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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by H.L. Gokhale, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicants in Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 were clerks appointed to posts reserved for scheduled tribes in the establishment of the District Judge of Sabarkantha at Himmatnagar. They had been working in two courts (Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Judicial Magistrate (First Class)) since 26 August 1992 and drew pay in the scale Rs. 950-20-1150-EB-25-1500. Their names were recommended by the employment exchange; they passed typing tests and interviews.

The District Judge (opponent) issued a combined office order dated 30 May 1994 terminating their services effective 13 June 1994, on the ground that two Judges were transferred out of the district and no replacements were appointed, allegedly causing closure of the courts and reduction in sanctioned staff.

The applicants challenged the termination by filing Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994, relying principally on the contention that their removal might affect scheduled tribe reservation quotas (citing R.K. Prajapati & Others v. State of Gujarat & Others (1992 (2) GLR 1422)). A learned single Judge of the High Court granted an ad interim ex parte order on 9 June 1994 staying the termination (order stated: “Rule. Ad interim relief in terms of para 7(B).”).

The ad interim order was served on the District Judge on 10 June 1994. Thereafter, the District Judge caused a civil application seeking vacation of the interim order to be filed; copies of that civil application were said to have been furnished to the petitioners' advocate's clerk on or about 25 October 1994 but the application was formally numbered and shown filed on 20 January 1995 as Civil Application No. 91 of 1995. On 21 December 1994 the District Judge communicated to the applicants that, because the civil application had not been decided within fourteen days, the interim stay had automatically stood vacated. The applicants then filed Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 (26 December 1994) seeking a declaration that the District Judge's 21 December 1994 communication was unauthorised and relief to restore the employees to status quo ante.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, for the purpose of Article 226(3) of the Constitution, the lodging/filing of an application in the Registry and service of a copy on the party in whose favour an ex parte interim order is made constitutes "making an application to the High Court" so as to trigger the two-week period after which the interim order stands vacated if not disposed of.
  2. Whether a judicial interim ex parte order can be treated as automatically vacated (and communicated as vacated by the respondent) where the respondent has not moved the matter before the learned Judge taking the assignment and significant time has elapsed between service of the interim order and the lodging/filing of the application.
  3. Whether the District Judge's communication of 21 December 1994 (stating that the interim order stood vacated because a civil application was not decided within fourteen days) was authorised and effective in law in the factual circumstances of these cases.

Arguments of the Parties

Respondent / District Judge (represented by Mr. A. R. Dave, Government Solicitor)

  • Invoked Article 226(3) of the Constitution: once an ex parte ad interim order is obtained, the respondent can make an application to the High Court to vacate such order; if the High Court does not dispose of that application within two weeks from the date it is received or from the date the copy of such application is furnished, the interim order stands vacated.
  • Submitted that copies of the District Judge's civil application were furnished to the petitioners' advocate's clerk on 25 October 1994 and that the application was lodged on 24 October 1994 (Stamp No. 26164 of 1994) with a note for listing on 25 October 1994; therefore, the two-week period contemplated by Article 226(3) commenced from 25 October 1994 and the interim order was to be treated as vacated when not disposed within that period.
  • Relied on Kishankumar v. Reserve Bank of India (AIR 1991 Calcutta 272) to contend that Article 226(3) is mandatory and the interim order automatically stands vacated if the application is not disposed of within the specified period; also relied on Order XXXIX (Rule 3A) CPC as supporting the mandatory character of the provision.
  • Also relied on the decision in Gheesalal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1981 Raj. 65) addressing consequences where applications are not listed within the specified period.

