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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, the Act)
  • S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • sub-clause (I) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 11
  • provisions contained in S. 13(2) as also Rule 9(j)
  • Act in 1976 since S. 13(2) of the amended Act
  • Act 34 of 1976. S. 13(2) of the unamended Act,
  • Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the P.F.A Rules.
  • Rule 9(j) and adding Rule 9A. Rule 9A
  • provisions contained in Rule 9(j).
  • S. 13(2) in preference to Rule 9(j).
  • Rule 9(j).4.
  • Rule 9(j)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • S. 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, the Act)
  • S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act
  • sub-clause (I) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 11
  • provisions contained in S. 13(2) as also Rule 9(j)
  • Act in 1976 since S. 13(2) of the amended Act
  • Act 34 of 1976. S. 13(2) of the unamended Act,
  • Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the P.F.A Rules.
  • Rule 9(j) and adding Rule 9A. Rule 9A
  • provisions contained in Rule 9(j).
  • S. 13(2) in preference to Rule 9(j).
  • Rule 9(j).4.
  • Rule 9(j)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a milk vendor, was the accused in S.T. Case No. 283 of 1976 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kozhikode. On 10-08-1976 Pw.1 purchased 675 millilitres of buffalo milk from the petitioner, and three bottles forming the sample were taken: one bottle was sent to the Public Analyst and two bottles were retained by the Local Health Authority. After receipt of the Public Analyst's report (Ext. P8), a complaint was presented on 18-09-1976 and prosecution followed.

The petitioner was convicted under S.16(1)(a)(i) read with S.7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three months and fined Rs.500/-, with one month imprisonment in default of fine. That conviction and sentence were confirmed by the Sessions Court in Crl. A. 69 of 1977. The petitioner admitted selling the milk but contended he was carrying it at another's instance and denied knowledge of adulteration. He did not, however, apply to have the retained sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory under the procedure mentioned in the amended S.13(2). The present revision petition challenges the conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether non-compliance with Rule 9(j) of the P.F.A. Rules (sending a copy of the Public Analyst's report to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days) vitiates the prosecution where the Act had been amended to incorporate a different procedure (amended S.13(2)).
  2. Whether, where there is an apparent conflict between a Rule (Rule 9(j)) and a statutory provision (amended S.13(2)), the Food Inspector was required to follow the Rule or the statute, and what consequence follows from omission to comply with the Rule.
  3. Whether the petitioner was prejudiced by any omission in procedure (including alleged non-compliance with Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the P.F.A. Rules) such that the conviction must be set aside.
  4. Whether the extra water shown in the Public Analyst's report is sufficient to establish adulteration in the absence of other proof.
  5. Whether it was established that the petitioner was carrying the milk for sale (the contention tied to the nature of milk as a primary food) or whether his claim that he was transporting it at another's instance raised a reasonable doubt.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There was non-compliance with Rule 9(j) of the P.F.A. Rules because no copy of the Public Analyst's report was sent to the petitioner within ten days of the Food Inspector's receipt of that report; therefore the procedure required by Rule 9(j) was not followed.
  • Even though the Act was amended, Rule 9(j) remained in force on the date of sampling and so should have been complied with.
  • Milk being a primary food, it must be established that the petitioner was carrying it for the purpose of sale; the petitioner asserted he was carrying it at someone else's instance.
  • There was non-compliance with Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the P.F.A. Rules—i.e., formalities of sampling were not followed.
  • The extra water noted in analysis was not proved to be due to adulteration and the Public Analyst's report alone is insufficient to establish adulteration.

