R.S. Narula, J. - This writ petition is directed against two separate proceedings. By the first order, which is impugned in this case, the petitioner was reverted to this substantive rank of a Sub-Inspector of Police from the post of an Inspector of Police which he was holding in an officiating capacity. The second impugned order is the one directing a department inquiry against the petitioner on a charge of alleged serious misconduct. A brief history of the case may first be set out. 2. On December 9, 1933 the petitioner joined the Punjab Police Service as a Foot Constable. Having been promoted on 15th November, 1941 as an Assistant Sub-Inspector the petitioner was confirmed in that post in 1946. He was promoted as a Sub-Inspector of Police in August, 1948 and was confirmed as such in 1952. In March, 1961 petitioner's name was brought on List 'F', i.e. on the list of Sub-Inspectors of Police approved for promotion as Inspectors. On August 14, 1961 the petitioner was appointed as an officiating Inspector of Police and was posted to the C.I.A. Staff, Hissar, as such. The petitioner's case is that since he joined the police service right up to December, 1962 there was no adverse report against him which might ever have been conveyed to him. On the other hand, contends the petitioner, he earned about 70 commendation certificates besides various cash rewards for distinctive services rendered in his capacity as a Police official. the grant of commendation certificates to the petitioner is admitted in the reply to the writ petition filed by the respondent No. 2. The grant of cash rewards has not been denied. It has, however, been added that the petitioner was awarded a censure on 27th June, 1946 and another one on 16th June, 1955. In view of this statement by both sides it is apparent that the petitioner had till December, 1962 a record which can properly be called meritorious and in no case termed as a bad one. 3. The petitioner then states that as the head of the Range Anti-Dacoity Staff he had arrested Bhartu and Shanti, proclaimed offenders on 20th/21th August, 1962 and had recovered a Sten gun with two loaded magazines containing 47 lives rounds at personal risk to his life, that a case under the Arms Act was registered against those persons and that in the initial special report relating to the said arrest and recovery, the Superintendent of Police, Hissar had observed that the Anti-Dacoity Staff headed by the petitioner had done an excellent job for which they deserved not only to be congratulated but also to be rewarded, and further observed that with the arrest of those proclaimed offenders a curse had been obliterated from the Hissar District. It is also stated by the petitioner that the Superintendent of Police, Hissar sent a Recommendation Roll dated 5th February, 1963 desiring the grant of a Class II Commendation Certificate with a cash reward of Rs. 100/- to the petitioner in recognition of his good work already appreciated by the Inspector General of Police, but that the D.I.G Ambala Range while granting commendation certificates and cash rewards to the other officials accompanying the petitioner, altogether ignored the petitioner though his name was at the top of the roll as he was the head of the party. In reply to this averment, it is stated by the second respondent in his written statement that the petitioner did arrest the two proclaimed offenders and had recovered a Sten gun with two loaded magazines containing 47 live rounds on the night in question from them and also the fact that the Superintendent of Police, Hissar recorded the above-mentioned note and that the D.I.G. Police congratulated the Police party on behalf of the I.G. Police and made an endorsement to the D.I.G. Police, Ambala Range to reward the Police party for the good work done by them. It has also been admitted in the said written statement that it is correct that the petitioner was recommended along with others for the grant of the commendation certificate and a cash reward of Rs. 100/- and that the certificates and the rewards were given to the other members of the party by the second respondent but he had by orders dated 20th March, 1963 directed the withholding of Commendation Certificate and cash reward meant for the petitioner in view of the enquiry in a serious case pending against him. 4. In December, 1962 a dacoity occurred in village Bhatla, Police Station Hansi involving a loss of about Rs. 50,000/-. That case was being investigated by the Station House Officer, Hansi. But the Superintendent of Police and the petitioner were personally supervising the investigation at the spot. During that investigation, states the petitioner, the Superintendent of Police got information that one Amrik Singh, a bad character of village Nathwan, Police Station Ratia was harbouring Chander dacoit who was said to be responsible for the dacoity under investigation. The petitioner was deputed by the Superintendent of Police to verify the correctness of the allegation against Amrik Singh by contacting him. Consequently, it is stated, that the petitioner went to the said Amrik Singh on 30th December, 1962. Amrik Singh denied that he was harbouring the said dacoit, namely, Chander. The petitioner also states that he warned Amrik Singh of his liability to be prosecuted under Section 216, I.P.C. According to the petitioner, it was this warning given by him to Amrik Singh that led Amrik Singh to nurture a grudge against the petitioner in his mind. In the alternative it has been argued before me that even if Amrik Singh had no personal grudge of his own he became a tool in the hands of one Ajmer Singh, a Police official who had been acting as a subordinate under the petitioner and whom the petitioner had got transferred from his charge on an adverse report and that it was at the instigation of the said Ajmer Singh that Amrik Singh aforesaid, an admitted bad character, acted as a stooge with the ulterior object of causing harm to the petitioner without there being any truth in the story which he subsequently concocted. In the written statement of respondent No. 2 it has been admitted that a dacoity was committed in village Bhatla, as stated above, in December, 1962 and that the petitioner was posted in those days in the C.I.A. Staff at Hissar. But the rest of the averments of the petitioner mentioned above have been denied. There is, however, no dispute about the fact that from the 30th of December, 1962 till the 5th of January, 1963 Amrik Singh did not raise his little finger about anything illegal having been done by the petitioner on the occasion whom the petitioner is stated to have gone to check up for the dacoit to Amrik Singh's house. The relevant records of the case produced in Court by the State at the request of the petitioner and inspected by the learned counsel for the petitioner reveal that Amrik Singh, who had a direct access to Shri Partap Singh Kairon, the then Chief Minister of the State of Punjab saw the Chief Minister of January 5, 1963 at Rohtak and complained to him (the Chief Minister) against the petitioner. But for the statement of Amrik Singh himself at a subsequent stage about his having seen the Chief Minister on 5th January, 1963, there is nothing else in the record shown to the Court from which it can be gathered as to what actually transpired at that meeting. It is, however, evident from the record that on January 11, 1963, Amrik Singh met the Inspector General of Police and complained to him against the petitioner. The case of the petitioner is that Amrik Singh did not at that stage tell the Inspector General of Police anything about the alleged removal of his money by the petitioner. According to the statement of Amrik Singh given by him before D.I.G. Police at a later stage the allegation made by him was that at the time of the search of his house in December, 1962 by the petitioner, the latter removed a sum of Rs. 12,300/- lying in cash with Amrik Singh as suspected stolen property and though he later returned Rs. 10,300/- out of the amount he illegally retained the balance of Rs. 2,000/- with him which he did not return to Amrik Singh in spite of his promising to do so form time to time. It cannot be disputed that the allegations made against the petitioner indicated the commission by the petitioner, who is a Police officer, of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The learned counsel for the respondents has stated that there is no written complaint by Amrik singh against the petitioner on the official record. This fact, the petitioner is not in a position to controvert. It, however, appears that a preliminary inquiry into the oral complaint of Amrik Singh was held against the petitioner by Shri Tek Chand, Deputy Superintendent of Police in February/March, 1963 on a reference made to him by the D.I.G., C.I.D. This allegation has been made in para 7 of the petition has been denied in the corresponding paragraph of the written statement of respondent No. 2. At the Bar I was informed that Shri Tek Chand had submitted some kind of report in or about February, 1963 but that the respondents were claiming privilege against the production of the said report and the proceedings of the alleged inquiry conducted by Shri Tek Chand Be that as it may, it is not disputed that on March 8, 1963 Shri Ajaib Singh, D.I.G., C.I.D. Chandigarh wrote a D.O. letter to Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, D.I.G., Ambala Range, marked as 'Immediate' and sent through "special messenger" to its addressee stating as follows :- "Government received a complaint against Inspector Avtar Singh C.I.A. Hissar that he visited village Nathwan, P.S. Ratia, district Hissar, searched the house of one Amrik Singh and took away with him Rs. 12,300/- and kept the money with him without preparing any record. Government ordered a secret inquiry into this complaint and according to the report of the Inquiring Officer, who was a Gazetted Officer, Shri Avtar Singh Inspector C.I.A. Hissar, raised the house of Amrik Singh son of Shamsher Singh, Jat of village Nathwan, P.S. Ratia, district Hissar on 30th December, 1962 and recovered Rs. 12,300/- (currency notes) from his house search. He brought Amrik Singh along with the recovered amount to Hissar. The Inspector did not prepare any recovery memo or case diary about the recovery of this amount from the house of Amrik Singh. Amrik Singh approached the Inspector along with some other persons to get back the money. The Inspector is alleged to have returned Rs. 10,300/- (Rupees Ten Thousand and Three hundred only) but kept Rs. 2,000/- (Two Thousand) with him telling Amrik Singh that his wife was on her family way and he needed this money. The case was brought to the notice of the C.M. by the Inspector General of Police. 2. The Inspector General of Police has desired me to request you to make inquiries personally about the allegations and send your findings for his information as early as possible. He was of the opinion that you may go from Rohtak after the V.I.P.'s visit to Hissar for this purpose. This may kindly be treated as very urgent. 