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Case Number

S.C.C M.P Nos. 1176 & 1177 of 1955

Advocates

For the Appellant: N. Bapiraju, Advocate

Judges

K. Subba Rao, C.J
Krishna Rao, J.

Acts

SECTION 34 ARBITRATION ACT 1940

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Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent had been married to the late Valluri Subbarao in or about 1930. The applicant was Subbarao's second wife. After Subbarao's death the respondent (plaintiff) filed O.S. No. 78 of 1949 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, Rajahmundry, seeking partition and recovery of possession of a half share in the plaint schedule properties. The 1st defendant alleged that the plaintiff had been deprived of her inheritance rights due to unchastity and that Subbarao executed a will dated 19 May 1948 bequeathing the entire properties to the applicant and others.

The learned Subordinate Judge, upon considering evidence, held that the applicant failed to establish that the 1948 will was executed in a sound disposing state of mind, and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, making provisions for maintenance and marriage expenses of Subbarao's daughters. The applicant appealed this decree to the High Court as A.S. No. 434 of 1954.

A receiver had been appointed in the suit; he collected funds, discharged debts, paid half the amount due to the 1st defendant, and deposited Rs. 100,000 in court (of which about Rs. 90,000 represented profits due to the plaintiff's share). While the appeal was pending the applicant filed two applications: (i) for directions to continue the receiver and (ii) for stay of further proceedings pending the appeal. These applications were heard by Bhimasankaram, J., who by order dated 17 February 1955 directed Rs. 60,000 to be kept in court and the balance to be paid to the plaintiff; ordered the receiver to continue collecting outstandings; and directed the receiver to hand over the plaintiff's share in his possession upon her furnishing security for Rs. 13,000. The 1st defendant preferred two appeals against that order, which were dismissed by the court that produced this opinion.

The present applications are under Article 133 of the Constitution of India for leave to prefer appeals to the Supreme Court of India against the order of this court (the interlocutory order just described).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the order made by the High Court (the interlocutory order of 17 February 1955) is a "judgment, decree or final order" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India and therefore appealable to the Supreme Court.
Whether the word "judgment" in Article 133(1) has a scope broad enough to include interlocutory orders (as contended by the applicant's counsel).
Whether clause (c) of Article 133(1) (the "fit case" provision) is relevant given the contention that a single judge of a High Court is not a "court immediately below" a division bench of the same High Court, and consequently whether the additional condition (when a judgment affirms the decision of the court below the appeal should involve some substantial question of law) is required to be satisfied.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

The applicant's counsel argued that the order under challenge is a "judgment" within the meaning of Article 133(1) if it directly or indirectly involves some claim or question respecting property of the value of Rs. 20,000 (or more), thereby entitling the applicant to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
He further contended that clause (c) of Article 133(1) has no application because a single judge of the High Court is not a "court immediately below" a division bench; therefore the additional condition that, where the High Court affirms the decision of the court below, the appeal should involve some substantial question of law, need not be complied with.
As to the meaning of "judgment," counsel argued that the word should be given a broader connotation (including interlocutory orders) and relied on the textual history (pointing out changes introduced by the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950) to support that view.

The opinion does not set out any detailed or opposing arguments by the respondent in the text of the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ramchand Manjimal v. Vishandas Ratanchand, (1920) I.L.R. 47 Cal. 918; L.R. 47 I.A. 124 (Privy Council)	The test that an order is "final" only if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties; an order refusing a stay was held not to be a final order.	Relied upon as leading authority establishing that an order is final only if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties; used to show that interlocutory orders fall outside appealability under the corresponding provision.
Abdul Rahman v. Cassim and Sons, (1932) I.L.R. 11 Rangoon 58 (Privy Council)	Reiterated the same view: "finality must be a finality in relation to the suit" and if the suit remains live then no appeal under the relevant provision lies.	Used to reinforce the principle that an order of remand (or other interlocutory order) is not a final order and thus not appealable under the constitutional provision.
Mohammad Amin Brothers v. The Dominion of India, 1950 S.C.J. 139; A.I.R. 1950 F.C. 77 (Federal Court)	Accepted the Privy Council's definition of "final order"; held that an interlocutory order (compulsory winding up direction set aside and remanded) is not a final order. Also considered the meaning of "judgment" and held it to mean a final determination of the rights of the parties (as in a decree).	Held binding on the court; applied mutatis mutandis to construe similar words in Article 133(1), and rejected the contention that an interlocutory order can be treated as a "judgment" for the purposes of appealability.
Goya Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1950) I.L.R. 30 Patna 853 (Patna High Court)	Ruled that an order of the High Court staying a suit under section 34, Arbitration Act, 1940, is not a "final order" within Article 133(1) because it did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties.	Applied as an example of a High Court following the finality test; used to illustrate that even where a cardinal point is decided, if the suit remains alive the order is interlocutory for Article 133 purposes.
Raghavacharyulu v. Ramanujacharyulu, (1954) 1 M.L.J. 198 (Madras High Court)	Applied the finality test to an order deciding some issues and remanding for trial on other issues; held such orders to be interlocutory. Also held that "judgment" in Article 133 is used in the sense of a decree or final order, not in the broader Civil Procedure Code sense.	Used to support the interpretation that "judgment" in Article 133 means a final judgment (i.e., one that finally disposes rights), and to show consistent judicial treatment rejecting interlocutory orders as appealable under the article.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a focused legal analysis grounded on the established test of "finality" as developed in prior case law. The key elements of the reasoning are:

Characterization of the challenged order: The court observed that the order made by Bhimasankaram, J. (17 February 1955), and confirmed by the present court, was an interlocutory, interim order made pending an appeal. It imposed temporary restrictions on the exercise of rights declared by the Subordinate Judge (e.g., direction about funds to be retained in court, continuation of the receiver, security for handover of property share).
Incumbent legal question: Whether such an interlocutory order qualifies as a "judgment, decree or final order" within Article 133(1), thereby attracting the right to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Treatment of the applicant's textual and historical argument: The applicant argued that the word "judgment" should be read broadly to include interlocutory orders (and relied on textual history). The court declined to resolve all aspects of textual history because authoritative precedents had already settled the question.
Reliance on authoritative precedents: The court relied on a consistent line of authority (Privy Council and Federal Court decisions and subsequent High Court rulings) that established the controlling test: an order is final only if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties in the suit. The court specifically cited Ramchand Manjimal, Abdul Rahman, and Mohammad Amin Brothers as settling that "judgment" and "final order" in the relevant appellate provisions refer to orders which finally determine the parties' rights, and that interlocutory orders are not included.
Application of the test to the present facts: Applying that test, the court found the order in question to be interlocutory because it did not finally dispose of the rights of the parties — the underlying suit remained live and the order imposed only temporary restrictions. The court therefore concluded that the order was not a "judgment, decree or final order" for the purposes of Article 133(1).
Ancillary point left open: The court noted it was unnecessary to express a view on whether the judgment of a single judge is that of a "court immediately below" a division bench for the purposes of clause (c) of Article 133(1), because it had already reached the conclusion that the order did not qualify as a "judgment, decree or final order."

Holding and Implications

FINAL DECISION: The applications for leave to prefer appeals to the Supreme Court under Article 133 were dismissed. The court held that the order under challenge was interlocutory in nature and therefore not a "judgment, decree or final order" within the meaning of Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India.

Direct consequences for the parties:

The applicant is not entitled to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 133(1) against the interlocutory order in question.
The interlocutory order (directions regarding funds, continuation of the receiver, and security conditions) remains in place as it was characterized and disposed of in the High Court; the applications for leave have been dismissed with costs.

Broader implications: The opinion applies and reiterates established authorities on the meaning of "final order" and "judgment" for appealability under Article 133(1). The opinion does not announce a novel principle beyond the cited authorities; it applies settled tests to the facts before the court.

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Vallury Mangaraju Petitioner ( In L.P.A Nos. 8 And 9 Of 1955) v. Vallury Varahalamma Alias Ammannamma ( In L.P.A Nos. 8 & 9 Of 1955).

(1) The chief justice. - these are applications under article 133 of the constitution of india for leave to prefer appeals to the supreme court of india against an order of this court.

(2) The respondent was married to late valluri subbarao in or about the year 1930. The applicant was the second wife of the said subbarao. After the death of subbarao, the respondent filed o. S. No. 78 of 1949 on the file of the subordinate judge's court, rajahmundry, for partition and for recovery of possession of a half share in the plaint schedule properties. The ist defendant contended that the plaintiff was deprived of her rights to inherit her husband's properties by reason of her unchastity and that late subbarao had executed a will, dated 19th may, 1948 bequeathing the entire properties to the applicant and others.

