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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 62(2) of the Copyright, 1957 and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999,
  • Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ('The Code of Civil Procedure')
  • section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957
  • SECTION 62 COPYRIGHT ACT
  • TRADE MARKS ACT
  • Section 20 of the Code
  • TRADE MARKS ACT 1999
  • Order VII Rule 10,
  • Order 7 Rule 11
  • Order 7 Rule 14.
  • Order 7 Rule 10,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 62(2) of the Copyright, 1957 and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999,
  • Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ('The Code of Civil Procedure')
  • section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957
  • SECTION 62 COPYRIGHT ACT
  • TRADE MARKS ACT
  • Section 20 of the Code
  • TRADE MARKS ACT 1999
  • Order VII Rule 10,
  • Order 7 Rule 11
  • Order 7 Rule 14.
  • Order 7 Rule 10,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, engaged in manufacturing, marketing, and selling bathroom fittings and industrial valves since 1984, adopted the trademark 'Ego' in the same year and has used it continuously since. The mark is registered under the Trademarks Act, 1999 in Classes 6, 7, and 11. The plaintiff also owns the registered trademarks 'Eco' and 'Igo' for Class 11 and claims copyright over original artistic works of the Ego label. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants adopted an identical trademark 'ECO' for similar goods dishonestly and fraudulently, causing confusion and passing off. The second defendant, formerly the plaintiff's commission agent, allegedly severed ties and colluded with the first defendant to unlawfully benefit from the plaintiff's goodwill.

The plaintiff filed suit CS (OS) 2362/07, and the second defendant preferred IA No.4274/08 under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, seeking return of the plaint on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction of the Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit filed by the plaintiff.
  2. Whether the defendants' adoption of the trademark 'ECO' amounts to infringement and passing off of the plaintiff's registered trademark 'Ego'.
  3. The applicability of prior registration and copyright ownership by the defendants concerning the disputed trademark.
  4. Whether the plaint should be returned under Order 7 Rule 10 for want of jurisdiction.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff has been using the trademark 'Ego' since 1984 and holds registered trademarks and copyrights in relation to the mark.
  • The defendants' mark 'ECO' is identical and deceptively similar in phonetics, visuals, structure, and artistic features, likely to cause confusion and infringe under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act.
  • The defendants' use of the inscription “Technology by Hi EGO Valves” on their label indicates malafide intent and attempts to misrepresent association with the plaintiff.
  • The plaintiff has established goodwill through sales figures, advertising expenditure, and reputation, qualifying the mark as well-known under the Act.
  • Jurisdiction lies with this Court as both parties carry on business in Delhi, supported by sales invoices and registrations.
  • Passing off action is maintainable despite defendants' trademark registration, as the protection of goodwill is paramount.
  • The plaintiff also claims copyright infringement over the artistic work in the mark, relying on precedents that no separate copyright registration is necessary.
  • The application for return of plaint for want of jurisdiction should be rejected, noting that a similar prior application was withdrawn.

