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Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad and Jamna Prasad, acting as managers of a joint family business styled Manorath Bhagat Dhana Ram in the District of Ballia, instituted a suit on 3 June 1904 to recover Rs. 9,240-7-0 claimed to be due on an account stated on 9 August 1901. On that date the defendants Shamrathi Singh, Mahadeo Singh and Rajinandan Singh had allegedly admitted the correctness of the balance and signed the account (Mahadeo Singh signing also for Shamrathi Singh).

In their written statements the principal defendants objected to the array of plaintiffs on the ground that not all members of the plaintiffs' joint family had been joined. On 22 August 1904 the original plaintiffs petitioned to have other family members added to remove this objection; by order dated 8 September 1904 additional family members (plaintiffs 4–12) were added and two additional defendants (Mahadeo Prasad and Chhote Lal) were included. If those added plaintiffs were necessary parties, the suit was, as of 8 September 1904, barred by limitation.

The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the original plaintiffs' contention that, as managing members of the joint family, they were entitled to sue in their own names and entered a decree in their favour. An appeal was brought challenging, among other matters, limitation and non-joinder. One ground of appeal was also that a decree had been granted against minor defendants; this ground was admitted by respondents' counsel who conceded that any decree as to minors should be satisfied only out of joint family funds.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit was barred by limitation in respect of persons who were added to the record on 8 September 1904.
  2. Whether Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad and Jamna Prasad, as alleged managing members of a joint family business, were entitled to maintain the suit in their own names without joining all other members of the joint family.
  3. Whether a decree should have been entered against minor defendants and, if so, how any such decree ought to be satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendants' Objection / Appellants' Argument

  • The defendants objected to the array of plaintiffs on the ground that all members of the plaintiffs' family had not been joined, implying non-joinder of necessary parties and the possible effect of limitation on those not originally made plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs' (Respondents') Argument

  • It was contended on behalf of the respondents that the original three plaintiffs were the managing members of the joint family and, as such managing members, were entitled to institute the suit in their own names on behalf of themselves and the other family members; therefore it was unnecessary to join all members as plaintiffs.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.P. Kanna Pisharody v. V.M. Narayanan Somayjipad (1881) I.L.R., 3 Mad., 284 Statement that, except where law specially allows, all co-owners must join in a suit to recover their property; co-owners may agree on management but cannot empower one to sue in his own name on their behalf. Used as authoritative support for the proposition that an individual or a subset of co-owners (or family members) cannot, by agreement alone, acquire competence to sue in their own names for the benefit of all; the Court regarded this authority as concluding the question against the plaintiffs' contention.
Balkrishna Moreshwar Kunte v. Municipality of Mahad (1885) I.L.R., 10 Bom., 32 The statement of law from K.P. Kanna Pisharody was adopted by Sargent, C.J. Adopted as supportive authority for the same principle that all co-owners/partners must join to enforce their rights.
Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo (1881) I.L.R., 6 Calc., 815 Where original plaintiffs could only enforce their claim in conjunction with added plaintiffs, and the added plaintiffs were at the time barred by limitation (Section 22 Limitation Act), the claim of the original plaintiffs is also barred. Applied to show that adding necessary parties after the period of limitation for them has expired defeats the suit; used as direct precedent for the limitation consequence when necessary co-plaintiffs are added late.
Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan (1883) I.L.R., 7 Bom., 217 Similar legal proposition relating to necessity of joinder and consequences for limitation. Cited as a similar decision supporting the proposition that where members carrying on business together must all sue, failure to join them can cause the suit to be barred.
Imam-ud-din v. Liladhar (1892) 1 L.R., 14 All., 524 Where a suit was brought by one of two partners and the other partner was added only after the period of limitation had expired for him, Section 22 of the Limitation Act applied; all surviving partners should have been plaintiffs. Relied on for the proposition that when a judge adds a necessary plaintiff after the period of limitation for that person's suit has expired, Section 22 applies and the suit cannot be maintained without that person; affirmed the need to join all partners.
Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (1894) I.L.R., 18 Mad., 88 Held in Madras that a manager of a Hindu family cannot sue without joining those interested with him. Cited as regional authority consistent with the rule that a single member (even a manager) cannot sue alone for the family's benefit without joinder.
Angamuthu Pillai v. Kolandavelu Pillai (1899) I.L.R., 23 Mad., 190 Reinforces the Madras rule that the manager of a Hindu family cannot sue without joining other interested members. Used as additional authority from Madras supporting the same principle.
Pateshri Partap Narain Singh v. Rudra Narain Singh (1904) I.L.R., 26 All., 528 The decision in that case arose from special circumstances: the objection of non-joinder was not pressed by defendants at trial and was only pointed out on appeal; the Court amended the record in that case. The Court here explained that this decision did not support the respondents' contention because it depended on peculiar facts (non-pressing of the objection at trial) and therefore was not a precedent for allowing a managing member to sue alone where non-joinder is properly raised.
Gopal Das v. Badri Nath (Weekly Notes, 1904, p. 282) — (See also) This is cited in the opinion as a "see also" reference; no principle from it is described in the text. Listed merely as an additional reference; the opinion does not explain any substantive application of this case to the present decision.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages. First it examined the factual question whether the three original plaintiffs were the managing members of the joint family when the suit was instituted. The record contained conflicting evidence: two witnesses who supported the defendants' case initially deposed that there was no single leading member since about 1890 and that business was conducted under orders of all proprietors, though one of those witnesses later named Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad, himself, Jamna Prasad and Lachhmi Prasad as those by whose orders the business was carried on; another witness explained that hundis were signed by "any of us who happen to be present," but acknowledged that the names of Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad and Jamna Prasad were entered in respect of the whole ilaka. The plaintiffs Bishan Prasad and Kishan Prasad deposed that they and Jamna Prasad were the managing members.

