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  • section 23 of the contract act, section 365
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Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • section 23 of the contract act, section 365
  • section 2, clauses (e)
  • Section 2 (g)
Smart Summary

Summary of the Opinion (Manohar Pershad, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This suit (O. S. No. 2/1 of 1953-54) was instituted by the respondent — a minor — through his mother and guardian, Aziz Khatoon, for recovery of Rs. 10,000. The plaint alleged that the defendant, a distant relative, represented to the mother that the minor's father, Khaja Kamaluddin (a jagirdar), was addicted to drinking and that funds deposited in the Court of Wards could be made available if a house were proposed to be purchased in the minor's name. On that pretext the defendant purported to sell a bungalow and garden (no. 678 at New Malakpet, Chanchalguda, Hyderabad) for Rs. 86,000, obtained Rs. 10,000 from the plaintiff by way of loan and executed an agreement of sale dated 13 May 1950; the plaint alleged the Rs. 10,000 was obtained fraudulently and not repaid despite demands.

In his written statement the defendant admitted executing the agreement but stated the agreement was with Khaja Kamaluddin (the father), who paid Rs. 10,000 as earnest money and was bound to pay the balance within two months, failing which the earnest money lapsed. The defendant denied that the amount was a loan and raised a legal objection about non-impleading heirs of the deceased jagirdar. The plaintiff denied defendant's allegations in rejoinder.

The trial court framed seven issues (listed in the opinion), heard documentary and oral evidence, found issues 1–3 against the plaintiff and issues 4–7 in his favour, and decreed the suit. The defendant appealed against that decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, as alleged in the plaint, the defendant borrowed Rs. 10,000 from the plaintiff and described it as earnest money for the purchase of his bungalow?
  2. Whether the agreement dated 13th May, 1950 was executed by the defendant only for show in order to enable the plaintiff to secure money from the Court of Wards?
  3. Whether the plaintiff can be allowed to adduce evidence to contradict the terms of the written agreement?
  4. Whether the name of the minor was entered in the agreement as 'benami' and the amount of Rs. 10,000 belonged to the deceased Khaja Kamaluddin; if so, what is the effect of not impleading other heirs of the deceased in this suit?
  5. Can the minor be allowed to repudiate the contract; if so, what is its effect on the suit?
  6. Is the suit maintainable?
  7. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (as summarised in the opinion)

  • When the trial court decided issues 1–3 in the defendant's favour (accepting the defendant's version that the Rs. 10,000 was earnest money and the agreement was genuine), the suit for return of Rs. 10,000 could not have been decreed.
  • The agreement of sale did not expressly state it was executed on behalf of the minor; in the absence of an explicit statement it must be taken as executed by the parents in their individual capacity rather than as guardians for the minor.
  • The agreement (if held to be on behalf of the minor) was illegal and unenforceable under section 23 of the Indian Contract Act and under provisions of Mulla's Mohammadan Law (section 365), and the cited case Thasi Muthukannu & Others v. Shanmugavelu Pillai was relied upon.
  • Section 65 of the Contract Act (restitution when agreement is discovered to be void) does not apply to contracts void ab initio; reliance placed on Narayana Rao v. Ramachandra Rao and Sivaramakrishnayya v. Venkata Narahari Rao.
  • If the Rs. 10,000 was earnest money, it lapsed on default by Khaja Kamaluddin in paying the balance within two months and the defendant was entitled to forfeit it.
  • Finally, if the court finds against the appellant on forfeiture, the appellant asked not to be "clubbed with costs."