Defendants' Arguments

  • The Court lacks territorial jurisdiction as neither the plaintiff nor the first defendant has registered or subordinate offices in Delhi; business activities primarily occur in Jalandhar.
  • The expression 'carries on business' requires that essential business activities take place at the location, which is not the case for Delhi.
  • No cause of action arose within Delhi since defendants have not demonstrated sales or business presence there.
  • The plaintiff's jurisdictional claim is tenuous, relying on isolated transactions insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
  • The plaintiff's suit should be dismissed under Order 7 Rule 10 for failure to disclose material facts and misrepresentation, especially as the defendants had prior registration of the trademark 'Eco' from 2001 and prior copyright ownership.
  • The defendants obtained copyright registration for the label 'ECO' including the inscription “Technology by Hi EGO Valves,” which refers to the second defendant's business, not the plaintiff.
  • Doctrine of forum conveniens applies, favoring trial in Jalandhar where both parties conduct business.
  • Reliance on case law supporting dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and invalidity of injunction obtained by alleged fraud.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhat (2004) 28 PTC 121 Injunction follows where plaintiff prima facie proves likelihood of deception. Supported plaintiff's claim for injunction based on trademark infringement.
Laxmikant Patel v. Bharat Shah (2002) 24 PTC 1 Principle that injunction must follow upon prima facie proof of deception. Reinforced plaintiff's entitlement to interim injunction.
Intas Pharmaceuticals v. Allergen Inc (2006) 32 PTC 272 Jurisdiction lies where part of the cause of action arises. Used to argue for jurisdiction in Delhi by plaintiff.
Amrutanjan v. Ashwin, PTC (Suppl 1) 27 Mad and Pfizer Products v. Rajesh Chopra (2006) 32 PTC 301 Territorial jurisdiction based on cause of action arising in the forum. Supported plaintiff's jurisdictional claim.
Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd., AIR 1960 SC 142 Passing off protects goodwill irrespective of trademark registration. Supported plaintiff's passing off claim despite defendants' registration.
Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar, AIR 1978 Del 250 Goodwill protection under passing off action. Supported plaintiff's passing off action.
NR Dongre v. Whirlpool Corporation (1996) 16 PTC 1997 Section 27 and 28(3) of the Trade Marks Act protect prior user’s goodwill. Affirmed plaintiff's rights despite defendants' registration.
Glaxo Operations v. Middlesex, AIR 1984 Del 265 No separate copyright registration needed to sue for infringement. Supported plaintiff's copyright infringement claim.
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and Others, AIR 1994 SC 853 Judgment obtained by fraud is non-est in the eyes of law. Defendants relied to challenge injunction obtained by plaintiff.
Uniply Industries v. Unicorn Plywood (2001) 5 SCC 95 Prior registration and copyright ownership support defendants' case. Supported defendants’ argument for vacating injunction.
Jindal Industries v. Nirmal Steel Tubes, AIR 1995 Del 42 Prior registration and copyright ownership as defense. Supported defendants’ position on prior rights.
Kensoft Infotech v. Krishnaswami (2008) 146 DLT 657 Order 7 Rule 10 demurrer decided on plaint averments alone. Used to support decision on jurisdiction based on plaint.
Liverpool and London SP and I Asson. Ltd. v. MV Sea Success (2004) 9 SCC 512 For Order 7 Rule 11, Court may consider documents along with plaint. Guided court’s approach to jurisdiction and plaint evaluation.
Sopan Sukhdeo v. Assistant Charity Commr. (2004) 3 SCC 137 Decision on Order 7 Rule 11 based on plaint averments; written statement irrelevant. Supported court’s focus on plaint for jurisdictional question.
Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia, 143 (2007) DLT 617 'Carries on business' meaning same under Copyright Act and CPC. Clarified jurisdictional principles applied by court.
Loknath Prasad Gupta v. Bijay Kumar Gupta, 57(1995) DLT 502 Definition of 'carries on business' for jurisdictional purposes. Supported interpretation of business presence.
Dhodha House v. S.K Maingi (2006) 9 SCC 41 Goods availability in market does not equate to carrying on business. Applied to reject jurisdiction based on mere sales in Delhi.
Nedungadi Bank v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1961 Ker 50 Business presence requires essential activities at the location. Supported court’s jurisdictional analysis.
Bharat Insurance Co. v. Vasudev, AIR 1956 Nag 203 Clarification on business presence for jurisdiction. Used to interpret territorial jurisdiction.
Sector Twenty-one Owners' Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval Housing Board, 65 (1997) DLT 81 (DB) Trivial part of cause of action insufficient for jurisdiction. Supported rejecting jurisdiction on weak connection.
H.P. Horticulture Produce Marketing and Processing Corpn. v. M.M Breweries, AIR 1981 Pand H 117 Cause of action arises where defendant makes commercial scale sales. Clarified cause of action for passing off and jurisdiction.
Gold Seal Engineering Products v. Hindustan Manufacturers, AIR 1992 Bom. 144 Suit for passing off must be filed where defendant carries on business. Supported dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Gupta Brothers Conduit Pipe Manufacturing Co. v. Anil Gupta (2001) 24 PTC 159 No jurisdiction without business presence or office in forum. Applied to reject jurisdiction in Delhi.
Haryana Milk Foods v. Chambel Diary Products (2002) 25 PTC 156 Entire plaint must be considered for territorial jurisdiction. Supported court’s jurisdictional assessment.
Dabur India Limited v. KR Industries (2006) 33 PTC 348 Jurisdiction denied where defendant has no presence or sales in forum. Supported court’s conclusion on lack of jurisdiction.
ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu (1994) 4 SCC 711 Advertisement alone insufficient to confer jurisdiction. Applied to reject jurisdiction based on advertising.
ABC Laminart v. AP Agencies (1989) 2 SCC 163 Cause of action defined as facts giving right to claim relief. Used to determine when cause of action arises for passing off.
Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 Res judicata principles and scope of enquiry under Order 7 Rule 10. Allowed court to consider jurisdiction despite earlier withdrawal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court prioritized the issue of territorial jurisdiction, examining the plaintiff's averments and the applicable statutory provisions: Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, and Section 134 of the Trade Marks Act. These statutes provide that jurisdiction lies where the defendant resides or carries on business, where the cause of action arises wholly or in part, or where the plaintiff resides and carries on business.

