Sudhamay Basu, J.:—This is an appeal from the judgment and order of Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. dated the 21st of July, 1971. His Lordship considered in connection with the matter, the judgment delivered by K.L Ray, J. in Matter No. 359 of 1969, (Bird & Company Private Limited v. Kalyan Kumar Sengupta). Although His Lordship was of the view that the facts of this case are not identical with the facts of the aforesaid case, yet in view of the said decision on the main question of law, he was “not inclined to decide the case in a way contrary to the said decision”. Following the said judgment the Rule was discharged.

2. The facts shortly are that in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 25(1) of the Customs Act 1962, the Government of India by a notification dated the 19th of June, 1968 inter alia, exempted in public interest “jute specialities” of certain kind whose F.A.S value was not less than Rs. 3500/- from payment of customs duties. Earlier the Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, had by a resolution dated 4th of December, 1962 constituted a committee for registration of export contracts in respect of jute goods to facilitate shipments and to remove or obviate considerable inconvenience experienced by shippers of Indian exporters of jute specialities on account of disputes or questions raised by the customs authorities regarding F.O.B price or the real values of jute goods entered in the shipping bills. Under the scheme, shippers could volunteer to register sale contracts after scrutiny by the committee for registration of export contracts. The Committee for registration was to consist of a representative of the Reserve Bank of India, an Additional Collector of Customs, Calcutta and a representative of the Jute Commissioner, Calcutta as members. Production of registration certificate with other shipping documents before customs authorities was to be accepted by the latter as constituting sufficient proof of the contract price and related financial items. Relying on the said provisions the petitioner company entered into contracts with R.E.B Wilcox and Company for sale of some jute specialities and duly registered the contracts with the committee for the purpose of exporting the goods to fulfill its contracts with foreign buyers. The petitioner presented the shipping bills in prescribed forms with necessary declarations. Officers of the Calcutta Customs, however, took the view that the goods had been overvalued and so could not be allowed to be exported at jute specialities without payment of export duty. By three notices, one dated the 17th and two dated 23rd December, 1968 the Assistant Collector of Customs for exports alleged that the F.A.S sale price appearing in the registration contract had been inflated to claim the goods as jute specialities. There was mis-declaration regarding the value of the goods and an attempt to cause loss of government revenue. The customs authorities proceeded on the basis that the duty was payable on the export goods and deducted Rs. 500/- per tonne as duty on alleged F.O.B price without, according to the appellant, taking into account the actual price of the profits included therein. The petitioner, however, paid customs duties and executed a guarantee bond without prejudice to its rights and contentions. Later on, the customs authorities issued three further notices, one dated the 17th and two dated 23rd March, 1969 calling upon the petitioner company to show cause why the said goods should not be confiscated under S. 113(1) of the Customs Act and why penal action should not be taken against the petitioner company under S. 114 of the Customs Act for alleged misdeclaration of the value of the goods exported by “under-valuation”. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an application under Article 226 to quash the said show cause notice. The same was ultimately rejected by S. Mukharji, J. as noted above.

3. On behalf of the customs, learned Advocate General contended that a writ did not lie at the stage of the show cause notices. He contended that the jurisdiction of the customs authorities was unquestioned and unconditional. There was no condition precedent to be fulfilled to confer jurisdiction. Unlike cases in the Indian Income Tax Act or the Foreign Exchange Act where some such expressions as “if the I.T.O has reasons to believe” or “if the officer is of opinion” are used to indicate a condition precedent to be fulfilled to confer jurisdiction, in this case, there was no bar in law to issue notice under S. 124 of the Customs Act. The question whether the goods might be confiscated or penalty might be imposed or whether the goods were dutiable or exports goods could be decided by the department. The Company was only asked to show cause. It might be that after hearing the company the customs authorities would agree with their views. In this connection he referred to the cases of Pilani Investment Corporation Limited v. I.T.O 69 ITR 847 and Rampyari Debi Saraogi v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, 67 ITR 84. The learned Advocate General contended that issue of notice was not a violation of the provisions of a statute. There was no bar to the issuance of the notice and therefore the notice could not be quashed. It was not a case, according to him, where the notices were ex facie bad. With regard to question of assessment etc. the customs authorities were the sole judge with exclusive jurisdiction under the statute. The Court will not interfere in its writ jurisdiction in such a case. He referred to the case of Colonial Bank of Australia v. Willam reported in (1873) 5 Privy Council appeal cases 417 and N. Chetty v. I.T.O Nelore 1959 Supreme Court Journal 250. He further contended that the legality of the notices could not be decided without ascertaining facts regarding under-valuation. Facts were not, according to him, finally investigated. He referred in this connection to a decision (Dadabhay & Co. v. S.P Jain) reported in 31 ITR 872. Referring to the decision of Raman and Raman Limited v. The State of Madras reported in AIR 1956 SC 463 he urged that in a case of certiorari the Court could enquire into correctness of decisions only as to collateral facts which constitute jurisdiction. The present was not such a case.

