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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, a long‑standing sub‑agent for the firm Tarachand Ganshamdas selling kerosene for the Burma Oil Company in Ahmednagar, had for about 20 years sent hundis and cheques by ordinary post to the firm. On 24 October 1923 the plaintiff obtained from the defendant bankers a cheque for Rs. 3,000 payable to himself or order on the Bombay Provincial Co‑operative Bank; the cheque was not crossed at the plaintiff's request. The plaintiff endorsed the cheque in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas and, together with a hundi for Rs. 600, sent it by ordinary post by a letter dated 24 October 1923. The letter and enclosures did not reach Tarachand Ganshamdas. On 25 October the cheque, duly endorsed, was presented in Bombay to the Bombay Provincial Co‑operative Bank, which paid Rs. 3,000 in due course. When the plaintiff did not receive acknowledgment he sent reminders; the defendants declined to pay and the plaintiff brought this suit to recover Rs. 3,000, the amount of the cheque.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was a "delivery" of the cheque within the meaning of section 46 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when it was sent by ordinary post, and consequently whether the plaintiff had locus to sue.
  2. Whether the plaintiff was guilty of gross and culpable negligence by sending an uncrossed cheque through ordinary post.
  3. Whether section 85 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (protection to the drawee who pays in due course where a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee) protects the drawee (and/or drawer) when the payee has endorsed the cheque in favour of an indorsee whose signature may be not genuine.
  4. Whether the amendment made by Act V of 1914 (section 16(2) as added) — providing that provisions relating to a payee shall apply, with necessary modifications, to an indorsee — operates to make an indorsee equivalent to a payee for the purposes of section 85.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • There was no "delivery" within the meaning of section 46 of the Negotiable Instruments Act because the cheque was sent by post; accordingly the plaintiff retained such interest as enabled him to sue.
  • The plaintiff was not guilty of gross or culpable negligence by sending the cheque by ordinary post and without crossing it; long habit of sending cheques by post did not amount to an implied request or approval by Tarachand Ganshamdas.
  • Section 85 did not protect the drawee in this case because the cheque had been endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas (an indorsee) and the subsequent indorsee should not be treated as the "payee" for the purposes of section 85; the Act V of 1914 amendment did not intend to alter section 85 by implication.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The plaintiff was grossly and culpably negligent for sending an uncrossed cheque by ordinary post; and because the cheque had been endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas, the plaintiff had no remaining interest and thus lacked standing to sue.
  • Section 85 protects the drawee who pays in due course where a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee. Once the payee signs and makes the cheque payable to another, that other person becomes the "payee" within the meaning of section 85.
  • After Act V of 1914 added section 16(2) (stating that provisions relating to a payee apply, with necessary modifications, to an indorsee), wherever the Act mentions "payee" the word "indorsee" should be read in, and therefore section 85 protects the drawee (and the drawer) even if the signature of the indorsee is not genuine.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pennington v. Crossley and Sons That the mere fact cheques were sent from time to time by post in the ordinary course of business does not warrant inferring an implied request or approval by the payee to send cheques by post. The court relied on this decision to reject an inference that Tarachand Ganshamdas had impliedly requested or approved the plaintiff's practice of sending cheques and hundis by ordinary post, and therefore to find the plaintiff not negligent on that ground.
Sulleman Hussein v. The New Oriental Bank Corporation, Limited That protection under section 85 is not limited to the drawee but also applies to the drawer (binding authority for that proposition for the judge). The court treated this decision as binding and used it to support the conclusion that protection under section 85 extends beyond the drawee to the drawer as well, reinforcing dismissal of the plaintiff's claim against the defendants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through a sequence of statutory interpretation and fact‑based findings:

  1. Section 46 (delivery by post): The judge held that sending a cheque by ordinary post did not constitute "delivery" within the meaning of section 46 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. On that basis, the court found that the plaintiff retained such an interest as to make his suit maintainable: there was no effective delivery to Tarachand Ganshamdas by the act of posting.
  2. Negligence: The court rejected the defendants' contention that the plaintiff was guilty of gross and culpable negligence for sending an uncrossed cheque by post. The judge emphasized that there was no express or implied request from the firm to send cheques by ordinary post; the plaintiff's long practice of sending cheques and hundis by post did not create an implied authority or approval. The court relied on Pennington v. Crossley and Sons for the proposition that regular practice alone does not establish implied request or approval.
  3. Section 85 and identity of "payee" versus "indorsee": The court examined section 85, which discharges a drawee by payment in due course where a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee. The court noted the statutory definitions: section 7 defines "payee" as the person named in the instrument to whom or to whose order payment is directed; section 16 defines "indorsee" as a specified person to whom the indorser adds a direction to pay. Applying these definitions, the court held that an indorsee (here Tarachand Ganshamdas) is not the "payee" as defined in section 7.
  4. Effect of Act V of 1914 (section 16(2) amendment): The defendants relied on the amendment—“The provisions of this Act relating to a payee shall apply with the necessary modifications to an indorsee”—to argue that wherever the Act refers to a "payee" the "indorsee" should be read in and that section 85 therefore protects the drawee even in respect of an indorsee's signature. The court rejected the plaintiff's contention that the amending Act sought only to amend sections 13 and 16 and did not intend to affect section 85. The judge concluded that the amendment should be read as extending protections afforded regarding payees to indorsees with necessary modifications; thus section 85 applies to indorsees as well.
  5. Application to the facts and genuineness of signature: The court found the signature purporting to be that of Tarachand Ganshamdas to be not genuine on the evidence of a clerk (Vadilal Dayabhai). The signature of the indorsee was therefore false. Nonetheless, because section 85 (as read with the amendment) protects the drawee even if the indorsee's signature is not genuine, payment in due course by the third party operated as a discharge. The court also observed that estoppel under section 121 would apply in such circumstances but found it unnecessary to go into it in detail.
  6. Extension of protection to drawer: The court referred to Sulleman Hussein v. The New Oriental Bank Corporation, Limited as binding authority for the proposition that protection under section 85 is not confined to the drawee but extends to the drawer. The court held that the third party (who paid in due course) had paid according to the tenor of the cheque and in good faith and without negligence.

On this combined statutory and factual analysis the court concluded that section 85 furnished a complete defence to the plaintiff's suit despite the indorsee's signature being not genuine.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE SUIT IS DISMISSED WITH COSTS.

Implications (direct effect on the parties):

  • The plaintiff's action to recover Rs. 3,000 is dismissed; the plaintiff does not recover the cheque amount from the defendants.
  • The defendants (bankers) and the third party who paid the cheque in due course are protected under section 85, read with the amendment effected by Act V of 1914, even though the indorsee's signature was not genuine; the protection extends to the drawer as well (following the cited authority).

The opinion does not assert that it establishes a new precedent beyond its statutory interpretation and application to the facts; its decision rests on interpretation of sections 7, 16, 46 and 85 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (and the amendment by Act V of 1914) and on the cited authorities.

    Jugjivandas Jamnadas v. Nagar Central Bank. Ltd.

    Kajiji, J.:— The plaintiff carries on business as a sub-agent of the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas and sells kerosene oil of the Burma Oil Company in the district of Ahmednagar. The defendants are bankers doing business at Ahmednagar. It appears that the plaintiff had dealings for the last 20 years with the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas and in the course of such business the plaintiff used to send from time to time either hundis or cheques by ordinary post to Tarachand Ganshamdas. On October 24, 1923, the plaintiff took from the defendants a cheque for Rs. 3,000 payable to himself or order on the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank, and the cheque was not crossed at the plaintiff's request. The plain tiff endorsed the cheque in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas or order and it was sent, according to the evidence of the plaintiff, by ordinary post with a letter, dated October 24, 1923, along with a hundi, for Rs. 600 to Tarachand Ganshamdas. The letter with the enclosures, namely, the cheque and the hundi, did not reach Tarachand Ganshamdas; it ought ordinarily to have reached him on October 25, but on October 25, some person presented the cheque duly endorsed in the ordinary course of business to the Bombay Provincial Co-operative Bank in Bombay who in due course made the payment of Rs. 3,000. It appears that the plaintiff, as he did not get an acknowledgment of receipt of the cheque and hundi, sent reminders and, the defendants declining to pay, this suit is filed to recover from the defendants the sum of Rs. 3,000 the amount of the cheque.