(3) The learned subordinate judge, on a consideration of the evidence, held that the applicant failed to make out that the will was executed by subbarao in a sound disposing state of mind and decreed the suit as prayed for. In decreeing the suit provision was made for the maintenance of subbarao's daughters and for the marriage expenses of those daughters. The applicant preferred an appeal against the decree to the high court and it is numbered as a. S. No. 434 of 1954. Pending the suit a receiver was appointed who collected a large amount, discharged debts, paid half the amount due to the 1st defendant to her and deposited a lakh of rupees in court out of which admittedly about rs. 90,000 represent the profits due to the plaintiff's share. Pending the appeal she filed two applications, one for directions for continuing the receiver and the other for stay of further proceedings pending the appeal. The applications came before bhimasankaram, j. , who by order, dated 17th february, 1955, directed rs. 60,000 to be kept in court and the balance to be paid over to the plaintiff. The learned judge also directed the receiver appointed by the first court to continue for the purpose of collecting the outstandings and directed him to hand over to the plaintiff her share of the property in his possession on her furnishing security for a sum of rs. 13,000. The 1st defendant preferred two appeals against the said order and we have dismissed them.

(4) From the aforesaid facts, it is manifest that the order of bhirnasankaram, j. , which was confirmed by us did not purport to decide the rights of the parties finally. It was only an interlocutory order made pending an appeal imposing some conditions on the plaintiff from drawing out the amounts to which she was entitled under the decree obtained by her. The question is whether an appeal lies under article 133 of the constitution of india to the supreme court against such an interlocutory order. Article 133 reads :

" (1) an appeal shall lie to the supreme court from any judgment, decree or final order in a civil proceeding of a high court in the territory of india if the high court certifies : (a) that the amount or value of the subject - matter of the dispute in the court of first instance and still in dispute on appeal was and is not less than twenty - thousand rupees or such other sum as may be specified in that behalf by parliament by law ; or (b) that the judgment, decree or final order involves directly or indirectly some claim or question respecting property of the like amount or value ; or (c) that the case is a fit one for appeal to the supreme court ; and where the judgment, decree or final order appealed from affirms the decision of the court immediately below in any case other than a case referred to in sub - clause (c) if the high court further certifies that the appeal involves some substantial question of law"

(5) The learned counsel for the applicant contends that his client is entitled to have leave if the order made by us is a ' judgment' within the meaning of article 133 (1) if the said judgment directly or indirectly involves some claim or question respecting property of the value of rs. 20,000. He says further that clause (c) has no application as a single judge of the high court is not a "court immediately below" a division bench of the same court and, therefore, the additional condition that when the judgment affirms the decision of the court below the appeal should involve some substantial question of law need not be complied with.

(6) It is not necessary in this case to express our view on the question whether the judgment of a single judge of a high court is that of a court immediately below a division b;nch of the same court for we are satisfied that the order complained of is not either a judgment, decree or final order within the meaning of article 133 (i) of the constitution.

(7) The learned counsel for the applicant contends that the word ' judgment' in article 133 (1) has a more comprehensive connotation than the words 'decree or final order ' but takes within its range not only final orders but also interlocutory orders. He seeks to derive support for this argument from the history of article 133 (1) by pointing out that the word 'judgment' was not present in sections 109 and 110 of the civil procedure code of 1903 but was only introduced in those sections by the adaptation of laws order, 1950. But in our view it would be futile to trace the history of the words in article 133 (1) as the controversy was closed by the authoritative decisions of the privy council and of the federal court.

(8) The leading decision on this question is that of the judicial committee in ramchand manjimal v. Vishandas ratanchand. (1920) i. L. R. 47 cal. 918 : l. R. 47 i. A. 124 : 39 m. L. J. 27 (p. C.). There, in a suit for damages for alleged breach of contract, the defendant applied under section 19 of the indian arbitration act for stay of proceedings with a view to the issues being referred to arbitration under that section. The trial judge granted stay but on appeal the court of the judicial commissioner of sind reversed that order and refused to stay the proceedings. The question was whether that order was a final order within the meaning of section 109, civil procedure code. Viscount cave held that the said order refusing stay was not a final order. At page 923, his lordship observed :

"the effect of those and other judgments is that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The orders now under appeal do not finally dispose of those rights, but leave them to be determined by the courts in the ordinary way."