Applicants / Petitioners (represented by Mr. Gupta)

  • Submitted that merely lodging/filing the application in the Registry and serving a copy on the advocate's clerk is insufficient; "making an application to the High Court" under Article 226(3) requires moving the learned Judge taking the assignment and drawing the Judge's attention to the application so that the Judge can take cognisance and dispose of it within the two-week period.
  • Argued that the District Judge delayed in seeking vacation (the ad interim order was served on 10 June 1994, whereas the District Judge only lodged an application on 24 October 1994 — a delay of about four months) and that the District Judge's communication of 21 December 1994 informing that the stay automatically stood vacated was unauthorised.
  • Supported the approach by analogy to limitation in contempt matters (Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971) and the authorities interpreting initiation dates for contempt actions, including State of Maharashtra v. J.V. Patel and Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, to argue that an action or application is not treated as initiated until it is placed before the appropriate judicial authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
R.K. Prajapati & Others v. State of Gujarat & Others (1992 (2) GLR 1422) Relied upon by applicants regarding reservation/quota concerns in the context of termination of scheduled tribe employees. The Court records that the applicants relied on this Division Bench judgment when challenging termination; the decision is part of the factual/petitioners' submissions rather than central to the Article 226(3) analysis.
Kishankumar v. Reserve Bank of India (AIR 1991 Calcutta 272) Held that Article 226(3) is mandatory and that if an application for vacation is not disposed of within the specified period the ex parte interim order automatically stands vacated; referred to Order XXXIX (Rule 3A) CPC to emphasize mandatory character. The Court accepts the core proposition in Kishankumar that the Article has mandatory consequences, but qualifies the application by construing what it means to "make an application to the High Court" (requiring presentation to the learned Judge, not mere lodging in the Registry).
Gheesalal v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1981 Raj. 65) Statement that where an application for vacating was not listed within the specified period due to mistake of the office, the party should not be made to suffer; and that once served the original petitioner should take active steps to have it listed. The Court distinguishes this view: it does not accept that lodging alone suffices, because that would allow administrative inaction to vacate a judicial order; instead, the Court reads "makes an application to the High Court" as requiring approach to the learned Judge taking the assignment.
State of Maharashtra v. J.V. Patel (LXXVIII B.L.R. 116) In contempt context, the date when the matter is placed before the Division Bench and the rule is granted is the date when contempt proceedings can be said to be initiated; a mere administrative reference or order is not the initiation. The Court uses this decision analogously to support the proposition that an application is not "initiated" (for computing a limitation-like period) until it is placed before the judicial authority and the authority applies its mind.
Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society (AIR 1980 Guj. 194) Held that if an application under the Contempt of Courts Act is filed within one year but the court passes no order before the expiry of one year, the application fails because the court did not apply its mind within the statutory period. The Court cites this case to draw an analogy about computation of periods and the necessity for judicial application of mind (supporting the view that the learned Judge must consider the application to trigger the running of the two-week period under Article 226(3)).
(Supreme Court authority cited) Borad Kanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikkrushna Mishra ((1975) 3 SCC 535; AIR 1974 SC 2255) Referenced in connection with the proposition on time-bars and the necessity for the court to apply its mind within the prescribed period in contempt-related proceedings. The Court cites the Supreme Court proposition as supporting the analogy that judicial action (application of mind) is required before limitation or vacatur consequences arise; it is used as an analogous principle rather than being applied directly to Article 226(3).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the textual requirement of Article 226(3) and the competing judicial interpretations. Two single-judge precedents were central to the debate: the Calcutta High Court decision in Kishankumar (which treated Article 226(3) as mandatory and resulting in automatic vacatur if the application is not disposed within the prescribed period) and the Rajasthan High Court decision in Gheesalal (which emphasized that a party should not suffer where an application is not listed due to office mistake and suggested that filing/serving may be sufficient to activate the period).

The Court agreed with the mandatory character of Article 226(3) as stated in Kishankumar but found the Rajasthan approach problematic because it allows an administrative inaction (registry/office failure) to produce the consequence of vacating a judicial order. The Court therefore undertook a close textual construction of the words “makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order”.