Respondent's Arguments (as summarised in the opinion)

  • The agreement's language shows it was executed in respect of a minor: the agreement itself states "the vendee being a minor this contract has been entered into with his father ... and his mother". Thus the sale was on behalf of the minor by his guardians.
  • The Rs. 10,000 was part of funds in the Court of Wards; Khaja Kamaluddin had earlier petitioned to allow some deposit to be made over to his wife for the children's benefit. Therefore the amount cannot be treated as solely the father's money and indicative of a purely individual transaction by the parents.
  • Section 65 of the Contract Act applies to agreements discovered to be void and includes agreements void from their inception; authorities and previous decisions support restitution where an agreement is void ab initio.
  • Even if the Rs. 10,000 is called "bayana" (earnest money) that term can also mean deposit; the intention of the parties, read from the document, shows that the Rs. 10,000 was part-payment/security (1/8th of price) and there was no written forfeiture clause; the defendant's oral evidence about an understanding of forfeiture is inconsistent with the written documents.
  • Forfeiture of such a heavy amount might be regarded as penalty if disproportionate to the purchase price; the respondent relied on Venkoba Char v. Kuri Sanjisappa to show that disproportionate forfeiture is penal and not enforceable.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Thasi Muthukannu & Others v. Shanmugavelu Pillai, (1905) I.L.R. 28 Mad. 413 : 15 M.L.J. 286 Example of a case where the agreement was for immoral consideration and therefore hit by section 23 of the Contract Act. The court distinguished this authority: it did not help the appellant because that case involved immoral consideration; the present agreement was not of that character.
Harnath Kuar v. Indar Bahadur, (1922) 44 M.L.J. 489 : I.L.R. 50 La. 69 : A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 403 Interpretation that "an agreement discovered to be void" includes agreements void from the inception (authority on scope of section 65 of the Contract Act). The court relied on this Privy Council authority to hold that section 65 applies to agreements void ab initio; the court followed its reasoning.
Sivaramakrishnayya v. Venkata Narahari Rao, (1959) 2 An. W.R. 241 Authority supporting restitution under section 65 where contract was unenforceable — involved sale of paddy in contravention of licensing orders. The court held this case supported the view that section 65 applies to agreements void ab initio and cited it as supportive of awarding restitution.
Budhulal v. Deccan Banking Co., A.I.R. 1955 Hyd. 69 (Full Bench) Case where a promissory note was invalid under statutory provisions (Hyderabad Paper Currency Act) and restitution under the corresponding statutory provision (section 66 of Hyderabad Contract Act) was allowed. The court cited this as an example of a contract void from inception where restitution was granted; used to support the proposition that void agreements may attract restitution.
Narayana Rao v. Ramachandra Rao, A.I.R. 1959 Andh. 370 Illustration where the amount alleged was unlawful gratification (hit by section 23), and therefore restitution under section 65 would not apply. The court distinguished this authority from the present facts, observing the instant case was not one of unlawful gratification and thus Narayana Rao did not help the appellant.
Kunwar Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swamp, (1925) 50 M.L.J. 629 : A.I.R. 1926 P.G. 1 Authority for the proposition that earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward and is forfeitable when the transaction fails due to the vendee's fault. The court accepted the general principle but examined the agreement to determine whether the money was intended as deposit/part-payment and whether forfeiture was intended or permissible under the facts.
Venkoba Char v. Kuri Sanjisappa, A.I.R. 1937 Mad. 681 Held that forfeiture of earnest money may be treated as penal if the earnest money is a disproportionate part of the purchase price; proportionality is decisive. The court applied the principle to assess whether Rs. 10,000 (about one-eighth of Rs. 86,000) was disproportionate; it concluded the amount was not disproportionate and thus not per se penal, though on facts forfeiture was not established.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the arguments in stages, applying textual analysis of the agreement, statutory provisions and cited authorities strictly as recorded in the opinion.

