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Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner was appointed as a dealer for sale of oil and oil products of Indo-Burman Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (I.B.P. Corporation) by letter dated 31 October 2005, and an agreement was executed on the same date. I.B.P. Corporation was later merged with Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., with dealers treated as dealers of Indian Oil Corporation on the same terms.

On 25 June 2007 samples of motor spirit and high speed diesel were drawn from the nozzle at the petitioner's retail outlet and a marker test was conducted. Sales and supplies were suspended by Indian Oil Corporation on 26 June 2007 after samples failed the marker test. The petitioner requested fresh inspection and subsequently a retained sample was tested at Mughalsarai Terminal on 15 October 2007 (after roughly 110 days from drawal); the retained sample also failed the marker test.

A show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner giving ten days to explain alleged irregularities. The petitioner filed a writ petition (Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52580 of 2007), which was disposed on 30 October 2007 directing the petitioner to submit a reply and the Corporation to conclude proceedings. The petitioner submitted a reply on 5 November 2007 alleging, inter alia, that time frames in Clause 2.10 of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines required testing within a much shorter period (35 days total) and that T.T. Retention Samples were available at the outlet but were not collected or tested.

The Corporation did not accept the petitioner's explanation and terminated the dealership on 24 January 2008, finding the petitioner guilty of adulteration. The termination order informed the petitioner of a right to appeal to the Executive Director (Retail Sales), Indian Oil Corporation. The petitioner appealed and the Executive Director dismissed the appeal on 4 April 2008. The present writ petition challenges those two orders (termination and appellate dismissal). An amendment was allowed to bring on record a Government Order (notification dated 31 December 2008) that, w.e.f. 12 January 2009, the marker test for judging adulteration was discontinued.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the dispute is required to be referred to arbitration under Clause 62(a) of the dealership agreement, i.e., whether the writ petition is maintainable in view of the arbitration clause.
  2. On merits, whether the inordinate delay (approximately 110 days) in testing the samples and the non-testing of T.T. Retention Samples vitiates the basis for cancellation of the dealership based on the marker test.
  3. Whether the withdrawal/discontinuance of the marker test by Government notification (w.e.f. 12 January 2009) affects the validity of cancellation based on that test.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • There was an inordinate delay (110 days) between drawal of samples (25 June 2007) and laboratory testing (15 October 2007), in breach of the time frame provided by Clause 2.10 of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines (which, petitioner states, provides for a total of 35 days).
  • T.T. Retention Samples at the retail outlet were not collected or tested though notice had been given; other discrepancies in sampling were also pointed out.
  • The marker test—the very basis for cancellation—was subsequently discontinued by the Government (notification dated 31 December 2008, effective 12 January 2009), and therefore the basis of cancellation is diseffective/inconclusive.
  • In rejoinder, the petitioner contended that since the appellate order was passed by the Executive Director (the same officer who could act as arbitrator under Clause 62), asking the petitioner to go to arbitration would amount to “an appeal from ceaser to ceaser's wife” (i.e., a merely formal remedy), and therefore arbitration is not a proper or effective remedy.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Raised a preliminary objection to maintainability based on Clause 62(a) of the dealership agreement, which provides for reference of disputes to a sole arbitrator who may be the Director (Marketing) of I.B.P. Corporation (or a nominated officer), and bars objection to appointment on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of I.B.P.
  • Relied upon several precedents (listed below) to support that disputes should be referred to arbitration as per the agreement.
  • On merits, respondents contended that although there was some delay, Clause 2.5 of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines indicates the prescribed times are for streamlining and do not affect the quality or result; thus delay does not negate the test results. One reason for delay identified was the merger of I.B.P. Corporation with Indian Oil Corporation.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Balaji Filling Station Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (Division Bench, Lucknow Bench) – Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10867 (M.B) of 2008, decided 3 Dec 2008 Relied upon by respondents to support reference to arbitration under the agreement. The Court recorded that this judgment was relied upon by respondents but found such authorities distinguishable on the facts of the present case.