4. The learned Advocate General's (preliminary) objection as to jurisdiction was strongly opposed on behalf of the petitioner. It was stated that the show cause notice was an empty threat if the goods concerned were not “export goods” or “dutiable” and Ss. 113 and 114 of the Customs Act had no application. Mr. Rathin Deb argued with some force that on the face of it S. 114 had no application and the goods were neither ‘export goods’ nor ‘dutiable goods’ and no duty was really sought to be evaded. There was an inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Customs authorities. As a matter concerning jurisdiction goes to the root this Court certainly can look into the matter. He referred to R.J Singh Ahulu Alia v. State Of Delhi reported in AIR 1971 SC 1552 in this connection. We find substance in Mr. Deb's contention. As the goods had already been exported before the issue of the three impugned show cause notices the goods concerned cannot be “export goods” in terms of S. 113 read with S. 2(19) of the Customs Act. According to the definition S. 2(19) ‘export goods’ means any goods which are to be taken out of India to a place outside India. As the goods had already been shipped these were no longer goods which “were to be taken out of India”. Again duty admittedly had already been paid on the goods under S. 2(14) of the Customs Act. “Dutiable goods” means goods which are chargeable to duty and on which duty has not been paid. Section 2(15) states that duty means a duty of customs leviable under the Act. Under the circumstances, the goods do not seem to be liable to be confiscated under S. 113(i) which applied only to dutiable or prohibited goods. It is nobody's case that the goods are prohibited ones. There is no allegation in the show cause notices that any duty was sought to be evaded. There is, in fact, no column for F.A.S value in the declaration form nor is there any declaration in respect of the same on the shipping bill. It is also well settled that no authority much less a quasi judicial authority can confer jurisdiction on itself by deciding the jurisdictional fact wrongly. In this case by merely alleging in the show cause notices that there was mis-declaration of the goods or that the goods were dutiable or that they were export goods the customs authorities could not confer jurisdiction on itself by a wrong decision as to jurisdictional fact. Reference may be made in this connection to the case of Raja Textile Limited v. The Income Tax Officer reported in 1973 SC 1362. Moreover there seems to be substance also in the contention that the notices concerned did not say that the contract price was different from what is stated in the shipping bill. Therefore, on reading the said notice it is manifest even on the assumption hat the facts alleged or allegations made therein are true, none of the conditions laid down in the specified sections, namely, 113 and 114 of the Customs Act, was contravened. Therefore, the respondent would have no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings pursuant to the notice. Reference was made in this connection to the case of East India Commercial Company Limited, Calcutta v. The Collector of Customs reported in AIR 1962 SC 1893. In the aforesaid view of the matter it is not necessary therefore to examine in depth the details of the argument and the cases cited by the learned Advocate General on the question of jurisdiction. Mr. Deb was certainly on strong grounds when he contended that no investigation was necessary. The goods have already been exported. When the goods are not available to confiscation under S. 113, prima facie S. 114 has also no application. In any event, availability for confiscation and penalty involve facts concerning jurisdiction. The question whether the jurisdictional fact has been rightly decided or not is also open for examination by the High Court in a writ application.

