AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of R. 19, Income-tax Rules,
  • Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939),
  • S. 28, Income-tax Act 1922,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of R. 19, Income-tax Rules,
  • Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939),
  • S. 28, Income-tax Act 1922,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appeal concerns the validity of an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Rawalpindi Range, dated 18 January 1942, which imposed on the appellant a penalty of Rs. 14,000 under S. 28 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 (as amended to the relevant date).

The appellant was a supply contractor in Bannu who, for the accounting year 1937–1938, was required by notice under S. 22(2) to furnish a return for the year 1938–1939. He did not initially comply. Following failed attempts to serve him a notice under S. 22(4), he was served with a notice returnable on 18 October 1938. On that date he produced a standard return showing Rs. 10,000 under the heading for business income (item 5) but did not supply the detailed particulars required by Note 5 of the form. He also made a contemporaneous vernacular statement, recorded in translation, that his return was an approximation, that his books had been spoiled by fire and that his clerk had been ill; he asked to be assessed on payments made to him by Government.

The Income-tax Officer, accepting that no books were available, made enquiries and found the appellant had received Rs. 6,69,929 in the account year and assessed net income at Rs. 1,00,488, issuing an assessment under S. 23(3) on 30 October 1938. The appellant appealed to the Assistant Commissioner on 30 November 1938, contesting only the amount of the assessment and not the validity of the assessment under S. 23(3). During those proceedings the Assistant Commissioner concluded the assessee had concealed particulars and furnished inaccurate particulars, issued a notice under S. 28, and by order dated 18 January 1942 affirmed the assessment and imposed the maximum penalty of Rs. 14,000 under S. 28(1).

The appellant appealed to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal against both the assessment and the penalty. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's contentions about invalidity of the return and affirmed the Assistant Commissioner's jurisdiction to impose the penalty. The appellant sought reference of questions of law under S. 66; the Tribunal referred two questions to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province. The Judicial Commissioner answered the first question in the affirmative (that a valid return had been filed), making the second question unnecessary. The appellant then appealed to the Judicial Committee (their Lordships), which heard the matter and delivered the opinion summarized here.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner of 18 January 1942 imposing on the appellant a penalty of Rs. 14,000 under S. 28, Income-tax Act 1922, is a valid order.
  2. Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the assessee had filed a valid return so as to justify an assessment under S. 23(3) of the Act (as referred by the Tribunal).
  3. If the answer to question (2) is in the negative, whether on the facts the assessment could be deemed to have been made on default under S. 23(4), in which case there would have been no valid proceedings on appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (under the law as it stood before its amendment in 1939), and consequently no power in the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to take action under S. 28 (as referred by the Tribunal).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The return filed on 18 October 1938 was not a valid "return" under S. 22(2) because it failed to comply with the prescribed form and rules (specifically R. 19 and Note 5(b) of the statutory form), in that the detailed particulars required by Note 5 were not provided.
  • Immediately after rendering the return the appellant made a statement indicating he had no definite information about his income and that the figures were approximate estimates; therefore the document should be treated as an estimate rather than a valid return.
  • If there was no proper return, the Income-tax Officer could not validly assess under S. 23(3) but must be taken to have made an assessment under S. 23(4) (an assessment to the best of his judgment on default), and under the law then in force (prior to amendment by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939) there would have been no right of appeal to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and hence no jurisdiction for him to impose a penalty under S. 28.
  • For the first time before their Lordships the appellant also contended that the Income-tax Officer could not lawfully have made an assessment under S. 23(3) because the necessary notice under S. 23(2) was not given; accordingly, the assessment must be treated as under S. 23(4). (The Court notes this contention was raised late.)

Respondent / Revenue Position (as reflected in the record)

  • The Income-tax Officer accepted the appellant's return and, being not satisfied that it was correct or complete, proceeded to assess under S. 23(3) after making enquiries and determining net income substantially higher than the return indicated.
  • The Assistant Commissioner found that the assessee had concealed particulars of income and had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars; on that footing he issued show-cause notice and imposed the maximum penalty under S. 28(1).
  • The Tribunal and the Court of the Judicial Commissioner treated the return as a valid return for purposes of assessment under S. 23(3) and rejected the appellant's contention that the incompleteness or the contemporaneous statement reduced the return to an invalid estimate.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The opinion, delivered by Lord Simonds, frames the matter narrowly and limits itself to the questions that had been explicitly argued in the Indian courts. The court's analysis proceeds as follows:

  1. Scope of review: Their Lordships note the question referred was limited and state they will not go beyond the issues raised in the Indian courts.
  2. On the validity of the return: The court acknowledged the appellant's failure to provide the detailed particulars required by Note 5(b) of the prescribed form and that the appellant made a contemporaneous statement describing the figures as approximate and explaining loss of books. However, the court held that it was within the competence of the Income-tax Officer to accept such a return as a valid return and to proceed to assessment under S. 23(3) rather than being compelled, in all circumstances, to treat the matter as a default assessment under S. 23(4). The officer in this case, explicitly dissatisfied with the completeness and correctness of the return, proceeded under S. 23(3), as shown by the assessment documents.
  3. On the contention that the return was only an estimate: Their Lordships found no justification in the incompleteness of the form or in the appellant's accompanying statement for holding that the assessment was incompetent or that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal which the appellant himself had initiated.
  4. On the late-raised procedural ground (S. 23(2) notice): The appellant's counsel for the first time before their Lordships argued that the Income-tax Officer could not lawfully have made an assessment under S. 23(3) because the necessary notice under S. 23(2) had not been given. The court regarded this contention as dependent upon unresolved questions of fact which had not been investigated at the relevant stage, and therefore held it was too late to raise this point before their Lordships.
  5. Conclusion of analysis: The reasons advanced in support of invalidity of the return were regarded by their Lordships as without foundation in the circumstances of the present case, and the court endorsed the view that the Income-tax Officer validly proceeded under S. 23(3), permitting the appellate proceedings in which the Assistant Commissioner imposed the penalty.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

Direct consequences:

  • The decision of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (including imposition of the penalty of Rs. 14,000 under S. 28(1)) stands, as the appeal against it has been dismissed by their Lordships.
  • The appellant was ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.

Broader implications:

The court expressly limited its decision to the specific referred question and declined to go beyond the issues argued in the Indian courts. Their Lordships did not set out to establish any broader legal principle beyond affirming that, in the circumstances of this case, the Income-tax Officer could validly accept the incomplete return and proceed under S. 23(3). The opinion does not indicate that a new general precedent was laid down beyond its application to the facts before the court.

    Malik Damsaz Khan v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Punjab And N.W.F. Province

    Lord Simonds:-

    The substantial question raised in this appeal which is brought from the judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North West Frontier Province, is whether an order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Rawalpindi Range, of 18th January 1942, imposing on the appellant a penalty of Rs. 14,000 under S. 28, Income-tax Act 1922, as amended up to the relevant date, is a valid order.

    [2] The question arises in this way. The appellant during the years 1937 and 1938 carried on business as a supply contractor at Bannu in the North West Frontier Province, supplying livestock, wood and vegetables to the military units stationed in Waziristan. On 13th April 1938 a notice was sent to him under S. 22 (2) of the Act requiring him to furnish on or before 13th May 1938, a return for the year 1938-1939 of his income for the previous year 1937 1938. He did not do so. After two attempts to serve him with notice under S. 22 (4) of the Act to produce accounts or documents had failed, ho was served with such a notice returnable on 18th October 1988. On the same day ho appeared before the Income-tax Officer and produced a return made out on the usual form. This return showed no income except against item 5, which is headed

    "Business, trade, commerce, manufacture, or dealing in property, shares or securities (details as in Note 5)"
    . Against this item was an entry of Rs. 10,000, which sum was also entered as the total income of the appellant. The declaration in the return was duly signed by the appellant. The details in Note 5 were not given, a matter which in these proceedings has assumed great importance.

    [3] On the same day the appellant made a statement to the income-tax Officer in the vernacular which he duly recorded. This statement according to the translation recorded in the judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner was as follows:

    "I have filled the form. I have given my approximate income. I had my books but they were spoiled in the fire which occurred during the previous year. My Munshi (clerk) has been ill and was treated for a long time by me. He could not therefore write those books correctly. Enquiry should be made about my status and I should be assessed on the payments made to me by Government."

    [4] The Income-tax Officer believing the appellant's statement that he had no books to produce made enquiries. He found that the appellant had received payments of Rs. 6,69,929 during the account year 1937-1938 and assessed the appellant at a net income of rs. 1,00,488. The income-tax and super-tax on this net income was Rs. 20,047. An assessment order in this sum was accordingly issued on 30th October 1938, it was expressed to be made under S. 23 (3) of the Act.

    [5] Against this assessment the appellant appealed to the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax on 80th November 1938. The appeal was directed solely to the amount of the assessment. It was not suggested in the grounds of appeal that the assessment bad not been validly made under S. 23 (3) of the Act. In the course, however, of the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner "it came to notice" (so runs his judgment) "that the assessee had concealed the particulars of his income and had deliberately furnished inaccurate particulars." Notice was therefore issued to him to show cause why a penalty should not be imposed on him under S. 28 of the Act. It was thereupon urged on his behalf that it was not competent for the Assistant Commissioner to impose a penalty upon him upon the ground that the return made by him was not valid inasmuch as the requirements of Note 5 (b) of the statutory form had not been satisfied. This was the only reason then put forward for saying that the return was not valid.

    [6] The Assistant Commissioner by his order of 18th January 1942, affirmed the assessment of the Income-tax Office and, rejecting the appellant's plea that there was no valid return, imposed the maximum penalty of Rs. 14,000 under S. 28 (1) of the Act.