P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G. Raju, 2000 4 SCC 539 Relied upon by respondents in the context of arbitration/contractual dispute resolution. The Court noted it was relied upon by respondents; the Court treated the cited judgments as distinguishable on facts and did not apply them to allow arbitration in this case.
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pink City Midway Petroleum, 2003 52 ALR 577 (SC) Relied upon by respondents regarding arbitration/contractual remedies. The Court observed the judgment was relied upon but considered it distinguishable on the facts of the present case.
A.B.L International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation, 2004 3 SCC 553 Relied upon by respondents in support of arbitration remedy. The Court noted the reliance but held that the precedents were distinguishable given the factual matrix here.
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport, 2006 7 SCC 275 Relied upon by respondents in the arbitration context. The Court treated the authority as distinguishable on the facts before it.
Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. U.P. Electronics Corpn. Ltd., 2006 7 SCC 737 Relied upon by respondents regarding arbitration/contractual dispute resolution. The Court recorded reliance but found the judgment distinguishable on facts.
Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Sri Laxmi Knits and Woven, 2007 67 ALR 7 (SC) Relied upon by respondents for arbitration-related principles. The Court noted reliance and concluded the cited judgment was distinguishable for the present facts.
The Empire Jute Co. Ltd. v. The Jute Corporation of India Ltd., JT 2007 12 SC 391 Relied upon by respondents concerning arbitration/contractual remedies. The Court recorded the reliance but did not apply it, finding factual distinctions.
National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises, 2003 12 AIC 129 (SC) Relied upon by respondents on arbitration/contractual dispute resolution. The Court held this authority was distinguishable on the facts of the present case.
Sanjana M. Wig v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., 2005 35 AIC 945 (SC) Relied upon by respondents in support of arbitration/contract remedies. The Court recorded reliance but treated the judgment as distinguishable here.
Kerala S.E.B. v. Kurient E. Kalathie, 2000 6 SCC 293 Relied upon by respondents concerning arbitration/contractual dispute resolution. The Court noted reliance and found that judgments relied upon were distinguishable on the facts before it.
Dr. Bishambhar Dayal v. Aligarh Muslim University through Vice-Chancellor, 1993 ALR 22 213 Principle that an authority who has decided a matter in one capacity cannot hear and decide the same matter in a different capacity. The Court expressly relied on this authority to support its conclusion that once the appellate authority (Director/Executive Director) has decided the matter in appellate capacity, arbitration before the same officer would not be a proper remedy; used to reject the preliminary objection.
Bhavnagar University v. Pallitana Sugar Mills (P), 2003 2 SCC 111 Referenced for the proposition that small differences in facts can affect the precedential value of a judgment. The Court cited this to justify distinguishing authorities relied upon by respondents and to observe that factual differences matter in the application of precedent.
Rajveer Singh v. Chaudhary Devi Lal, AIR 2008 SCW 5817 Referenced as a recent following of the principle that factual differences can change precedential application. The Court referenced this decision to support the view that precedents may be distinguished on facts; it was not applied to mandate arbitration in this case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in two stages: first addressing the preliminary objection on maintainability (arbitration), and then considering the merits.

(1) Preliminary objection on arbitration:

  • The Court noted that Clause 62(a) of the dealership agreement provides for arbitration before the Director (Marketing) of I.B.P. Corporation (who may act as arbitrator or nominate another officer).
  • Respondents relied on several precedents to contend arbitration should be the remedy. The Court examined whether arbitration was an efficacious remedy in the factual matrix where the petitioner had already availed the appeal remedy provided under the Marketing Discipline Guidelines and the appellate authority was the same officer who could act as arbitrator.
  • The Court accepted the petitioner's submission that where the appeal has been decided by the same authority who might be the arbitrator, invoking arbitration thereafter would, in effect, amount to seeking redress before the same person in a different capacity (described in the petition as akin to "appeal from ceaser to ceaser's wife").
  • Relying on Dr. Bishambhar Dayal v. Aligarh Muslim University, the Court held that once the appellate authority has decided the matter in that capacity, he cannot hear and decide the same matter in a different capacity; thus arbitration would not be a proper remedy in the present facts.
  • The Court therefore rejected the preliminary objection and held that arbitration was not the proper remedy here where the petitioner had chosen and pursued the appeal remedy before the same authority.

