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Case Number

CRP. No. 151 of 1982

Advocates

For the Appellant: T.L. Viswanatha Iyer

Judges

Varghese Kalliath, J.

Acts

Sections 16 to 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ss. 19 and 20

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Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This matter is a civil revision petition filed by the defendant challenging interlocutory jurisdictional rulings. The underlying suit, instituted by the plaintiff, seeks a permanent injunction restraining the defendant and its officers (including its Vice‑Chairman and Managing Director) from proceeding with or holding any enquiry against the plaintiff pursuant to a memorandum numbered V0/6078 dated 4‑6‑1980. The plaintiff's pleaded contention is that the disciplinary authority, insofar as the plaintiff is concerned, is the President of India and not the defendant.

On the averments in the plaint the trial court held that it had no jurisdiction to try the suit because no cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within its territorial limits. The aggrieved plaintiff appealed to the Additional Sub Judge, Cochin, who took a different view after examining the plaint and submissions: he held that part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of the Munsiff's Court (Cochin), and therefore that court was bound to try the suit. The defendant was aggrieved by that appellate decision and filed the present revision petition. The court in this opinion confines itself to the jurisdictional question and not the merits of the disciplinary dispute.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, on the averments in the plaint, the cause of action for the suit (in whole or in part) arose within the local limits of the court where the suit is filed, thereby conferring territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code (C.P.C.).
Whether communication or service of notices/orders (including notices initiating disciplinary proceedings) constitutes part of the cause of action for determining the place where part of the cause of action arises.
Whether a statutory notice under Section 80 C.P.C. can be treated as equivalent to a communication to the aggrieved person for the purpose of determining territorial jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

The disciplinary authority competent in respect of the plaintiff is the President of India and not the defendant; therefore the proceedings initiated by the defendant (or its officers) are beyond competence.
The disciplinary proceedings concern the plaintiff's services at Cochin (the plaint alleges the plaintiff's area of operation is at Cochin), a fact which the plaintiff must prove if traversed.

Defendant/Respondent's Arguments

The counsel for the respondent submitted that because the ultimate consequence of the disciplinary action might be the termination of the plaintiff's services at Cochin, at least part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Cochin court where the suit was filed.
The Additional Sub Judge accepted that the fact the plaintiff was working at Cochin under the respondent is a circumstance justifying the conclusion that part of the cause of action arose within the local limits of the Munsiff's Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Read v. Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128	Definition of "cause of action": every fact which the plaintiff must prove, if traversed, to obtain judgment.	Used as the foundational definition of cause of action to analyse whether facts in the plaint, if proved, create a cause of action within Cochin.
State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (AIR 1966 SC 1313)	An order of dismissal kept on file without communication is effective only when actually communicated or published.	Applied to show that communication/service of orders affecting rights is an important element of the cause of action.
S.R. Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur (AIR 1958 SC 1036)	Cause of action accrues when the resolution/order is communicated to the person affected (date of communication starts limitation).	Relied upon to support the proposition that receipt of communication is the critical moment and place for accrual of part of the cause of action.
Veeri Chettiar v. S.T. Officer, Bombay (A.I.R. 1971 Madras 155)	Impact on the addressee by a notice gives rise to part of the cause of action at the place of the addressee (writ may lie where addressee is located).	Used to illustrate that a notice received by the aggrieved person creates a local impact which can ground jurisdiction where the addressee is situated.
Bata Shoe Co. v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1954 Bombay 129)	View that a notice under Section 80 C.P.C. is a preliminary procedural requirement and does not constitute part of the cause of action.	Cited as one line of authority in the survey of conflict on whether statutory notices form part of the cause of action.
P.C. Biswas v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1956 Assam 85)	Contrary view to Bata Shoe: impliedly takes a different approach on whether a notice is part of cause of action.	Referenced to show there is not unanimous authority on whether statutory notices are part of the cause of action.
Niranjan v. Union of India (A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 391)	Observes that no part of the cause of action arises at the place from which the notice is issued and posted.	Referred to as part of the conflicting authorities about the territorial import of notices.
Asst. Security Officer v. Kullinga Gounder (1976 K.L.T. 673 (D.B.)) and Abdul Sattar v. Union of India (1983 K.L.T. 681)	Principles regarding whether any part of cause of action arose within court's jurisdiction; factual application in those cases showed no part arose within that court.	Used by this court to explain the concept of "cause of action in part" and to justify application of the principle to the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court framed the jurisdictional enquiry under Section 20 C.P.C., which prescribes where personal actions may be instituted: (a) where the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain; or (c) where the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises. The court emphasized that Section 20 aims to bring justice near citizens and that a court has jurisdiction if the cause of action arises, wholly or partly, within its local limits.