Complainant / State's Arguments

  • Rule 9(j) need not be followed after the 1976 amendment to the Act because amended S.13(2) prescribes a different statutory procedure for forwarding a copy of the analyst's report; the Food Inspector followed the procedure in S.13(2) and issued the intimation (Ext. P10) accordingly.
  • No prejudice resulted to the petitioner: the petitioner did not apply to have the retained sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory and did not raise procedural objections in the trial court.
  • Formalities of sampling were complied with (as evidenced by documents proved by Pw.1) and there was no cross-examination to controvert them.
  • The Public Analyst's report (Ext. P8) established that the milk had not conformed to prescribed standards and contained substantial added water, supporting a presumption of adulteration.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Crl. A. 286/77 (disposed by Subramonian Poti, J.) Consideration of applicability of Rule 9A and Rule 9(j) depending on their date of coming into force; sampling formalities. Referred to as a decision where the judge held Rule 9A had no application (it came into force 4-1-1977) and that Rule 9(j) in force on the date of purchase should have been complied with; the court noted no definite opinion was expressed there on consequences of non-compliance.
State of Maharashtra v. Mohanlal Hanumandas Vaishnowa (1978 All India P.F.A. Journal 183) Rule 9(j) is intended to protect the person from whom the sample was collected; the rule is mandatory to avoid manipulations by collectors of samples. Cited as authority holding Rule 9(j) mandatory and protective; used as persuasive material in the discussion of the purpose and mandatory nature of Rule 9(j).
The State of Maharashtra v. Jesti Dosa (1978 F.A.J. 19) Expression of opinion on the mandatory nature of Rule 9(j) (earlier case). Cited as an earlier instance of the Bombay High Court expressing the same view on Rule 9(j); relied on for persuasive support.
Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. J. Muralidhar (1977 Crl. L.J. 1634) Construction of Rule 9(j): duty of Food Inspector to send copy of Public Analyst's report within 10 days; discussion of consequences of delay and need to show prejudice. Quoted at length for its exposition that Rule 9(j) casts a duty on the Food Inspector and that failure to send the report before filing complaint can justify acquittal, but slight delays do not automatically vitiate prosecution unless prejudice is shown.
Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1694) Principle for deciding whether a requirement is mandatory or directory: decide by the purpose of the requirement in the context of the Act's scheme, not merely by the presence of specified consequences for omission. The court (by reference to earlier learned judges) applied this principle in assessing whether Rule 9(j) or the statutory provision should control and whether non-compliance is fatal to prosecution.
Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra (1977 SCC (Cri) 97) That where the Public Analyst's report shows the sample does not conform to prescribed standards and contains added water, a presumption of adulteration arises. Applied to support the conclusion that Ext. P8 showing not less than 28% added water justified the finding of adulteration and sustained conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a stepwise analysis grounded on chronology, statutory interpretation and factual appraisal:

  1. Chronology and procedural choice: The sample was taken on 10-08-1976—after the amended Act (Act 34 of 1976) had come into force but before Rule 9(j) was formally deleted and before Rule 9A (which mirrors amended S.13(2)) came into force on 04-01-1977. The Food Inspector followed the procedure set out in amended S.13(2) (Ext. P10), forwarding a copy of the analyst's report and informing the petitioner of the ten-day period to apply for Central Food Laboratory analysis.
  2. Conflict between rule and statute: The court identified a material difference between the erstwhile Rule 9(j) and the amended statutory S.13(2). Rule 9(j) required sending a copy of the analyst's report within 10 days of receipt by the Food Inspector but did not prescribe a time limit for applying for Central Food Laboratory analysis. Amended S.13(2), by contrast, requires forwarding a copy only after institution of prosecution and expressly prescribes a ten-day period within which the accused may apply to the court to have the retained sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.
  3. Principle of interpretation: The court emphasized the well-recognised principle that rules framed under a statute cannot override or conflict with specific provisions of the statute itself; where conflict exists the statute prevails. Thus, following the amended S.13(2) was appropriate for offences where sampling occurred after the amendment came into force.
  4. Consequence of omission to comply with Rule 9(j): Because there was a conflict between Rule 9(j) (which was later deleted) and the amended S.13(2), the omission to comply with Rule 9(j) did not vitiate the prosecution. The court held that after Act 34 of 1976 came into force the Local (Health) Authority was obliged to comply with S.13(2), and failure to observe the deleted Rule 9(j) would not affect the prosecution.
  5. Prejudice and factual opportunities: The petitioner did not assert that S.13(2) itself was not complied with or that he was denied an opportunity to have the retained sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. The objection based on Rule 9(j) was first taken in the appellate court and was treated as an after-thought; there was no showing of prejudice caused by the Food Inspector's omission.
  6. Sampling formalities and evidentiary issues: The petitioner’s claim of non-compliance with Rules 16, 17 and 18 was rejected on the factual record: Pw.1 (the Food Inspector) proved documents showing the sampling formalities had been complied with and there was no cross-examination on those points. On the contention that extra water was not proved to be due to adulteration, the court relied on the Public Analyst's report (Ext. P8) showing not less than 28% added water and applied the presumption described in Kisan Trimbak Kothula to conclude the milk was adulterated.
  7. On the question whether the petitioner was carrying milk for sale, the court found Pw.2’s testimony that the petitioner was a milk vendor who supplied the hotel to be unrebutted; the petitioner’s claim that he was carrying milk for someone else remained unproven.
  8. Conclusion: Considering the statutory interpretation, absence of prejudice, the compliance with required formalities as proved, and the analyst's report, the court concluded there was no basis to set aside the conviction or to alter the sentence.

Holding and Implications

Primary Holding: Revision petition dismissed; the conviction and sentence of the petitioner are upheld.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on parties: The petitioner's conviction under S.16(1)(a)(i) read with S.7(1) of the P.F.A. Act and the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three months with a fine of Rs.500/- (and one month default imprisonment) stands confirmed; the revision petition is dismissed.
  • Procedural consequence: The court held that where amended statutory provisions (here, S.13(2) as amended by Act 34 of 1976) conflict with an earlier rule (Rule 9(j)), the statutory provision governs and omission to comply with the now-deleted rule does not by itself vitiate prosecution, absent a showing of prejudice or non-compliance with the statutory procedure.
  • On precedent and novelty: The decision rests on application of established principles of statutory interpretation and existing case law cited in the opinion; the court affirmed the conviction on the facts and did not purport to institute a novel legal doctrine beyond those applications. (No broader new precedent is declared by this opinion beyond the immediate statutory interpretation and its application to the facts of this case.)

Disposition: Dismissed.

    Narayanan v. Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation

    1. The petitioner is the accused in S.T Case No. 283 of 1976 on the file of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kozhikode. He was convicted by the Court for an offence punishable under S. 16(1)(a)(i) read with S. 7(1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short, ‘the Act’) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months and a fine of Rs. 500/-. In default of payment of fine, he is to undergo rigorons imprisonment for one month. The conviction and sentence were confirmed in Crl. A. 69 of 1977 of the Sessions Court, Kozhikode. The case against the petitioner is as follows. The petitioner is a milk vendor. On 10-8-76 at about 8-20 A.M, Pw. I approached the petitioner and purchased 675 milli-litres of buffalo milk, following the formalities prescribed under the Act. Out of the three bottles containing the sample, one bottle was sent to the Public Analyst and the two remaining bottles were entrusted with the Local Health Authority. On 18-9-1976 after receipt of report from the Public Analyst, a complaint was presented in Court against the petitioner for the offences already mentioned. On the same day, the Food Inspector despatched a copy of the certificate of analysis to the petitioner along with an intimation as provided in S. 13(2) of the Act as amended by Act 34 of 1976 informing the petitioner that if he desired to have the sample further analysed, he might make an application to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate where the complaint had been presented within 10 days of the date of receipt of the intimation. The petitioner, however, did not proceed to get the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. He was in due course tried and convicted for the offence. He admitted the sale; but contended that he was carrying the milk at the instance of some other person. He denied knowledge that the milk was adulterated. The Chief Judicial Magistrate relied upon the evidence of Pw. 1, the Food Inspector and Pw. 2, one of the attestors to the mahazar and convicted the petitioner. It is against the above conviction that the revision petition has been filed.