  1. On the appellate contention that the trial court could not decree recovery after deciding issues 1–3 in the defendant's favour, the court explained that if the defendant's own version, adopted by the trial court, still entitles the plaintiff to relief, the court is justified in granting it. The decisive question is whether, on the defendant's version, the plaintiff has a right to relief.
  2. Construction of the agreement: the court examined the Urdu agreement and its accepted English translation. The document expressly states "the vendee being a minor this contract has been entered into with his father ... and his mother" and "the guardians of the vendee have agreed to pay the balance". On that textual basis the court concluded the agreement was executed on behalf of the minor by his father and mother acting as guardians, rejecting the appellant's contention that an explicit formula beyond these words was necessary to show guardianship.
  3. Source of the Rs. 10,000: the court noted the Rs. 10,000 had been advanced after an application to the Court of Wards by the mother and a petition by Khaja Kamaluddin that some deposit be made over to his wife; the court considered these facts inconsistent with a pure personal transaction by the parents and supported the view that the money related to the minor's interests.
  4. Illegality argument: although the defence did not plead illegality, the court permitted the appellant to raise the legal point because it was a pure question of law. The court analysed section 23 of the Contract Act (agreements unlawful if forbidden by law, fraudulent, against public policy, etc.) and provisions of Mulla's Mohammadan Law (referred to as section 365) concerning the powers of a de facto guardian.
  5. The court rejected the submission that the agreement was unlawful or void merely because guardians entered into it. The court observed that section 365 (as cited) concerns competency but does not in terms prohibit a guardian from entering into an agreement; in the absence of a prohibition the agreement could not be held unlawful on that ground alone. The Thasi Muthukannu authority (involving immoral consideration) was distinguished because the present agreement did not involve immoral consideration.
  6. Applicability of section 65 of the Contract Act: the appellant argued section 65 applies only where a contract becomes void (and not where it is void ab initio). The court referred to Privy Council authority (Harnath Kuar v. Indar Bahadur) and concluded that "an agreement discovered to be void" includes agreements void from the inception; accordingly section 65 applies and restitution is available where an agreement is void ab initio. The court found support in Sivaramakrishnayya and related authorities.
  7. Consequence on present facts: the court concluded that the guardians' agreement was void ab initio (for reasons of incapacity under governing personal-law rules as interpreted), and therefore the defendant who had received Rs. 10,000 was liable to repay it under section 65. The trial court's decree in favour of the plaintiff was thus sustained on this ground.
  8. Forfeiture contention: the court analysed whether the Rs. 10,000 was "bayana" (earnest money) and whether the defendant could forfeit it on account of default by Khaja Kamaluddin. The court applied the "golden rule of intention", focusing on the document: total price Rs. 86,000, Rs. 10,000 paid up front with balance to be paid later; payment of one-eighth suggested part-payment/security rather than a mere nominal deposit.
  9. The court further noted the absence of any written forfeiture clause and the inconsistency of the defendant's oral testimony (he did not put a forfeiture clause in the written agreement or receipt though he authored them). The defendant's later explanation — that the Court of Wards being an intermediary made forfeiture unnecessary — contradicted the claimed oral understanding. The court found the defendant's evidence inadequate to establish a contractual right to forfeit.
  10. Even considering proportionality: the court accepted the principle from Venkoba Char that forfeiture may be penal if the earnest money is disproportionately large. It observed that Rs. 10,000 on a price of Rs. 86,000 (slightly more than one-eighth) was not disproportionate and could not be regarded as penal per se; despite that, on the facts and the guardian-invalidity point, forfeiture was not made out.
  11. Costs: the court refused the appellant's request to deprive the successful plaintiff of costs; costs normally follow the result and the circumstances did not justify withholding costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The court affirmed the trial court's decree and dismissed the appeal with costs. The defendant was held liable to repay the Rs. 10,000 received.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellant's appeal fails; the trial court decree for recovery of Rs. 10,000 in favour of the minor (through his guardian) is sustained and the appellant must repay that sum and bear costs.
  • Broader precedent: The court relied on established authorities (including Privy Council decisions and appellate cases) to apply section 65 of the Contract Act to agreements void ab initio and to distinguish cases involving immoral or unlawful consideration; the opinion does not purport to establish a novel legal principle beyond the application and clarification of those authorities on the facts. The opinion does not state that it sets any new legal precedent beyond these applications.