5. It is significant that in this D.O. letter the D.I.G., C.I.D. specially stated that fact that Government had ordered a secret inquiry into the complaint in question and that the said inquiry had been held by a gazetted officer who had submitted a report which is alleged to have been adverse to the petitioner. This is not very consistent with the averment of the second respondent in para 7 of his written statement denying the allegation of the petitioner about such an inquiry having been made and such a report having been submitted. It is also evident from the above said statement of Amrik Singh recorded by the D.I.G. at a later stage and from the facts stated in the D.O. letter of the D.I.G., C.I.D. dated 8th March, 1963 (stating the "-- The case was brought to the notice of the C.M. by the Inspector General of Police") that this matter was being handled at personal level between the then Chief Minister and the D.I.G., C.I.D. It is not disputed that on the receipt of the D.O. Communication, Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, D.I.G. Ambala Range did hold a detailed preliminary inquiry into the complaint against the petitioner which indicated the commission of a criminal offence and submitted his report by his letter dated 1st April, 1963 of which a copy has been produced before me at the hearing. In this report it was stated by the D.I.G., Ambala Range, inter alia, as follows :- "This money (Rs. 12,300/-) was placed in a small attachecase belonging to Amrik Singh. My inquiries have shown that no recovery memo was prepared at the spot or subsequently. In fact no case diary was prepared to show about this raid having been concluded or any money recovered ............". "I may mention here that Amrik Singh is a very notorious person and is a bad character on Register No. X. He has a very long criminal career ranging from the year 1939 during which he committed murders, thefts and other heinous offences. He along with his two brothers wiped out the family of his cousin Harnaik Singh, killing him, his wife and two little children. He was convicted in this case and sentenced to transportation for life. His two brothers were hanged, however, Amrik Singh was acquitted in appeal in the High Court. Amrik Singh remained untraced for about 8 years and during this time he created contacts with dacoits and criminals of PEPSU. I fully realise that Amrik Singh is a highly undesirable person and his evidence should not be relied upon under the normal circumstances. I have, however, convinced myself by open and confidential enquiries that in this case Inspector Avtar Singh of C.I.A. did not recover Rs. 12,300/- and returned only Rs. 10,300/- so far. I, therefore, consider that the Inspector should be dealt with departmentally and suitably published". 6. It is not disputed that after the first contact of Amrik Singh with Shri Partap Singh Kairon and with the Inspector General of Police in January, 1963 the preliminary investigations were held into the complaint against the petitioner by Shri Tek Chand, Deputy Superintendent of Police without any reference having been made by the Deputy Superintendent to the Superintendent of Police or by the Superintendent of Police to the District Magistrate. Nor does nay reference under rule 16.38(1) of the Police Rules appear to have been made before the investigation conducted by Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, Deputy Inspector General of Police. The above-quoted report of the D.I.G. dated 1st April, 1963 was received by Shri Ajaib Singh, Deputy Inspector General of Police, C.I.D. Chandigarh on 3rd April, 1963. Advance copy of the same docketed by Mr. Rosha to the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh was received in his office on 4th April, 1963 and was put up on the same day to the I.G. It appears to have been routed through the S.P. Crimes who initialled it on 5th April, 1963. On the next day, i.e. 6th April, 1963 the first impugned order was then passed by the Inspector General of Police in the following words :- "Offg. Inspector Avtar Singh posted to Hissar District is reverted to his substantive rank of Sub Inspector and transferred to the P.A.P." 7. On the basis of the above-quoted order a wireless message was sent on 8th April, 1963 from the office of the Inspector General of Police, Chandigarh to the D.I.G. Ambala Range and copies to the Superintendent of Police, Hissar and various other authorities reading as follows :- "Officiating Inspector Avtar Singh B/68 posted to Hissar district is reverted to his substantive rank of S.I. and transferred to the P.A.P. Necessary Gazette Notification may be issued by you under advice to all concerned. The date in which he is relieved from Hissar should be reported immediately". 8. Copy of the wireless message has been filed by the petitioner as annexure 'A' to the writ petition. 9. The case of the petitioner is that he apprehended further trouble and, therefore, wanted to make sure that the departmental authorities did not obtain some order from the District Magistrate for departmental proceedings against the petitioner instead of following the normal course of a magisterial inquiry and trial in a competent Court and, therefore, submitted a written application dated 29th April, 1963 (Copy annexure B to the writ petition) to the District Magistrate, Hissar, wherein it was stated, inter alia, as follows :- "That on an alleged complaint of corruption made by Amrik Singh ....... against me in February 1963, an inquiry was first held by Shri Tek Chand D.S. P./C. I.D., Punjab, Chandigarh from 9th February, 1963 to 15th February, 1963 at Canal Rest House Chimu and Hissar, and therefore by Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, I.P.S., D.I.G. Police, Ambala Range, on 26th March, 1963 and 27th March, 1963 ........... By these inquiries were held ex-parte and no witness was examined by the enquiry officers in my presence nor any opportunity to cross-examine them was given to me. That subsequent to the above enquiries I suddenly received orders of the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab Chandigarh reverting me to the rank of Sub Inspector and transferring me ............". "It is respectfully submitted that if a reference is now made to your honour by the Superintendent of Police Hissar, in view of Punjab Police rule 16.38, an enquiry by a selected Magistrate of the 1st Class may kindly be ordered in the interest of justice and fairplay. Since the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala has already held an inquiry into the matter and on his report the Inspector-General of Police, Punjab, has ordered my reversion, an enquiry now by any Police Officer would be merely an eyewash and farce, and would therefore deprive me of the protection afforded by Punjab Police rule 16.38........." 10. The filing of this application by the petitioner before the District Magistrate, Hissar is not disputed. According to the petitioner the District Magistrate passed an order on the said application to the effect that it may be put up at the time of reference, if any, made to him by the S.P. concerned. The respondents do not admit the passing of that order but have not been able to show what other order was passed on the said application of the petitioner. 11. On June 1, 1963 the Superintendent of Police, Hissar was appointed as the inquiry officer to hold a departmental inquiry into the above-said allegations against the petitioner. On August 16, 1963 the said Superintendent of Police wrote to the District Magistrate, Hissar a letter in which he first gave the history of the allegations against the petitioner and after completing the history stated as follows : "It is, therefore, requested that necessary permission to deal with him departmentally vide Police rule 16.38 may kindly be accorded and communicated to this office". 12. Thus not only a suggestion was thrown about the order which the District Magistrate may pass on the said reference by the S.P. but a clear and unequivocal request was made to the District Magistrate for giving permission to the inquiry officer to deal with the petitioner departmentally. It is also significant that no action under rule 16.38(1) was taken at that stage. 13. To the said communication of the Superintendent of Police dated 16th August, 1963 a reply dated 17th August, 1963 signed by the District Magistrate was sent in which the allegations against the petitioner were again repeated and immediately after finishing those allegations the letter ended with the following words :- "In view of the circumstances of the case I consider it expedient that a departmental inquiry should be held against Shri Avtar Singh by a gazetted Police Officer". 14. This letter of the District Magistrate is dated 17th August, 1963 and could not have reached the inquiry officer any earlier. With all possible promptitude, the inquiry officer gave a detailed summary of the allegations against the petitioner to him on that very day, i.e., on 17th August, 1963. A copy of the same has been filed in this Court as annexure C to the writ petition. After giving a survey of the allegations against the petitioner, three charges against him were communicated in the said summary of allegations out of which charge No. 3 was as follows :- "(3) This amount (Rs. 2,000/-) has not been returned to Shri Amrik Singh till today which amounts to an act of corruption". 15. The summary of allegations then proceeds on to state that the allegations against the petitioner amounted to a grave misconduct on the part of the petitioner for which he was liable to be departmentally dealt with. The petitioner states, and it is not disputed by the respondents, that he (the petitioner) gave a written application to the inquiry officer on 17th August, 1963 for supply of copies of the statements of five witnesses examined against him by Shri Tek Chand, D.S.P. in the first preliminary inquiry and of the statements of witnesses subsequently recorded by Shri Bahgwan Singh, Rosha, D.I.G. in the second ex-parte preliminary inquiry held against the petitioner. Petitioner's case is that he required those copies to effectively cross-examine those witness who were proposed to be on 28th August, 1963 the petitioner submitted a written application to the Superintendent of Police, Hissar, the inquiry officer, for the supply of certain documents to him, detailed list of which was given in the said application and the relevancy of which for the purposes of inquiry has not been disputed. According to para 13 of the written statement of respondent No. 2 when those applications of the petitioner were received in the office of the D.I.G. from that of the Superintendent of Police, Hissar, the same were forwarded to the Commandant, Punjab Armed Police, Jullundur to whom the inquiry had been transferred. On February 16, 1964 the Commandant of 33 Battalion, Punjab Armed Police stated to be holding the rank of an officiating Superintendent of Police Amritsar, summoned the petitioner to appear before him at Gharinda Police Station on the ground that the inquiry had been entrusted to him and had been fixed by him for 25th February, 1964. 