(2) On the merits:

  • The appellate order (dated 4 April 2008) had recorded that time frames prescribed for testing were intended to streamline proceedings and, under Clause 2.5 of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines, did not affect the quality/result of the product; therefore the appellate authority did not find the delay to be prejudicial.
  • The Court observed that the appellate authority did not examine whether the specific delay of about 110 days in testing would in fact adversely affect sample quality or the accuracy of the test report.
  • The Court noted the Government notification (31 December 2008) discontinuing the marker test w.e.f. 12 January 2009, and emphasized that the withdrawal of the marker test (which had been in force only for a short period) and concerns that it was not conclusive for detecting adulteration were relevant to the evaluation of the Corporation's basis for cancellation.
  • The Court framed two specific issues requiring examination by the Corporation: (a) whether the delay of 110 days in testing affected the sample quality; and (b) whether such delay was merely technical and did not substantially affect the petitioner's rights.
  • Given that the marker test had been withdrawn and that the appellate authority had not assessed the effect of delay on quality, the Court found that the appellate order could not be legally sustained in its present form.
  • The Court quashed the appellate order and directed the Marketing Director to re-examine the matter afresh, to pass a reasoned, speaking order in light of the observations, preferably within four weeks from filing of a certified copy of the Court's order.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Writ petition allowed; the appellate order dated 4th April, 2008 is quashed and the matter is remanded to the Marketing Director for fresh consideration.

Implications and consequences:

  • The Court rejected the respondents' preliminary objection that the petition should be referred to arbitration under Clause 62(a) on the facts that the petitioner had already availed and been decided upon by the appellate remedy before the same authority; arbitration was held not to be a proper remedy in these circumstances.
  • The appellate order was quashed because the appellate authority had not examined whether the long delay in testing (about 110 days) affected sample quality or whether the delay was merely technical; given also that the marker test was later discontinued by Government notification, the matter needed reassessment.
  • The Marketing Director is directed to examine the matter afresh and pass a reasoned speaking order, preferably within four weeks of receiving a certified copy of this judgment.
  • The Court's decision has direct effect between the parties (quashing the appellate order and remanding the case). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent beyond its application to the facts before the Court; the Court expressly distinguished the authorities relied upon by respondents on factual grounds.

Disposition: Petition Allowed. (Order: "Petition Allowed.")

Petition Allowed.

    M/S. Anil Service Station, Rohuwa Mustafabad, Azamgarh Through Its Proprietor And Another v. Union Of India And Others

    Arun Tandon, J.:— Heard Sri M.D Singh ‘Shekhar’, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Sanjay Kumar Singh, learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri Prakash Padia, learned Counsel for respondent Nos. 2 to 4 and learned Additional Solicitor General of India for Union of India.

    2. Petitioner was appointed as dealer for sale of oil and oil products of Indo-Burman Petroleum Corporation Limited (for short ‘I.B.P Corporation) under letter of the Divisional Manager, I.B.P Corporation dated 31st October, 2005 (Annexure-2 to the writ petition). An agreement was also executed between the petitioner and I.B.P Corporation on 31st October, 2005 (as is admitted in paragraph-4 of the writ petition), a copy of the same has been produced before this Court at the time of hearing neither the execution nor the terms and conditions of the agreement are in dispute between the parties.

    3. I.B.P Corporation has since been merged with Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. with all rights and obligations. The dealers appointed by the I.B.P Corporation are treated to be the dealers of Indian Oil Corporation on same terms and conditions. There is no dispute in that regard between the parties.