The analysis began by clarifying the legal meaning of "cause of action" by reference to Read v. Brown: it comprises every fact that the plaintiff must prove (if traversed) to obtain judgment. The court reiterated that the cause of action is the congeries of material facts that give rise to a right to relief, not every piece of evidence.

The court then considered the role of communication or service in disciplinary contexts. Citing State of Punjab v. Amar Singh and S.R. Goel, it reasoned that orders affecting valuable rights (for example, dismissal) become effective only upon communication; therefore, the service or receipt of communication is an important element of the cause of action. By parity, the initiation of disciplinary proceedings by notice is likewise a material event forming part of the cause of action.

The opinion surveyed conflicting authorities on whether statutory or procedural notices (notably Section 80 C.P.C. notices) constitute part of the cause of action. Some High Courts, and the Bombay decision in Bata Shoe Co., regard Section 80 notice as a preliminary procedural step not constituting part of the cause of action; other courts (including Assam, and certain dicta) have taken differing views. The present court rejected equating a Section 80 notice with communication to the aggrieved person.

The court underscored that it is principally the defendant's action that creates jurisdictional links; the plaintiff cannot confer jurisdiction by his own actions. Thus, where the defendant's act (for example, serving a notice or initiating proceedings) impacts the plaintiff at a specific place, that place may be where part of the cause of action arises.

Applying these principles to the plaint, the court observed that (i) the plaint alleges the plaintiff's area of operation is Cochin and that disciplinary proceedings have been initiated in respect of his services there; (ii) service/receipt of the initiating notice or any communication affecting the plaintiff's service is a material fact that must be proved if contested; and (iii) because the alleged acts of the defendant affect the plaintiff at Cochin, at least part of the cause of action is referable to Cochin.

On that basis the court concluded that the circumstances pleaded in the plaint enable the plaintiff to maintain the suit in the Cochin court and that the trial court's finding of want of territorial jurisdiction was incorrect. The court therefore dismissed the revision petition.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED.

Direct consequences for the parties:

The revision by the defendant is dismissed; the plaintiff's suit may proceed in the Munsiff's Court at Cochin on the basis that at least part of the cause of action is referable to Cochin.
No order as to costs was made by the court.
The defendant is directed to be allowed to file a written statement and the case is to be posted for filing the written statement of the defendant.

Broader implications: The opinion applies established authorities on the definition of "cause of action" and the significance of communication/service in disciplinary contexts to territorial jurisdiction under Section 20 C.P.C., but it does not announce or claim to establish any new legal precedent beyond the application of existing principles to the facts of this case.

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Shipping Corporation Of India Ltd. v. Kandaswamy

1. This is a civil revision petition by the defendant. The trial court on the averments in the plaint considered the question of jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit. It held that it has no jurisdiction to try the case. This was done on the basis that no cause of action wholly or in part has arisen within the jurisdiction of the court. The aggrieved plaintiff filed an appeal before the Additional Sub Judge, Cochin. The Additional Sub Judge took a different view. He also examined the averments in the plaint. Valued the submissions made by the defendant and the plaintiff and found that part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Munsiff's Court. He held that the Munsiff court is hound to try the suit. The defendant is aggrieved. He files this revision.

