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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Shops Rent Control Act of 1988 Act No. XXXIV of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I of the Code
  • Provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1
  • Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the CPC
  • Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC
  • Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Act. Section 11(h)
  • Section 11(h)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Shops Rent Control Act of 1988 Act No. XXXIV of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I of the Code
  • Provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1
  • Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the CPC
  • Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC
  • Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC
  • TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT
  • Act. Section 11(h)
  • Section 11(h)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, Abdul Haq, filed a suit for ejectment of two shops in Mohalla Ustad, Jammu, against the petitioner (the defendant) and for arrears of rent of Rs. 360. In paragraph 5 of the plaint the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had sub-let the shops to one Kasturi Lal, which was an asserted ground for ejectment. In his written statement the defendant categorically denied sub-letting and also denied damaging the suit property. Issues were framed on 2-12-1968; Issue No. 2 concerned subletting. While leading evidence on 23-5-1969 the defendant applied to amend his written statement to add Kasturi Lal as a co-defendant. The plaintiff resisted the amendment. The City Judge, Jammu, rejected the application for amendment on 17-12-1969. The defendant filed this revision application challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendant should be permitted to amend his written statement at the stage of trial to add Kasturi Lal as a co-defendant.
  2. Whether, under the J. & K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (specifically Section 11(h) proviso) and Order I Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), sub-tenants (or persons in occupation) must be made parties to an ejectment suit and whether Kasturi Lal falls within that class.
  3. Whether Order I Rule 10 and Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC permit an amendment that would introduce a party or a plea that is contrary to or forbidden by law.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant (Applicant for Revision / Petitioner) — Arguments in favour of amendment

  • The plaintiff himself pleaded subletting to Kasturi Lal in the plaint; therefore Kasturi Lal should be added as a party.
  • Section 11(h) of the J. & K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (Proviso) requires that all sub-tenants be made parties and allowed an opportunity to contest ejectment.
  • Rules on amendment should be construed liberally; amendments are usually allowed and costs can compensate any prejudice to the other side. The petitioner relied on authorities supporting liberal amendment of pleadings.