The key legal determination was that "makes an application to the High Court" must be read as making the application to the learned Judge taking the assignment (i.e., presenting/moving the application before the judicial officer who is to dispose of it), not merely lodging papers in the Registry and serving copies on the opposite party. The Court reasoned that the High Court is required to "dispose of the application" within two weeks and that disposal necessarily implies judicial consideration on the merits by the Judge. Hence the period of two weeks for disposal should be construed as commencing from the date the application is actually made to and taken up by the learned Judge (and the learned Judge's office makes a note or otherwise takes the matter for hearing), rather than from the date of registry-lodging or registry service alone.

The Court accepted that the aggrieved party seeking vacation ought to move expeditiously and preferably within two weeks of receipt of the interim order; however, where a party approaches beyond that period the High Court may still entertain the application if circumstances are explained. The Court emphasized the responsibility of the applicant (respondent in the original ex parte order) to actively move the matter before the learned Judge so the judicial machinery can apply its mind within the statutory period.

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court found that the District Judge had delayed (the civil application was lodged months after service of the interim order) and that the District Judge's communication of 21 December 1994 effectively treated the interim order as vacated without the matter having come before any learned Judge and without judicial disposal within the two-week period from a proper commencement date. The Court held that such a communication was unauthorised and that the ex parte interim order continued in force until displaced by an order of the High Court on the merits.

Consequently, the Court declared the District Judge's communication of 21 December 1994 invalid and directed restoration of the employees to status quo ante; it ordered that the employees be allowed to resume duty on 1 March 1995 and be paid wages from the date of discontinuation until rejoining, to be paid along with March salary at the end of March 1995. The Court also directed that the civil applications filed by the District Judge (numbered belatedly as 91 of 1995 and 90 of 1995) be placed for hearing on the merits along with the respective main special civil applications.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 is allowed and the rule is made absolute to the extent stated.

Implications and direct consequences (as provided in the opinion):

  • The District Judge's communication dated 21 December 1994, which purported to treat the interim ex parte order of 9 June 1994 as vacated, is held unauthorised and in violation of the High Court's earlier ad interim order.
  • The applicants are declared entitled to restoration to the status quo ante; they are to be allowed to resume duty on 1 March 1995.
  • The employees are entitled to wages from the date of their discontinuation until they are allowed to join; such wages shall be paid along with the salary for the month of March (to be paid at the end of March 1995).
  • The District Judge's civil applications (Civil Application No. 91 of 1995 and Civil Application No. 90 of 1995), being belated and not placed before any Judge for hearing prior to the District Judge's 21 December 1994 communication, cannot be treated as having succeeded by administrative communication; they are directed to be heard on merits along with the main Special Civil Applications (No. 7565 of 1994 and No. 7814 of 1994 respectively).
  • In the similar matter (Civil Application No. 3054 of 1994 arising from Special Civil Application No. 7814 of 1994), the Court allowed the civil application filed by the petitioner and directed that the District Judge's civil application (No. 90 of 1995) be adjourned to be heard with the main matter.
  • On the application of Mr. Dave (Government Solicitor) for a stay of the orders passed in these matters, the Court ordered that the judgment/order will stand stayed for two weeks from the date of the judgment (the opinion records: "This order will stand stayed for two weeks from today").

The Court thereby clarifies the procedural requirement that an application to vacate an ex parte interim order under Article 226(3) must be presented to the judicial authority (the learned Judge) so that judicial disposal is possible within the statutory period; mere registry-lodging and service do not suffice to trigger automatic vacatur.

    S.N. Pandor v. District Judge

    H.L Gokhale, J.:— The applicants in Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 are working as clerks on vacant and permanent posts. They all belong to various scheduled ??? and they were appointed on posts which were meant for scheduled tribes candidates in the establishment under the District Judge of Sabarkantha at Himmatnagar the opponent herein. The applicants were allotted to work in two courts of Civil Judges (Junior Division and Judicial Magistrate (First Class) both situated at Himmatnagar. They were so working from 26th August 1992 and were drawing pay in the pay scale of Rs. 950-20-1150-EB-25-1500. Their names had been recommended by the employment exchange on the query from the office of the District Judge in that behalf and on their passing the necessary typing test and interview they had been appointed in those posts.