16. On 24th February, 1964 the inquiry officer, the Superintendent of Police, P.A.P. submitted a memorandum of that date to the District Magistrate, Hissar with reference to the earlier communication dated 17th August, 1963 from the District Magistrate in which memorandum it was stated, inter alia, as follows :- "The preliminary inquiry was conducted by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala Range without obtaining your orders under Police rule 16.38(1). It is requested that permission may kindly be granted under Police rule 16.38(1) to Shri P.N. Handa, Deputy Superintendent of Police P.A.P., Amritsar for conducting a preliminary enquiry. In case his finding is that allegations or a part thereof are correct, your orders will be obtained under Police rule 16.38(2) for dealing with the case departmentally/judicially". 17. In spite of the precautionary measures taken by the petitioner well in advance it appears that his application dated April 29, 1963 was not placed before the District Magistrate (that is the allegation of the petitioner) and the Magistrate passed almost a routine order on the memorandum of the S.P. dated 24th February 1964, which is contained in a letter dated 26th February, 1964 addressed to the Commandant. The operative part of that letter reads as follows :- "For the reasons given in this office memorandum No. _______ dated the 17th August, 1963 to the address of Superintendent of Police, Hissar, the allegations levelled against Inspector (now S.I.) Avtar Singh may please be inquired into by a gazetted police officer. Necessary sanction as required by rule 16.38(1) of the Punjab Police Rules is hereby accorded". 18. No reasons whatever for according the sanction under rule 16.38(1) were at all mentioned in this communication dated 26th February, 1964. The reference to "the reasons given" in the District Magistrate's earlier letter dated 17th August, 1963 was equally meaningless in view of the fact that no reasons whatever had either been given in that letter. But it has to be kept in view that rule 16.38(1) does not require any reasons to be recorded by the District Magistrate. 19. It is in the above circumstances that the petitioner filed this writ petition on 4th March, 1964 for quashing the order of his reversion on the ground that it had in fact been passed by way of punishment and for directing a withdrawal of the order of the petitioner's transfer from the Police district to the Punjab Armed Police. A further prayer has been made in the case for the quashing of the departmental inquiry proceedings against the petitioner. A direction has also been sought that if such an inquiry has to be held, it should be conducted by some officer who should not be of a rank lower than that of the Inspector General of Police on the ground that the D.I.G., Ambala RAnge has already expressed his opinion against the petitioner in the ex-parte preliminary inquiry. In the writ petition, the Inspector General of Police, Punjab and the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Ambala Range have been arrayed as respondent Nos. 1 and 2, respectively. The Commandant 33 Battalion, Punjab Armed Police, Amritsar, who has been appointed as the inquiry officer in the pending inquiry proceedings, has been made the third respondent in the writ petition. 20. Respondent No. 1 (the I.G. Police) has not made any return to the rule issued in this case. In the absence of any definite indication or evidence to the contrary it has to be presumed that the first respondent admits all the material allegations which have been made in the writ petition. Respondent No. 2, the D.I.G. Police, has filed a written statement dated nil along with a brief affidavit dated nil sworn on 1st May, 1964 in reply to the writ petition. This written statement does not purport to be on behalf of respondent No, 1 or respondent No. 3 and has, therefore, to be taken as one filed by and on behalf of respondent No. 2 only. The written statement is signed by respondent No. 2 and is not dated by him. The verification under the written statement is in the following words :- "Certified that the contents of the written statement as given above are correct and true to the best of my knowledge and information derived from the official records". 21. The affidavit of Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, respondent No. 2 consists of only two paragraphs and is reproduced below verbatim :- "1. That I have read the copy of Civil Writ Petition No. 393 of 1964 filed by Avtar Singh Uppal son of Mela Singh, S.I. of Police, P.A.P./35 Battalion No. 33 Amritsar and I am conversant with the facts of the case. 2. That I solemnly affirm that contends of the enclosed written statement in parawise replies to the writ petition (paras 1 to 19) are stated partly on personal knowledge and partly on information derived from the official records of the case and I believe the same to be true and nothing material has been concealed therefrom". 22. The affidavit is not verified and as stated above, has not been dated by the deponent at any place. The affidavit has, however, been attested by a Magistrate 1st Class under his signatures dated 1st May, 1964. 23. Rule 6 of Chapter 4-F(b) of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court, Volume V, prescribes the manner in which an answer has to be made to a rule nisi issues in a writ case. The provision reads as follows :- "6. An answer to the rule nisi showing cause against such application shall be made by filing an affidavit in the office of the Register, and by serving a copy thereof upon the applicant or his advocate as the case may be, at least two days before the returnable date of the rule". 24. There is no provision in the rules for a written statement being filed separately from the requisite affidavit. Leaving aside that technicality it is in any case necessary that the return itself should be in the form of an affidavit. The written statement filed in this case does not satisfy even the requirements of Order VI, rule 15(2) and (3) of the Civil Procedure Code as the person verifying the written statement has not specified by reference to the numbered paragraphs thereof as to what he verifies of his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. The requirement of sub-rule (3) of rule 15 of Order VI has also not been complied with as the date on which and the place at which the written statement was signed, have not been given. What is, required as a return to a rule signed in a civil writ case is not a written statement in the nature of a pleading as understood in Order VIII, rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. When rule 6 of Chapter 4-F(b) of Volume V of the High Court Rules and Orders requires an answer on affidavit it is deemed to be in the nature or rebut or support the allegations made in the writ petition and it should satisfy the requirements of Order XIX rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. Rule 3(1) of Order XIX of the Code reads as follows :- "3(1) Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted : provided that the grounds thereof are stated". 25. As stated above, written statement and the affidavit filed by respondent No. 2 in this case do not satisfy the requirements of either Order VI rule 15 or of Order XIX rule 3 of the Code. 26. Rule 2(a) of Part A of Chapter I of Volume V of the Rules and Orders of this Court requires that every memo of appeal and every application has to be typed in double spacing on water-marked, plain paper unless a printed form is prescribed for the purpose by the High Court. There seems to be no doubt that even in respect of written statements to be filed by respondents or defendants in proceedings in the original jurisdiction of this Court the same rule has to be complied with. The written statement filed by respondent No. 2 in this case is also defective for the reason that it has not been typed on water-marked Government revenue paper. 27. But even if the last requirement about the water-marked paper may be ignored for the purposes of this case, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the written statement filed in this case does not fulfil the requirements of law as no poper affidavit has been filed by respondent No. 2. In a Division Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, I.L.R. 37 Cal. 250, Sir Lawrence H. Jenkins, C.J. and Woodroffe J. held in this respect as follows :- "All we have on which to act is an allegation of the appellants' lack of means followed by a general averment that the statements are to the best of the deponent's knowledge, information and belief; but what his information and belief are, or on what his belief is grounded, is in no way indicated. We desire to impress on those who propose to rely on affidavits that, in future, the provisions of Order XIX, rule 3, must be strictly observed and every affidavit should clearly express how much is a statement of the deponent's knowledge and how much is a statement of his belief, and the grounds of belief must be stated with sufficient particularly to enable the Court to judge whether it would be safe to act on the deponent's belief". 28. The ratio of the judgment in Padmabati's case (supra), was followed in Durga Das v. Nalin Chandra Nandan and others, A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 694. A full Bench of the Patna High Court held in Dipendra Nath Sarkar v. State of Bihar and others, A.I.R. 1962 Patna 101, as below :- "The affidavit of Shri N.P. Sinha is also defective because it does not clearly express as to how much is a statement of the knowledge of the deponent and how much is a statement of his belief ........... On behalf of the petitioner reference was made to the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar (supra), where Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J. and Woodroffe, J. observed that the provision of Order 19, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code must be strictly observed, and where there is violation of that provision the affidavit must be ignored. I accept the argument of the petitioner and hold that no value should be attached to the affidavit of Sri N.P. Sinha". 29. Somehow a practice appears to have grown in the various departments of the Punjab Government to prepare written statements on the style of pleadings in civil suits, without even complying with the provisions of Order VI, rule 15, Civil Procedure Code as to proper verification etc., on any kind any size of paper and not on the requisite State revenue paper. In some cases such written statements are being sent to the Registry of the Court by post in-stead of being filed in the prescribed manner. In such cases even a copy of the written statement is not served on the counsel for the petitioner and he is left to inspect the records and make copy of the affidavit in reply. Sometimes the counsel for the petitioners in writ cases rely on rule 6 (supra) and presume that no written statement has been filed by the State if no copy is served on them. This very often leads to unnecessary adjournment of cases because of the violation of the salutary principles contained in the above-said rule. In the majority of cases, it has been noticed by me that affidavits filed on behalf of the State authorities are not dated at all and are not properly verified. Though in order to avoid injustice to the State, I am taking into consideration the purported written statement filed in this case, I do want to impress on all concerned in the camp of the Government about the necessity to follow the relevant rules and law in this respect. It would be open to this Court to decline to look at a written statement of the type that has been filed in this case if the State departments insist on following the wrong practice that has somehow started off in this respect. 