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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The suit arises from the respondent (plaintiff) Ramprashad's action for ejectment of the appellants from a shop in Naya Bazar, Ajmer City. The appellants had been carrying on the business of moonj and ban in the shop for 10–15 years. Sooraj Karan (son-in-law of the respondent) owned and operated an adjoining shop and purchased both that shop and the disputed shop on 14 September 1960. He sold the disputed shop to the respondent on 19 December 1960. The respondent served an ejectment notice on 2 January 1961 and filed suit on 20 May 1961, alleging that he required the shop for his own use to start his own business.

At trial, the learned Munsiff framed issue no. 3:

"3. Does the plaintiff require the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for his own use and occupation?"
The plaintiff testified that he wanted to sit in the shop himself (in words quoted in the record). He admitted owning another shop which he had rented out and that he had three sons in railway service. The trial court heard evidence from multiple witnesses, including Sooraj Karan and several defense witnesses, and found that the plaintiff's bonafides were doubtful and that Sooraj Karan was likely behind the litigation. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

On appeal, the learned Civil Judge, Ajmer, reversed the trial court's decision and allowed the suit, reasoning that a landlord need not disclose the nature of the business he intends to carry on in order to prove personal requirement; the Civil Judge considered surrounding facts (caste, family business connections, and available assistance) relevant to the plaintiff's bona fide claim.

In the present appeal before Bhargava, J., the High Court considered whether the appellate court erred in law in its approach to the proof required to establish a landlord's reasonable and bona fide requirement under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff required the suit premises reasonably and bona fide for his own use and occupation (issue no. 3 as framed by the trial court).
  2. Whether a landlord claiming personal requirement must disclose the nature of the business or purpose for which the premises are required, in order to prove that the requirement is reasonable and bona fide.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The learned Civil Judge misread the plaintiff's statement; the plaintiff did not state on oath that he wanted to start some business — he only said he would himself sit in the shop.
  • The lacuna in the plaintiff's statement (failure to disclose the nature of any business) could not be filled by testimony of other witnesses, particularly Sooraj Karan, who was asserted to be the real mover behind the litigation.
  • The Civil Judge wrongly assumed facts not supported by the record — for example, that the plaintiff had necessary finance and that he would receive assistance from his son-in-law.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent's counsel (Mr. Guptaa) admitted the plaintiff's own statement was not sufficient because the nature of the business was not disclosed, but contended that the witness Sooraj Karan had supplied that lacuna by stating that the plaintiff required the shop to start business of moonj and ban.
  • The Civil Judge held that a landlord need only assert that he wanted to do some business in the premises and that if this is challenged, the defendant should cross-examine on the point; the respondent relied on this approach in support of the appellate court's decision.
  • The Civil Judge also rejected the suggestion that Sooraj Karan was the real party in interest on the ground that Sooraj Karan could have himself sued if his own shop was insufficient.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The High Court (Bhargava, J.) reviewed the findings of both the trial court and the first appellate court and analyzed the standards for proving a landlord's reasonable and bona fide requirement under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950.

Step-by-step reasoning as set out in the opinion:

  1. The question whether premises are required reasonably and bona fide is primarily a question of fact and generally not interfered with in a second appeal. However, where the first appellate court misdirects itself on legal principle, interference is appropriate.
  2. The Civil Judge's reasoning proceeded from the premise that it was enough for a landlord merely to state that he required the premises for his own business without disclosing the nature of the business. Bhargava, J. found this premise to be erroneous.
  3. The Court emphasized that the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 requires that the landlord's requirement be reasonable and bona fide. If the plaintiff only asserts he requires premises for starting a business or for personal use without disclosing the nature of the business or the purpose, the court has no basis to judge whether the requirement is bona fide or reasonable.
  4. Mere assertion by the landlord is insufficient; the nature of the requirement must be disclosed so that the tenant can rebut it and the court can test it against reasonableness and bona fides. This prevents landlords from circumventing eviction protections by asserting personal requirement as a pretext.
  5. The Court rejected the respondent's reliance on Sooraj Karan's testimony to fill the plaintiff's failure to disclose the nature of the business. When the requirement is claimed as the plaintiff's personal requirement, the plaintiff himself must allege and prove the nature of that requirement; evidence of other witnesses on that point is of no avail according to the Court.
  6. The other factual bases relied upon by the appellate court (the plaintiff's financial position and the likelihood of assistance from his son-in-law) were not supported by the record, and so could not justify the appellate court's conclusion that the plaintiff's requirement was reasonable and bona fide.
  7. Having concluded that the trial court correctly found the plaintiff failed to discharge the burden of proving bona fide and reasonable requirement, the High Court held that the civil judge erred and that the trial court's dismissal of the suit should be restored.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The High Court allowed the appeal from the first appellate court and restored the trial court's decree. Specifically, the Court stated: this appeal is allowed with costs and the decree of the first appellate court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. As a result, the plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed.