It was found that both the plaintiff and the first defendant reside and conduct business primarily in Jalandhar, with no registered or subordinate offices in Delhi. The defendants do not have such presence in Delhi, and essential business activities occur in Jalandhar. The Court relied on precedents establishing that mere sales or availability of goods in a place do not constitute carrying on business there.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the defendants sell or manufacture their products in Delhi. The Court held that a single sale or tenuous connection is insufficient to establish territorial jurisdiction. The cause of action for passing off arises only when the defendant uses the impugned trademark in the forum, which was not proved for Delhi.

Further, the Court noted that the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental and can be addressed despite prior applications being withdrawn. The plaintiff’s reliance on registrations and isolated transactions in Delhi did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements.

Accordingly, the Court concluded it lacks territorial jurisdiction to try the suit, and the application under Order 7 Rule 10 for return of plaint is allowed.

Holding and Implications

The Court's final decision is IA No.4274/08 is allowed, and the plaint in CS (OS) 2362/07 is returned for want of territorial jurisdiction.

The suit is dismissed without prejudice, with leave to file in the court of competent jurisdiction. The ruling does not set new precedent on substantive issues but clarifies the strict application of territorial jurisdiction principles in trademark and passing off suits, emphasizing the necessity of establishing business presence or cause of action within the forum.

    A.V. R. Engineers v. Sharma Moulding Works

    S. Ravindra Bhat, J.:-

    1. This order, will dispose of IA No.4274/08 in CS (OS) 2362/07, preferred under Order 7 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, ('The Code of Civil Procedure') by the second defendant.

    2. The facts relevant for deciding the applications are the following. The plaintiff is engaged in manufacturing, marketing and selling bathroom fittings, valves, cocks and industrial valves of all types since 1984. It is averred that in the same year, it adopted the mark 'Ego' and has been using it continuously and uninterruptedly ever since. The mark is also registered under the Trademarks Act, 1999 (hereafter 'the Act') in relation to products in Class 6, 7 and 11 (No. 1314352, No. 442765 and No. 1314353 respectively). It is also averred that the plaintiff is the proprietor of the trademarks 'Eco' and 'Igo', both of which are also registered with respect to class 11 under the Act. It is averred that the plaintiff is using different versions of the Ego label; all of them are original artistic works in which copyright subsists. The plaintiff is the author, owner and proprietor of the respective copyrights too. It is claimed that on account of prior use and widespread reputation, the mark is distinctively associated with the plaintiff. The plaintiff alleges that the goodwill generated by the goods, is evidenced by the large turnover for the same. It places reliance on the sales figures. It also avers about to the large sums of money spent by it for advertising and promoting that brand. Therefore, it claims to be a well known mark within the meaning of Section 2 (1) (zg) of the Act.

