The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Malimath, C.J:— This appeal is by the Advocate General challenging the judgment of the learned single Judge rendered in O.P No. 3568/86. The relevant facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal may briefly be stated as follows: The Advocate General filed the petition invoking S. 2 of the Madras Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act. VIII of 1949. (here in after referred to as the Act), as amended by the State of Kerala by the Kerala Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956. The allegations in the petition are that the respondent Sri. T.A Rajendran, Editor of a paper by the name ‘Nawab’ residing at Fort Cochin has been habitually and without any reasonable ground instituting vexatious proceedings in civil and criminal courts in the State including the High Court and that therefore an order should be passed directing that no proceeding, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by him in any court without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge. The petition was filed on 26th of May, 1986 and it was posted for preliminary bearing before the learned single Judge and it was heard on the 28th of May 1986 and the order was pronounced dismissing the original petition in limine on 2-6-1986. It is the said decision that is challenged in this appeal.

2. The principal contention of the learned Advocate General is that the learned Judge was not justified in dismissing the original petition at the stage of admission. The learned Advocate General pointed out that in the petition reference was made to several cases filed by the respondent in support of the plea that the respondent is habitually resorting to vexatious litigation. The copies of the relevant judgments or orders pertaining to those cases and other records pertaining to the same were not produced along with the petition. It was submitted that it is only when the respondent joins issue in regard to the substantive averments of the appellant that the necessity of substantiating the averments by producing adequate and satisfactory evidence would arise. All that is required to be examined at the stage of the preliminary hearing is as to whether the petition is maintainable and as to whether a prima facie case has been made out. The submission of the learned Advocate General is that this is not the stage at which the court was required to embark upon an exhaustive enquiry into the merits of the case.

3. A petition under S. 2 of the Act is different from other original petitions that are brought before the High Court, for more than one reason. The object of the Act is to protect innocent parties from being subjected to vexatious litigation. In other words, it is an action that is brought to prevent the abuse of the process of the court as a result of which innocent persons are harassed. It is the paramount duty of the court to prevent abuse of the process of the court. When the Advocate General initiates action under S. 2 of the Act, he does so, for achieving a very laudable objective of the Act and to assist the court in the discharge of its paramount duty of ensuring that the process of the court is not abused. The right to move the court for preventing vexatious litigation is conferred on the Advocate General of the State. The Legislature has entrusted this onerous responsibility on such a high, responsible and independent authority with the object of ensuring that the provisions of the Act themselves are not misused. There is no lis in the ordinary sense of the term between the Advocate General on the one hand and the party against whom the petition is filed, for, the Advocate General seeks no relief for himself or for the State. The ultimate beneficiaries of an order under the Act may be a known or unknown class of persons who are likely to be subjected to harassment by a vexatious litigant. The Advocate General is expected to discharge his obligations in a very objective manner bearing in mind the high purpose that he is required to serve. We should not therefore proceed on the premise that the Advocate General may bring actions which are thoroughly unfounded and which do not require serious investigation at the hands of the court. the court in dealing with petitions under S. 2 of the Act must take into account all these aspects at the time of preliminary hearing. It has to consider as to whether the petition itself is maintainable and whether a prima facie case has been made out. As the Advocate General is not expected to make unfounded, baseless and irrelevant allegations in such a petition, the normal attitude for the court to take in such cases is to accept the same as prima facie evidence in support of the petition. After the petition is admitted and the respondent is served; the court, after giving opportunity to both parties of substantiating their respective cases, would proceed to decide the matter on merits.