    Mohamed Amir Ali Khan v. Khaja Jamaluddin, Minor, By Mother And Guardian Aziz Khatoon

    Manohar Pershad, J.:-

    (1) O. S. No. 2/1 of 1953 - 54, out of which this first appeal ore behalf of the defendant arises, was instituted by the respondent herein, a minor, through his guardian aziz khatoon, the mother, for recovery of a sum of (o. S.) rs. 10,000, alleging that the defendant who was his distant relative was in need of money and in that connection approached his mother and represented to her that her husband, khaja kamaluddin, jagirdar, was addicted to drinking, due to which it was difficult to obtain the amount of the jagir deposited in the court of wards and if she proposed to the court of wards that she wanted to purchase a house in the name of her son, she would be able to get the amount lying in deposit there and on that pretext he proposed to sell his house together with the garden (khana bagh) bearing no. 678 at new malakpet, chanchalguda, hyderabad, in consideration of rs. 86,000 (o. S.) after obtaining a sum of rs. 10,000 by way of loan and executiag an agreement of sale dated 13th may, 1950. It is the further case of the plaintiff that the defendant promised that he would obtain the amount from the court of wards through his influence, and although the plaintiff had neither any property nor could afford to purchase a house on payment of such a large sum, nor was the defendant's house so valuable, the defendant obtained the money from him fraudulently, and in spite of repeated demands, the defendant had failed to pay the amount.

    (2) The defendant, in his written statement, while admitting having executed the agreement to sell, stated that the agreement was with khaja kamaluddin, the father of the plaintiff, who paid the earnest money under the terms of the agreement and that according to the agreement, khaja kamaluddin was bound to pay the balance of the said consideration amount within two months and get the bungalow registered in his favour and obtain possession of the same, but as he did not abide by his promise, the earnest money lapsed. He inter alia denied that the amount of rs. 10,000 was paid to him by way of loan and stated that that was paid as earnest money of the sale agreement. Legal objection was also taken that unless all the heirs of the deceased jagirdar are co - plaintiffs the suit could not proceed. In the rejoinder, the plaintiff denied the allegations of the defendant and stated that even if there was any agreement of sale, the same could not bind him as it was not beneficial to him. He also alleged that there could not be any case of the lapse of earnest money.

    (3) On these averments in the pleadings, the trial court framed the following seven issues : 1. Whether, as alleged in the plaint, the defendant borrowed rs. 10,000 from the plaintiff and described it as earnest money for the purchase of his bungalow ? 2. Whether the agreement, dated 13th may, 1950 was executed by the defendant only for show in order to enable the plaintiff to secure money from the court of wards ? 3. Whether the plaintiff can be allowed to adduce evidence to contradict the terms of the written agreement ? 4. Whether the name of the minor was entered in the agreement as ' benami' and the amount of rs. 10,000 belonged to the deceased khaja kamaluddin? if so, what is the effect of not impleading other heirs of the deceased in this suit ? 5. Can the minor be allowed to repudiate the contract. If so, what is its effect on the suite 6. Is the suit maintainable ? 7. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ? evidence was led by the parties, both documentary and oral. On the evidence produced, the learned trial judge found issues 1, 2 end 3 against the plaintiff and issues 4" 5 and 6 to 7 in his favour. In the result, the learned judge decreed the suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, the defendant has come up in appeal.

    (4) The contention of sri sadasiva rao, the learned counsel for the appellant, is that, when the lower court decided issues 1 to 3 in favour of the appellant, the suit of the respondent for the return of the earnest money could not have been decreed. We do not find any force in this argument. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff came out with the allegations that the amount of rs. 10,000 was advanced to the defendant - appellant by way of loan. The appellant denied that the amount was advanced to him by way of loan and alleged that it was paid to him by way of earnest money. The court below accepted the version of the defendant and rejected the plea of the plaintiff that the amount advanced was by way of loan. When the defendant himself, in order to defeat the claim of the plaintiff, came forward with certain version and the court believed that version, and if on that version the plaintiff - respondent is entitled to relief, the court would be justified in granting such a relief and there cannot be any objection by the defendant. The only question that would arise is whether as per the version of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to any relief.

