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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant is a decree-holder seeking to execute a decree obtained on 19th July, 1921, in suit No. 236 of 1921 before the First Class Subordinate Judge, Bijapur, against defendants 1 and 2. The decree, based on an award, ordered payment of a money sum by instalments, with a provision that default in two instalments would render the entire amount immediately recoverable. Two instalment defaults occurred, making the whole amount payable on 1st May 1923. Since then, five execution applications (darkhasts) have been filed, the present being the fifth (No. 383 of 1939, filed 29th May 1939). Earlier darkhasts were filed and disposed of between 1924 and 1939.

The principal procedural question was whether the present darkhast was barred by limitation under Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), with limitation running from 1st May 1923. The decree-holder contended entitlement to exclude certain periods from the limitation calculation under Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and specific provisions of the CPC. The trial court rejected these contentions, leading to the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the periods during which execution was partially or wholly stayed by various courts can be excluded from the period of limitation under Section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1908, when computing limitation under Section 48 of the CPC.
  2. Whether partial stays of execution, affecting only a portion of the property, qualify as a "stay of execution" sufficient to exclude the period under Section 15 of the Limitation Act.
  3. Whether the pendency of the fourth darkhast before the Collector can be excluded from limitation under subparagraphs (1) and (3) of paragraph 11 of Schedule 3 of the CPC.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant sought exclusion of two aggregate periods totaling about four and a half years from limitation: approximately two and a half years during which execution was stayed by the Muddebihal Court and the Joint Subordinate Judge at Bijapur, and about two years during which the fourth darkhast was pending before the Collector.
  • Reliance was placed on Section 15 of the Limitation Act, which excludes from limitation the time during which execution is stayed by injunction or order, and on judicial precedents including 45 Bom. L.R. 234, 38 Bom. 153, 34 ALL. 436, and 33 Cal. 689 to support the proposition that partial stays or stays affecting a major part of the property suffice for exclusion.
  • It was contended that a stay affecting a substantial portion of the property effectively operates as a stay of the entire execution, thus justifying exclusion of the relevant periods from limitation.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents argued that partial stays affecting only fractions of the property do not amount to a complete stay of execution and thus do not qualify for exclusion under Section 15 of the Limitation Act.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in A.I.R 1940 Lah. 75 and 17 Cal. 268, which held that Section 15 applies only to absolute stays of execution and not to limited or partial stays.
  • They contended that since the decree-holder could have proceeded against the unaffected portions of the property, the limitation period could not be extended by excluding the partial stay periods.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
45 Bom. L.R. 234 Section 15 of the Limitation Act excludes time during which execution is stayed by injunction or order from limitation calculation. Confirmed that Section 15 controls Section 48 of the CPC regarding limitation in execution applications.
38 Bom. 153 Partial stay of execution may save limitation for execution of decree as a whole. Distinguished by the court as not good law in view of later Privy Council decisions.
34 ALL. 436 Stay of sale of attached property justifies exclusion of that period from limitation even if other properties are available for execution. Held not applicable as the present case involved stays on portions of the same property, not alternative properties.
33 Cal. 689 Execution application postponed due to injunction on part of property treated as continuation of former application, saving limitation. Held inapplicable due to lack of evidence that stay on part of property effectively prevented execution on remainder.
A.I.R 1940 Lah. 75 Section 15 applies only to absolute stays, not partial or limited stays of execution. Relied upon to hold that partial stays do not justify exclusion of limitation periods.
17 Cal. 268 Distinguished; concerned continuation of execution application and steps-in-aid of execution. Not regarded as authority on partial stay exclusion under Section 15.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed whether the periods during which execution was stayed partially or wholly could be excluded from limitation under Section 15 of the Limitation Act. It noted that Section 15 excludes only periods of absolute stay of execution, i.e., when the decree-holder is incapable of executing the decree in any manner.

The court examined the stay orders affecting four-fifths and three-fifths of the property and held that these were partial stays, not absolute stays. Since the decree-holder could have executed the decree against the unaffected portions of the property, these stays did not constitute a complete stay under Section 15.

The court considered the appellant's reliance on precedents that suggested partial stays could justify exclusion but found them either inapplicable or overruled by later authoritative decisions, including the Privy Council ruling cited in the notes to Section 15.

Regarding the period during which the fourth darkhast was pending before the Collector, the court deemed it unnecessary to decide on its exclusion because even if accepted, the aggregate excluded period would not meet the required four years and one month to render the present darkhast timely.

Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's decision rejecting the appellant's contention that the present execution application was within time.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED WITH COSTS

The court held that partial stays of execution affecting only portions of the property do not qualify as absolute stays under Section 15 of the Limitation Act and thus cannot be excluded from the limitation period under Section 48 of the CPC. The appellant's present execution application was therefore time-barred. The decision directly affects the parties by upholding the dismissal of the execution application and does not establish any new precedent beyond reaffirming the principle that only absolute stays exclude time for limitation purposes.

    Virchand Kapur Chand v. Marualappa And Another S 2 And 3.

    Sen, J.:— The appellant is a decree-holder who is seeking to execute a decree obtained by him on 19th July, 1921, in suit No. 236 of 1921 in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge, Bijapur, against defendants 1 and 2. It was a decree for money and was passed in terms of an award. It made the decretal amount payable by instalments and directed that in default of payment of two instalments the whole amount should become recoverable at once. Two defaults in the payment of instalments were committed so that the whole amount became payable on 1st May 1923. Thereafter five darkhasts have been filed, the present one being the fifth, darkhast No. 383 of 1939 filed on 29th May, 1939. The previous darkhasts were as under: Darkhast No. 106 of 1924 filed on 10th March, 1924, and disposed of on 26th June, 1928; darkhast No. 375 of 1929 filed on 7th August, 1929, and disposed of on 26th June, 1931; darkhast No. 753 of 1931 filed on 26th November, 1931, and disposed of on 10th April, 1934; and darkhast No. 490 of 1984 filed on llth July 1934, and disposed of on 19th January, 1939. When the present darkhast was filed the question arose whether it was time-barred under section 48 of the cpc, limitation having begun to run from 1st May 1923. The decree-holder submitted a statement purporting to show that he was entitled to exclude certain periods. Those periods he classified under four heads, two of which have now been relied on by the learned advocate for the appellant. The first comprises a period of about two and a half years, being the aggregate of the periods during which the first darkhast was wholly or partially stayed by the Muddebihal Court and the Court of the Joint Subordinate Judge at Bijapur. It is contended that these periods must be excluded when calculating the period of limitation under section 15 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the provisions of which would apply, as held in 45 Bom. L.R 2341. Item 2 is another period of about two years during which the fourth darkhast No. 490 of 1934, was pending before the Collector. It is contended that under subparas. (1) and (3) of para. 11 of sch. 3 of the CPC, this period also must be excluded. The learned trial Judge has held against the decree-holder on both these points.

    2. The darkhast was filed on 29th May, 1939, and as the period of 12 years from 1st May 1923, was over on 30th April, 1935, the decree-holder has to show that an aggregate period of four years and one month should be excluded from calculation. If, therefore, he succeeds in proving that he is entitled to two and a half years under one head and to two years under another head of his statement, Ex. 38, the present darkhast will be within time. In 45 Bom. L.R 234 it was held that the provisions of s. 48 of the Code are controlled by Section 15 of the Act, which provides that in computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit or application for the execution of a decree, the institution or execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order, the time of the continuance of the injunction or order shall be excluded. During the pendency of the darkhast no. 106 of 1924, there was an order of the Muddebihal Court made in civil suit no. 88 of 1925 staying execution, the order being passed on 23rd March, 1925, and finally withdrawn on 19th March, 1926. Again, during the pendency of the same darkhast there was an order of the Bijapur Court in civil suit no. 227 of 1925 staying execution to the extent of four-fifths of the property. That order appears to have been made at the instance of the sons of judgment-debtor 1. Again, during the pendency of the same darkhast there was an order made in civil suit No. 423 of 1926 staying execution to the extent of three-fifths of the property. That suit was also brought by certain sons of judgment-debtor 1. The period of the stay under the order in civil suit No. 227 of 1925 was from 22nd March, 1925, to 5th December, 1926, i.e, a period of one year, eight months and 12 days, and the period of the stay under the last order above mentioned was from 15th March, 1927, to 31st January 1928, a period of ten months and 16 days. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondents that of the three orders of stay the last two stayed not the whole of the pending execution but Brayed it only to a limited extent, viz., to the extent of four-fifths of the property in one case and three fifths of the property in the other, and that, therefore, it could not be said that in these cases the execution was stayed, that is, wholly stayed, which is what is meant by the expression “execution of which has been stayed by injunction or order” in section 15 of the Limitation Act.