    2. The main contention put forward on behalf of the revision petitioner is that there has been non-compliance of the provisions contained in Rule 9(j) of the Act. Rule 9(j) as it stood on the date of sampling imposed a duty on the Food Inspector to send by registered post, a copy of the report received from the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken within ten days of the receipt of the said report in all cases where the sample did not conform to the provisions of the Act or Rules. It is the admitted case that no copy was sent to the petitioner within 10 days of the receipt of the report by the Food Inspector and, therefore, there has been non-compliance of the above rule. But the stand taken by the complainant is that Rule 9(j) need not be followed after the amendment of the Act in 1976 since S. 13(2) of the amended Act prescribes a different procedure. The purchase of the sample was after the amended Act came into force. Ext. P10, the intimation issued to the petitioner is in conformity with the provisions contained in S. 13(2). The argument put forward on behalf of the petitioner is that eventhough the amended Act had come into force, Rule 9(j) stood intact on the date of the purchase and, therefore, the Food Inspector should have complied with the provision. The learned Sessions Judge before whom the above contention was raised did not accept it and observed that Rule 9(j) stood deleted and the procedure followed by the Food Inspector was in conformity with Rule 9 A framed after the amendment of the Act The learned Judge also held that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner. The appeal against the conviction and sentence was dismissed.

    3. In this Court, reference was made by the revision petitioner to the decision in Crl. A. 286/77 disposed of by Subramonian Poti, J. The appeal in that case was against the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. One of the grounds of acquittal was non-compliance of the provisions contained in Rule 9(j). It was argued before this Court that the acquittal was unsustainble in view of the conditions of the provisions contained in Rule 9A. The learned Judge observed that Rule 9A had no application since it came into force on 4-1-1977 and that Rule 9(j) which was in force on the date of the purchase should have been complied. The learned Judge also held that the sampling by the Food Inspector was defective in the sense that the necessary formalities had not been complied with and, therefore, refused to interfere with the order of acquittal. No definite opinion is seen expressed in the above case on the consequences of non-compliance of Rule 9(j).

    4. A single Judge of the Bombay High Court had occasion to consider the effect of non-compliance of Rule 9(j) in the decision in State of Maha-rashatra v. Mohanlal Hanumandas Vaishnowa (1978 All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal, 183). The learned Judge observed that Rule 9(j) was a provision intended to protect the person from whom the sample was collected. The purpose was to avoid manipulations at the hands of persons collecting the sample. The rule was held to be mandatory. The same expression of opinion was made by another Judge of the same High Court in an earlier case, The State Of Maharashtra v. Jesti Dosa* (1978 F.A.J 19). The matter came up for decision before a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor, Hyderabad v. J. Muralidhar (1977 Crl. L.J 1634). Regarding the scope of Rule 9(j), the Bench observed:

    “A reading of the said rule would show that a duty is cast on the Food Inspector to send a copy of the report which he has received from the Public Analyst within 10 days of its receipt to the person from whom the sample was taken…………………………… But it is evident from R. 9(j) that where the report of the Public Analyst is against the person from whom the sample was taken, the Food Inspector is duty bound to send a copy of the report to such person within 10 days of its receipt by him……………………………… …………………We are not laying any undue emphasis on the word ‘shall’ used in the rule; but we are of the opinion that having regard to the scheme of the Act and the severity of the punishment, the Legislature had insisted on the requirement of sending the report of the Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken as a protection for safeguarding the liberty of the subject………………………………………. From what has been stated above, we should not be misunderstood as having held that even a delay of one day over and above ten days would be enough to throw out the case of the complainant for non-compliance with R. 9(j) of the Rules. Of course, if there is some delay in sending the report, the complainant's case cannot be thrown out unless the accused shows that even this slight delay has caused prejudice to him. It is not possible to lay down any hard and fast rule regarding the delay in sending the report of the Public Analyst to the person from whom the sample was taken. Every case will have to depend on its circumstances. But when the report of the Public Analyst was not sent to the accused even until the filing of the complaint, then to our mind, in such a case, the accused could be acquitted without his pleading prejudice.”