    (5) It is next contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if the version of the defendant - appellant is accepted, in the absence of any mention in the agreement to sell that the contract was on behalf of the minor, acting as guardian, the lower court was not justified in holding that the agreement to sell was not in his individual capacity, but as guardian acting for the minor. In order to appreciate the contention, we have first to refer to the agreement of sale. The said agreement is in urdu but the english translation of the same given by the appellant is accepted to be true by the other side also. It reads :

    "i, mohd. Amir ali khan, h. C. S. , son of late mohd. Sardar khan yahiazi, resident or chenchalguda, hyderabad, do hereby of my own accord and free will, execute this deed of agreement, to the effect that i will sell my bungalow with the khana bagh bearing no. 687 and which was constructed on extent of land measuring 5,700 square yards and situate at new malakpet, chenchalguda road, to nawab khaja kamaluddin, son of nawab khaja kamaluddin khan. The vendee being a minor, this contract has been entered into with his father nawab khaja kamaluddin and his mother azeez khatoon. The sale consideration has been fixed at rs. 86,000. From out of the sale consideration, a sum of rs. 10,000 has been received towards earnest money for which a separate receipt has been executed. The guardians of the vendee have agreed to pay the balance of the sale consideration within a period of two months. After the receipt of the balance of rs. 76,000 the sale deed will be got registered and possession of the bungalow and the khana bagh will also be delivered at that time. (sd.) mohd. Amir ali khan. 25th rajjab, 1369 - h - 13th may, 1950."

    (6) The court below, on a reading of the document, has come to the conclusion that this is an agreement executed by khaja kamaluddin and aziz khatoon as guardians for the minor khaja jamaluddin. In other words, the court below has held that this document was executed on behalf of the minor by the guardians. The contention of sri sadasiva rao, as stated earlier, is that, if the document was intended to be executed on behalf of the minor, there would have been a mention of the same in it, and in the absence of it, that it is on behalf of the minor, it has to be taken that it was in their individual capacity. We are not prepared to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The document has been executed in favour of the minor. The mention of the words, " the vendee being a minor this agreement has been entered into with his father nawab khaja kamaluddin and his mother azeez khatoon " and " the guardians of the vendee have agreed to pay the balance of the sale consideration within a period of two months " is clear to show that this agreement is one on behalf of the minor by the father and the mother acting as his guardian. If, as is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that this agreement was not on behalf of the minor but by the father and the mother, acting in their individual capacity we cannot understand why they should have said that the vendee being a minor this contract was entered into by them. They could have instead said that this property was purchased for their son khaja jamaluddin by them and they have agreed to pay the balance of the sale consideration. Relying on the fact that the amount of rs. 10,000 paid to the defendant - appellant was the amount of nawab khaja kamaluddin lying in deposit in the court of wards, it is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that when the amount belonged to the father of the plaintiff and the plaintiff had no share in it, that would go to show that nawab khaja kamaluddin khan wanted to purchase a house in the name of his son after entering into an agreement in his individual capacity. This argument is equally devoid of force. It is no doubt true that the amount of rs. 10,000 paid to the appellant was the amount lying in deposit in the court of wards in the name of khaja kamaluddin, plaintiff's father. But it may be noted that when aziz khatoon, the mother, applied to the court of wards that since her husband was addicted to drink and spending money extravagantly she wanted to make some provision for her children and thus wanted to purchase a house, khaja kamaluddin khan filed a petition in the court of wards to the effect that he had no objection if rs. 40,000 were made over to his wife. It also appears that it was only after this that rs. 10,000 were advanced to khaja kamaluddin khan for the purchase of the house. When khaja kamaluddin had already agreed to give a portion of the amount lying in deposit to his children and wife, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the amount belonged to kamaluddin and he alone paid the earnest money loses its importance.