Immediate consequences:

  • The decree of the Civil Judge (first appellate court) is set aside.
  • The trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit is restored; the plaintiff's ejectment suit is dismissed.
  • Costs were awarded in favour of the successful appellant (the opinion states "allowed with costs").

Broader legal implication (as articulated by the Court within this opinion):

  • The Court clarified that, under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950, when a landlord claims personal requirement for eviction, he must disclose the nature of the business or purpose for which the premises are required; mere assertion without such disclosure is insufficient to establish a reasonable and bona fide requirement.

The opinion does not indicate that it is establishing a new binding precedent beyond this clarification and restoration of the trial court's decree.

    Birdhichand v. Ram Prashad

    Bhargava, J:-

    Respondent ramprashad filed the present suit out of which this civil second appeal arises for ejectment of the appellant from a shop situated in naya bazar, ajmer city. The appellant's carrying on the business of moonj and ban etc. In the shop for the last 10 to 15 years is not in dispute. Respondent's son - in - law surajkaran is in occupation of an adjoining shop and is also carrying on the same business is also not in dispute. Sooraj karan purchased the disputed shop as well as the shop in which he himself was carrying on business on 14th september, 1960. Thereafter, on 19th december, 1960, he sold the disputed shop to the respondent, who is a retired employee of the railways. After purchasing the shop the respondent served a notice of ejectment on the appellant on 2nd january, 1961, and having not received any reply from them, filed a suit for ejectment on 20th may, 1961. In the plaint, it is alleged that the shop is required by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation as he purchased it for starting his own business. The appellants contested the suit and their case was that the sale of the disputed shop in favour of the respondent was fictitious and sham. In fact it was sooraj karan who wanted to have the appellants ejected from the shop so that they may be uprooted from the rival business which they were carrying on. It was stated that the respondent had no bonafide and reasonable necessity for the shop. The learned munsiff, ajmer city, who tried the case, amongst others, framed the following issue on the question of the plaintiff's bonafide and reasonable necessity,

    "3. Does the plaintiff require the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for his own use and occupation?"
    in support of this issue the plaintiff examined himself and stated that he wanted the shop to be vacated for his own use. The exact words of his statement are ‘‘में दुकान अपने खुद के बेइने के लिए करना चाहता हूूं’’

    He admitted that he owned one shop which is situated below his house in khazanchiwali gali. He also admitted that he had rented out that shop to bhaironlal before the institution of the suit. He also admitted that he had three sons, all of whom were in service of the railways. Chandmal