    3. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants' adoption of the identical trademark ECO label in respect of same/similar allied/cognate goods is dishonest, malafide and fraudulent. It is alleged that they have blatantly copied the essential and striking features of plaintiffs trade mark/label. It is averred that the defendants' malafide intent is apparent from the mentioning on their impugned label “Technology by Hi EGO Valves” which is a direct reference to plaintiff's said goods and business in the said trade mark/label. It is alleged that the defendants are misrepresenting that the impugned goods are the plaintiff's and that the first defendant is a part of the plaintiff. The defendants are illegally projecting and canvassing their association with the plaintiff, which causes confusion in the minds of the public and therefore, amounts, as well as passing off. It is also submitted that the second defendant, who was for a number of years, the commission agent of the plaintiff had suddenly started dealing with the first defendant had severed his ties with the plaintiff. The fact that the second defendant is privy to the business activities of the plaintiff and their trade secrets further shows the malafide intent of the defendants to unlawfully benefit from the goodwill of the plaintiff.

    4. Mr. SK Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff, contended that the impugned Trade Mark/label is identical with and deceptively similar to the plaintiff's Trade Mark/label in each and every respect. It is phonetically, visually, structurally, in its basic idea, in its essential features, in its placements as well as in its artistic features deceptively similar to that of the plaintiff's. The defendants impugned goods and business is also of the same/similar/allied cognate nature to the said goods and business of the plaintiff. Therefore, he contends that the adoption of the said mark will definitely cause confusion in the minds of the public and will prima facie amount to infringement under section 29 of the Act. Relying on Midas Hygiene v. Sudhir Bhatia, (2004) 28 PTC 121 and Laxmikant Patel v. Bharat Shah, (2002) 24 PTC 1, he contends that in cases where the plaintiff has prima facie proved likelihood of deception, an injunction must follow.

    5. Learned counsel submitted that the defendants' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court is totally unfounded. He relied on sales invoices indicating the plaintiff's sales to customers in Delhi and also relied on the invoices filed by the defendants that show that the latter sell their products in Delhi. He placed reliance on Intas Pharmaceuticals v. Allergen Inc, (2006) 32 PTC 272; Amrutanjan v. Ashwin, PTC (Suppl 1) 27 Mad and Pfizer Products v. Rajesh Chopra, (2006) 32 PTC 301 to argue that if a part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, the Court can entertain the plaint.

    6. In relation to passing off, Mr. Bansal contended that the defendant's registration of its trademark is irrelevant, since the primary concern in an action for passing off is the protection of goodwill and the not the property right in the mark. He relied on Corn Products Refining Co. v. Shangrila Food Products Ltd ., AIR 1960 SC 142; Century Traders v. Roshan Lal Duggar, AIR 1978 Del 250 and NR Dongre v. Whirlpool Corporation, (1996) 16 PTC 1997, to contend that section 27 and 28(3) of the Act, due to the plaintiffs prior use, protects its goodwill and therefore, an action for passing off is maintainable.

    7. Learned counsel also contended that the plaintiff is also the owner and author of the copyright in the original artistic work in the marks, and therefore, can sue for infringement of copyright as well. Placing reliance on Glaxo Operations v. Middlesex, AIR 1984 Del 265, he contended that in such cases a separate registration of the copyright is not needed. He also relied on the sales tax registration, central excise registration, ISI certification, ISO 9001 certification and advertisements placed in prominent newspapers like Indian Express to submit that the plaintiff is a bonafide user of the mark and that it has established for itself considerable reputation over the years. It is contended that the defendants' activities, have led to the plaintiffs' suffering from a loss of reputation, which cannot be monetarily compensated and hence, the injunction must be confirmed. Learned counsel submitted that the present application for return of the plaint, for want of jurisdiction should not be entertained, since in a similar application, the other defendant had impeached the jurisdiction of the court, but, during the hearing, sought permission and withdrew it.