4. The contention of the learned Advocate General is that in this case the learned single Judge proceeded to send for the judgments referred to in the petition, to analyse them critically and to come to the conclusion that there is no substance in the case brought by the Advocate General that the respondent has resorted to vexatious litigation. We have been taken through the judgment of the learned single Judge. It was submitted that the learned single Judge has not confined his attention to finding out whether a prima facie case has been made out. It was submitted that the learned single Judge has made a very exhaustive probe by putting the several judgments to critical analysis and drawing an inference from the same that it cannot be said that the respondent has brought vexatious litigation. The learned single Judge has observed that the action brought by the respondent cannot be treated as vexatious as he has not concentrated on one individual or one cause of action in his litigations. Though an inference that the litigation is vexatious may be drawn more readily when concentration is on the same person or on the same cause of action, it cannot be said as an invariable rule that litigation cannot be regarded as vexatious merely because be has chosen different persons and different causes of action. The essential question for consideration is as to whether the party is habitually bringing actions which are thoroughly unfounded, not with a view to vindicate justice but for the purpose of harassing the opponent. The learned single Judge has observed that the allegation that the respondent is a regular blackmailer and is in the habit of receiving bush money cannot be accepted without sufficient and satisfactory material. The learned Advocate General submitted with considerable justification that if an opportunity was given to him, be would have substantiated those allegations and that that stage would arise if the respondent controverted the allegations made in the petition. The same is the position in regard to the observation of the learned single Judge that it cannot be said that there was total lack of substance or such dominance of malice as to condemn the respondent as a vexatious litigant. No doubt, the learned single Judge has noticed the fact that the respondent had chosen as his opponents in the several actions be has brought, men occupying very responsible positions as the Chief Minister, the Deputy Chief Minister, the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, the leader of Muslim League and Minister, the Advocate General of the State and he had also filed cases in the Delhi High Court challenging the appointment of two additional Judges of the High Court of Kerala. In one of the actions brought against the then Chief Minister the respondent has gone to the extent of alleging that the Chief Minister is a person of unsound mind. The case of the Advocate General in the petition is that all these actions were thoroughly unfounded and were not brought for vindicating justice, personal or public, but for the purpose of harassing the opponents. The learned single Judge after considering the several judgments in the actions brought by the respondent, has proceeded to draw the inference that they cannot be regarded as vexatious considering only the result of those actions and the observations made by the courts in the respective judgments. The learned Advocate General submitted that the investigation so made does not do justice to the cause brought by him and cannot be regarded as very satisfactory as the motive behind such actions and the surrounding circumstances have not been taken into consideration along with the ultimate decision of the court in the matter of deciding whether the respondent has resorted to vexatious litigation. It was rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General that the learned single Judge ought not to have confined his attention only to the result of the actions brought by the respondent. The learned Advocate General submitted that he would have certainly led evidence at the appropriate stage regarding motive of the respondent in bringing the actions and the surrounding circumstances from which an inference could legitimately be drawn that the actions brought by the respondent were vexatious. On a perusal of the allegations made in the petition filed by the Advocate General, we have no hesitation in taking the view that a prima facie case was made out justifying admission of the original petition and giving opportunity to all the parties of substantiating their respective cases. We would, however, like to make it clear that we have not expressed any final opinion on the merits of the case. It has become unnecessary for us to express any opinion of a conclusive nature in regard to vexatious character of the litigation brought by the respondent for the reasons to be stated presently. All that we have stated so far is only to bold that the petition brought by the Advocate General was not liable to be dismissed in limine for the reasons stated by the learned single Judge.

5. The learned single Judge has not addressed himself to the question of maintainability of the petition, which we now propose to do in the light of the contentions raised by Sri. Madhusudanan, learned counsel for the respondent. The Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act VIII of 1949 was in force, in the former State of Madras immediately prior to the re-organisation of States. A part of the State of Madras popularly described as Malabar area stood transferred to the new State of Kerala under the States Reorganisation Act with effect from 1-11-1956. By operation of S. 119 of the States Re-organisation Act, the Vexatious Litigation (Prevention) Act continued to remain in force in the Malabar area of the new State of Kerala with effect from 1-11-1956. The said Act was however amended by the Kerala Adaptation of Laws Order, 1956. Before its amendment the relevant Ss. 2 and 3 read as follows:

“2(1) If on an application made by the Advocate-General, the High Court is satisfied that any person has habitually and without any reasonable ground instituted vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal, in any court or courts, the High Court may, after giving that person an opportunity of being heard, order that no proceedings, civil or criminal, shall be instituted by him in any court—

(i) in the Presidency town, without the leave of the High Court; and

(ii) elsewhere, without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge.

(2) If it appears to the High Court that the person against whom an application is made under Sub-section (1) is unable on account of poverty, to engage a pleader, the High Court may engage a pleader to appear for him.