    [7] The appellant next appealed against both decisions of the Assistant Commissioner to the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal. It is unnecessary to refer further to the assessment, since that is not under appeal to their Lordships. It is, bow-ever, important to note what were the grounds (so far as they are now relevant) of appeal against the imposition of a penalty. These were in effect twofold, and are thus stated in the judgment of the Tribunal:

    "(1) That there was no valid return in this case and consequently there could be no appeal and, since in that view there were no valid proceedings before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, S. 28 could not be invoked by him, and (2) that since in the return no particulars whatever were furnished there could have been no concealment of any inaccurate particulars and consequently there is no case for the application of S. 28."

    Once more the alleged invalidity of the return was based on the failure to fill in the details prescribed by Note 5 of the form. But it was also suggested that, having regard to the statement made by the appellant contemporaneously with his return, the item of income entered in his return should be regarded only as an estimate and that the return itself should therefore be held to be invalid. These contentions the Tribunal rejected, as also they rejected an argument that, as there was no proper return filed, the Income-tax Officer was bound to make an assessment to the best of his judgment under S. 23 (4) and not to proceed under S. 23 (3) of the Act.

    [8] The appellant then applied to the same Tribunal under S. 66 of the Act that questions of law should be referred to the decision of the High Court, and, after argument, by order of 25th May 1943, the Tribunal referred the following questions of law for the decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, North-West Frontier Province:

    "(1) Whether in the circumstances of the case the assessee bad filed a valid return, so as to justify an assessment under S. 23 (3) of the Act ?

    If the answer to question (1) be in the negative,

    (2) Whether on the facts of the case, the assessment could be deemed to have been made on default under S. 23 (4) in which case there was no valid proceeding on appeal before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (under the law as it stood before its amendment in 1939), and consequently no power in Appellate Assistant Commissioner to take action under S. 28?"

    [9] As appears from the judgment of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner the appellant's contention in that Court was as follows :

    "The return of income rendered by the appellant on 18th October 1938, was not a return within the meaning of the word in S. 22 (2) of the Act. It was not a return for two reasons, namely : (1) it did not comply in form with the provisions of R. 19, Income-tax Rules, in that it did not contain the statement required by Note 5 (b) of the form prescribed by that Rule; and (2) after rendering the return the appellant made a statement showing that he had no definite information about his income, thus making it clear that the so-called return, was merely an approximate guess. If there was no proper return, the Income-tax Officer could not make a valid assessment under S. 23 (3) of the Act. Therefore, it was contended, the assessment was made, ' or must be deemed to have been made, under S. 23 (4) of the Act", and, consequently, under S. 30 (1) of the Act (as it stood until amended as regards subsequent years of assessment by the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1939), the appellant had no right of appeal against the assessment to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, who, consequently, had no jurisdiction to impose a penalty, since there were no proceedings before him in which he had jurisdiction to do so."

    The Court of the Judicial Commissioner answered the first question put to it in the affirmative, the second question therefore did not arise.

    [10] Their Lordships observe that the question thus referred was of a limited character and they do not propose to go beyond it or to consider any other reasons for challenging the validity of the return made by the appellant than those adduced in the Courts in India. The reasons so adduced have been already stated and they appear to their Lordships to be without foundation.

    [11] It has been observed that the appellant when making his return failed to comply with the prescribed form in that he did not enter any details such as Note 5 of the form required. It is this failure which in the appellant's contention invalidated his return. It is unnecessary for their Lordships to determine whether the Income-tax Officer could properly have declined to receive such a return and, upon the footing that the assessee had failed to make a return, have made an assessment to the best of his judgment under S. 23 (4) of the Act and they do not cast any doubt upon analogous decisions to that effect in the Courts of India. But it appears to them that it was clearly competent for the Income-tax Officer in the circumstances of the present case to accept the return as a valid return and proceed to assessment under S.23 (1) or S. 23 (3) as the case might be. Since he was not satisfied that the return was correct and complete he could not proceed under S. 23 (1): he, therefore, as appeared upon the face of the assessment, proceeded under S. 23 (3). Neither in the incompleteness of the return nor in the fact that in an accompanying statement the appellant referred to his return as an estimate can their Lordships find any possible justification for the plea that the assessment was incompetent or that the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal proceedings which the appellant himself initiated.

    [12] For the first time before their Lordships the appellant by his counsel raised the contention that the Income-tax Officer could not lawfully have made the assessment under S. 23 (3) as he had not given the necessary notice under S. 23 (2), and that for this reason the assessment must be treated as having been made under S. 23 (4). This plea depends for its validity upon questions of fact which have not been investigated and it is in their Lordships' opinion too late for the appellant to raise it now.

    [13] In the result their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal must be dismissed. The appellant will pay the costs of the appeal.

    Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Malik Damsaz Khan v. Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Punjab And N.W.F. Province
    (Jun 17, 1947)