    5. The learned Judges followed the dictum in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad (A.I.R 1962 SC. 1694) that the question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specified provision which, for instance, sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the require-has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof.

    6. The above case arose before S. 13(2) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act was amended by Act 34 of 1976. S. 13(2) of the unamended Act, no doubt, enabled the accused-petitioner to make an application to Court after the institution of the prosecution to send part of the sample mentioned in sub-clause (I) of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of S. 11 to the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. It did not provide for the supply of a copy of the Analyst's report to the accused. It was only under Rule 9(j) that a direction was made for the supply of a copy of the report to the accused in the case within 10 days of the receipt of the report. By the amendment, a change was effected and the Statute itself provided for the supply of a copy of the report. S. 13(2) as amended reads:

    “On receipt of the report of the analysis under sub-section (1) to the effect that the article of food is adulterated, the Local (Health) Authority shall, after the institution of prosecution against the person from whom the sample of the article of food was taken and the person, if any, whose name, address and other particulars have been disclosed under S. 14A, forward, in such manner as may be prescribed, a copy of the report of the result of the analysis to such person or persons, as the case may be, informing such person or persons that if it is so desired, either or both of them may make an application to the court within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory.”

    7. S. 14A directs that the vendor should, if so required, disclose to the Food Inspector the address and other particulars of the person from whom he purchased the article of food. A casual reading of S. 13(2) as amended would show that there is material difference between the provisions contained therein and Rule 9(j) in so far as when a copy of the Analyst's report should be supplied to the accused. While S. 13(2) as amended directs the forwarding of a copy of the Analyst's report after the institution of the prosecution and limits the period within which the accused should make an application for getting the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory, Rule 9(j) directed supply of a copy within 10 days of the receipt of the report by the Food Inspector but did not refer to or prescribe any time limit for the making of an application for getting the sample analysed by the Central Food Laboratory The conflict between the two provisions was set right by deleting Rule 9(j) and adding Rule 9A. Rule 9A only repeats the provision in S. 13(2) as amended and provides the manner in which the copy is to be delivered. It may be delivered either by registered post or by hand. The change came into force only on 4-1-1977.

    8. The sample in the instant case was taken on 10-8-1976, after the amended Act came into force and before Rule 9(j) was deleted. What the Food Inspector did was to follow the procedure prescribed in S. 13(2) in preference to Rule 9(j). The question is whether he was right in doing so and whether he was obliged to follow the procedure in Rule 9(j) which was still in the statute book.