    8. Mr. Seeraj Bagga, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants, at the outset itself contended that this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. He argues that a mere averment in the plaint that the plaintiff and the defendant carry on business in Delhi is not sufficient to make the suit amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court, especially since both the plaintiff and the first defendant do not have any registered office, sub-office or branch office in Delhi. He contends that it is well settled law that the expression 'carries on business' alone are insufficient to confer/invoke jurisdiction. He further states that to constitute 'carrying on business' at a certain place, the essential part of the business must take place in that place. Since neither the plaintiff nor the first defendant have their registered offices at Delhi nor are based at Delhi and all the essential characteristics of the business, viz, the manufacture, packing, dispatch, sales, receipt of orders, all takes place at Jalandhar; this court cannot have territorial jurisdiction in this regard. It is settled law that a corporation in view of the Explanation appended to Section 20 of the Code would be deemed to be carrying on business inter alia at a place where it has a subordinate office. Merely because the first defendant's goods are being sold at a place would thus evidently not mean that it carries on business there. It is reiterated that since the first defendant is a firm and does not have any subordinate office or sub-office at Delhi, and its sole or principal office is at Jalandhar, Punjab, this court has no territorial jurisdiction.

    9. Mr. Bagga further argues that no cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. He argues that though the plaintiff has demonstrated its considerable sales in Delhi, it has not been unable to prove that the defendants also sell their products here, in the absence of which no cause of action can be established in Delhi. He placed reliance on Kensoft Infotech v. Krishnaswami, (2008) 146 DLT 657 to say that a plea of demurer, such as the case under Order 7 Rule 10, is to be decided on the basis of the plain averments only and that the written statement should not be gone into. He further contended that even according to the plaintiff, (as is evident from his bill books and challans,) the jurisdiction in respect of any dispute between the plaintiff and any other party has been restricted to the Courts at Jalandhar, where alone the production, marketing and distribution of the goods took place. He submitted that primacy should be given to that place where the cause of action arose, and if the plaintiff was able to prove his allegations, the cause of action could have arisen only at Jalandhar-the place where the defendant was carrying on business. Therefore, he submitted that no cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of this court, under section 20 of the cpc or under section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957 or under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. To this end he relied upon decisions reported as Kensoft Infotech v. Krishnaswami, (2008) 146 DLT 657; SS Products v. Starplast, (2001) PTC 835 and Austin Reed Ltd. v. Suntex Garments, (2007) 35 PTC 774. He also submitted the court should apply the doctrine of forum conveniens, as both the plaintiff and the first defendant were based in Jalandhar and carried out their business from there.

    10. Learned counsel also argued that the plaintiff was guilty of misrepresentation as material facts were not intentionally disclosed when the injunction was obtained. It is submitted that the first defendant adopted the mark 'Eco' and obtained the registration for the same with effect from 2001 in Class '6, much before the plaintiff got it registered in 2004 in class '11. He also submitted that due to the prior adoption, the copyright in the said label also vested in the defendants. Relying on the registration certificate, learned counsel urged that the first defendant came into existence in 1976, whereas the plaintiff came into being in 1984. He also relied on documents to show that the first defendant was using the label 'Eco' even before the plaintiff came into existence. He contended that the ex parte interim injunction deserves to be set aside and the suit merits to be dismissed as the order is non est in the eyes of law in view of the decision in S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. Vs. Jagannath (dead) by LRs and Others, AIR 1994 SC 853 wherein the Court has held that where any decision or judgment is obtained by playing a fraud then the same is non-est in the eyes of law.

    11. Mr. Bagga also contended that prima facie case lies in the favour of the defendants since not only do they enjoy prior use and prior registration, but also have obtained copyright in respect of the label ECO along with the distinct style and colour scheme of the packaging along with the inscription “Technology by Hi EGO Valves” on 9.6.2006. He submits that the said copyright certification was obtained after due enquiries were made and a No Objection Certificate was obtained. The reference to Ego Valves in the inscription was not a reference to the plaintiff but a reference to the second defendant-M/s Hi Ego valves, established in 1968. Therefore, he contended that since the defendants had a prior registration and also a copyright registration in respect of the said label, the interim injunction ought to be vacated. In this regard he relied on Uniply Industries v. Unicorn Plywood, (2001) 5 SCC 95; Jindal Industries v. Nirmal Steel Tubes, AIR 1995 Del 42 and SS Products (supra).