    4. On 25th June, 2007 samples of motor spirit and high speed diesel were drawn from the nozzle of the delivery pump established at the retail outlet of the petitioner. A ‘marker test’ was carried out by the representatives of S.G.S India Private Limited. On 26th June, 2007, sales and supplies of the petroleum products from the retail outlet of the petitioner was suspended as the samples failed the marker test, under order of the Deputy Manager (Retail Sales), Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., Varanasi. On 28th June, 2007, the petitioner is stated to have sent a letter to the Indian Oil Corporation with a prayer that fresh inspection should be made and samples be drawn in the presence of the petitioner. This was followed by another letter dated 16th August, 2007 for the said purpose.

    5. However, under letter dated 11th October, 2007, the petitioner was invited to appear for testing of the second sample drawn on 25th June, 2007 at the laboratory at Mughalsarai Terminal on 15th October, 2007 at the time fixed. Laboratory test of the retained sample was done at Maghalsarai Terminal on 15th October, 2007 in the presence of the representative of the petitioner and the samples again failed the marker test.

    6. For the purposes of carrying out the marker test after nearly five months of the date on which the samples were drawn from the nozzle of the retail outlet of the petitioner at Mughalsarai Terminal, approval was also obtained from the competent authority, which added a note that for delay of five months, explanation of the officers concerned be called for.

    7. On the basis of the failure of the samples, a show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner calling upon him to submit a written explanation for the irregularities mentioned in notice itself within ten days, failing which the Corporation will have no other option but to take action against the dealership of the petitioner as per Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2005 and relevant clauses of standard dealership agreement.

    8. Petitioner instead of submitting his reply to the notice issued filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 52580 of 2007, which was disposed vide order dated 30th October, 2007 by providing that the petitioner may submit his reply within ten days from the date of order and General Manager, Indian Oil Corporation Ltd., U.P State Office-II, Kapoorthala Complex, Aliganj, Lucknow was directed to conclude the proceedings within fifteen days thereafter.

    9. Petitioner submitted his reply to the notice so issued vide letter dated 5th November, 2007 and pointed out that under Clause-2.10 of the marketing discipline guidelines, samples collected from the retail outlet of the petitioner should have reach the laboratory for testing, within ten days and the testing must have been carried out at the laboratory within 20 days. Results of such testing are required to be communicated to the dealer within next 5 days. The total aforesaid period would work out to 35 days only. It was pointed out that in the facts of the case, the Indian Oil Corporation had taken 110 days for testing the samples, which was per se illegal. It was further pointed out that T.T Retention Samples were available at the retail outlet, and an information to that effect was sent by a letter, however, the T.T Retention Samples were not collected nor tested. Other discrepancies in taking of the samples were also pointed out.

    10. The Indian Oil Corporation did not find the explanation furnished by the petitioner satisfactory. Accordingly the dealership of the petitioner was terminated, having been found guilty of adulteration, as per order of the General Manager, U.P State Office, Lucknow of Indian Oil Corporation dated 24th January, 2008. It has been recorded in the order that delay in testing of samples will not affect the quality of samples, hence no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It is further recorded that T.T Retention Samples were not made available to M/s. S.G.S Indian Private Limited as per its report dated 25th June, 2007 as they were not properly sealed. The explanation that the T.T Retention Samples were kept in almirah was therefore, not accepted.

    11. The termination order of the dealership of the petitioner itself provided that as per Clause No. (iv) of the “notes” in Chapter 6 of the marketing Discipline Guidelines-2005, the petitioner has a right of an appeal against the order before the Executive Director (Retail Sales), Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Indian Oil Bhawan, G-9 Ali Yavar Jung Marg, Bandra (East), Mumbai-51. Petitioner accordingly preferred an appeal before the Executive Director. The appeal filed by the petitioner has also been dismissed under the order of the Executive Director dated 4th April, 2008. It is against these two orders that the present writ petition has been filed.