    (7) It is next "urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is held that the agreement of sale was on behalf of the minor, it being an illegal agreement prohibited by the personal law, was not enforceable. In this connection, the learned counsel relied on section 23 of the contract act, section 365 of mulla's mohammadan law, and the case of thasi muthukannu and others v. Shunmgavelu pillai, (1905) i. L. R. 28 mad. 413 :15 m. L. J. 286.

    (8) We may at the outset point out that this plea that the document was not enforceable as it was an illegal contract was not taken in the written statement and no issue has been framed to that effect. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that, since it is a legal point and goes to the very root of the case, he is entitled to take such a plea. As the point raised was a pure question of law, we allowed the learned counsel to raise it. But we do not find any merit in it. Section 23 of the contract act is in the following words : the consideration or object of an agreement is lawful, unless - it is forbidden by law ; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law ; or is fraudulent ; or involvel or implies injury to the person or property of another ; or the court regards it as immoral or oppoesd to public policy. In each of these cases, the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful. Every agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. " section 364, mulla's mohammadan law, enjoins : "a de facto guardian has no power to transfer any right or interest in the immovable property of the minor. Such a transfer is not merely voidable, but void. " thus, it is clear that under section 23 of the contract act, if any agreement or contract is entered into between the parties, which is forbidden by law, or is of such a nature, that if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law or is fraudulent or involves or implies injury to person or property of another or the court regards it as immoral and opposed to public policy, such an agreement being unlawful would be void.

    (9) The contention of sri sadasiva rao is that, under the personal law, khaja kamaluddin was forbidden to enter into any agreement of purchase on behalf of his minor son and any agreement or contract entered into by him would not only be unlawful but void. We are not prepared to agree with his contention. Under the codified criminal law, acts forbidden by law seem practically to consist of acts punishable under the penal code and all acts prohibited by special legislation or by regulation or orders made under authority derived from the legislature. Section 365, of mulla's mohammadan law, on which great stress is laid, only refers to the competency of the guardian and does not prohibit him from entering into an agreement. When there is no prohibition, we cannot understand how it can be urged that the agreement in question being forbidden by law, it is unlawful and void.

    (10) The case of thasi muthukannu and others v. Shanmugavelu filial, (1905) i. L. R. 28 mad. 413 : 15 m. L. J. 286. Does not help the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant, for that was a case where the agreement was for immoral consideration. That being so, it would be hit by section 23 of the contract act. The present agreement is not one of that type.

    (11) It is next urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is held that the agreement to sell executed by the guardians was not unlawful still the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover the amount of rs. 10,000 under section 65 of the contract act, for that section does not apply to contracts which are void ab initio but to such contracts which are discovered to be void. Reliance was placed on the case of narayana rao v. Ramachandra rao, a. I. R. 1959 andh. 370. And sivaramakrishnayya v. Venkata narahari rao, (1959) 2 an. W. R. 241. We do not agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Section 65 of the contract act, which refers to the liability of the person receiving the consideration to repay the same, when that agreement is discovered to be void, reads thus :

    "when an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to restore it or to make compensation for it, to the person from whom he received it."

    (12) The learned counsel for the appellant lays great stress on the words " when an agreement is discovered to be void or when a contract becomes void " and contends that these words clearly show that it does not apply to a contract, which is void ab initio. We are not prepared to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. Their lordships of the privy council, while considering the scope of section 65 of the contract act, in the case of harnath kuar v. Indar bahadur, (1922) 44 m. L. J. 489 : l. R. 50 la. 69 : a. I. R. 1922 p. C. 403. Have held that an agreement discovered to be void includes agreements void from the inception. We are also of the same view. Section 65 deals with agreements and contracts. The distinction between agreements and contracts is apparent from section 2, clauses (e) and (h) ; by clause (e) every promise and every set of promises, forming the consideration for each other, is an agreement and by clause (h) an agreement enforceable by law is a contract. It follows, therefore, that section 65 deals with agreements enforceable by law and with agreements not so enforceable. Section 2 (g) enjoins that, if an agreement is not enforceable by law it is said to be void. It would appear, therefore, that an agreement discovered to be void is one discovered to be not enforceable by law and on the language of the section would include an agreement that waslvoid in that sense from its inception as distinct from a contract that becomes void. The agreement in question was manifestly void from its inception and it cannot be said that it became void, because its subject - matter was incapable of being bound in the manner stipulated.