2. The suit is for a permanent injunction to rest rain the defendant and its officers including its Vice-Chairman and Managing Director from taking any proceedings or holding any enquiry against the plaintiff pursuant to a memorandum No. V0/6078 dated 4-6-1980. The main contention raised by the plaintiff is that the disciplinary authority as far as the plaintiff is concerned, is the President of India and not the defendant. I am not now concerned with the merits of the case. The only point that requires consideration is whether on the averments in the plaint, the alleged cause of action as a whole or any part of it has arisen within the jurisdiction of the court where the suit has been filed.

3. The complaint of the plaintiff is that disciplinary proceeding has been initiated by a person who has no competency to do it in regard to his services at Cochin. Obviously, the area of operation of his service as per the averments in the plaint is at Cochin. This is a fact which would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to merit a judgment in his favour. It is also disputed before me. Further the counsel for the respondent submits that since the ultimate result of disciplinary action, perhaps will be the termination of the services of the plaintiff, at Cochin, at least part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the court where the suit has been filed. The appellate court also has taken the view that since the plaintiff is working at Cochin under the respondent (Shipping Corporation of India Ltd.) that has to be taken as one of the circumstances to hold that at least part of the cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of the Cochin Court. S. 20 of the Civil Procedure Code runs thus:)

“Subject to the limitations aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction—

(a) the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more man one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business or personally works for gain; or

(b) any of the defendants, where there are more than one at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business, or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or

4. This Section postulates the Rule as to the ‘place of suing’ in cases of personal actions. It is so since the Section begins with a Verbum Sapienti that the provisions in the section are to be applied to the provisions of Ss. 15 to 19 C.P.C

5. The prime devoir of the Section is to secure that justice might be brought as near as possible to every citizen. The broad basis of the Code is to categorise actions into three classes: (i) those relate to immovable property; (ii) those which relate to the person or moveable property and (iii) actions partly relating to immovable property and partly personal. Clauses one and three are the subject-matter under Sections 16 to 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Ss. 19 and 20 deal with the second classes of cases. It is plain that a court would have jurisdiction under S. 20 if (i) the defendant resides or carries on business or personally works for gain within the local limits of its jurisdiction or (ii) the cause of action arises, wholly or in part within such local limits.

6. Now, the question to be enquired is whether at least a part of the acause of action has arisen at Cochin or not. I feel that it is appropriate to begin my examination from an enquiry as to what is cause of action. Certainly cause of action in a suit is that integral whole of facts constituted of a bundle of facts and circumstances. In Read v. Brown (1888) 22 QBD 128, Lord Esher M.R defined cause of action to mean:

“Every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintilf to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved”.

Fry L.J agreed and said:—

“Everything which, if not proved, gives the defendant an immediate right to judgment, must be part of the cause of action”.

Lord Watson observed

“Now the cause of action has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, nor does in depend upon the character of the relief prayed forby the plaintiff. It refers entirely to the grounds set forth in the plaint as the cause of action, or, in other words, to the media upon which the plaintiff asks the court to arrive at a conclusion in his favour”.

7. True that cause of action as is well known means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove if traversed in order to enable him a judgment of the court but it will not comprehend every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary to be proved.

8. Communication of the initiation of a proceeding particularly a disciplinary proceeding is a vital aspect. There is no doubt that communication of a dismissal order is so important that only on an actual communication of the dismissal order, it will take effect. In State of Punjab v. Amar Singh (AIR 1966 SC 1313) the Supreme Court held:

“An order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published”.

9. The above observation of the supreme Court is a certain indication that an order affecting the valuable right of a person shall and should take effect only when it is served on the person concerned. The service of the order which affects the person to whom it is served is therefore an important part of the cause of action. In S.R Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur (AIR 1958 SC 1036) the Supreme Court held thus:—

“The cause of action in the present case accrued to the appellant the moment the resolution of the Board was communicated to him and that was the date of the commencement of the limitation. The remedy, if any, by way of filing a suit against the Board in respect of his wrongful dismissal was available to him from that date and it was open to him to pursue that remedy within the period of limitation prescribed under S. 326 of the Act.”

