to any notification having been issued by the State Government under Section 22-A(1)(e) of the Act. In the absence of a notification being issued by the State Government, in exercise of its powers under Section 22-A(1)(e) of the Registration Act, the question whether the State Government has an avowed or accrued interest does not necessitate examination.

    In any event, mere registration of a conveyance deed neither creates title in the transferee, nor would it come in the way of Government in asserting its right of availing the appropriate remedy to assert its title to the land, and claim the property back, in accordance with law. (Madiga Papamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh 2011(2) ALD 487). Registration of the sale deed dated 22.07.2010 would not prevent the Government, if it so chooses, from initiating appropriate proceedings before a competent Civil Court for cancellation of the sale deed, executed by it earlier in favour of the “Society”, in accordance with law. That, however, does not justify the action of the 3rd respondent in refusing to register the document in question. As the provisions of Section 22-A of the Act are not attracted, the order of the 2nd respondent confirming the order of the 3rd respondent is patently illegal and without jurisdiction.

    The impugned order of the 2nd respondent, confirming the order of the 3rd respondent, is set aside.The 3rd respondent shall, in accordance with the observations made hereinabove and if the document otherwise satisfies all legal requirements, consider registration of the document strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, the Registration Act and the Rules made thereunder.The entire exercise in this regard shall be completed within a period of two months from today.All these Writ Petitions stand disposed of accordingly.However, in the circumstances, without costs.

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    Dr. Dinakar Mogili v. State Of Andhra Pradesh And Others
    (Sep 8, 2011)