    It is urged on behalf of the defendants that, as the plaintiff sent the cheque in a letter by ordinary post without the cheque being crossed, he was guilty of gross and culpable negligence and, as the cheque was endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas, the plaintiff had no interest left in Mm in the cheque and, therefore, this suit is not maintainable by the plaintiff and ought to have been filed by the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas. But in my opinion there is no delivery within the meaning of section 46 of the Negotiable Instruments Act simply because the cheque is sent by post and, therefore, on the issue whether the suit is maintainable or not, I must find in favour of the plaintiff and hold that there was no delivery within the meaning of section 46. It must also be mentioned that the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas has not given credit to the plaintiff for this amount and the practice has been to give credit only after the cheque is cashed or the moneys of the hundi are recovered and, therefore, the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas were perfectly justified in not giving credit to the plaintiff for the amount. I also hold that the plaintiff was not guilty of gross and culpable negligence as alleged by the defendants simply because he sent the cheque by ordinary post and without it being crossed. There is not the slightest doubt that there was no express or implied request from the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas to the plaintiff to send cheques or hundis by ordinary post. Because the plaintiff for the last 20 years was in the habit of sending cheques and hundis by post, it cannot be inferred that there was an implied request by or that Messrs. Tarachand Ganshamdas approved of the mode of sending cheques or hundis by ordinary post. It is clear from the decision in Pennington v. Crossley and Sons that from the mere fact that cheques were sent from time to time by post in the ordinary course of business it cannot be inferred that there was any implied request from the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas to the plaintiff to send cheques by post.

    The real defence to this suit is that under section 85 of the Negotiable Instruments Act protection is given to the drawee if a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee and if the drawee makes the payment in due course. Section 85 is in these terras:— “Where a cheque payable to order purports to be endorsed by or on behalf of the payee, the drawee is discharged by payment in due course.” The cheque in suit (Exhibit A) was made payable by the defendants to the plaintiff Jugjiwandas Jamnadas or order. Jugjiwandas Jamnadas endorsed it before sending the cheque by post to Tarachand Ganshamdas as follows:—“Please pay to Tarachand Ganshamdas or order” and signed his name. It is not disputed that the endorsement of the payee, namely, Jugjiwandas Jamnadas is genuine. If the cheque, Exhibit A, had not been endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas and had only borne the endorsement of the payee whether genuine or not there is not the slightest doubt that section 85 of the Negotiable Instruments Act gave complete protection to the drawee. But it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that as in this case the cheque was endorsed in favour of Tarachand Ganshamdas section 85 gave no protection to the drawee or drawer. But it is contended on behalf of the defendants that once the payee signs his name and makes it payable to some other person, that other person becomes the payee within the meaning of section 85. In my opinion that contention is absolutely untenable, for section 7 of the Act itself defines payee as the person named in the instrument to whom or to whose order the money is by the instrument directed to be paid. So in Exhibit A the payee is Jugjiwandas Jamnadas and, therefore, if Jugjiwandas Jamnadas endorsed it in favour of somebody else, and in this case to Tarachand Ganshamdas, then that person cannot be the payeee within the meaning of this definition. Further the word “indorsee” is also defined by section 16 and it is as follows:— “………. if he [sc. the indorser] adds a direction to pay the amount mentioned in the instrument to, or to the order of, a specified person the person so specified is called the indorsee of the instrument.” Therefore, Tarachand Ganshamdas is the endorsee and not the payee and the first contention of the plaintiff that the subsequent indorsee becomes the payee within the meaning of section 85 of the Negotiable Instruments. Act is untenable.