    2. The opponent-District Judge decided to discharge them from their services with effect from 13-6-1994 (before office hours). A combined office order dated 30-5-1994 was issued to that effect. The said order of termination was issued on account of transfer of the said two Judges outside the district and since there was no appointment of any other Judge in their place. The applicants filed Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 to challenge the said order of termination. Various contentions were raised therein. The principal one amongst them being that since they belong to scheduled tribes, before the termination of their services was effected it was necessary to examine whether the quota of scheduled tribes candidates in any way got affected because of their termination and they relied upon a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in R.K Prajapati & Others… v. State Of Gujarat & Others…, reported in 1992 (2) GLR 1422. The petition came to be considered by a learned single Judge of this Court who passed the following order on 9-6-1994.

    “Rule. Ad interim relief in terms of para 7(B).”

    3. The prayer Clause 7(B) sought the stay the operation, implementation and execution of termination order dated 30-5-1994 which was to be effective from 13-6-1994. The aforesaid order was obtained without serving a copy thereof on the opponents and by requesting the learned Judge to pass an ex parte ad interim order inasmuch as there was; urgency and urgent order was necessary to protect the petitioners, which according to the petitioners was prima facie justified in the facts of the case. The order of this court was served on the opponent on 10th June 1994 along with a copy of the petition. The opponent accepted the said order and the applicants continued to work in pursuance thereto. Strange enough on 21-12-1994 the applicants were served with an office order issued on the same day signed by the opponent informing them that the opponent had filed a civil application in Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 for vacating the stay therein. The order further stated that the opponent-learned Judge had been informed by the Government Solicitor that the said civil application had been filed on 25th October 1994 after serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner's advocate and since the same was not decided within fourteen days of filing the same, the stay or injunction granted by the High Court earlier automatically stood vacated. The applicants therefore rushed to this Court of and filed Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 on 26-12-1994 and prayed for a declaration that the opponent-Judge's order dated 21-12-1994 is unauthorised and in violation of High Court's earlier ad interim order dated 9-6-1994 in Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994. The applicants also prayed for restoration of the status quo ante by prayer Clause 6(B). No reply has been filed by the learned District Judge to the civil application though an affidavit-in-reply has been filed to the main Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 which is affirmed by one B.R Valand, clerk of the court.

    4. The civil application filed by the learned District Judge though affirmed on 20-10-1994 and though copy thereof was served on the clerk of the applicant's Advocate on the same day, the same has been filed on 20-1-1995 and given No. 91 of 1995. The said civil application as stated above seeks to vacate the ad interim ex parte order dated 9-6-1994 passed in Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994. The main submission their in is that the transfer of the two learned Civil Judges (Junior Division) has led to closure of the two courts and the strength of the sanctioned staff has been reduced on that account necessitating the termination of services of the concerted employees. The application therefore seeks to vacate the ad interim ex parte order.

    5. As stated above though the civil application of the learned District Judge is filed on 20-1-1995 the same has been affirmed on 20-10-1994 and a copy was given to the clerk of the petitioner's advocate on 25-10-1994. It is the action based on this civil application which has led to the termination of the applicants from their services vide office order dated 21-12-1994 and to the Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 which is filed on 26-12-94. Mr. A.R Dave learned Government Solicitor appearing for the learned District Judge emphasised that under Article 226 sub-Clause (3), once an ex parte ad interim relief is obtained against a respondent the respondent is given a right to make an application to the High Court to get the stay order vacated and if the High Court does not dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the day on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of the application is so furnished (to the party or to the Counsel of the party in whose favour the order is made), the interim order on the expiry of that period stands vacated. It is material to note the relevant article in this behalf which reads as follows:

    “226(3). Where any party against whom an interim order whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under Clause (1), without - (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the pica for such interim order; and

    (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the Counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated.”