    (13) The case of sivaramakrishnayya v. Venkata narahari rao does not help the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. On the other hand, it supports our view that section 65 of the contract act applies to contracts which are void db inttio. This was a case of sale of paddy. Under the ordinances in force in the state of madras, known as madras foodgrains procurement order, 1947 and the madras foodgrains (intensive) procurement order, 1948, sale of foodgrains was only permitted to persons holding licence. The first defendant, to whom 106 bags of paddy were sold, had no licence. The plaintiff, who sold the paddy, was unaware of his disability. The court foundlthat the contract was unenforceable. As a result of that finding the trial court gave a decree to the plaintiff for the recovery of the value of paddy. That judgment was affirmed on appeal by the subordinate judge and ultimately by this court in second appeal. In this case reliance was placed on the judgment of a full bench (five judges) of the erstwhile hyderabad high court in budhulal v. Deccan banking co. , a. I. R. 1955 hyd. 69. That was a case where the banking company had laid an action on the basis of a promissory note executed in its favour of a stated sum. The defendant, in the written statement, while admitting the execution of the promissory note, among other things, raised an objection that inasmuch as the promissory note, was payable to bearer, it contravened section 15 of the hyderabad paper currency act. Section 15 of the hy erabad paper currency act, corresponding to section 32 of the reserve bank of india act, declared that the making of an instrument in contravention of the provisions of section 15 was an offence punishable with a fine equal to the amount of the bill, hundi, note or engagement in respect whereof the offence was committed. Section 15, hyderabad paper currency act, enacted :

    "no person in h. E. H. The nizam's dominions shall draw, accept, make or issue any bill of exchange, hundi, promissory note or engagement for the payment of money payable to bearer on demand,, or borrow, lend or take up any sum or sums of money or any such bill of exchange, hundi, promissory note or engagement."
    having regard to these provisions, it was held by the full bench that the promissory note was invalid. After holding thus, the learned judges thought that by reason of section 66 of the hyderabad contract act, corresponding to section 65 of the indian contract act, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the amount advanced under the promissory note. The case of budhulal1 was one where the contract was void from the very inception.

    (14) The case of narayana rao v. Ramachandra rao, a. I. R. 1959 andh. 370. Was a case where the amount of rs. 10,000 alleged to be due on a promissory note was found as amount payable by way of reward and that being unlawful gratification, was hit by section 23 of the contract act. The instant case is not one of that type. We are therefore clear that since the agreement in the instant case was void ab initio, the defendant who received rs. 10. 000 from the plaintiff's parents was liable to repay the amount to the plaintiff. In this view of the matter, we agree with the trial court.