Explanation-For the purpose of this section ‘pleader’ has the same meaning as in S. 2, clause (15) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

3. The leave referred to in S. 2, sub-section (I), shall not be given in respect of any proceedings unless the High Court or as the case may be, the District and Sessions Judge, is satisfied that there is prima facie ground for such proceedings.”

(we have underlined the portions deleted)

6. By the Adaptation of Laws Order, clause (i) of sub-section (1) of S. 2 and the word ‘elsewhere’ occurring in clause (ii) were deleted. In S. 3 the expression ‘High Court or, as the case may be’ has been deleted. the Act has not been extended to the other parts of the State of Kerala either by the Adaptation of Laws Order or by subsequent amendment. Thus, the Act, as amended by the Adaptation of Laws Order continues to operate only in the Malabar area in the State of Kerala.

7. When an application is made and S 2(1) by the Advocate General, the High Court has to be satisfied after giving an opportunity of being heard to the person concerned that be has been habitually and without any reasonable ground instituting vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal, in any court or courts. On such satisfaction, the court can make an appropriate order directing that such person shall not institute any proceedings, civil or criminal, without the leave of the District and Sessions Judge. As the Act is in force only in the Malabar area of the Kerala State, the expression ‘any court’ must mean any court situate in the territory where the Act is in force. The intendment of the Act is to prevent vexatious litigation being brought in courts located in the territory to which the Act applies. The High Court has therefore to be satisfied that the respondent is habitually and without any reasonable ground instituting vexatious proceedings, civil or-criminal, in any court or courts located within the Malabar area of the Kerala State. As the Act is not in force in other parts of the State, it follows that even if the respondent is shown to be habitually and without any reasonable ground instituting vexatious proceedings, civil or criminal, in courts outside the Malabar area, such facts will not attract the provisions of S. 2 of the Act. It is also obvious that the leave of the District Judge contemplated by S. 2(1)(ii) of the Act can be granted only by a District and Sessions Judge in the Malabar area.

8. The learned Advocate General would therefore be justified in calling upon this court to take action under S. 2(1) of the Act only by satisfying this Court that the respondent is habitually and without any reasonable ground instituting proceedings, civil or criminal, in any court or courts in the Malabar area of the Kerala State. The respondent in the counter affidavit filed in the appeal has taken a positive stand that S. 2 cannot be invoked against him in this case on the ground that it is not the case of the learned Advocate General that the respondent is guilty of instituting vexatious litigation in courts in the Malabar area. The learned Advocate General has given particulars about the actions instituted by the respondent in several courts. We find from those particulars that all the actions were brought by the respondent either in the High Court or in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Trivandrum or in the Court, of Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Varkala. It is not disputed that none of the courts where the respondent had brought litigation on which the appellant relied, is located within the Malabar area where alone the Act is in force.

9. Thus it is clear that the respondent is alleged to have instituted actions only in courts which are located in an area where the Act is not in force. As it is only actions brought in courts, civil or criminal, located in the Malabar area of the State of Kerala where the Act is in force that can be taken into consideration for the purpose of S. 2 (I) of the Act, the petition of the Advocate General is not maintainable in law. Therefore, it has become unnecessary for us to examine as to whether the actions instituted by the respondent are vexatious. We have therefore no hesitation in taking the view that no action can be taken against the respondent under S. 2(1) of the Act on the allegations as brought before the court by the learned Advocate General. We would however like to make it clear that this would not preclude appropriate action being taken in accordance with law, if circumstances justify such a course of action.

10. Law to prevent vexatious litigation has been in force in the State of Kerala only in the Malabar area for the last 31 years. After the new State of Kerala came intoexistence, no steps have been taken so far to enact a law to prevent vexatious litigation applicable throughout the State. Prevention of vexatious litigation is a very laudable object. People must resort to courts for vindicating justice and not for harassing others. The tendency of abusing the process of the court and harassing the innocent is on the increase. It is incongruous that law to prevent vexatious litigation is in force only in a part of the State. We would therefore like to invite the attention of the Legislature of the State to the urgent necessity of enacting a uniform law to prevent vexatious litigation applicable to the entire State of Kerala.

11. For the reasons stated above the judgment of the learned single Judge (reported in 1986 KLT. 758, Advocate General v. T.A Rajendran) is set aside and O.P No. 3568 of 1986 is dismissed as not maintainable. The Writ Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. No costs.