    But it is urged on behalf of the defendant that by Act V of 1914, section 16(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been amended by adding the words:—“The provisions of this Act relating to a payee shall apply with the necessary modifications to an indorsee”, and therefore, wherever the word “payee” occurs in the Act, the word “indorsee” must also be included and section 85 would, therefore, read:— “Where a cheque payable to order purports to be indorsed by or on behalf of the payee (i.e, indorsee also) the drawee is discharged by payment in due course.” If that contention is correct, that is a complete answer to the suit. But it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that section 16 under the amending Act V of 1914 purported only to make the amendments to two sections, viz., sections 13 and 16 for as the preamble states there were some doubts as to the validity of making endorsements in negotiable instruments in certain forms and, therefore, it was thought fit to amend both sections, viz., 1.3 and 16 only and to limit its operation to these two sections, and that it was never intended to amend section 85 by implication. It is further urged on behalf of the plaintiff that if it was intended to make such a change in section 85 the easiest way would have been by adding the word “or indorsee” in section 85 or adding a note to section 85. In my opinion the two contentions of the plaintiff that the words “This Act” in section 16, clause 2, do not mean Negotiable Instruments Act and that Act V of 1914 limited its operation to sections 13 and 16 only are both untenable. When a general provision has got to be made it is usual in the Amending Act to say that the provisions relating to a payee shall apply with the necessary modifications to an “indorsee”. In my opinion section 16(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act which is added by Act V of 1914 certainly gives protection under section 85 to the drawee in the case of an indorsee also if the signature of the indorsee is not genuine. The signature of the indorsee in this case is no doubt a false one. It is true that the evidence of Goculdas Chabildas, a moonim in the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas, does not and cannot carry much weight and is not of much value, for, though he has been in their service for a long time yet as he does not know how to read or write English, his statement that the endorsement of Tarachand Ganshamdas is not by any authorised man is useless. One Vadilal Dayabhai, a clerk in the firm of Tarachand Ganshamdas, has sworn that the endorsed signature “Tarachand Ganshamdas” on the cheque, Exhibit A, is not the genuine signature of Tarachand Ganshamdas or his son, Ramprasad, who is also authorised to sign cheques. I, therefore, hold that that signature is not a genuine one. It is urged by the defendants that Ramprasad who is in Bombay has not been called, but I do not think his evidence would have carried the case any further. In my opinion section 85 is a complete answer to the plaintiff even if the signature of the indorsee is not genuine. I cannot understand why, if the Legislature gave protection to the drawee in the case of the signature of the payee not being genuine, the same protection should not be extended to the case of the signature of the indorsee. When the drawee is protected even if the signature of the payee is not genuine, I think the Legislature by Act V of 1914 extended that protection to the indorsee and doubts having arisen as to whether section 85 was applicable or not section 16 was amended in this manner. It is unnecessary to go into section 121 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for even in the case of an indorsee in such a case the protection of estoppel would apply. At one time the learned counsel for the plaintiff suggested that the protection under section 85 was given only to the drawee and not to the drawer. But as far as I am concerned the case of Sulleman Hussein v. The New Oriental Bank Corporation, Limited, is binding on me and there Sir Charles Sargent C.J, has held that the protection under section 85 is not limited to the drawee, but it also applies to the drawer. From the evidence of the pay clerk and the accountant of the third party the amount of the cheque was paid by the third party in due course according to the tenor thereof and in good faith and without negligence. I, therefore, dismiss the suit with costs.

    Attorneys for the plaintiff:— Messrs. M.B Chothia & Co.

    Attorneys for the defendants:— Messrs. Captain and Vaidya.

    Attorneys for the third party:— Messrs. Payne & Co.

    J.S.K
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    Comments

    Jugjivandas Jamnadas v. Nagar Central Bank. Ltd.
    (Aug 21, 1925)