    6. Mr. Dave submitted that admittedly an ex parte interim order had been obtained against the learned District Judge. It cannot be disputed, he asserted, that the copies of the civil application of the learned District Judge were furnished to the advocate's clerk of the petitioners on 25-10-1994. He pointed out that the application has been lodged on 24-10-1994 with Stamp No. 26164 of 1994 and a note had been filed on 25-10-1994 seeking to place the application before the court on 25-10-1994. The application is however numbered on 20-1-1995 as application No. 91 of 1995. Mr. Dave therefore submits that once the application is lodged in the office of the court and copy thereof was served on the original petitioner through his Advocate on 25-10-1994 along with a note dated 24-10-1994 that the matter be placed for hearing on 25-10-1994, the period of two weeks contemplated in the Article 226(3) will start running. He, therefore, submitted that if before the expiry of two weeks from 25-10-1994 if the interim ex parte order was not confirmed it will be construed as having been vacated. As against that Mr. Gupta learned Advocate appearing for the main petitioners submitted that it is no use merely lodging the application in the Court Registry and serving the same on the advocate's clerk of the petitioners. Such an application will have to be moved before the Honourable Judge drawing his attention that the aggrieved party wants the interim ex parte order to be vacated and it is only in the event of the said application not being decided within two wrecks, thereafter that the fiction contemplated in Article 226(3) will come into play. Mr. Gupta also submitted that inasmuch as the High Court was expected to dispose of the application within two weeks it was also expected that the aggrieved party also must move expeditiously and preferably within a similar period of limitation. In the instant case the ad interim ex parte order was served on the respondent District Judge on 10-6-1994. The said order was being acted upon and much later, that is, on 24-10-1994 that the learned District Judge has lodged her civil application to vacate the said order, that is, nearly after four months from the date of service of the interim ex parte Order 7. Mr. Dave the learned Government Solicitor appearing for the learned District Judge pressed into service two judgments of Calcutta High Court and Rajasthan High Court, both of single Judges. In Kishankumar v. Reserve Bank of India reported in AIR 1991 Calcutta 272 a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court has held the provisions of Article 226(3) to be mandatory and if the application for vacation is not disposed of within the specified period the original ex parte interim order shall automatically stand vacated. The learned single Judge has referred to the provisions of the Order XXXIX (Rule 3A) of the Code of Civil Procedure in support to emphasise the mandatory character of the provisins of Article 226(3). The learned Judge observed in paragraph 8 as follows:

    “When a statutory provision not only directs a tiling to be done in a specified period, but at the same time provides for the inevitable consequence of non-compliance with the direction, the direction must be held to be obligatory and not merely directory.”

    7. The learned Judge has further held in paragraph 12 in the same judgment that although after such an eventuality the interim relief will stand vacated, “nothing shall prevent the Court to grant an interim order afresh after hearing the parties, on the application for vacation or otherwise, if the Court finds sufficient grounds to make such fresh order.”

    8. The learned Judge has also relied upon an earlier judgment of a single Judge of Rajasthan High Court reported in AIR 1981 Raj. 65 (Gheesalal v. State of Rajasthan). In that matter, the learned single Judge of Rajasthan High Court had held that, “where an application for vacating was not listed within the specified period on account of mistake of the office, the party could not be made to suffer”. The learned Judge further held that after the party obtaining original order is served with the notice of the other side, it is for that party to take active steps to get the matter listed in the Court within the period specified.

