Judgement
SUBBA RAO, C.J. :- S. C. C. M. Ps. Nos. 4205 to 4221 of 1954 :
These are applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of India against the judgment pf the Madras High Court delivered on 18-12-1953 in C. R. Ps. Nos. 1927 to 1943 of 1949 reported in AIR 1954 Mad 788 (FB). The said revisions arise out of 17 suits filed in the District Munsifs Court, Bezwada by the respondents, who are proprietors of the village called Bommaluru in the Krishna District against tenants, the petitioners, for possession of holdings in the village, for an injunction restraining them from removing the paddy heaps standing in the suit land and for effecting division of the paddy heaps.
In ten of the suits, they also asked for recovery of cesses from the tenants. The 1st defendant was a co-sharer with the plaintiffs and the other defendants are tenants. The tenants pleaded, inter alia, that the village was an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act and that they had occupancy rights therein.
This contention was countered by the plaintiffs stating that the decision of the Revenue Divisional Officer in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 holding i that the village was not an estate was res judicata between the parties and, therefore, the plea that the village was an estate was not open to the tenants.
To defeat this plea, the tenants pleaded that In O. S. No. 318 of 1943 and other suits, it was held that the finding in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 to the effect that the village was not an estate was not res judicata and that this would, in its turn. operate as res judicata between the parties with the result that the petitioners would be entitled to prove in the present suits that the village was not an estate.
2. On the above pleadings, the following issues were framed in one batch of suits.
1. Whether the suit land is an estate and, if so, whether this Court has jurisdiction to try the suit ?
2. Whether the decision in O. S. No. 318 of 1943 and other suits of that batch operates as res Judicata on the above issue ?
3. Whether the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 on the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nuzvid operates as res judicata with regard to issue 1 ?
4. Whether the suit is premature as far as cesses are concerned ?
5. To what relief are the plaintiffs entitled ?
3. The said issues are common to O. S. Nos. 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120 and 122 of 1946. The following issues were settled in O. S. Nos. 452B, 454, 458, 460, 462, 464, 468 and 470 of 1946 :
1. Whether the defendants have occupancy-rights ?
2. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction ?
3. Whether the plaintiff, is entitled to a. " charge ?
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest ?
5. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata ? Additional Issue framed on 11-4-194" :-
Whether the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 ort the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nuzvid, operates as res judicata with regard to issue-1 ?
4. The learned District Munsif held that, the village was an estate and therefore the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. In that, view, he held that the other issues did not arise for consideration. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge placed before himself the following points :
1. Whether the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 193S of the Revenue Divisional Officer of Nuzvid-operates as res judicata as between the parties on. the question, whether the suit land is an estate ?
2. Whether the suit land is an estate and the-contesting defendants have occupancy rights-therein ?
3. whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to-try the suit ?
5. The learned District Judge held, agreeing with the first court, that the suit land was an. estate and that the defendants have occupancy rights. On the first point, he found that the-decision in M. P. No. 3 of 1938 did not operate as res judicata between the parties. He also allowed the appeal filed by the tenants against the order of the first Court disallowing costs. In the-result, he dismissed the appeals filed by the plaintiffs and allowed the appeals filed by the defendants.
The High Court held that the finding of the Revenue Court was not res judicata but disagreed with the Courts below and held that the village was neither an estate under S. 3(2) (d) nor under S. 3(2) (e) of the Madras Estates Land Act. The suits were remanded for further trial on, the other issues not disposed of.
The High Court, therefore, decided issues 1 and 3 in the batch of suits O. S. Nos. 110 of 1946 etc., and issues 1, 2 and the additional issue in the batch of suits O. S. Nos. 452 of 1946 etc. After remand, issues 2, 4 and 5 in the former batch and issues 3, 4 and1 5 in the latter batch remain to be decided.
In view of the conclusion arrived at by the Madras High Court that the decision in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 viz., that the village was not an estate was not res judicata and that the village was not an estate, issue 2 becomes unnecessary for that issue was raised only as a counter-blast to issue 3. Issue, 2 raised the question whether the finding in. O. S. No. 318 of 1943, namely, that the finding in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 was not res judicata would operate as res judicata between the parties. As it was held that the finding in M. P. No. 2 of 1938 would not operate as res judicata between the parties, issue 2 became unnecessary.
6. As regards the question of cesses Mr. Somasundaram, learned Counsel for the petitioner concedes that the plaintiffs would be entitled to a decree for cesses. Among the issues framed in the connected batch of O. S. Nos. 452 of 1946, etc., the only issues, which remain to be decided are (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a charge ?
(2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to interest ?
7. Mr. Somasundaram, learned counsel for the petitioners, concedes that the two issues should automatically be decided in favour of the plaintiffs, if the finding of the High Court on the other question was right. The result is that, after the remand; by the High Court, nothing remains to be done except to make formal decree in favour of the plaintiffs.