10. In the present case, of course it is not an order of dismissal that is attacked in the suit. What is attacked in the suit is the initiation of the disciplinary proceedings which may result in an order of dismissal. This proceeding is commenced by a notice. In the circumstance the issue of notice itself is an important element which would form part of the cause of action. The Supreme Court has said that the order of dismissal will take effect only after it is communicated. So the receipt of the communication of the order is also important and vital. If the receipt of the communication of an order is important and vital, no doubt the place at which the person concerned received the order is also important for determining the place where the aggrieved person can commence his action against the order which affected his rights.

11. In a case reported in A.I.R 1971 Madras 155 (Veeri Chettiar v. S.T Officer, Bombay) a Division Bench of the Madras High Court observed thus:—

“The impact on the addressee caused by a notice of a taxing authority and his proposal to assess relate to that bundle and is thus cause of action in part, for issue of a writ against taxing authority. A writ petition will therefore lie in the High Court of the place of the addressee even if the authority is situate outside that High Court's territorial limits”.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred me to certain decisions under S. 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, on this aspect of the matter. There is conflict of decision on the question whether a notice under S. 80 C.P.C would also form part of the cause of action for the suit against the Government. The Bombay High Court in Bata Shoe Co. v. Union of India (A.I.R 1954 Bombay, 129), took the view that a notice under S. 80 C.P.C is only a requirement as the preliminary step for a legal and valid institution of the suit and that it does not really form or constitute part of the causs of action in the suit itself. This view has been shared by the High Courts of Madras, Calcutta, Madhyapradesh, Punjab and Patna. The courts took the view that cause of action really precedes the issue of notice. Notice under S. 80 serves only the purpose of intimating the authority concerned the cause of action and so it is not part of the cause of action. The High Court of Assam in P.C Biswas v. Union of India (A.I.R 1956 Assam 85) took a different view. The Calcutta High Court in Niranjan v. Union of India (A.I.R 1960 Cal. 391) observed that “in any event no part of the cause of action can arise at the place from which the notice is issued and posted.”

13. I feel that for the purpose of jurisdiction, the action of the defendant is more relevant than those of the plaintiff. The plaintiff cannot by his own action create jurisdiction in a particular court. It is the action of the defendant in serving the offensive communication on the plaintiff affecting his right that will give rise to the cause of action. This is plain and clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court I have referred to.

14. I am of the opinion that the statutory notice under S. 80 C.P.C cannot be equated to a communication to the aggrieved person regarding the action taken against him affecting his right.

15. I feel that it is plain that cause of action is always referable to the congeries of material facts to be proved if traversed which precede the commencement of the proceedings before the court and if a link of that cumulation of facts is available or referable to have occasioned at a particular place, since it is part of cause of action the court which has got jurisdiction over that particular place would have territorial jurisdiction over the suit, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant whose act has created the said cause of action, situates or resides, as the case may be, outside the territorial limits of the court.

16. In a decision reported in Abdul Sattar v. Union of India (1983 K.L.T 681) this court held thus:—

“The facts of the case in Asst. Security Officer v. Kullinga Gounder (1976 K.L.T 673 (D.B)) also show that no cause of action, not even a part of it, arose within the jurisdiction of this court in as much as there was no plea that the petitioners (respondents) function, in the discharge of their duties, within the territorial jurisdiction of this court………”

17. I think the principle behind this decision can also be applied for understanding what is ‘cause of action in part’. I feel the circumstances and facts revealed in the plaint would enable the plaintiff to maintain the suit in the court where it has been laid. In the result, I see no merit in this C.R.P It is dismissed. No order as to costs. I make it clear that the defendant should be allowed to file a written statement in the case. The court should post the case for filing the written statement of the defendant.

18. Dismissed.

Shipping Corporation Of India Ltd. v. Kandaswamy

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

Defendant/Respondent's Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Shipping Corporation Of India Ltd. v. Kandaswamy

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