Plaintiff (Respondent in Revision) — Arguments opposing amendment

  • The plaint clearly alleged subletting to Kasturi Lal while the defendant had categorically denied subletting in his written statement; the defendant should not be permitted at the late stage to introduce Kasturi Lal as a party merely to prolong proceedings.
  • Allowing such an amendment would be a device to get the case tried de novo and to protract an ejectment proceeding (in the tenant's interest).
  • Under the Act’s definition of "tenant" (Section 2(6)), a person put into occupation by a tenant without the landlord's consent is not a "tenant" and therefore cannot be a sub-tenant within the meaning of Section 11(h); consequently adding Kasturi Lal would be contrary to the Act.
  • The amendment would introduce persons and controversies unrelated to the issues properly between the plaintiff and defendant in the rent-ejectment suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
AIR 1967 SC 96 Amendment introducing a new case cannot be allowed if a suit on such case is barred. Relied on to support the proposition that amendments cannot be permitted where they introduce matters barred by law; cited as authority that courts cannot sanction such amendments.
AIR 1962 Pat 357 Interpretation of sub-rule (2) of Order I Rule 10 CPC: only two cases justify adding a person as party (ought to have been joined or necessary for complete decision). Quoted to emphasize that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to add a person as party against his wishes and that the Court has no jurisdiction to add someone who is neither necessary nor proper.
AIR 1960 Punj 575 Defendant is not restricted when filing written statement to only contest amended parts; new pleas may be raised in a fresh written statement to an amended plaint. The court noted this precedent but held it was of no help to the petitioner in the present factual and legal context.
AIR 1954 Nag 200 Improbability of a new defence is not alone a ground to refuse amendment of a written statement. The court observed this ratio but found the factual circumstances of that case different from the present case, so it did not assist the petitioner.
AIR 1958 J. & K. 39 In a rent suit a third party claiming to be owner could not be made a party as it would convert a rent suit into a title suit. Applied to support refusal to add a third person (Kasturi Lal) where adding him would change the nature and scope of the rent-ejectment suit.
AIR 1968 Mad 287 Criteria for adding a party: necessity for adjudicating the real controversy; avoiding multiplicity of suits; proposed party must have a direct substantive interest; avoid impleading for collateral grievances; avoid prejudice by adding irrelevant parties. Adopted as guiding criteria; the court held Kasturi Lal did not satisfy these criteria (no defined legal interest and not necessary to adjudicate the controversy).
AIR 1934 All 11 Amendment refused where addition of plea concerned limitation. Cited to show courts may refuse amendments that raise untenable or legally inappropriate defences and to illustrate limits on amendment.
AIR 1942 Cal 153 Raising a new plea after restoration that imposes an additional burden and may defeat the plaintiff's claim can be refused as causing injustice. Used to demonstrate that amendments causing obvious injustice or defeating the plaintiff's case on grounds not previously pleaded can be denied.
AIR 1953 Cal 15 Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to written statements, but not where the amendment is no answer to the plaint or is immaterial/useless; costs are a remedy but not a panacea for impermissible amendments. Applied to underline that even liberal principles of amendment do not permit amendments that do not meet legal requirements or answer the plaint; the proposed amendment here was treated as immaterial/foreign to the suit.
AIR 1955 Bhopal 22 In arrears of rent suits, a person who challenges the plaintiff's right to sue should not be joined if that would effectively convert the suit into one based on title. Cited to reinforce that adding Kasturi Lal could convert the rent claim into a title dispute, which is impermissible in the context of the rent-ejectment proceeding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court assessed the amendment application primarily under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC (addition of parties) and considered the statutory framework of the J. & K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act (notably Section 11(h) proviso and the definition of "tenant" in Section 2(6)). The analysis proceeded in the following steps, strictly as reflected in the opinion:

  1. The court accepted that Order I Rule 10 permits addition only of persons whose presence is necessary to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate all questions in the suit. It asked whether Kasturi Lal was such a person.
  2. The court examined the Act's definition of "tenant" (Section 2(6)) which expressly excludes "any person placed in occupation of the house or shop by its tenant without the consent of the landlord." The court concluded that it was not alleged (nor shown) that Kasturi Lal was put into occupation with the landlord's consent; therefore Kasturi Lal could not be regarded as a "tenant" under the Act.
  3. Because a sub-tenant presupposes a tenant (tenant being the genus and sub-tenant the species), the proviso to Section 11(h) (requiring sub-tenants to be made parties) only applies where the person can properly be called a sub-tenant. If the person is not a tenant, that proviso does not operate to require his joinder.
  4. The court observed the practical and legal consequences of allowing the amendment: if persons in mere occupation without statutory status as tenants were to be made parties, innumerable occupiers or employees could be impleaded, thereby expanding and distorting the rent-ejectment proceeding into a broader inquiry (potentially into title), which the Act and relevant procedure do not contemplate.
  5. The court further held that Order VI Rule 17 (amendment of pleadings) could not be used to effect an amendment that is forbidden by law; an amendment that would introduce a plea or a party contrary to statutory provisions cannot be sanctioned simply because pleadings are otherwise amendable.
  6. The court considered authorities cited by both sides. It found several precedents supportive of refusing such an amendment where the proposed party was neither a necessary nor a proper party, where the amendment would convert a rent suit into a title dispute, or where permitting the amendment would cause injustice or be contrary to law. It distinguished or rejected authorities cited by the petitioner that permitted broad pleadings or additions where those authorities did not match the present statutory context.
  7. On these grounds the court concluded that introducing Kasturi Lal as a co-defendant would be "completely foreign to the scope of the litigation" between the plaintiff and defendant and therefore should not be allowed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the amendment application to add Kasturi Lal as a co-defendant was properly rejected by the subordinate court. The revision application was dismissed and costs were awarded against the petitioner.