The Court agreed with the Subordinate Judge's factual finding that the original plaintiffs were the managing members of the family and had sued as such. Having accepted that factual premise, the Court turned to the legal question whether such managing members could maintain the suit in their own names without joining all other family members.

The Subordinate Judge had held that because the business had, in practice, been carried on in the names of the three plaintiffs (and prior suits had been instituted in their names), they could justifiably sue in their own names for the benefit of all. The Court rejected that conclusion on the law: it held that the business was carried on in the name of the plaintiffs' firm, not in the personal names of the three members; and, more importantly, the Court treated the point as conclusively governed by authority.

The Court reviewed multiple precedents from different High Courts and an authoritative statement in K.P. Kanna Pisharody to the effect that, except where statute permits, co-owners or partners must all join to enforce rights in the joint property and cannot clothe a single member with competence to sue in his own name on behalf of all. The Court relied on cases (including Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo and Imam-ud-din v. Liladhar) which established the consequence that if a necessary co-plaintiff is added after his period of limitation has expired, Section 22 of the Limitation Act will preclude the suit — i.e., the suit fails because it cannot be maintained without that person.

The Court also cited doctrinal authority (Mayne on Hindu Law) and Madras decisions to reinforce that a manager of a Hindu family cannot sue alone without joining those interested, and explained why the appellant/respondent reliance on Pateshri Partap Narain Singh was misplaced because that decision turned on peculiar facts which are not present in the instant case.

Turning to the minor-defendant point, the opinion records that the respondents' counsel conceded the decree against minors was improper and agreed that any decree in their favour should be satisfied only out of joint family funds; the Court noted that on that ground alone the appeal must succeed in part. Ultimately the Court integrated this with its legal conclusion on non-joinder and limitation and disposed of the suit.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with costs in both Courts.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The plaintiffs' suit to recover Rs. 9,240-7-0 is dismissed in its entirety by the appellate Court.
  • As conceded by respondents' counsel, any decree that had been entered against minor defendants was improper and, to the extent relevant, such relief (if any enforced) should be satisfied only out of the joint family funds.
  • The Court's decision enforces the principle, supported by cited authorities, that managing members of a joint family carrying on a joint business cannot, as a general rule, sue in their own names on behalf of all members without joining those members; and that adding necessary parties after the period of limitation applicable to them will preclude maintenance of the suit under Section 22 of the Limitation Act.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a new legal principle; it applies existing authorities and doctrine to the facts and concludes the suit is barred for want of proper joinder and the consequences of limitation.

Editor’s note in the original opinion also referred the reader to Gopal Das v. Badri Nath (Weekly Notes, 1904, p. 282) as an additional reference; the opinion itself does not elaborate on that case.

    Kishan Prasad And Ors. v. Shamrathi Singh And Ors.

    and William Burkitt, J.

    1. The main question in this appeal is one of limitation. The suit was brought to recover a sum of Rs. 9,240-7-0 alleged to be due on foot of an account stated on the 9 th of August 1901. The plaintiffs Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad and Jamna Prasad instituted the suit on the 3rd of June 1904 as managers of a joint family business, styled Manorath Bhagat Dhana Ram, carried on in the District of Ballia, to recover the debt which was due by the family of the defendants in respect of money dealings. The dealings between the parties had been carried on for several years, and on the 9th of August 1901 the accounts were adjusted, when the defendants Shamrathi Singh, Mahadeo Singh and Rajinandan Singh admitted the correctness of the balance and affixed their signatures to the account, Mahadeo Singh signing it on behalf of himself as well as of Shamrathi Singh.