    3. Mr. Madbhavi on behalf of the appellant contended that it was enough that execution was stayed with regard to a major part of the property affected, and he has relied on 38 Bom. 1532, 34 ALL. 4363 and 33 Cal. 6894 as supporting his argument. The first was a case in which on an application to execute a decree having been made against the defendant and her surety, the Court, on 30th November, 1908, held that the surety was liable only for costs and therefore, directed the execution to proceed as to a part of the decree. The surety appealed, and pending the appeal, the execution of the decree was stayed from 9th January to 18th February, 1909. Thereafter the decree-holder again applied to execute the decree. The lower Court held that the second application was barred by limitation, having been made more than three years after the date of the first application. It was held that the second application was within time, for the applicant was entitled to exclude the period during which the execution of the decree had been stayed in computing the period of limitation for the second application. In the judgment there is an observation made by Shah J. with reference to the view taken by the lower appellate Court that the order of the Court of first instance made on 30th November, 1908, directing execution to proceed as to a part of the decree related only to the recovery of costs and that deduction of time ought not to be made. Shah, J. observed that it was perfectly immaterial for the purposes of the point under consideration as to whether the order of 30th November, 1908, related only to a part of the decree, and that if the period during which the execution of the decree had been stayed was excluded, the application was clearly within time. On reference to the facts of this case it seems to be clear that what was stayed from 9th January to 18th February, 1909, was the execution of the whole decree and not any part of the decree. The order of 30th November, 1908, no doubt related only to the recovery of costs, but that did not alter the fact that the execution of the whole decree was stayed on the surety having appealed. It seems to us, therefore, that the observation of Shah, J. referred to above is not one which supports Mr. Madbhavi's contention in the present case.

    4. Mr. Madbhavi has next relied on 34 ALL. 436. There in execution of a decree certain property was attached by the decree-holder. An objection having been taken to the attachment, it was disallowed. This was followed by a declaratory suit against the decree-holder and an injunction was granted whereby the sale of the property was stayed. The suit terminated in June 1907, but the injunction lasted until January 1909. The next application for execution being made in April 1910, it was held that it was within time and that it was not relevant that the decree-holder might possibly have obtained execution of the decree against other properties of his judgment-debtor, i.e, those which were not the subject-matter of the injunction whereby the sale of the attached property had been stayed. The ratio of this case was that a decree-holder is not bound to search out and proceed against all the property of which his judgment-debtor would stand possessed: as there was a stay with regard to the property against which the decree-holder wanted to proceed, the benefit of such stay must go to the decree-holder. That principle, it seems to us, does not apply to the facts of the present case where the decree-holder wanted to proceed against certain property and execution was stayed with regard to four fifths or three-fifths of the same property; and there was no question of his searching out and proceeding against any other property.

    5. The third case, relied on by Mr. Madbhavi, was 33 Cal. 689. That was a case in which the holder of a mortgage decree having applied for sale of the mortgaged property, the judgment-debtor's son, claiming a portion of the property, filed a suit and obtained an injunction for stay of the sale of the share claimed. Thereafter, excluding the son's share the property was put up for sale, but there being no bid, the darkhast was dismissed. On the withdrawal of the suit by the judgment-debtor's son the decree-holder renewed his application for sale of the entire property. When the judgment-debtor objected that as regards a three-fourths share in the property, which had previously been put up for sale, the application was barred by limitation, it was held that the last application of the decree-holder must be treated as a continuation of his former application and that the execution was not, therefore, barred by limitation. There the decree-holder did make a real effort to sell the three-fourths share of the property which was not affected by the stay order, but the circumstances were such that nobody could be expected to buy the said property; and their Lordships observed (p. 692):

    “Thus although the injunction operated prima facie only to postpone the sale of a one-fourth share, it was effectual in preventing the decree-holder from selling the remaining share of the property and he was compelled to wait until the bar was removed before renewing the application, which had been virtually suspended in the meantime.”