Core Ruling: The revision is dismissed and the amendment to add Kasturi Lal as a party is refused.

Practical Consequences and Implications

  • Direct effect: The defendant's application to amend the written statement to add Kasturi Lal as a co-defendant was refused; Kasturi Lal was not added and the existing parties (plaintiff and defendant) remain the parties to the suit.
  • Legal rationale: The decision rests on the statutory definition of "tenant" under the Rent Control Act, the limits of Order I Rule 10 (necessity/propriety of joinder), and the principle that amendments cannot be allowed if they would introduce parties or pleas forbidden by law or convert the nature of the suit (for example, from rent-ejectment to a title controversy).
  • Scope: The court did not purport to create a novel rule of law beyond applying existing statutory definitions and precedents; it confined itself to the direct effect on the parties before it and noted that other occupants without statutory tenant status would be bound by any decree and do not have a separate right to defend the suit.

    Sant Ram v. Abdul Haq .

    1. This is a revision application directed against the order of the City Judge, Jammu, dated 17th December, 1969 whereby he has rejected the application for amendment of the written statement presented by the defendant.

    2. The facts giving rise to this application are that the respondent Abdul Haq filed a suit for ejectment of two shops situate in Mohalla Ustad, Jammu, against the present petitioner and for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 360/-. In paragraph 5 of the plaint the plaintiff stated that the defendant had sub-let the shops to one Kasturi Lal which gave a further ground of ejectment to the plaintiff. In reply to this paragraph 5 of the plaintiff the defendant categorically denied the sub letting and further mentioned that he had in no way damaged the suit property. Issues were struck in the case on 2-12-1968 and issue No. 2 pertains to subletting of the shops by the defendant. On 23-5-1969 however when the Page: 82defendant was leading evidence, he made an application for amending the written statement as stated above. This application was resisted by the plaintiff and the learned subordinate Judge heard arguments and ultimately rejected fee application. Against this order the present revision petition has been filed by the defendant. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner that the plaintiff had himself raised the plea of subletting of the shops by the defendant and there was already an issue struck by the Court with respect to this fact. Under Section 11(h) of the J. and K. Houses and Shops Rent Control Act of 1988 Act No. XXXIV of 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” in this Judgment) all sub-tenants had to be made parties. This sub-section reads as under:—

    “(h) where the house or shop is reasonably required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the house or shop is held:

    Provided that all sub-tenants in the house or shop are made parties to the suit and allowed opportunity of contesting claim to decree for ejectment.”

    3. Therefore the Court was not right in refusing to add Kasturi Lal as a co-defendant in the suit. The learned counsel further argued that the rule of amendment has to be construed liberally and amendments should usually be allowed because the other party can be compensated by way of costs. He has cited some authorities in support of his contention. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has argued that when the plaintiff mentioned clearly in his plaint that the defendant had sub-let his shop to Kasturi Lal and the defendant had categorically denied this fact in his written statement on that ground alone, he should not be permitted at the fag end of the case to introduce this Kasturi Lal as a party. The only object of the defendant by adding Kasturi Lal as a party was to get the case tried de novo and simply prolong the case in the Court as it is in the interests of a tenant to protract the proceedings of ejectment against him. He has further argued that such an amendment cannot be permitted under the law because it will introduce into the arena of dispute persons who have not the remotest connection with the same. He has referred me to the definition of the word “tenant” under the Act which is given under Section 2(6) and reads as under:—

    “‘tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent or any money liable to be paid for use of house or shop, is or but for a special contract would be payable for any such premises and includes legal representatives of such person; and, person continuing in possession after termination of tenancy in his favour but does not include any person placed in occupation of the house or shop by its tenant without the consent of the landlord.”