    2. In their written statements the principal defendants objected to the array of plaintiffs complaining that all the members of the plaintiffs family had not joined in the suit. In consequence of this objection on the 22nd of August 1904 the plaintiffs applied to the Court to have the other numbers of the family added as parties, stating in their petition that they (the original plaintiffs) were the managers of the firm and on that account brought the suit in their own names alone, but that with a view to remove the objection of the defendants, they desired that the names of the other members of the family should be brought on the record. By order of the 8th of September 1904 the plaintiffs 4--12 were brought on the record as plaintiffs, and Mahadeo Prasad and Chhote Lal, two members of the family, were added as defendants. If the added plaintiffs were necessary patties to the suit, it is admitted that on the 8th September 1904; when they were added as plaintiffs, the suit was barred by limitation. But on behalf of the respondent it was contended that the original plaintiff's were the managing members of the joint family and as such were entitled to institute the suit in their own names alone on behalf of themselves and the other members of the family. The learned Subordinate Judge acceded to this contention and pasted a decree in favour of the plaintiffs.

    3. One of the grounds of appeal is that a decree against the persons of the minor defendants ought not to have been granted. Mr. Sundar Lal on behalf of the respondents admits that this is so, and so far as the minor defendants are concerned the decree should be satisfied out of the joint family funds alone. So far the appeal must in any case succeed.

    4. As regards the main question it is first necessary to determine whether or not Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad and Jamna Prasad were the managing members of the family when the suit was brought. It appears that at the time of the institution of the suit dissension existed between some of the members of the plaintiffs' family and hence we find two of them supporting the defendants' case. The evidence of these two witnesses only has been translated and printed by the appellants. These are the depositions of Sarju Prasad and Lachhmi Prasad, sons of the plaintiff Kishan Prasad, and themselves plaintiffs, Sarju Prasad deposed that there was no leading member in the family since about 1890, and that the business of the firm was carried on under the orders of all the proprietors. Then he modified this statement and said that the names of those by whose orders the business was carried on were Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad, himself (the witness), Jamna Prasad and Lachhmi Prasad. In cross-examination he stated that all the suits relating to the family, the ilaka or the firms brought since 1890 were instituted in the names of Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad and Jamna Prasad only, or in the came of Debi Prasad as long as he lived. Debi Prasad we may mention was a son of the plaintiff Jamna Prasad. "We now come to the evidence of Lachhmi Prasad. He deposed that hundis were drawn by the firm under the signatures of all--and then he said they are "signed by any of us who happen to be present." He admitted, however, that the names of Kishan Prasad, Bishan Prasad and Jamna Prasad were entered in respect of the whole ilaka and the names of the other members of the family were not so entered. As against this evidence we have the evidence of the plaintiffs Bishan Prasad and Kishan Prasad who deposed that they and Jamna Prasad were the managing members of the family.

    5. The learned Subordinate Judge came to the conclusion on the evidence that the original plaintiffs were the managing members of the family and sued as such, and we have no hesitation whatever in agreeing with him as to this. The question then is whether the managing members of a joint family carrying on a joint family business are entitled to maintain a suit in their own names against debtors of the family without joining with them in the suit either as plaintiffs or defendants all the other members of the family.

    6. The learned Subordinate Judge held on this point that inasmuch as all the business carried on by the plaintiffs family was carried on in the names of the three original plaintiff's, and that all suits relating to the family which had been previously instituted in the Civil or Revenue Courts had been instituted only in the names of these plaintiffs, therefore the suit was properly instituted in their names for the benefit of all the members of the family, and that it was not necessary for the other members to join in the suit or to be made parties to it.