    12. An amendment application has been filed, which has been allowed vide order dated 24th April, 2009 for bringing on record the amendments made under the Government Order dated 31st December, 2008, to the Motor Spirit and High Speed Diesel Regulation of Supply Distribution and Prevention of Malpractices) Order, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Order, 2005’), whereby w.e.f 12th January, 2009, the marker test for judging adulteration in the petroleum products has been discontinued.

    13. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contended that there has been inordinate delay in testing of the samples drawn from the nozzle of the retail outlet of the petitioner, further the T.T Retention Samples were neither taken nor tested. Lastly, it is submitted that the very basis on which the dealership has been cancelled, namely marker test itself has been found to be diseffective/inconclusive to Judge adulteration, therefore, discontinued under the Government Order w.e.f 12th January, 2009.

    14. A Heavy reliance has been placed upon Clause 2.10 of Chapter-2 (Industry Guidelines for Sample Collection and Testing) of Marketing Discipline Guidelines, with reference to time frame provided for collection of the sample, transmission of the same to laboratory and testing thereof as well as for communication of the test report.

    15. Learned Counsel for the petitioner clarifies that the time framed fixed under Clause 2.10, has to be strictly followed and the total period provided would work out to 35 days from the date of drawal of the sample. In the facts of the present case the Indian Oil Corporation has taken 110 days to test the samples from the date of drawal, which makes the entire exercise illegal.

    16. On behalf of the respondents a counter-affidavit has been filed and a preliminary objection has been raised, with regard to the maintainability of the present writ petition, with specific reference to Clause 62(a) of the agreement executed between the parties, which provides that any dispute in relation to, or arising thereto, as per the agreement, shall be referred to sole arbitrator i.e, the Director (Marketing) of I.B.P Corporation, who may either himself act as the arbitrator or nominate some other officer of I.B.P to act as the arbitrator, with a specific condition that no objection can be raised with regard to appointment of such arbitrator on the ground that the arbitrator is an officer of I.B.P Reliance in that regard has been placed upon the Division Bench judgment of Lucknow Bench of this Court in the case of Balaji Filling Station Ltd. v. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 10867 (M.B) of 2008, decided on 3rd December, 2008 as well as upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v. P.V.G Raju . 2000 4 SCC 539., Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pink City Midway Petroleum . 2003 52 ALR 577 SC, A.B.L International Ltd. v. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation . 2004 3 SCC 553., Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. v. Verma Transport . 2006 7 SCC 275., Bharat Sewa Sansthan v. U.P Electronics Corpn. Ltd.. . 2006 7 SCC 737., Agri Gold Exims Ltd. v. Sri Laxmi Knits and Woven . 2007 67 ALR 7 SC, The Empire Jute Co. Ltd. v. The Jute Corporation of India Ltd. . JT 2007 12 SC 391., National Highways Authority of India v. Ganga Enterprises . 2003 12 AIC 129 SC, Sanjana M. Wig (Ms) v. Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. . 2005 35 AIC 945 SC, Kerala S.E.B v. Kurient E. Kalathie . 2000 6 SCC 293..

    17. On merit it has been explained that although there has been some delay in sending of the samples and testing of the same at laboratory, but in view of Clause 2.5 of Marketing Discipline Guidelines, it is apparently clear that time prescribed is only for streamlining the system and is not in any way related to the quality and result of the product. It is stated that one of the reason for delay in testing of samples was because of merger of the I.B.P Corporation Ltd. with Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.

    18. In rejoinder it has been stated on behalf of the petitioner that since the appellate order has been passed by the Executive Director (Retail Sales) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (Marketing Division), Mumbai, any arbitration by the same officer as has been provided under Clause-62 of the agreement between the parties would virtually be an appeal from ceaser to ceaser's wife.