    12. This court, in the above circumstances, is of the opinion that the issue of territorial jurisdiction needs to be addressed first. The plaintiff's averments and contentions in this regard are two-fold. Firstly, that the plaintiffs and the defendants are selling their respective products, and therefore carry on business within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, and two, that the respective registrations have been effected in Delhi. Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Section 62(2) of the Copyright, 1957 and section 134 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, provide for the following fora where the disputes could be adjudicated. First, the place at which the defendant actually and voluntarily resides or carries on business. Second, the place at which the cause of action, wholly or in part arises. Lastly, by an amendment to the Copyright Act and the Trade Marks Act, the suit can be instituted at the place where the plaintiff resides and carries on business.

    13. In the present scenario, the cause title would reveal that both the plaintiff and the first defendant are residents and carry on business in Jalandhar, whereas the second defendant is a resident of Chennai. The explanation to section 20 of the cpc, makes it clear that the place at which a corporate entity carries on business is either the place at which it has its sole or principle office or where it has a subordinate office. The defendants do not have any offices in Delhi, let alone its principle or sole office. The first defendant's office is based in Jalandhar.

    14. Undoubtedly, the court has to see only the averments in a plaint, to decide whether the suit discloses a triable cause of action, and whether this court has jurisdiction. In this context, it would be useful to notice the judgment of the Supreme Court in Liverpool and London SP and I Asson. Ltd. v. MV Sea Success, (2004) 9 SCC 512, where it was held that for the purposes of rejecting a plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 the Court should not only look at the averments in the plaint but also must look into documents filed along with, in view of Order 7 Rule 14. In Sopan Sukhdeo v. Assistant Charity Commr., (2004) 3 SCC 137, the Court opined that for the purposes of deciding an application under Order 7 Rule 11, the averments made in the plaint are germane and that the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be irrelevant. Further, the court also emphasized that a meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint was to be adopted so as to nip in the bud any clever drafting of the plaint. This approach has been emphasized by this Court in Kensoft Infotech (supra).

    15. In Indian Performing Rights Society v. Sanjay Dalia, 143 (2007) DLT 617, this Court, relying on Loknath Prasad Gupta v. Bijay Kumar Gupta, 57(1995) DLT 502, held that the expression 'carries on business' in section 62 of the Copyright Act has the same meaning as in section 20 of the cpc. It was further held that merely having a branch office in Delhi would not mean that the plaintiff carries on business in Delhi. The plaintiff would be deemed to carry on business at a branch office only if a cause of action had arisen in Delhi. A well established principle of law is that to amount 'to carrying on business' in a certain place, the essential part of the business must take place in that place. (Dhodha House v. S.K Maingi., (2006) 9 SCC 41; Nedungadi Bank v. Central Bank of India, AIR 1961 Ker 50; Bharat Insurance Co. v. Vasudev, AIR 1956 Nag 203). In Dodha House, the Court went on to observe that it was possible that the goods manufactured by the plaintiff were available in the markets in Delhi or they are sold in Delhi, but that by itself would not mean that the plaintiff carries on any business in Delhi. On an application of the above principles and a consideration of the documents submitted by the plaintiff will indicate that though he has been able to establish that he markets his goods in Delhi, he has not been able to establish that the defendants also manufacture and market their goods in Delhi.

    16. It was held, in SectorTwenty-one Owners' Welfare Association v. Air Force Naval Housing Board, 65 (1997) DLT 81 (DB) that a trivial or insignificant part of the cause of action arising at a particular place would not be enough to confer jurisdiction on the court to entertain the lis. Citing a number of precedents it observed that the emphasis had shifted from the residence or location of the person or authority sought to be proceeded against, to the situs of the accrual of the cause of action. In H.P. Horticulture Produce Marketing and Processing Corpn. v. M.M Breweries, AIR 1981 Pand H 117, in relation to action for passing off the Court observed as follows:

    "In a case of present nature, the cause of action partly or wholly can arise in a given jurisdiction only if it is the defendant who is proved to have directly made sale of the goods under the impugned trademark (within a given court) not to an individual customer but to a distributor or a wholesaler or retailer and that such a sale should be at a commercial scale."