    4. He has laid emphasis on the last part of this definition namely that a tenant does not mean a person who has been introduced or put into the occupation of the shop by its tenant without the consent of the landlord. The learned counsel also has given me some authorities.

    5. In my opinion the question of the amendment in question has to be viewed in the light of the Provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC because by this amendment the defendant prays for the addition of a party.

    6. Under Order 1, Rule 10 of the CPC only such persons can be added as parties whose presence before the court may be necessary in order to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Accepting the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent, I do not think that this is a case in which Kasturi Lal should be introduced because Kasturi Lal's introduction would be completely foreign to the scope of the litigation between the parties already before the court. It is nobody's case that Kasturi Lal was put in occupation of this shop with the consent of the respondent landlord. Therefore, according to the definition of the “tenant” he cannot be regarded as a tenant under the Act. Section 11(h) proviso quoted above and relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner applies only to those people who can be called sub-tenants. When a person is not to be considered as a tenant the question of his becoming a sub-tenant cannot arise because tenant is the genus and sub-tenant is the species. Under the ordinary law of Transfer of Property Act unless there is a clear restriction to the contrary, a tenant can sublet his tenancy. See Section 103(6) which says:—

    “the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it…………”

    7. But cases under the Act have to be determined and decided in terms of the provisions of the Act itself. Even if Kasturi Lal is in occupation of the suit property he has no locus standi to fight a case against the landlord of the said property. He cannot be even given a hearing. He will be bound by the decree, if any that may be passed against the Page: 83defendant in the suit. If such people were to be made parties then any employee or any number of them or any person who for the time being sat on the shop on behalf of the defendant had to be added as a party or parties. The relationship of landlord and tenant exists between the plaintiff and the defendant in this case. All other persons who may be for the time being in occupation of the shop will be bound by any decision that may be passed. They have no separate right to defend the suit nor can they be permitted to take any plea which the defendant is not permitted to take.

    8. In my opinion the object of Order 6, Rule 17 of the CPC is not to permit an amendment which is forbidden by law because even the words of the rule do not warrant any such thing nor has any such authority been cited (because there can be none) where amendment has been allowed to introduce a plea or introduce a party which plea or existence of which party is against the provisions of any law. The Supreme Court has in AIR 1967 SC 96 held that amendment of pleadings introducing a new case cannot be allowed if a suit on such case is barred. Authorities have gone so far as to say that no plaintiff can be compelled to add any person as a party against his wishes. For instance see AIR 1962 Pat 357 in which it has been held that there are only two cases in which a person may be added as a party to a suit under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order I of the Code and they are:

    (1) when he ought to have been joined as plaintiff or defendant, and is not so joined, or

    (2) when without his presence the questions in the suit cannot be completely decided.

    9. His Lordship further went to hold that:—

    “On a proper construction of Order 1, Rule 10(2) of the CPC therefore a plaintiff cannot be compelled to add a person as a party defendant against his wishes and he cannot be compelled in spite of his protest, to fight the litigation against such a person against his choice. Where a person is neither a necessary nor a proper party, the Court has no jurisdiction to add him as a party under sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code….”

    10. Now as the learned counsel for the parties have cited certain authorities I must take notice of them also. First let me refer to the authorities viz. AIR 1960 Punj 575 : AIR 1954 Nag 200 referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

    11. In AIR 1960 Punj 575 the point for determination was whether a party could add further pleas than taken already when an amended plaint was presented and it simply held that:—

    “There is no rule of law, statutory or otherwise which restricts or limits the defendant when he is called upon to file a written statement to an amended plaint, to contest the plaintiff's claim, to any particular pleas. The general scheme of the Code of Civil Procedure and the policy underlying the law of pleadings does not suggest that the new written statement should be confined and restricted to the amended portion of the plaint and should not contain any other additional plea…….”