    9. As far as the proposition laid down by the learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court is concerned, there is no reason to depart therefrom. However, in my understanding, the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court has not taken into consideration one aspect, namely that the interpretation that he was accepting will lead to a judicial order being vacated by an administrative inaction. In my view such an interpretation cannot be contemplated. When Article 226(3) specifically requires an aggrieved party to make an application to the High Court for the vacation of such an order, that application will have to be construed as to be made to the learned Judge taking up the assignment. A filing or lodging of such an application in the Registry cannot be construed as making an application to the High Court. This is because it is the High Court which is supposed to dispose of the application within the period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of the application is so furnished to the other side whichever is later. The disposal is also permitted to be done on a day next to the day on which the High Court is closed. When the Article speaks of the High Court disposing of the application it will have to be construed as disposing the application on merits and hence that is the responsibility of the learned Judge taking up the assignment. That responsibility will start from the day the application for vacation is made to the learned Judge. An interim ex parte order passed by the learned Judge will otherwise stand vacated even before the matter coming up before the learned Judge which is what has happened in the present case. For these reasons I am unable to accept the view of the learned single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court expressed in paragraph 10 of his judgment that it is for the original petitioner to take active steps once the application is served on him. The original petitioner is of course expected to take active steps to have the application heard at the earliest, but that responsibility will start after the application is made to the learned Judge and not merely on lodging the application in the office of the Court and serving the same on the Counsel of the original petitioner. In my respectful understanding, the words, “makes an application to the High Court for vacation”, have not been properly considered by the learned Judge who decided the matter in the Rajasthan High Court.

    10. The learned Advocate of the applicants supported his submission by the approach which the courts are expected to take with respect to Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The said Section reads as follows:

    20. Limitation for action for contempt - No court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.”

    11. This section provides that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt (either on its own motion or otherwise) after the expiry of the period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in State of Maharashtra v. J.V Patel reported in LXXVIII B.L.R 116 has held that, under Section 20 read with Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the date on which the matter is placed before the Division Bench of the High Court and on which date the rule is granted is the elate when contempt proceedings can be said to be initiated in the Court. “A reference by the subordinate court or the administrative order of the Administrative Judge of this court cannot therefore be said to be the beginning of Contempt proceedings.” A similar view is taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Dineshbhai A. Parikh v. Kripalu Co-operative Housing Society, Nagarvel, Ahmedabad reported in AIR 1980 Guj. 194. In that matter the court held as follows:

    “If an application for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is filed within a period of one year from the date of alleged commission of contempt but the court has passed no order therein before the expiry of one year from the said date, such application automatically fails and the jurisdiction of the Court is barred because the court did not apply its mind to the complaint or information within a period of one year. The said view is taken following the proposition laid down by the Supreme Court in a case reported in (1975) 3 SCC 535 : AIR 1974 SC 2255, (Borad Kanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikkrushna Mishra).

    12. In my view a similar approach will be required to be taken in the present case. It will have to be held that the application will have to be made to the learned Judge, the learned Judge will be expected to apply his mind and then only the period of limitation can be said to have started. I am conscious that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act are in a different context. However in the instant case under this Article certain rights are given and consequences are also provided. The consequences are to vacate a judicial interim order on account of the application for vacation thereof not being decided within two weeks. Such consequences cannot be said to be flowing from mere lodging of an application and service thereof on the Counsel for the petitioner and computing a period of two weeks thereafter. Such making of an application will have to be read as making it to the learned Judge concerned.

    13. The submission of Mr. Gupta that for invoking this provision the aggrieved party also should move expeditiously is well taken. If the High Court is expected to decide an application for vacation within two weeks, it is implied that the party concerned is very much aggrieved and it will not be improper to read that such a party ought to rush to the court expeditiously and preferably within two weeks of receipt of the order. In a case where a party approaches the High Court beyond this period, the High Court may still entertain the application if circumstances are explained. However, the Article cannot be read to mean a right to a respondent to move the High Court any time when the party feels like moving.

    14. In the view that I am taking it will be expected of such an aggrieved party to move the High Court expeditiously and preferably within two weeks from the receipt of the notice of the application for vacation. Such a party will make an application to the learned Judge drawing his attention that the vacation is sought under Article 226(3) of the Constitution. The learned Judge will be expected to make a note in that behalf whereafter the period of-two weeks will start running and if the original petitioner does not get the application decided within two weeks it can be said that he will be doing so at is own peril. It is possible that in a case such an application may not be decided within fourteen days in which case the dicta of the learned single Judge of Calcutta High Court will apply namely that, the learned Judge concerned may extend the interim relief having heard the parties, by extending the interim relief for further period. However if that is not done the interim order will expire. Mr. Gupta submitted that taking up the matter for hearing within two weeks will suffice since in a given case it may not be possible to decide it within two weeks. That is very much likely. That is why the court will be expected to extend the interim relief after forming a prima facie opinion after hearing both parties within two weeks. That is within the power of the court as stated in para 12 of the Calcutta judgment. In the absence of such an extension however the interim order will stand vacated at the end of two weeks.