    6. Mr. Madbhavi has relied on these remarks and contended that in the present case also the stay as regards a fraction of the property sought to be sold virtually operated as a stay with regard to the whole property. We do not think, in the absence of any evidence, that is the only conclusion which is warranted by the circumstances of this case. There is nothing to show that the decree-holder could not have proceeded against the fractional share in the property which was not affected by the stay order, and we are unable to hold that considerations similar to those which applied in 33 Cal. 689 would apply to the facts of the present case. In the notes under section 15 of the Limitation Act, by Chitaley, Edn. 2, under the heading “Partial Stay of Execution,” it is stated that the section contemplates an absolute stay of execution which renders the decree-holder incapable of taking out any execution of the decree, and it is pointed out, e.g that a stay of execution in one particular mode is not the stay of execution within the meaning of the section if it is open to the decree-holder to execute his decree in any other mode, and that an injunction restraining a decree-holder from executing the decree for the principal does not necessarily debar him from realising the interest. There is, however, a reference to some cases where it seems to have been held that a stay of execution of a part of the decree or as against a particular property will nevertheless save limitation for the execution of the decree as a whole (38 Bom. 153, 46 I.C 3995 and 64 I.C 5946) and it is remarked that in view of the decision of the Privy Council in 60 I.A 437 those decisions are not good law. The point relating to S. 15 that arose in the Privy Council case appears to have arisen from an order passed by a Court executing a decree to the effect that the decree-holders were to wait for some time for payment. That order was subsequently set aside having been in operation for about seven months. The appellants' contention was that the provision of section 15 of the Limitation Act, applied with respect to that period of seven months. That contention appears to have been conceded by the High Court, but their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the order that the appellants were to wait could not be in any sense “a stay of the execution by injunction or order.” It seems to us that the facts of that case can offer no guidance in the present case.

    7. Mr. Hungund on behalf of the respondents has relied on A.I.R 1940 Lah. 758 and 17 Cal. 2689. In the Lahore case it was held that if execution is not completely and absolutely stayed, S. 15 does not come into play. That was a case where the sale of a particular house attached in execution was stayed, and it was held that it was open to the decree-holder to have other properties of the judgment-debtors attached and also to take action for their arrest, and that hence the decree, holder could not claim the benefit of s. 15. Their Lordships relied on several cases including 48 Bom. 48510 as supporting their view. In that case Macleod, C.J observed that s. 15 only applies to an absolute stay, and not to such a limited stay as would be ordered by the notice under O. 21, R. 53(1)(b). The facts in that case were not similar to those in our present case, but the Lahore High Court was no doubt right in relying on the dictum referred to as supporting the view that it took as to the operation of section 15 of the Limitation Act. In the present case, therefore, it seems to us that it was open to the decree-holder to apply for execution against the share of judgment-debtor 1 which was one-fifth or of the two-fifths of the property which was not affected by the last stay order. 17 Cal. 268, which is also relied on by Mr. Hungund, does not appear to us to be a case in point. There two persons having obtained a decree, certain property belonging to the judgment-debtor was attached whereupon a claim was made to the attached property by third parties and a two-thirds share therein was released by the Court executing the decree. Thereafter the decree-holders instituted a suit for a declaration that the entire property was liable to be sold under their decree, and obtained a decree accordingly.

    8. The decree, however, was reversed by the first appellate Court which upheld the order releasing a two-thirds share of the property and that decree was affirmed by the High Court on appeal. Thereafter the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree in respect of the remaining one-third share. An objection having been raised that the application was time-barred, it was held that the last application was not a continuation of the original darkhast application, and that the institution of the suit by the decree-holders and the subsequent appeal to the High Court were not steps-in-aid of execution. It was remarked that the decree-holders had throughout been free to prosecute their application for execution against the one-third share which had not been affected by the order releasing a two-thirds share. The questions that arose in that case, however, were whether the last application was a continuation of the first application in execution and whether the institution by the decree-holders of their suit and the subsequent proceedings should be regarded as steps-in-aid of execution; and it seems to us, therefore, that this case cannot be regarded as an authority on the question now before us.

    9. With respect we hold that the decision in A.I.R 1940 Lah. 75 was correct, and that if the principle of that decision is accepted, it would not be possible to exclude the periods affected by the stay orders in civil suit no. 227 of 1925 and civil suit No. 423 of 1926, i.e, the decree-holder would not be entitled to exclude an aggregate period of over two years. That being so, it seems to us unnecessary to go into the merits regarding the period for which darkhast No. 490 of 1934 was pending before the Collector, because even if we were to decide on that point in favour of the appellant, the aggregate period which the appellant will be entitled to exclude would fall short of the period of four years and one month which must be excluded from calculation before the present darkhast can be found to be in time. We must, therefore, hold that the decision of the lower Court was correct, and the appeal will be dismissed with costs.

    10. Appeal dismissed.

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    Virchand Kapur Chand v. Marualappa And Another S 2 And 3.
    (Nov 19, 1943)