    12. This authority is of no help to the petitioner.

    13. In AIR 1954 Nag 200 the ratio decidendi is that:—

    “the improbability of the convincing nature of the new defence sought to be raised is not in itself a ground or refusing to allow an amendment of the written statement by the inclusion of such defence.”

    14. And regard being had to circumstances of that case amendment was allowed. But the point in that authority is not similar to the point in this case.

    15. The learned counsel for the respondent referred me to AIR 1958 J. & K. 39; AIR 1968 Mad 287; AIR 1934 All 11; AIR 1942 Cal 153 : AIR 1953 Cal 15; AIR 1955 Bhopal 22.

    16. In AIR 1958 J and K 39 a Division Bench of this Court held that:—

    “In a rent suit the third party claiming to be owner of the property could not be made a party as it would convert a simple suit for arrears of rent into one for determination of the title to the property in respect of which the rent is claimed.

    17. In AIR 1968 Mad 287 it is laid down that a Court has no power to add any person as a party unless he is a necessary or a proper party and a proper party has been defined as one without whose presence the question in a suit cannot be completely and effectually adjudicated upon, and the following criteria for adding a party has been laid down:—

    (1) If for the adjudication of the “real controversy” between the parties on record, the presence of a third party is necessary, then he can be impleaded:

    (2) It is imperative to note that by such impleading of the proposed party, all controversies arising in the suit and all issues arising thereunder be finally determined and set at rest, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits over a subject matter which could still have been decided in the pending suit itself;

    (3) The proposed party has a defined subsisting direct and substantive interest in the litigation, which interest is either legal or equitable and which right is cognizable in law;

    (4) Meticulous care should be taken to avoid the adding of a party if it is intended merely as a ruse to ventilate certain other grievances of one or the other of the parties on record which is neither necessary or expedient to be considered by the Court in the pending litigation; and

    (5) It should always be remembered that considerable prejudice would be caused to the opposite party when irrelevant matters are allowed to be considered by Courts by adding a new party whose interest has no nexus to the sub-ject matter of the suit.”

    18. In AIR 1934 All 11 the defendant was refused permission to amend his written statement by adding an additional plea on the ground of limitation.

    19. In AIR 1942 Cal 153 in a suit by a mortgagee to enforce his mortgage, the transferee defendant pleaded in his written statement which was filed on 2-11-1933, that he was not bound or affected in anyway by the plaintiff's mortgage and accepted the position that the plaintiff could proceed against the properties allotted to the share of the other cosharer's mortgagor.

    20. The suit was first decreed ex parte but was later restored. After restoration the defendant in additional written statement raised a new plea of subrogation by virtue of payment of certain prior mortgages etc. It was held that the case was not one of mere delay. The raising of new plea involved obvious injustice to the other party as it threw on the plaintiff an additional burden the effect of which would be to defeat the whole of the plaintiff's claim and the plea was not at all entertained.

    21. In AIR 1953 Cal 15 it was held that although the costs do act as a sort of panacea for amendment and the court should be more liberal in allowing amendment of written statements than of plaints nevertheless no amendment of the written statement should be allowed which is no answer to the plaint and the cause of action pleaded therein and an immaterial and useless amendment should not be permitted by the Court.

    22. In AIR 1955 Bhopal 22 If was held that in a case of arrears of rent by a landlord against the tenant no person who challenges the light of the plaintiff to sue may be joined so as almost to convert the suit into one based on title.

    23. As 1 said earlier that amendment sought and the introduction of Kastori Lal into the picture is wholly foreign to the scope of the suit and Kastori Lal has no locus standi or status in the suit even to put in appearance and in view of the conduct of the defendant who denied any subletting by him in the initial written statement, this amendment would cause hardship to the plaintiff and enlarge the scope of enquiry and introduce persons and controversies in the suit which are even contrary to the relevant law.

    24. In my opinion the amendment has been rightly rejected and this revision application is dismissed with costs.

    25. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Sant Ram v. Abdul Haq .
    (Dec 15, 1970)