(9) In abdul rahman v. Cassim and sons, (1932) i. L. R. 11 rangoon 58 : l. R. To l. A. 76: 64 m. L. J. 307 (p. C.). The judicial committee again reiterated the same view by holding that an order of remand was not a final order. Sir george lowndes laid down the following test :

"the finality must be a finality in relation to the suit. If, after the order, the suit is still a live suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined no appeal lies against it under section 109 (a)"

(10) The federal court in mohammad amin brothers v. The dominion of india, 1950 s. C. J. 139 : a. I. R. 1950 f. C. 77. Accepted and followed the definition of a " final order " as laid down by the judicial committee. There an order of a single judge of the high court directing the compulsory winding up of a company was set aside by a division bench of the same court and the case was sent back to the trial court to be heard at a future date in accordance with the directions contained in the judgment. In holding that the said order was not a final order but only an interlocutory order mukherjea, j. , after noticing the previous case - law on the subject pointed out that the test for determining the finality of an order is whether the judgment or order finally disposed of the rights of the parties. That decision is also important for another reason for that is the first case where the federal court considered the meaning of the word 'judgment' as distinguished from 'final order '. Under section 205 (1) of the government of india act the appellate jurisdiction of the federal court can be invoked only in respect of a judgment, decree or final order passed by a high court. When it was contended that though the order in question was not a final order it was a judgment within the meaning of that section. His lordship in rejecting that contention made the following observations at page 79 :

"in english courts the word 'judgment' is used in the same sense as a decree in the civil procedure code and it means the declaration or final determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought before the court. According to the definition given in the civil procedure code, a judgment is the statement of reasons given by a judge on which a decree or order is based. If the order which is made in this case is an interlocutory order, the judgment must necessarily be held to be an interlocutory judgment and the collocation of the words ' judgment, decree or final order' in section 205 (1) government of india act makes it clear that no appeal is provided for against an interlocutory judgment or order."

(11) These observations apply mutatis mutandis to the construction of similar words used in article 133 (1) of the constitution of india. We are bound by that judgment. The patna high court in goya electric supply co. , ltd. V. State of bihar, (1950 i. L. R. 30 patna 853. Ruled that an order of the high court staying a suit under section 34, arbitration act, 1940, is not a ' final order ' within the meaning of article 133 (1) of the constitution. Applying the test laid down in the decisions of the english courts and in those of the federal court and supreme court of india the learned chief justice held that the effect of the order under appeal was not finally to drpose of the rights of the parties even though it decided a cardinal point in the case and that the suit was still alive because the order did not terminate the suit and therefore it was not an order within the meaning of the said article.

(12) The madras high court in raghavacharyulu v. Ramanujacharyulu, (1954) 1 m. L. J. 198. Applied the same test to an order of the high court deciding some issues and remanding the suit for trial on other issues. The learned judges rajamannar, c. J. And venkatarama ayyar, j. , held that the said order was interlocutory in character. At page 201, venkatarama ayyar, j. , who delivered the judgment on behalf of the bench, observed : "it is therefore well - settled that an order can be held to be a final order only if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties in the suit or proceedings". When it was contended that though an order of remand was not a final order it was a judgment within the meaning of article 133 (1) of the constitution of india, the learned judge repelled that contention at page 202 with the observation that the word "judgment " in article 133 is used in the sense of a decree or order and not in the sense in which it is used in the civil procedure code. From the aforesaid dissussion of the case law on the subject it is clear an appeal lies to the supreme court under article 133 if the order complained of finally disposes of the rights of the parties. To put it differently it should not be an interlocutory order but a final order deciding the rights of the parties. The word 'judgment' in the article in the context means a final judgment in the sense that it finally decides the rights of the parties. Can it be said in the present case that the order made by us satisfied the aforesaid tests ?

(13) It was an interim order made pending an appeal. It did not purport to decide the rights of the parties. Indeed it imposed temporary restrictions on the rights declared by the learned subordinate judge in favour of the applicant. The order in our view is obviously interlocutory in nature for it does not purport to decide finally the rights of the parties. We cannot therefore hold that the order is a "judgment, decree or final order" within the meaning of article 133 (1) of the constitution of india. The applications fail and are dismissed with costs. Applications dismissed with cost.

Vallury Mangaraju Pe... v. Vallury Varahalamma ...