    (pw 2) stated that he did not know whether the plaintiff required the shop for his own use. Statements of both these witnesses were recorded by the trial court on 14th april, 1962. Sooraj karan, the next witness, and who is the son - in - law of the plaintiff and who was examined on 25th july, 1962 was also present in the court on 14th april, 1962, as would appear from the order sheet of that date, but the learned counsel for the plaintiff sought adjournment. On 25th july, 1962, sooraj karan and one more witness rampal were examined. Sooraj karan stated that the plaintiff required the shop for starting business of moonj and ban, rampal stated that the plaintiff wanted to sit on the shop and do business of any kind. The defendants examined themselves and produced as many as six witnesses to establish that the shop was not required by the plaintiff for his own use and it was really sooraj karan who for the purpose of eliminating the defendants from the business wanted to get the shop vacated. Learned munsiff, after a consideration of the evidence on record came to the finding that the bonafides of the plaintiff were very doubtful looking to all the circumstances of the case and in his view there was great probability that it was sooraj karan who was behind the litigation. In his view the plaintiff had failed to discharge the burden of proving issue no. 3. The learned munsiff having regard to the statement of the plaintiff himself, which has been quoted above, was of the view that the plaintiff was very lukewarm in putting forth the grounds of his requirement. He also accepted the argument of the appellants that the shop near the plaintiff's house was quite suitable if he at all wanted to carry on business especially when the plaintiff has been so indifferent as to state the kind of business he wanted to carry on. The learned munsiff also remarked that sooraj karan was purposely not examined on 14 - 4 - 62 because certain gaps had to be filled in. In his view the plaintiff was not a very trustworthy witness because he had denied the receipt of money orders which he had refused to accept and which were proved by the evidence of postmen namely d. W. 2/4 and d. W. 2/5. He, therefore, dismissed the plaintiff's suit. 2. On appeal the learned civil judge, ajmer reversed the finding of the lower court. In the opinion of the learned civil judge, it was not necessary for a landlord intending to start some business in a premises to disclose the nature of the business or work which he intended to undertake. All that was necessary was that he wanted to do some business in the premises, and if this fact is challenged, then it is for the defendant to subject him to cross - examination on that point. The learned civil judge, taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff was agarwal by caste and his brother had been carrying on business to whose shop he used to go off and on, that he was not engaged in any other business then and had purchased the property in 1960 from his son - in - law, came to the conclusion that there was nothing unreasonable if the plaintiff wanted the shop to start business of moonj and ban because in that case he could count upon the help and assistance of his son - in - law. The argument that it was sooraj karan who really wanted the shop to be vacated was repelled by the learned judge on the ground that if that was so, sooraj karan could have filed a suit on the basis of his bonafide necessity by asserting that his own shop was insufficient for his business. 3. In this appeal learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the learned civil judge has completely mis - read the statement of the plaintiff inasmuch as he even did not say on oath that the wanted to start some business in the shop. All that he stated is that he would himself sit in the shop and which does not mean that he would start any business in that shop. It is contended that the lacuna in the statement of the plaintiff could not be filed by the evidence of the witnesses, especially in this case by the evidence of sooraj karan who is at the bottom of the entire litigation. It is contended that the learned civil judge has wrongly assumed certain facts such as that the appellant has got necessary finance to carry on the business and that in case he starts his business in the shop, he will have the assistance of his son - in - law which are not borne out by the record. 4. Now the question whether the premises are required reasonably and bona - fide by the plaintiff for his own use and occupation is largely a question of fact and ordinarily cannot be interfered in second appeal, but here the learned civil judge has mis - directed himself on the question that it is enough for a landlord to say that he required the premises for his own business without disclosing its nature and it is upon this premise that he has found the statement of the plaintiff sufficient to discharge the burden that the shop was required reasonably and bona - fide for his personal use and occupation. In my view the learned civil judge was in error in coming to the finding to which he did on the aforesaid premise. No doubt there is no bar for persons to start or engage themselves in business after their retirement from service. They may enter into a new venture for the purpose of augmenting their income or to keep themselves occupied but the law, i. E. , the rajasthan premises

    (control of rent & eviction) act, 1950 which has been enacted to control eviction from the premises of tenants and is apparently for their protection requires that the landlord's requirement should be reasonable and bonafide. If in a suit for ejectment, the plaintiff only makes a statement that he requires the premises for starting business or for his own use without disclosing the nature of the business or the purpose for which he requires it, then there would be no basis for the court to judge whether the requirement is bonafide and reasonable. Mere assertion on the part of the landlord that the premises are required for his own use or business is not sufficient. Nature of the requirement must be disclosed so that not only the tenant may have an opportunity to rebut it, but the court may also in the light of the circumstances of each case be able to put it to the test of reasonableness and bonafide. Under the garb of personal requirement, it is not open to the landlord to circumvent the law and it is the duty of the court to see that the landlord is not seeking eviction on the false pretence and for ulterior purpose. 5. Mr. Guptaa, for the respondent, admits that the plaintiff's own statement in the present case is not sufficient to prove that the requirement was reasonable and bonafide because he has not told the court the nature of the business he required to start, but his contention is that his witness sooraj karan had supplied that lacuna and he has stated that the plaintiff required to start business of 'moonj' and 'ban* in the shop. However, i am of the view that when it is the personal requirement of the plaintiff, it is he alone who has to disclose the nature of the requirement and if he does not do so, the evidence of other witnesses on that point can be of no avail. The nature of the requirement must therefore be alleged and proved by the plaintiff. Learned civil judge was, therefore, clearly in error in holding that it was for the defendant - tenant to elicite from the plaintiff in cross - examination about the nature of the business for which the landlord required the premises. The other factors which the learned civil judge has taken into consideration i. E. , the financial position of the plaintiff and the help and assistance he was likely to get from his son - in - law are also not borne out by the evidence on record. In the present case when the plaintiff has neither disclosed the nature of the business in the plaint nor in his statement before the court, it cannot he held that his requirement is reasonable and bonafide. The trial court was, therefore, right in dismissing the suit. 6. This appeal is, therefore, allowed with costs and the decree of the first appellate court is set sadie and that of the trial court is restored. As a result, the plaintiff's suit shall stand dismissed.

    1970 rlw 1

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    Comments

    Birdhichand v. Ram Prashad
    (Oct 22, 1969)