    In Gold Seal Engineering Products v. Hindustan Manufacturers, AIR 1992 Bom. 144, it was held that a suit for passing off could not be filed in Bombay if the defendants carry on business in Calcutta and that supply of goods to Delhi was on a commercial basis. In Gupta Brothers Conduit Pipe Manufacturing Co. v. Anil Gupta, (2001) 24 PTC 159, this Court held that since neither plaintiff nor the defendants have offices in Delhi and are not carrying on business in Delhi, the suit had to be returned due to lack of jurisdiction. The court held, in Haryana Milk Foods v. Chambel Diary Products, (2002) 25 PTC 156 that for the purposes of ascertaining territorial jurisdiction the entire plaint has to be taken into consideration. In that case since the plaintiff could not prove that the defendant had a office in Delhi or carries on business in Delhi, the Court held that it did not have territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.

    17. In Dabur India Limited v. KR Industries, (2006) 33 PTC 348, a Division Bench of this Court held that since the defendant was from Andhra Pradesh and since there was no documentary evidence to show that the respondent was selling its goods in Delhi, this Court did not have territorial jurisdiction. In Dhodha House (supra), after noticing the decision in ONGC v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711, the Court had categorically held that a mere advertisement in a journal or paper by itself, will not confer jurisdiction on the Court. In that context it also observed that cause of action will arise only when the infringing goods are used not when an application for registration is made or pending.

    18. Cause of action, though not defined by the legislature, consists of that bundle of facts, which give cause to enforce the legal injury. In ABC Laminart v. AP Agencies, (1989) 2 SCC 163, the Supreme Court held that cause of action means that set of facts, which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to claim relief against the defendant. If that were so, the cause of action in a case of passing off would arise only when the defendant uses the impugned trademark. The object of action for passing off being to protect the goodwill, the goodwill will get affected only when the defendant markets his good under the impugned mark. Therefore, the mere advertisement in the Trademarks Journal or preferring of application or even the registration of a trademark at a particular place, will not and cannot confer jurisdiction, since it cannot amount to cause of action in relation to passing off.

    19. It is no doubt a fact that the first defendant had earlier filed an application for rejection of plaint, which inter alia, contained averments about lack of territorial jurisdiction, but later withdrew it. However, that defendant has not filed the present application. Moreover, it is under Order VII Rule 10, for return of plaint. The Supreme Court has in Arjun Singh V. Mohindra Kumar AIR 1964 SC 993 held that where the principle of res judicata is invoked in the case of the different stages of proceedings in the same suit, the nature of the proceedings, the scope of the enquiry which the adjectival law provides for the decision being reached, as well as the specific provisions made on matters touching such decision are some of the material and relevant factors to be considered before the principle is held applicable. In this case, the issue of jurisdiction is fundamental; it goes to the root of maintainability of the action before the court. Consequently, this court does not and is not prevented from going into this aspect of maintainability, as it was not decided in the earlier part of the proceeding. The plaintiff had sought to rely on a copy of one sale voucher pertaining to a transaction, which took place in Delhi, placed on the record along with the defendant's pleading, to claim that this court possesses jurisdiction. Besides the fact that such tenuous connection (“one swallow does not a summer make”) cannot be made by the plaintiff, since it has been unable to provide any material about the defendant's sale or any meaningful commercial presence within jurisdiction of this court, to enable exercise of jurisdiction. Here admittedly, both parties reside and carry on business at Jalandhar, the sales of products of the defendants have not been shown to be within jurisdiction of the Court, the suit cannot be entertained.

    20. In view of the above reasoning, it is concluded that this court does not possess territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try this suit. IA No.4274/08 has to succeed; it is accordingly allowed. CS (OS) 2362/07 is therefore, returned, with leave to file it in the court of competent jurisdiction. The applications are accordingly disposed off.

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    A.V. R. Engineers v. Sharma Moulding Works
    (May 26, 2008)