8. The law on the subject has been well settled. Article 133 of the Constitution of India says :
Article 133(1)
An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order in civil proceedings of a High Court in the territory of India if the High Court certifies :
9. Mr. Venkatarama Sastry contends that, as the High Court remanded the matter for disposal on the remaining issues, the order of remand was not a "final order within the meaning of that Article. Mr. Somasundaram for the petitioners argues that the High Court decided all the material issues and that after remand nothing remains except for the trial court to make a formal decree, and therefore, the order of remand was a "final order" within the meaning of the Article.
The connotation of the word final in Art. 133 and similar words in the previous statutes have been the subject of judicial scrutiny by the Privy Council, Supreme Court and by the High Courts. In Firm Ramchand Manjimal v. Firm Goverdhandas Vishandas Ratanchand, AIR 1920 PC 86 (A) the Judicial Committee, in construing similar words in 8. 109, C.P.C. observed at page 87 as follows :
"The effect of those and other judgments is that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The orders now under appeal do not finally dispose of those rights but leave them to be determined by the courts in the ordinary way"
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10. The Judicial Committee again in Abdul Rahman v. D.K. Cassim and Sons, AIR 1933 PC 58 at p. 60 (B) reiterated the same view and laid down the following test namely
"The finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If, after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it under S. 109(a)"
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11. The Federal Court in Mohammad Amin Bros. Ltd. v. Dominion of India AIR 1950 FC 77 (C), accepted and followed the definition of a final order as laid down by the Judicial Committee. A Division Bench of the Madras High Court consisting of Rajamannar, C.J. and Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Ragavacharyulu v. Venkata Ramanujacharyulu, AIR 1954 Mad 406 (D) also adopted the same test when they said :
"It is therefore well settled that an order can be held to be a final order only if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties in the suit or proceeding"
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12. So too a Division Bench of this Court of which one of us (The Chief Justice) was a member, in Mangaraju v. Varahalamma. AIR 1956 Andhra 47 at p. 49 (E), after reviewing the case law on the subject, observed :
"From the aforesaid discussion of the case law on the subject, it is clear an appeal lies to the Supreme Court under Art. 133 if the order complained of finally disposes of the rights of the parties. To put it differently, it should not be a interlocutory order but a final order deciding the rights of the parties. The word judgment in the Article in the contest means final judgment in the sense that it finally decides the rights of the parties."
13. The question, therefore, is whether the judgment of the Madras High Court in the present case has finally decided the rights of the parties, or whether the suit after remand was still a live suit in which the rights of the parties should be determined. What matters is not the form but the substance. If, in substance, no rights of the parties are outstanding to be decided in the suit, it cannot be said that a mere pendency of a suit on the file of a Court deprives the otherwise final adjudication of the rights of the parties by the High Court of its finality.
This view gets support from the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Amritsar v. Shiv Ratan Deo Singh, (S) AIR 1955 SC 576 (F). There, the High Court had decided all the material issues and what remained to be done was only the passing of the decree by the first court in terms of the High Courts decree. On that basis, the Supreme Court held that the order of the High Court was final order within the meaning of Art. 133.
14. If the aforesaid principles are applied, can it be said in the present case that the order in question is not a final order within the meaning of Art. 133. All the material issues between the parties were finally decided. It was finally held that the village was not an estate and that the previous judgments did not operate as res judicata.
In view of the clear concessions made before us, there is nothing more to be done after remand by the trial Court except to pass a decree. In the circumstances, we hold that the order of the Madras High Court is a final order within the meaning of Art. 133.
15. It is not disputed that the value of the subject-matter in dispute is more than Rs. 20,000/-. We, therefore, grant leave to the petitioners to prefer appeals to the Supreme Court under Art. 133(1) of the Constitution of India, C. M. P. No. 422 of 1954
16. This is an application for consolidating the appeals for purpose of valuation, security and printing. It is ordered.
C. M. P. No. 4580 of 1955.
17. This is an application for staying the trial of O. S. No. 110 of 1946 pending appeal to the Supreme Court. As we have admitted the appeal, we think it is just and proper that the trial of the suit should be staved. But it is represented to us that the plaintiffs received their half share giving security bonds to the Court. It is agreed that the said security bonds given in O. S. No. 110 of 1946 and the other connected suits should be cancelled. There will be no stay as regards the decree for costs.
C. M. Ps. Nos. 4578 and 4579 of 1955
18. These are two applications for stay of trial of two suits O. S. No. 234 of 1953 and 6. S. No. 250/51 filed by the respondents for declaration that the petitioners and others in the village have no occupancy rights and that the plaintiffs are entitled to half the produce on the suit lands. We do not see any reason for staying these suits pending the disposal of the appeal to the Supreme Court.
19. These applications are, therefore, dismissed with costs.
Order accordingly.