    (15) It is further urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that even if it is held that section 65 of the contract act was applicable and under that provision the defendant is liable to repay the amount, since the amount paid was by way of earnest money and nawab kamaluddin khan committed default in not paying the balance of the purchase money within two months of the contract, that amount lapsed and the defendant was justified in forfeitting the same. On behalf of the other side, it is contended by sri vaidya that the word " bayana " used in the agreement does not only mean " earnest money " but also means money paid by way of deposit. It is next urged that even if it is taken that the word " bajana " means " earnest money ", parties never intended that the earnest money would be forfeited in case of default, as they never doubted about the matter going through and for that they did not treat rs. 10,000 as security or guarantee for the completion of the contract, and so it was not inserted in the agreement. It is not denied, by the learned counsel for the plaintiff - respondent that if the word " bayana " is taken to mean " earnest money ", then the defendant has the right to forfeit the same on default of the purchaser to complete the sale transaction, for, earnest money is part of the purchase price when the transaction goes forward. It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the fault or failure of the vendee. "we may in this connection refer to kunwar chiranjit singh v. Har swamp, (1925) 50 m. L. J. 629:a. I. R. 1926 p. G. 1. We have therefore first to see whether the word " bay ana " means only earnest money or it means also deposit. In order therefore to see whether it is a deposit or earnest money, courts have always applied the golden rule of intention, which has to be gathered from the document itself. In the agreement of sale, the sale consideration is shown as rs. 86,000. Out of this, rs. 10,000 have been paid and there is a further recital that on payment of the remaining amount of sale money of rs. 76,000 the sale deed would be registered and possession will be given of the house and khana bagh. The payment of 1/8th of the purchase money is clear to show that the intention of the parties was that the amount was deposited being security for and part - payment of the sale transaction. Even if we take it that the amount of rs. 10,000 mentioned in the agreement of sale was the earnest money, the question of forfeiture does not arise, firstly for the reason that the agreement to sell is one by the guardians and that being unenforceable in law ; and secondly, there is a differing version of the defendant relating to the forfeiture clause. As stated earlier, there is no mention of any forfeiture in case of default in the agreement. The defendant, in his written statement, only states that the earnest money lapsed and does not refer to any oral agreement, whereas in his oral testimony has come forward with the version that there was an undertaking between the parties that earnest money shall be forfeited in case of default. If as stated by the defendant, that there was such an understanding between the parties, we fail to understand why the defendant, who is the writer of the agreement and the receipt, would fail to make a mention of the same in those documents. The defendant has tried to explain the omission by saying that since the court of wards was an intermediary and there was no risk of default apparently involved and it was thought that the contract was honoured by both the parties, this was not mentioned in the agreement. The contention of sri vaidya is that, this very explanation of the defendant is sufficient to come to the conclusion that parties never intended that the earnest money would be forfeited in case of default. We find sufficient force in the contention of sri vaidya.

    (16) When the defendant himself says that he was confident that the contract would go through as the court of wards was the intermediary and. There was no risk of default, we cannot understand why there should be a talk of forfeiture of the earnest money, that apart, we may point out that the defendant knew full well that the property was to be purchased from the amount of the deposit, which kamaluddin khan had with the court of wards and subsequently it was found that there was no sufficient funds for the purchase of the house, as such, the question of forfeiture does not arise. Yet another argument was advanced by sri vaidya, the learned counsel for the plaintiff, relying on the case of venkoba char v. Kuri sanjisappa, a. I. R. 1937 mad. 681. That rs. 10,000 being a heavy amount, forfeiture of the same would be in the nature of penalty aad no court would allow the defendant to retain the whole of the amount. The question whether forfeiture of the earnest money by the defaulting purchaser is penalty or not would depend on the fact as to what is the proportion between that amount and the purchase money. Of course, if the earnest money constitutes a large part of the price, stipulation for its forfeiture would be in the nature of a penalty, as observed by venkataramana rao, j. In venkoba char v. Kuri sanjivappa. But if the amount deposited bears a small reasonable proportion to the price and there is no such disproportion and nothing unreasonable, that stipulation cannot be treated as penal, as observed in that very case, relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In the light of the above principles, if we were to refer to the agreement in question, we find that the purchase price is rs. 86,000 and a sum of rs. 10,000 has been paid by way of deposit or earnest money, which is a little more than the 1/8th. The amount of rs. 10. 000 cannot be said to be disproportionate to the purchase price, so as to hold that the stipulation was penal. We are therefore - clear that the defendant has not made out a case for entitling him to forfeit the amount of deposit and retain the same. Sri sadasiva rao, the learned counsel for the appellant made a last request that in case this court is of the view that the defendant has not made out a case for the forfeiture of the amount, at least, he should not be clubbed with costs. We are not prepared to accept the request of the learned counsel for the appellant. Costs normally follow the result. The circumstances of the case discussed above, in our opinion, do not justify non - awarding of costs to the plaintiff. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal dismissed.

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