    9. It is well recognised principle of interpretation that Rules framed under a Statute should not be allowed to override any specific provision in the Statute itself. The purpose of framing rules is to supply matters which are subsidiary to the provisions of the Act and or to prescribe a procedure for the proper working of the Act. The Statute itself may authorise framing of rules to carry out its provisions. In such cases, the rules framed have the same force as the Statute. But all the same, a rule cannot militate against the provisions of the Act and cannot go beyond the scope of the Act. In the instant case, S. 13(2) directs that a copy of the report should be delivered over to the accused after the institution of the prosecution and also that an intimation should be given to the person concerned that he might make an application to the Court within a period of 10 days from the date of receipt of the copy of the report to get the sample of the article of food kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. Being a provision in the Statute, the authority concerned is obliged to follow the procedure, in all cases where the sample is taken after the commencement of the Act. The Food Inspector had, therefore, to send a copy of the report after the prosecution was launched and also to intimate the accused that he, if so desired, should move for the examination of the sample kept with the Local (Health) Authority within 10 days of the receipt of the copy. It is significant to note that since S. 13(2) provides a time limit for application for examination of the sample by the Central Food Laboratory, the accused in the usual course, is not expected to make an application afterwards. This speaks to the importance of complying with S. 13(2) in the case of offences after the amended Act came into force. If Rule 9(j) was to be followed, no intimation was to be sent by the Food Inspector and to that extent there would have been contravention of S. 13(2) and the accused would have been prejudiced. There is no question of complying with Rule 9A because Rule 9A only prescribes the mode of service of copy and does not cast any additional duty on the Food Inspector or Local (Health) Authority. To hold that the Food Inspector or the Local (Health) Auhority concerned should have complied with the provisions contained in S. 13(2) as also Rule 9(j) would amount to enlarging of the statutory obligation, which is beyond the function of the rule-making authority. There is thus conflict between the provisions of the Statute and the Rule 9(j). In such cases, the statutory provision should prevail in preference to the procedure prescribed by the rules. It follows that after Act 34 of 1976 came into force the Local (Health) Authority is obliged to comply with the provisions of S. 13(2). The omission to comply with the direction in Rule 9(j) (since deleted) will not affect the prosecution.

    10. There is no case for the revision petitioner that the provisions contained in S. 13(2) have not been complied with or that he did not get an opportunity to have the sample kept by the Local (Health) Authority analysed by the Central Food Laboratory. No such case was put forward when the matter was pending in the trial court. The objection based on non-compliance of Rule 9(j) was taken for the first time in the appellate Court. The inference is that it is an after-thought and no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner due to the non-compliance. It follows that the conviction is not liable to be set aside because of the omission of the Food Inspector to comply with Rule 9(j).

    11. On behalf of the petitioner, it was argued that milk is primary food and, therefore, it must be established that the petitioner was carrying the same for the purpose of sale. Assuming that it is so, the testimony of Pw. 2, the owner of the Lucky Star Hotel is that petitioner is a milk-vendor and he used to supply milk to the hotel. There is no evidence to the contra. The petitioner's case that he was carrying milk to somebodyelse stands unproved.

    12. That the petitioner sold buffalo milk to Pw. 1, the Food Inspector is not disputed. The petitioner had nothing to say against the evidence of Pw. 1 on the point. Ext. P8, the report of the Public Analyst shows that the milk did not conform to the standards prescribed for buffalo milk under the P.F.A Rules and that it contained not less than 28% of added water as calculated from the milk-solids-not fat content. The milk was, therefore, adulterated.

    13. On behalf of the petitioner, a contention was raised that there has been non-compliance of Rules 16, 17 and 18 of the P.F.A Rules. The case is that there has been failure on the part of the Food Inspector to follow the formalities prescribed under the above rules. But Pw. 1, the Food Inspector has proved the several documents in connection with the sampling which prima facie show that the formalities have been complied with. There was no cross-examination on the point. No objection based on non-compliance of the provisions of the rules was raised while the case was pending in the courts below. It is not open to him to raise the issue in revision.

    14. A contention has been raised that the extra water noted at the time of analysis is not proved to be due to adulteration. The argument is that a case of adulteration cannot be spelt out solely from the report of the Public Analyst. But the petitioner had no such case when the case was pending in the trial court. Once it is made out from the report of the Public Analyst that the milk contained extra water and it did not conform to standards prescribed, the presumption is that it is adulterated. See Kisan Trimbak Kothula v. State of Maharashtra (1977 SCC (Cri) 97). It follows that the finding of the courts below that the buffalo milk was adulterated does not call for interference. The conviction of the petitioner has, therefore, to be upheld. Since the sentence passed is the minimum provided for the offence, it does not require any modification. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed.

    15. Dismissed.

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    Comments

    Narayanan v. Food Inspector, Calicut Corporation
    (Feb 23, 1979)