    7. The Subordinate Judge is in error in saying that the business was carried on in the names of the three original plaintiffs. It was carried on in the name of the plaintiffs' firm. The evidence of Bishan Prasad, Muhammad Suleman and Amjad Ali Khan. coupled with the plaintiffs' own statement in the plaint show this. If the question had been an open one, there is a good deal to be said in favour of the view taken by the Court below; but it appears to us that it is concluded by authority. In the case of K.P. Kanna Pisharody v. V.M. Narayanan Somayjipad (1881) I.L.R., 3 Mad., 284 it was held by Turner, C.J., and Kindersley, J., that "unless where by a special provision of law co-owners are permitted to sue through some or one of their members all co-owners must join in a suit to recover their property. Co-owners may agree that their property shall be managed and legal proceedings taken by some or one of their number, but they cannot invest such person or persons with the competency to sue in his own name on their behalf or if sued to represent them." Sargent, C.J., adopted this statement of the law in the case of Balkrishna Moreshwar Kunte v. the Municipality of Mahad (1885) I.L.R., 10 Bom., 32. In the case of Ramsebuk v. Ramlall Koondoo (1881) I.L.R., 6 Calc., 815 two of the sons out of a joint Mitakshara family, consisting of a father and three sons, and the widow and sons of a deceased son, and carrying on business in partnership, sued on a hath-chitta for recovery of the amount payable thereunder. When the suit came on for hearing an objection was taken that all the parties who ought to sue were not on the record. Thereupon on the application of the original plaintiffs the names of the father and the third son were added and the plaintiffs were described as surviving partners of the deceased son. At the time these additional persons were made parties, the suit was as regards them barred by limitation. It was held that in as much as the original plaintiffs could only enforce their claim in conjunction with the added plaintiffs, and the added plaintiffs were barred by Section 22 of the Limitation Act, the claim of the original plaintiffs was also barred. Garth, C.J., who delivered the judgment of the Court, in the course of it observed: "When a joint family. or any members of it, carry on a trade in partnership and contract with the outside public in the course of that trade, they have no greater privilege than other traders. If they are really partners they must be bound by the same rules of law for enforcing their contracts in Courts of law as any other partnership." A similar decision was arrived at by a Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Kalidas Kevaldas v. Nathu Bhagvan (1883) l. L.R., 7 Bom., 217. The same question was considered in the case of Imam-ud-din v. Liladhar (1892) 1. L.R., 14 All., 524. In that case a suit was brought upon two hundis by one only of two members of a firm. The defendants in their written statement, as here, raised the objection that all necessary parties were not joined as plaintiffs. Upon that the other partner applied to be made a co-plaintiff and the Court acceded to the application. At the time when he was made a co-plaintiff the suit was barred by limitation, and the Subordinate Judge on that account dismissed it. On appeal the District Judge allowed the appeal on the ground that the defendants did not raise the plea of non-joinder at the earliest possible period. On second appeal Edge, C.J., and Tyrrell, J., after a review of the authorities, set aside the order of the District Judge and affirmed the decree of the Court of first instance, holding that all the surviving partners of the firm should have been plaintiffs in the suit; and further that where a judge, acting under Section 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, adds a person as a necessary plaintiff after the period of limitation for a suit by him alone, or with others, has expired, Section 22 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877, would clearly apply to the right of suit of the person so added, and the suit could not be maintained without him. In Madras it has been hold that the proposition that the manager of a Hindu family can sue without joining those interested with him is one which cannot be supported. Alagappa Chetti v. Vellian Chetti (1894) I.L.R., 18 Mad., 88 and Angamuthu Pillai v. Kolandavelu Pillai (1899) I.L.R., 23 Mad, 190.

    8. Mr. Mayne in his work on Hindu Law in dealing with this question says, at pp. 368 and 369 of the sixth edition: "A necessary consequence of the corporate character of the family holding is that wherever any transaction affects that property all the members must be privy to it, and whatever is done must be done for the benefit of all, and not of any single individual. For instance a single member cannot sue or proceed by way of execution to recover a particular portion of the family property for himself whether his claims be preferred against a stranger who is asserted to be wrongfully in possession or against his coparceners. If the former, all the members must join and the suit must be brought to recover the whole property for the benefit of all.", and later on: "One member cannot sue by himself without joining or asking the consent of the others and making the defect good by joining the others as defendants. If from any cause, such as lapse of time, the other members cannot be joined as plaintiffs, the whole suit will fail."

    9. Our decision in the case of Pateshri Partap Narain Singh v.Rudra Narain Singh (1904) I.L.R., 26 All., 528, which has been relied on by Mr. Sundar Lal, does not help the contention advanced on behalf of the respondents. That decision was based upon the peculiar circumstances of the case. The objection raised as to non-joinder of parties was not pressed by the defendants, and it was only on appeal that we pointed out the defect in this respect and amended it. We observed in our judgment that if the question had been raised at the trial, the plaintiff would no doubt have obtained in good time the consent of his brother to his name being added to the array of parties to the proceedings.

    10. For the foregoing reasons we allow this appeal, set aside the decree of the Court below, and dismiss the plaintiffs' suit with costs in both Courts.

    11. [See also Gopal Das v. Badri Nath Weekly Notes, 1904, p 282.--Ed.]

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    Kishan Prasad And Ors. v. Shamrathi Singh And Ors.
    (Feb 2, 1907)