    19. I have considered the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the present writ petition.

    20. The Court may first consider the preliminary objection qua the remedy of arbitration. The order impugned as has been passed by the Executive Director, Marketing in his capacity as the appellate authority under the Marketing Discipline Guidelines. Arbitration application as per Clause 62(a) of the dealership agreement has to be filed before him. He is to act as the arbitrator or can appoint some other officer for the same. In the aforesaid factual background, the reply of the petitioner to preliminary objection i.e, asking the petitioner to avail the remedy of arbitration under Clause-62 would only be an remedy from ceaser to ceaser's wife is justified. Alternative remedy should a real remedy and not a mere formality.

    21. In the facts of the present case, this Court is satisfied that the preliminary objection qua the matter being referred for arbitration has to be rejected. This Court may record that with the enforcement of Marketing Discipline Guidelines-2005, which provide for an appeal against cancellation of dealership, a dealer has been provided two remedies one by way of appeal and the other by way of arbitration, both before the same authority i.e, Director marketing. If the dealer has chosen the remedy of appeal, I am of the considered opinion that the remedy of arbitration is lost. Inasmuch as once the appellate authority has decided the matter in that capacity, he cannot hear and decide the same matter in a different capacity. (Reference Dr. Bishambhar Dayal v. Aligarh Muslim University through Vice-Chancellor . 1993 ALR 22 213.. The judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the respondents are clearly distinguishable on facts noticed above. It has been repeatedly held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a little difference in the facts or additional facts may make a lot of difference in the presidential value of a judgment (Reference Bhavnagar University v. Pallitana Sugar Mills (P) . 2003 2 SCC 111., which has recently been followed in the case of Rajveer Singh v. Chaudhary Devi Lal . AIR 2008 SCW 5817.. The Court holds that in the facts of the present case, arbitration would not be the proper remedy.

    22. Now turning to the merits of the case. The appellate order has only recorded that the time prescribed for testing of the samples is only for streamlining the proceedings and does not affect the quality of the samples as per Clause 2.5 of the Marketing Discipline Guidelines. What has not been examined by the appellate authority is as to who whether infact the delay of 110 days in testing of the samples would adversely affect its quality and as to whether such delay would in any way affect the testing report obtained thereof. This Court may also note that in between the Government of India has itself done away with marker test as is established from the amendments made in Order, 2005 vide notification dated 31st December, 2008, which has been brought on record as Annexure-22 to the writ petition (by way of amendment application). The issuance of the said notification is not in dispute between the parties.

    23. Thus, two issues are set up for consideration before this Court (a) whether delay of 110 days in testing of the samples would in any way effect its quality or not and (b) whether such delay is technical in nature and does not substantially affect any rights of the petitioner. The aforesaid issues need examination in the background that the Government of India has itself done away with marker test, as is established from the amendments made in Order, 2005 vide notification dated 31st December, 2008. It has to be kept in mind that establishment of retail outlet incurs heavy expenditure and is bread and butter to the dealer concerned. The same is not to be cancelled unless there is conclusive evidence of adulteration by the dealers. This Court feels that impact of withdrawal of marker test, which had remain in force only for a short duration of two years also needs examination in the aforesaid background. The Corporation is the best judge to satisfy itself as to whether the dealership is liable to be cancelled on the basis of marker test only, specifically in the background that such test at laboratory was done after 110 days of the drawal of the samples and when the marker test itself has been withdrawn by the Government of India basically for the reason that the marker test has not been found to be conclusive for coming to the conclusion that there has been adulteration in the petroleum product, meaning thereby that the authenticity of such marker test itself has been found to be doubtful.

    24. In such circumstances, the order passed by the appellate authority i.e, Marketing Director dated 4th April, 2008 cannot be legally sustained and is hereby quashed.

    25. Let the Marketing Director examine the matter afresh in light of the observations made above and pass a reasoned speaking order, preferably within four weeks from the date a certified copy of this order is filed before him.

    26. The writ petition is allowed subject to the observations made above.

    Petition Allowed.

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