    15. In the present case it is an admitted position that the civil application of the learned District Judge is made after four months after receipt of the interim order. The ex parte interim order was being acted in the meanwhile and after the expiry of two weeks after lodging of the application the original petitioners were informed that the interim ex parte order stood vacated which communication was made dehors any order by the High Court and without the matter coming up for hearing before the court. In my view therefore the declaration which is sought in Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 is fully justified and the order of the learned District Judge dated 21-12-1994 will have to be held as and in vacation of the High Court's earlier interim order dated 9-6-1994 passed in Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 The applicants will therefore be entitled to the said declaration and consequently a mandatory order as prayed for in prayer Clause 6(B) that the employees concerned be restored to status quo ante which existed prior to the office order dated 21-12-1994 issued by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge is expected to comply with this order by the end of this month and see to it that the employees concerned are allowed to resume on duty on 1st March 1995. The employees will also be entitled to their wages from the date of their discontinuation until they are allowed to join. The said wages will be paid to them along with the salary for the month of March when the same is paid at the end of March 1995.

    16. Consequently Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 is allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

    17. The effect of the District Judge's communication dated 21-12-1994 which is under challenge in Civil Application No. 3052 of 1994 was that although the Civil Application No. 91 of 1995 filed by the District Judge was pending in the Registry of this Court the District Judge had communicated the applicants that since the civil application of the District Judge was not decided in two weeks, the ex parte interim order obtained by the applicants in Special Civil Application 7565 of 1994 stood vacated. Thus the District Judge had herself allowed Civil Application No. 91 of 1995 in an indirect way. That cannot be done. The Application No. 91 of 1995 cannot be said to be allowed in this fashion inasmuch as it was never moved before a learned Judge taking the assignment and it was quite belated. The Application No. 91 of 1995 will therefore have to be heard on the submissions contained therein on merits. The application is, therefore, directed to be placed along with Special Civil Application No. 7565 of 1994 to be heard on merits for considering either the confirmation or vacation of the ad interim order.

    18. Similar are the facts in Special Civil Application No. 7814 of 1994. The petitioner herein is a handicapped person appointed on a clerical post. Apprehending his termination on account of non-availability of the two Judges in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) at Himmatnagar he filed Special Civil Application No. 7814 of 1994 and obtained an ad interim relief against the notice of termination dated 30-5-1994 on 9-6-1994. The notice was to be effective on 13-6-95. After the ad interim injunction was granted, a civil application was filed by the learned District Judge in similar fashion as in the other case being Civil Application 90 of 1995. The said civil application was affirmed on 11-11-1994 and ??? on the petitioner's advocate on 17-11-1994 but filed on 20-1-1995. In this matter also the petitioner was informed by the learned District Judge by her order dated 21-12-94 pointing out that since the said civil application was not decided within two weeks, the interim order stood vacated. The petitioner filed Civil Application No. 3054 of 1994 being aggrieved by the said order. Civil Application No. 90 of 1995 was never placed before any Judge for his orders, any time before the learned District Judge communicating the petitioner that the interim injunction stood vacated. Hence for the reasons narrated in the earlier part of this judgment Civil Application No. 3054 of 1994 is allowed and Civil Application No. 90 of 1995 is adjourned for hearing with the ma in matter that is Special Application No. 7814 of 1994. Mr. Dave applies for stay of the order that I have passed in both these matters. This order will stand stayed for two weeks from today.

    19. Orders accordingly.

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    Comments

    S.N. Pandor v. District Judge
    (Feb 21, 1995)