30. On July 20, 1964 the petitioner filed Civil Miscellaneous application No. 2486 of 1964 in this Court praying for the summoning of certain relevant records including the personal file of the petitioner, the file containing the correspondence between the Superintendent of Police, Hissar and the D.I.G. Ambala Range, the file of the preliminary inquiry conducted by Shri Tek Chand, Deputy Superintendent of Police in February, 1963, the file containing the correspondence showing the necessity of a second investigation by the D.I.G. Ambala Range, the file containing the record of inquiry by Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, D.I.G., the file containing the correspondence between the S.P. Hissar and the Commandant, 22nd Battalion, P.A.P., Jullundur, the file containing the correspondence between the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate, Hissar and the entire record of the formal departmental proceedings against the petitioner. Minute details of the documents sought to be produced by the State were given in the application. Jindra Lal, J. directed notice of the said application to be given to the counsel for the respondents. After hearing both sides the Court (Jindra Lal, J.) passed an order in the above-said application on August 24, 1964 which is in the following words :- "A list containing a large number of documents has been submitted with an application that the respondents be ordered to produce them in Court. It is submitted that from the return filed by the respondent No. 2, the summoning of relevant records mentioned in the list submitted appears to be very essential for the proper disposal of the case. I am not at all sure whether many of the files requires are at all relevant. In any case, the inquiry against the petitioner has been stayed as far back as the 12th March, 1964, and it is desirable to expedite hearing. There are assertions of facts made in the main petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, some of which are denied by the respondent. It is the duty of the respondent to support the impugned order from their record. A return had already been filed. It will be for the Bench hearing the main petition to decide if it wants any records further than those produced at the time of hearing by the respondents". 31. An affidavit dated 9th October, 1964 was filed by Shri Gurdial Singh Inspector of Police, Punjab in connection with the above-said application (C.M. 2846 of 1964) in response to the order for producing the above-said documents. In that affidavit Shri Gurdial Singh stated that as the head of the Department of Police and in control of and in charge of its records, he had carefully considered the relevant documents and had come to the conclusion that those were unpublished official records relating to the affairs of the State and that their disclosure would be prejudicial to the public interest for certain reasons given by him. The reason given for claiming privilege in respect of the personal files of the Police Officers was that those contained the confidential reports by their superior officers regarding their working, and it was essential for the purpose of maintenance of discipline of the Police force that such records should not be open to the eyes of others than the official superiors of the officers concerned. Regarding the records of the preliminary inquiry conducted by Shri Tek Chand and the record showing the necessity of second inquiry by the D.I.G. it was stated by Shri Gurdial Singh that those files related to the office of C.I.D. Punjab and were of secret nature and the disclosure of their contents would be prejudicial to the public interest because those comprised the secret Police record of the progress of the investigation and the action taken or proposed to be taken by the Police. Regarding the direction of the Court to produce the final orders passed by the Inspector General of Police on the application of the petitioner for the transfer of the inquiry and to produce the correspondence relating to the transfer of Sub-Inspectors serving in the various Ranges of the Punjab Police to the Punjab Armed Police along with their personal files, etc., it was sworn by the Inspector General of Police as follows :- "The final orders were passed on the nothing of the file which contains confidential remarks of superior officers on the working of police officers and as such it is not in the interest of the discipline and efficiency of the Police force, and therefore of the public, that such remarks should be disclosed". 32. On October 30, 1964 the petitioner filed Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 3845 of 1964 for obtaining leave of the Court to file an affidavit in rejoinder (called replication by the petitioner) in reply to the written statement of respondent No. 2. The affidavit in rejoinder was attached to that application. Shamsher Bahadur, J. passed an order on that miscellaneous application on December 3, 1964 to the following effect :- "The application which has been filed may be admitted. Copy of it shall be delivered to the opposing counsel". 33. In the replication, most of the allegations adverse to the interest of the petitioner contained in the written statement were traversed and the facts stated in the writ petition were generally reiterated. The operative part of para 5 of the replication is in the following words :- "The return does not categorically admit or deny the petitioner having been found guilty on the report submitted by the D.I.G. to I.G. Police in the complaint of Amrik Singh. In the absence of the denial of the Inspector General of Police of the fact that he ordered the reversion of the petitioner on the report of the D.I.G. and without producing the original records as prayed for by the petitioner, this plea of respondent No. 2 cannot be entertained as correct and straight forward". 34. In para 6 of the replication it is stated, inter alia, as follows :- "The Inspector General's directions to the D.I.G. vide endorsement No. 21009-C dated 7th September, 1962 were to the effect that he should reward the police party for the good work done by them and did not leave any discretion with him to single out the petitioner for withholding and thus depriving him of the II Class Commendation certificate and reward of Rs. 100/- which is admitted to have been sanctioned in the recommendation of S.P. Hissar. This withholding of earned reward amounts to punishment and monetary loss which is positively opposed to the rules of natural justice". 35. The order passed by the District Magistrate, Hissar on April 30, 1964 on the petitioner's application dated 29th April, 1964 has been quoted in para 10 of the replication and after the quotation (reproduced below) it is stated by the petitioner in that paragraph as follows :- "The District Magistrate had passed the following order on the said application of the petitioner in his presence :- "File and put up as and when a reference is received from the police in this respect. (Sd.) IQBAL SINGH District Magistrate, 30.4.64". Marked to Reader. In spite of the above-noted order of District Magistrate, it appears his sanction under Police rule 16.38 was taken from the District Magistrate by personal approach by the S.P. on 17th August, 1963 and the above-noted application was never put up with the same". Regarding his reversion from the officiating post the petitioner stated, inter alia, as follows :- "The reversion of the petitioner was in fact imposed by way of punishment and this it amounted to a reduction in rank. This reduction has entailed reduction of his pay and other emoluments and his future chances of promotion have also been jeopardized because even if at some subsequent stage he is again promoted, the officers junior to him would have preference over him in getting the confirmation in the rank of Inspector and getting their further promotion to the rank of D.S.P. for which it is a condition precedent that an officer should continuously hold the rank of Inspector for a period of 4 years. Hence the reply saying that the petitioner's name still exists on the promotion List 'F' and will again be promoted to officiate as Inspector is no compensation for the punishment conferred on him. As explained above his future chances of promotion have been marred". Again in para 15 of the rejoinder, the petitioner has affirmed as below :- "The holding of inquiry by a subordinate of the D.I.G. who has already found the petitioner guilty and stopped the payment of reward and commendation certificates earned by him, would be a farce inasmuch as no subordinate officer would care to come to a different finding than the finding given by the D.I.G. already. Further this inquiry would be used for awarding further punishment when already three punishments have been awarded to him for the same matter. In these circumstances it was all the more necessary that the District Magistrate should have exercised his powers under Rule 16.38 independently". 36. Regarding the alleged violation of the mandatory provisions of rule 16.38 it was further stated by the petitioner in para 16 of his replication as follows :- "The provisions of rule 16.38(1) were infringed when no immediate information was submitted to the District Magistrate by the S.P. of the complaint made to him against the petitioner and preliminary inquiries were held by Shri Tek Chand, D.S.P. (C.I.D.) Chandigarh, and Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, then D.I.G. Ambala Range. Any sanction of the District Magistrate even of obtained thereafter was of no consequence. It is strange that the inquiry having been started on 17th August, 1963 by the S.P. Hissar, by obtaining some order be persuation under 16.38(ii) that thereafter on 26th February, 1964 they thought of holding an investigation by a gazetted officer after sanction under 16.38(1). This is just putting the cart before a horse. The regular inquiry having begun against the petitioner, there was no occasion to hold investigation thereafter under 16.38(1). The production of the original document regarding the obtaining of sanction would throw light on the whole matter for the proper appreciation of the point. In any case the Commandant P.A.P. is not a Superintendent of Police for the purposes of Police rule 16.38". 37. Regarding the petitioner's attack against his transfer of the Punjab Armed Police, he stated in para 20 of his affidavit in rejoinder as follows :- "In view of the provisions of Police Rules 1.1, 1.3. and 1.5, the P.A.P. being not a part of any General Police District and until and unless the police rules are amended, any order passed by any other authority which is in conflict with the provisions of the police rules is not a valid order. It is almost invariably by way of punishment that a Sub Inspector serving in the General Police District is transferred to the Punjab Armed Police". 38. This replication was ended by the petitioner by a repeated averment of the effect (para 21 of the replication) that the reversion of the petitioner amounted to reduction in rank and the same was imposed against the petitioner by way of penalty. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner alleged that manifest injustice had been done to him and his unblemished record of 30 years' service besides his seniority and chances of promotion had been directly affected as a consequence of the order of reversion. 39. Admittedly a copy of the affidavit in rejoinder was served on the learned counsel for the State but no attempt was made on behalf of the respondents to obtain the leave of the Court to file any further affidavit in reply to the said replication. 40. The petitioner submitted C.M. No. 1146 of 1965 in this case in April 5, 1965 praying for a direction being given to the respondents to produce in Court the records of the case and the documents mentioned in C.M. No. 2486 of 1964 before hearing the writ petition itself. On 6th April, 1965 notice of the application was directed by P.D. Sharma, J. to be given to the Advocate General. After hearing both sides, Sharma, J. passed an order on the said application of the petitioner on 23rd April, 1965 reading as follows :- "The learned counsel for the respondents states that all the documents mentioned by the petitioner in his C.M. No. 2496 will be ready with him in the Court on the date the civil writ petition is heard by the Bench. This will enable the Bench to look into the documents which the learned counsel for the petitioner will refer to at the time of his arguments in support of the contentions made by the petitioner in the civil writ. It may also be mentioned here that the learned counsel for the petitioner will have no right to look into the documents for which the other party claims privilege and is also admissible to the party under the law". 41. On May 11, 1965 the petitioner made still another application to the Court. This was C.M. No. 1595 of 1965 seeking leave of the Court to file an additional affidavit to prove to the Court that the petitioner had suffered evil consequences of the order of reversion on account of the promotion of a large number of petitioner's juniors over his head. In para 2 of the additional affidavit it was sworn by the petitioner that 29 persons, who were holding the substantive rank of Sub Inspectors and 5 officiating Sub Inspectors, who were junior to the petitioner, had been promoted as impugned order of petitioner's reversion. In para 3 of the said additional affidavit it was further stated that the petitioner had been reverted with a view to punish him so much so that about 133 persons junior to him had been promoted over his head and made his seniors. The petitioner also swore in para 4 of the said affidavit that the had even earned one commendation certificate with a cash reward of Rs. 25/- within three months prior to May, 1965. 42. The application was treated by the Court as one for leave to amend the writ petition and P.D. Sharma, J. passed the following order on the same on May 18, 1965. "The petitioner is allowed to amend his petition as prayed for by him. The respondents, if they so like, can file their written statement meeting the points now incorporated in the Civil Writ within 14 days from today". 43. The above order was passed in the presence of Shri M.S. Pannu, the learned Deputy Advocate General who appears for the respondents in this case. Not only was no affidavit in reply to the allegations made in the additional affidavit of the petitioner filed in this Court within 14 days of the order as permitted by Sharma, J. but even subsequently no application for leave to file any such affidavit was sought from the Court. In fairness to the learned counsel for the respondents I must also state that the fact stated in the said additional affidavit relating to the promotion of a large number of petitioner's juniors to the officiating rank of Inspector of Police after the impugned reversion of the petitioner has not been disputed before me even at the hearing of the writ petition. Of course the averment in the additional affidavit to the effect that his reversion was by way of punishment has been disputed at the hearing. 44. When the writ petition was on my daily still another application dated 27th July, 1965 (C.M. No. 2830 of 1965) was filed by the petitioner in which the prayer was to the effect that the respondents be directed to file the relevant records in Court and the petitioner may be allowed to inspect the same. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for both sides I passed the following order in that application on 29th July, 1965 :- "Except for the records in respect of which privilege may be claimed by the respondents, all other records referred to in the order of Sharma J. dated 23rd April, 1965 should be filed in Court to enable the counsel for the petitioner to inspect the same". 45. In pursuance of the above order, which was passed without any objection from the counsel for the respondents, certain records were filed in Court by the State and have been inspected by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Some references to those records have already been made in this judgment. 46. When the writ petition reached for hearing before me on August 4, 1965 the petitioner made still another application. In this application the prayer of the petitioner was to direct the respondents to produce in Court for inspection by the petitioner's counsel the remaining records also and to refuse the privilege which had been claimed by respondent No. 1 in respect of some those documents. No separate orders passed on that application and it was not considered necessary to compel the respondents to produce any further records in this case. 47. When the learned counsel for the petitioner had concluded his opening submissions in this case on 12th August, 1965 he stated that if Shri Gurdial Singh, Inspector General of Police filed an unequivocal affidavit in this Court even at this stage swearing to the effect that he did not pass the order of reversion. The learned Deputy Advocate General accepted this offer and prayed for a short adjournment to enable the Inspector General of Police to file an affidavit to the above effect as the respondents' position was and has throughout been that the order of petitioner's reversion had not been passed by way of punishment. After this offer of Shri H.S. Gujral, (the learned counsel for the petitioner) had been accepted by the learned Deputy Advocate General, Mr. Gujral wanted to add that he would press the claim for setting aside the order of reversion only if the Inspector General of Police further affirmed that the reversion of the petitioner was not as a result of the specific allegations made against the petitioner by Shri Amrik Singh. The Deputy Advocate General did not agree to any such addition being made and Mr. Gujral thereupon withdrew the condition of the additional averment required of the Inspector General of Police. The case was accordingly adjourned till today to enable the first respondent to swear such affidavit, if any, as he might chose to do in the circumstances. At the hearing of the case before me, an affidavit by Shri Gurdial Singh, Inspector General of Police has been filed wherein, in spite of the above facts he had not sworn that the reversion of the petitioner was not by way of punishment. In fairness to respondent No. 1 I may quote both the paragraphs of his affidavit dated 13th August, 1965 -- "1. that the above mentioned civil writ came up for hearing on the 12th August, 1965, and this Hon'ble Court desired that an affidavit be filed by me in regard to the order of reversion of the petitioner Avtar Singh passed by me on 6th April, 1963. 2. that the petitioner Avtar Singh was reverted by me because I did not consider him fit for holding the rank of Inspector. He was officiating in that rank and could be reverted to his substantive rank at any time without assigning any reasons". 48. However good the arguments of the Inspector General of Police contained in his affidavit may be, the fact remains that not only did he not deny the specific allegation of the petitioner to the effect that he had been reverted by way of punishment on any earlier occasion in spite of more than one opportunity but he had very fairly and frankly declined to give an affidavit to that effect in spite of a specific opportunity having been specifically provided to him at the request of the counsel for both sides during the hearing of the case. 49. The petitioner after the adjournment of the case on the last date of hearing filed C.M. No. 3080 of 1965 in the Registry of the Court through Shri Prem Partap, Advocate, which came up for hearing today, praying that the Inspector General of Police may be directed to swear an affidavit on the question whether or not 'he reverted the petitioner as a result of the specific allegations made against him by Shri Amrik Singh and on the basis of the inquiry report of Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha dated 1st April, 1963. This was treated by me as a crude attempt on the part of the petitioner to avoid the effect of a possible affidavit which may have been filed by Shri Gurdial Singh to the effect that the petitioner had not been reverted by way of punishment. In view, however, of the nature of the affidavit dated 13th August, 1965 filed by Shri Gurdial Singh and the facts enumerated above I dismissed the above-said application in limini today. 50. The stage is now set to consider the various arguments of Mr. H.S. Gujral. His first argument was that this client's transfer to the Punjab Armed Police without his consent and against his will was not justifiable and the order of his such transfer was liable to be set aside in these proceedings. He contended that this transfer of the petitioner is illegal and without jurisdiction because the Punjab Armed Police is not a part of the general Police district under the Police Act. According to the learned counsel the petitioner's service could only be used in the district Police which is said to consists of - (i) general District Police; (ii) Railway Police; and (iii) C.I.D. Police. 51. The Punjab Armed Police, according to the petitioner, is not a part of the general District Police and is a new creation on military lines comprising of battalion system. The grievance of the petitioner is that after having received special training for service as an investigator in the District Police and after his 20 years career in that line he has been thrown over to the routine armed police to which recruitment is normally made on voluntary basis. Mr. Gujral has invited my attention to rules 1.1, 1.3 and 1.5 of the Punjab Police Rules which reads as follows :- "1.1. For the purposes of Section 3 of the Police Act (V of 1861) the Punjab is divided into "General Police District", namely, - (a) the Provincial Police District. (b) the Railway Police District. All ranks of Police employed in the province are appointed or enrolled under Section 2 of the Act. 1.3. The Provincial Police general district is devided into administrative establishments; a Training School (including the Provincial Finger Print Bureau); a Criminal Investigation Department, and District Police Establishments. The Railway Police, general district, is divided into a Central Investigating Agency, and such number of sub-divisions as the Provincial Government may authorise from time to time". "1.5. All police officers appointed or enrolled in either of the two general police districts constitute one police force and are liable to, and legally empowered for, police duty anywhere within the province. No sub-division of the force territory or by classes, such as mounted and foot Police, affects this principle. Though not liable to permanent transfer beyond the limits of the Punjab, every police officer is empowered by Section 3, Police Act II of 1888, when necessary, to exercise the powers, functions and privileges of a police officer in any part of British India. In the exercise of such functions a police officer is deemed to be a member of the police force of the province in which he is at the time". 52. The counsel then referred to Section 3 of the Police Act, 1861 which provides that the superintendence of police throughout a general Police district vests and is exercised by the State Government to which such district is subordinate and accept and as authorised under the provisions of the said police act no person, officer or Court can be empowered by the State Government to supersede or control any police functionary. The argument is that by having been transferred to the Punjab Armed Police the petitioner has ceased to be in the service of general Police district and deprived of the benefits of Section 3 of the Police Act. The relevant allegations in this behalf have been made by the petitioner in para 15(viii) of the writ petition. In the corresponding paragraph of the written statement of respondent No. 2 it is stated that Police rule 14.15 lays down that all enrolled police officers are under Section 22 of the Police Act liable for service in any part of the general Police district and that Punjab Armed Police to which the petitioner is now posted is also a part of the general Police district. In view of this averment on oath of respondent No. 2, who is a responsible officer, it is impossible to state that the Punjab Armed Police (P.A.P.) to which the petitioner is now posted, is not a part of general Police district. Even in the rejoinder, which the petitioner filed subsequent to the above-said written statement of respondent No. 2 nothing specific to convert this allegation of the second respondent has been stated. Once it is held that the Punjab Armed Police is in the general Police district, the petitioner cannot complain of his transfer from one breach of the Police force to another. I, therefore, find no force no in this contention of Mr. Gujral and reject the same. 53. The second contention of Mr. Gujral relates to the order passed by the Inspector General of Police, Punjab (respondent No. 1) reverting the petitioner from his officiating rank of an Inspector of Police to that of his substantive rank of a Sub-Inspector. The law in this respect is settled to the extent that such reversion can be challenged only if it is by way of punishment and has been effected without affording the officiating officer the opportunity required under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. Whether a particular order of reversion is by way of punishment or not will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Leaving aside the natural consequence of loss in the emoluments of the higher post and becoming junior or subordinate to other officiating and permanent incumbents of the higher post, which are natural and necessary consequence of a normal order of reversion, the order would be by way of punishment :- (i) if it is expressed to be so; or (ii) if evil consequences ensue from the order as a direct result thereof; or (iii) if a stigma is case on the officiating officer by an order of reversion beyond the mere finding of the officer being not suitable to hold the higher post. 54. The circumstances in which evil consequences can be held to ensue from an order of revdecided ersion cannot be defined with any particularly. Nor does it appear to be advisable to attempt to do so. 55. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union Of India., A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36, it was held that if the order entails or provides for the postponement of the officer's future chances of promotion, then the circumstances may indicate that although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the rules, in truth and reality the Government has reverted the official by way of penalty. Their Lordships of the Supreme court further held in that case that the use of any particular expression by the authority passing the order is not conclusive and that in spite of the use of even innocuous expressions, the Court has to apply the test laid down in that judgment and has to find out whether the official concerned has been visited with evil consequences of the kind referred to therein. If it is found that the order of reversion has visited the officer concerned with any of the evil consequences in question, the reversion of the official concerned to his substantive rank must be regarded as a reduction in rank and if the requirements of Article 311 and of the relevant rules, which give protection to a government servant have not been complied with, the order of reversion must be held to be wrongful and in violation of the constitutional right of the government servant concerned. 56. In State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore Prasad, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 689; it was held that the order discharging Gopi Kishore Parshad from his service as a probationer was liable to be struck down as the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution had not been complied with and Mr. Parshad had been discharged from service on enquiry as being unsuitable to the post on grounds of corruption and unsatisfactory work in the discharge of his public duties. In that case it was held that it is true that if the Government come to a conclusion that a particular officer is not a fit and proper person to hold a port in the public services of the State it can discharge him without holding any inquiry into his alleged misconduct; and that if the Government proceeds against an officer in that straightforward manner without casting any aspersions on his honesty and competence his discharge would not in law have the effect of removal from service by way of punishment and he would, therefore, have no grievance to ventilate in Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further observed in that case that if instead of taking that easy course, the Government chose the more difficult one of starting proceedings against him and of branding him as a dishonest and incompetent officer, he would have a right to insist upon the protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. 57. In Shri Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. State Of Mysore., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 8, it was held as follows :- "Ordinarily, if a public servant has been officiating in a higher rank it cannot be said that he has substantive right to that higher rank. He may have to revert to his substantive rank a result of the exigencies of the services or be he may be reverted as a result of an adverse finding in an enquiry against him for misconduct. In every case of reversion from an officiating higher post to his substantive post, the civil servant concerned is deprived of the emoluments of the higher post. But that cannot, by itself, be a ground for holding that the second test in Dhingra's case 1958 SCR 828 : (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36) namely, whether he has been visited with evil consequences, can be said to have been satisfied. Hence, mere deprivation of higher emoluments as a consequence of reversion cannot amount to the "evil consequences" referred to in the second test in Dhingra's case 1958 SCR 828 : (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36); they must mean something more than mere deprivation of higher emoluments. That being so, they include, for example, forfeiture of substantive pay, loss of seniority, etc. Applying that test to the present case, it cannot be said that simply because the appellant did not get a Deputy Collector's salary for three years, he was visited with evil consequences of the type contemplated in Dhingra's case 1958 SCR 828 : (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36). Even if he had been reverted in the ordinary course of the exigencies of the service, the same consequences would have ensued. If the loss of the emoluments attaching to the higher rank in which he was officiating was the only consequence of his reversion as a result of the enquiry against him, the appellant would have no cause of action. But it is clear that as a result of the Order, dated August 11, 1948, Exhibit 35 the appellant lost his seniority as a Mamlatdar, which was his substantive post. That being so, it was not a simple case of reversion with no evil consequences; it had such consequences as would come within the test of punishment as laid down in Dhingra's case 1958 SCR 828 : (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36). If the reversion had not been for a period of three years, it could not be said that the appellant had been punished within the meaning of the rule laid down in Dhingra's case 1958 SCR 828 : (A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 36). It cannot be asserted that his reversion to a substantive post for a period of three years was not by way of punishment. From the facts of this case it is clear that the appellant was on the upward move in the cadre of his service and but for this aberration in his progress to a higher post, he would have, in ordinary course, been promoted as he actually was some time later authorities realised perhaps that he had not been justly treated, as is clear from the Order of the Government, dated March 26, 1951, promoting him to the higher rank with effect from August 1, 1950. But that belated justice meted out to him by the Government did not completely undo the mischief of the Order of Reversion impugned in this case. It is clear to us, therefore, that as a result of the Order of Reversion aforesaid, the appellant had been punished and that the order of the Government punishing him was not wholly regular". 58. In an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in Narain Singh v. State Of Punjab ., Civil Appeal No. 492 of 1963, the appellant had been reverted as Deputy Superintendent in view of his unsatisfactory record. It was found that Narain Singh had not been deprived of any accrued benefits and no evil consequences had been visited on him either. It was further found that he had right to hold the higher post of a Superintendent. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that though his juniors were still officiating as Superintendents, Narain Singh was not entitled to any relief as the order of his reversion had not visited him with any evil consequences or deprived him of any accrued benefits. 59. In P.C. Wadhwa v. The Union of India and another, 1964(IV) Current Law Journal 10, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that when a person is reverted to a substantive rank the question of penal consequences in the matter of forfeiture of pay or loss of seniority must be considered in the context of his substantive rank and not with reference to his officiating rank from which he is reverted because every reversion must necessarily mean that the pay will be reduced to that the substantive rank. The order of reversion of P.C. Wadhwa was, however struck down in that case as the Supreme Court found that he had not merely suffered the loss of pay which was inevitable on reduction of rank but he had also suffered loss of seniority and postponement of future chances of promotion of the senior scale. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that a matter of this kind has to be looked at from the point of view of substance rather than of form. 60. Again in Jagdish Mitter v. Union Of India ., 1964(IV) Current Law Journal 66-(A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 449), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court held that the form in which an impugned order passed against a government servant is expressed is not decisive and that if a formal departmental enquiry is held in which findings have been recorded against the government servant and as a result at such findings his services are terminated, the fact that the order by which his services are terminated, postensibly purports to be a mere order of discharge would not disguise the fact that in substance and in law the discharge in question amounts to dismissal of the temporary servant. Their Lordships held that that was why the form of the order was inconclusive and it was the substance of the matter which determined the character of the termination of services. It was observed that in dealing with this aspect of the matter, the real character of the termination of the services must be determined by reference to the material facts that existed prior to the order. 61. In Ved Parkash Vohra v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1965 Punjab 28, this Court (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) held that the substance of the order of termination of services had to be looked into and that the Court is not confined only to the contents of the order of discharge but in order to discover as to what the mind of the Government was at the time when the order of discharge was passed, it has to consider the totality of the circumstances relevant on the subject which would disclose as to what the true position was. 62. The position of law relevant to the decision of this case, which emerges from the discussion of the above authorities, may be summarised as below :- 1. If an officiating government servant has no right to hold a higher post and is reverted to his substantive rank otherwise than by way of punishment, he had no cause of action. 2. If the reversion is by way of punishment and the same is effected without affording the official concerned the requisite opportunity under Article 311(2) of the Constitution, the order of reversion will have to be struck down. 3. The order of reversion would be deemed to be by way of punishment if it visits the official concerned with evil consequences ensuing from the order of reversion, the evil consequences in the matter of forfeiture of pay or loss of seniority being considered only in the context of the official's substantive rank and not with reference to his officiating rank from which he is reverted. 4. If the official concerned not only suffers loss of seniority on account of the order of reversion but also suffers on account of the order of reversion the postponement of his future chances of promotion to the senior scale or the higher post, the order is by way of penalty. 5. That in determining whether a particular order of reversion amounts to the reduction of the official in rank within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution or not it is not only the form or the wording of the particular order which is to be treated as conclusive but it is the substantive of the matter which has to be determined after consideration of the totality of the circumstances. The real character of the order has to be determined by reference to the material facts that existed immediately prior to or at the time of the impugned order. 6. If the real intention is found to be penalise or punish the official then notwithstanding the form of the order the reversion would be held to amount to reduction in rank. 7. That in considering the circumstances of each case the motive of the relevant authorities in reverting the official concerned is wholly irrelevant but the mind or the intention to inflict punishment or to revert in ordinary course would certainly be relevant. 8. The mere fact that it is found that it was the official's unsatisfactory work, which resulted in his reversion, will not vitiate the order as there is not sense in trying a person in a higher rank in officiating capacity if he cannot be reverted in spite of his work in the higher rank being unsatisfactory or in spite of his being found unsuitable to hold the higher post without taking disciplinary proceedings against him. To such a case Article 311(2) of the Constitution will not apply. 63. Shri Mohinder Singh Pannu, the learned counsel for the State relied on a Division Bench judgment of this Court (Dulat and Grover, JJ.) dated 10th February, 1965 in H.C. Baij Nath v. State of Punjab, L.P.A. No. 407 of 1963, wherein it was held that the order of reversion was not by way of punishment as it was clear that the order did not in any manner affect Baij Nath's chances of promotion. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down in that case. The judgment of another Division Bench of this Court (Dulat and R.P. Khosla, JJ.) dated 16th July, 1965 in State of Punjab v. Ved Parkash Vohra, L.P.A. No. 345 of 1964, which has also been relied on by the learned Deputy Advocate General, does not appear to help in the decision of this case at all. 64. Applying the above tests to the facts of this case it is significant to note :- (i) that as a result of the order of reversion the petitioner has been deprived of the Commendation Certificate and Cash reward which had otherwise been recommended and sanctioned for him but was withheld later. (ii) that the future chances of promotion of the petitioner to the higher rank have been seriously jeopardised as a direct result of the impugned order of reversion which was passed on 6th April, 1963. In spite of the fact that since then more than 100 of the juniors of the petitioner have been promoted to the higher rank and in spite of the fact that the petitioner has even subsequent to the order of reversion obtained rewards and commendation certificates, he had not been afforded any chance to officiate in the higher rank. As a result of this order of reversion his juniors have become his seniors. (iii) Under rule 13.16 of the Punjab Police Rules substantive vacancies in the rank of Inspectors have to be filled by promotion of officers from list 'F' selected according to the principles laid down in rule 13.1. Admittedly the name of the petitioner is still held on list 'F'. But his juniors have been promoted and he has been kept back because of the order of reversion. (iv) Though the petitioner gave an affidavit to the effect that Shri Gurdial Singh respondent No. 1 had passed the order of reversion by way of punishment, Shri Gurdial Singh did not file any affidavit to deny that allegation in reply to the writ petition. Even when the case was specially adjourned to enable Shri Gurdial Singh to file a clear and unequivocal affidavit denying the allegation of the reversion having been ordered by way of penalty, he did not say so though he did file an affidavit of a argumentative nature. (v) The facts and circumstances as the existed on the date of the passing of the order of reversion as detailed in an earlier part of this judgment leave no doubt about the fact that it was on the complaint of the notorious character, Amrik Singh and it was on the intervention of late Shri Partap Singh Kairon, the ex-Chief Minister of the State and the special interest taken by Shri Ajaib Singh, D.I.G., C.I.D. in the complaint of the said Amrik Singh Rosha, and it was as a direct result of the report of Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, D.I.G. Ambala Range submitted by him after an enquiry into the complaint that the order of petitioner's reversion was passed in this case. (vi) The fact that the order of reversion was accompanied by an order of transfer of the petitioner from the General Punjab Armed Police and that even thereafter efforts were continued to proceed further against the petitioner departmentally on account of the same oral complaint of Amrik Singh lodged with the Chief Minister is also indicative of the mind of the punishing authority. (vii) It is also clear in this case that as a result of the order of reversion the petitioner has lost his seniority even as a Sub-Inspector in his substantive post as officiating Sub-Inspectors junior to him have become his seniors. This is, therefore, not a case of simple reversion with no evil consequences and the case falls within the dictum of the Supreme Court in Madhay Laxman Vaikunthe's case (supra). 65. Considering the totality of all the above circumstances and the facts stated above and applying the tests enumerated in an earlier part of this judgment, I hold that the order of petitioner's reversion passed by Shri Gurdial Singh, Inspector General of Police, Punjab, respondent No. 1 in his case on or about 6th April, 1963 was by way of punishment. That being so, the order cannot be sustained as it is not disputed that the petitioner was never afforded the requisite opportunity under Article 311(2) of the Constitution. I, therefore, quash and set aside the above-said impugned order of petitioner's reversion from his officiating post of Inspector of Police to that of his substantive rank of Sub-Inspector of Police. 66. The third attack of the learned counsel for the petitioner is directed against the enquiry pending against this official. There is no doubt that this inquiry is directed into the allegations made against the petitioner by Shri Amrik Singh named above to late Shri Partap Singh Kairon in the first instance and to the Inspector General of Police in the second instance and repeated by him in his statement before Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, D.I.G. Police, Ambala Range. The only valid attack against the pending enquiry which has impressed me is that the same is being conducted in direct violation of rule 16.38(1), (2) and (3) of the said rules which read as follows :- "16.38. (1) Immediate information shall be given to the District Magistrate if any complaint received by the Superintendent of Police, which indicates the commission by a police officer of a criminal offence in connection with his official relations with the public. The District Magistrate will decide whether the investigation of the complaint shall be conducted by a police officer, or made over to a selected Magistrate having 1st Class powers. (2) When investigation of such a complaint establishes a prima facie case, a judicial prosecution shall normally follows; the matter shall be disposed of departmentally only if the District Magistrate so orders for reasons to be recorded. When it is decided to proceed departmentally the procedure prescribed in rule 16.24 shall be followed. An officer found guilty on a charge of the nature referred to in this rule shall ordinarily be dismissed. (3) Ordinarily a Magistrate before whom a complaint against a police officer is laid proceeds at once to judicial enquiry. He is, however, required to report details of the case to the District Magistrate, who will forward a copy of this report to the Superintendent of Police. The District Magistrate himself will similarly sent a report to the Superintendent of Police in cases of which he himself takes cognizance. 67. The facts stated in the opening part of this Judgment clearly reveal that admittedly the provisions of sub-rule (1) of rule 16.38 have not been complied with in this case. This fact is also admitted in the letter of the Superintendent of Police, Punjab Armed Police, dated 24th February, 1964. Even otherwise it is patent on the face of the record that through "immediate information" was required to be given to the District Magistrate before August, 1964. It is also significant to note that prior to sending such information to the District Magistrate investigation into the complaint of Amrik Singh had been completed at least twice, firstly by Shri Tek Chand, Deputy Superintendent of Police and on the second occasion by Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, D.I.G. Police. The reference of August, 1963 was in fact under rule 16.38(2) of the Police Rules and was made in order to secure the order of the District Magistrate to proceed against the petitioner departmentally instead of following the normal procedure of a judicial prosecution into the serious allegations made against him. Mr. Pannu, the learned Deputy Advocate General contended that the Government has already realised its mistake in not following the mandatory provisions of rule 16.38(1) of the Police Rules and is, therefore, now seeking to obtain the decision of the District Magistrate for conducting the investigation of the complaint by a Police Officer instead of getting the same done by a selected Magistrate having first class powers. The arrangement of the learned counsel for the State appears to me to be fallacious. Investigation has admittedly been conducted at least by the D.I.G. into the complaint without complying with the provisions of rule 16.38(1) of the Police Rules. The entire investigation proceedings against the petitioner in this case have, therefore, been vitiated on that account. The permission now obtained by the Superintendent of Police P.A.P. to have another investigation made into the complaint by a Deputy Superintendent of Police is a fraud in the rule and is likely to result into nothing short of a farce in view of the existing report of enquiry by Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, the Deputy Inspector General of Police. It is beyond my comprehension to conceive that in the face of the report of the D.I.G. it can be expected that a D.S.P. will be in a position to hold independent investigation. Though there is no force in the argument of Mr. H.S. Gujral to the effect that the District Magistrate must record reasons for allowing the Police Officers to conduct an investigation as sub-rule (1) of rule 16.38 does not contain any such requirement, I feel that fresh investigation by a gazetted Police Officer as now permitted by the District Magistrate would be wholly illegal. If the contention of the State counsel is to prevail, I have to obliterate the word "immediate" in the opening part of rule 16.38(1) of the Police Rules and to ignore the same altogether. Effect must be given to every word of the statutory rule. Immediate information not having been given to the District Magistrate and in fact no information having been given to him for more than three months, the entire enquiry proceedings against the petitioner are vitiated and rendered null and void on account of the non-compliance with the above-said mandatory rule. It is also to be noticed that in spite of the precaution taken by the petitioner in applying to the District Magistrate well in advance on 29th April, 1963, the application of the petitioner was not put up to the District Magistrate and the Police authorities appear to have obtained the orders of the District Magistrate by presenting the papers to him personally. 68. It is then contended by Mr. Gujral that the provisions of rule 16.38(2) of the aforesaid rules have also violated in this case as departmental proceedings have been commenced against the petitioner without obtaining any valid and legal order of the District Magistrate required under that sub-rule. 69. In Jagan Nath v. The Senior Superintendent of Police, Ferozepore, 1961 P.L.R. 860, Grover, J. held that sub-rules (1) and (2) of rule 16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules are mandatory in so far as they enjoin upon the Superintendent of Police the duty to forward the complaint to the District Magistrate who has to decide whether the investigation should be conducted by a Police Officer or made over to a Magistrate and that it is only after examining the result of such investigation that the District Magistrate has to decide and has to give reasons in his decision for proceeding against the Police Officer departmentally and not prosecuting him judicially if the investigation establishes a prima facie case. In the instant case there has admittedly so far been no legal investigation after compliance with the provisions of rule 16.38(1) of the Police Rules. Without, therefore, applying his mind to the result of any lawful investigation the District Magistrate has already permitted the holding a departmental inquiry under sub-rule (2) of that rule. The manner in which and the indecent haste with which such permission has been secured from the District Magistrate does not inspire much confidence in the way in which the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner are proceeding in this case. Nor has the District Magistrate given any reasons in his order, permitting departmental inquiry. Grover, J. has held in the aforesaid case that the District Magistrate has to keep in mind at the stage of passing an order under the aforesaid rule that normally a judicial prosecution should take place if a prima facie case is disclosed but taken it as his discretion to deviate from that normal rule and order a departmental enquiry for reasons to be recorded. This has not been done in the instant case. In Nand Singh v. Superintendent of Police and another, 1964 Current Law Journal 146, Harbans Singh, J. held that the idea behind rule 16.38(1) is that where an accusation against a police officer regarding his conduct with the public comes to the notice of the Superintendent of Police, he should immediately obtain orders of the District Magistrate as to whether the inquiry into those accusations is to be made in the usual routine procedure by the Police or whether the matter should be enquired into by a Magistrate. The learned Judge held that any investigation carried out by the Police on such a complaint against a Police Officer without getting a direction from the District Magistrate would be vitiated. In that case it was further held that where the Superintendent of Police had made a definite suggestion that the petitioner should be proceeded against departmentally in the first instance, the word "allowed" recorded by the District Magistrate on such memorandum without giving any further reasons for holding a departmental inquiry in preference to a judicial trial in a Court of law was a valid permission granted under rule 16.38(2) of the Punjab Police Rules. The relevant communications relating to compliance with rule 16.38 have already been referred to in the opening part of this Judgment. They clearly show that a definite suggestion was proceedings against the petitioner in preference to a Magistrate proceeding. Even in the last communication of the Superintendent of Police, P.A.P. dated 24th February, 1964 while asking for directions under rule (1) it has been clearly indicated that after the report of the investigation the Police would again hold a departmental enquiry. This indication is apparent from the following words used in that communication :- "In case his finding (the finding of the investigating officer) is that allegations or a part thereof are correct, your orders will be obtained under Police rule 16.38(2) for dealing with the case departmentally/judicially". 70. The law laid down by Grover, J. in connection with the above rule has been consistently followed in this Court. It was held by P.C. Pandit, J. in Gobind Singh v. D.I.G. of Police and another, 1964 Current Law Journal (Pb.) 150, and by Shamsher Bahadur, J. in Walaiti Ram Softa v. The State of Punjab and another, 1965 Current Law Journal (Pb.)1, that the requirement of this rule is mandatory and non-compliance with the same vitiates the enquiry or the departmental proceedings as the case may be. 71. Mr. Pannu, the learned Deputy Advocate General contended that rule 16.38 applies only to a Superintendent of Police and that inasmuch as the complaint in his case was made by Amrik Singh to Shri Partap Singh Kairon and to the Inspector General of Police it was not necessary to comply with that rule. It is needless to go into this argument as the complaint did reach the Superintendent of Police, Crimes, when the report of Shri Bhagwan Singh Rosha, D.I.G. Ambala Range reached his hands on the 5th of April, 1963 and again when a reference was made to the District Magistrate in August, 1963. Even when this matter went up for investigation to Shri Tek Chand, Deputy Superintendent of Police he should have acted under rule 16.23 and should have sent up the papers to the Superintendent of Police who was in turn bound by the provisions of rule 16.38. There is, therefore, no force in this contention of the learned State counsel. 72. Lastly, Mr. Pannu has relied on an unreported judgment of a Division Bench of this Court (A.N. Bhandari C.J. and Dulat, J.) dated August 19, 1958, in Bua Dass Kaushal v. Inspector General of Police, Letters Patent Appeal No. 169 of 1957, wherein it was held that if a report is made to the District Magistrate with a recommendation that the appellants case should be dealt with departmentally and the District Magistrate agreed with the same by merely signing his name below the recommendation of the Superintendent of Police, it amounted to a valid order under rule 16.38(2) as that is the usual method of transacting departmental business. 73. Though all the decisions of this Court given by various learned Judges sitting in a Single Bench have not been very consistent with the said earlier vies it is not necessary to refer this matter to a larger Bench because in this case the departmental proceedings pending against the petitioner are being set aside not only on the ground of a suggestion having been made to the District Magistrate to permit departmental proceedings but even otherwise. 74. No other point has been urged before me in this case by either side. I, therefore, grant this writ petition and set aside and quash the impugned order of the petitioner reversion as well as the entire pending investigation and departmental proceedings against the petitioner on the complaint of Shri Amrik Singh aforesaid. This would not, however, in any manner debar any magistrial enquiry of judicial proceeding against the petitioner in connection with the said complaint. In the peculiar circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs of the proceedings in this Court. Petition allowed.