5. Again it is not clear from the impugned show cause notices how the goods failed to correspond in any material particular with the entry made under the Act. What is misdeclaration to attract the provisions of S. 113(i)? The provisions refer to goods (“dutiable or prohibited”) which do not correspond in any material particular with the entry made under the Act. “Material particulars” have been construed to have relation with the object of the Act. (C.G Ambalal E.X.P Private Limited v. The Assistant Collector of Customs reported in AIR ??? Calcutta 444). It has further been held in the said case that neither the preamble nor terms of different sections warrant a conclusion that the declaration of value for Foreign Exchange purpose was material for the purpose of Customs Act, 1962. The impugned notices in this case, however, allege that if the misdeclaration had not been detected in time it might have resulted in loss of foreign exchange. This obviously is not relevant for the Customs Act. Question of loss of foreign exchange is not a matter obviously within the jurisdiction of the customs authority. The notices, moreover, did not say that the contract price was otherwise than what is declared therein. The discrepancy in price is said in the notices to be based on alleged “market price” on the date of sale but market price under S. 2(30) is the wholesale price of the goods in India but the price declared was of contract executed with a foreign buyer. Mr. Deb, therefore was on strong grounds when he urged that there is no material in the particulars as to valuation in the impugned notices to make out any case of mis-declaration. He also argued with some force that even assuming that S. 14 of the Customs Act which refers to valuation of goods for purposes for assessment is to be applied in the present case the Customs authorities have made calculations on the basis of “market price” in India (See S. 2(30) that is, domestic transaction but S. 14(1) mentions “in the course of international trade.” Section 2(41) of the Customs Act states that value in relation to any goods means the value thereof determined in accordance with the provisions of sub-s. (1) of S. 14. The said definition of value is to be applied only if it is applicable in the context. Section 14(1) seems to apply in cases where goods are chargeable to duty with reference to value. Value as defined in S. 2(41) is, therefore, not a general definition but is a limited one, the scope being confined to spheres where S. 14 will apply. But it is already noted that S. 14(1) can hardly be applied in this case as the customs authorities have calculated on the basis of market price in India. Incidentally it is to be noted that there is not at all any column in the shipping bill for declaration of F.A.S value nor is there any declaration as to F.A.S value on the shipping bill. Therefore, on the face of it, the allegation in the impugned notices that the goods have been deliberately misdeclared on the shipping bill in respect of F.A.S value is hardly tenable.

6. Mr. Deb, of course, argued further that question of any entry under the Customs Act does not arises as the act does not require any entry to be made under the Act but only in the prescribed form which is not a form to be found in the Act it is not an ‘entry made under the Act.’ It was not brought to the knowledge of the Court whether the forms were prescribed in any rules framed under the Act. In view of the other findings it is not necessary to decide that point in that case.

7. As already noted, the petitioner executed a guarantee bond without prejudice to its rights and contentions before it was allowed to ship the goods. The learned Advocate General contended that the company took benefit of S. 143 of the Customs Act by executing a bond and agreeing to pay fine or penalty if it was found to be payable. The implication of the bond was that it submitted to investigation by customs authorities. It undertook to go to appeal under the Customs Act and to abide by it. It also agreed to pay fine or penalty to be found ultimately on adjudication. There was no prayer to quash the bond. He urged that it would be an anomalous position if the rule was made absolute and the bond which was a perfectly valid document would be made nugatory and remained a piece of paper. According to him, customs authorities could have confiscated the goods under S. 113(i) or otherwise before they were exported. In that context the arguments that the goods were not for exports or dutiable etc. would not be available to them. Citing some cases, such as, (Gour Chandra Mallick v. P.K Mallick) reported in AIR 1945 Calcutta 6; 77 I.T.R 187; 78 I.T.R 133 he urged that even assuming that mention of S. 113 was a mistake — mere mention of a wrong section in a show cause notice would not take away the jurisdiction of the authorities. If they have the power of jurisdiction otherwise, mere mention of a wrong section will not take away the same. He also relied on a decision of this Court in Matter No. 8 of 68, The Assistant Collector of Customs v. Acharyya Brothers.

8. On this question Mr. Deb's contention was that the same has no validity because it was executed under compulsion. As the petitioner company had to fulfill its obligation to the foreign buyers and as the Customs authorities would not allow them to execute the goods otherwise, it was forced to execute the bond. Consent alone could not confer jurisdiction when the customs authorities had no jurisdiction under the statute, that is, either under S. 113(i) or S. 114 of the Customs Act. Referring to S. 15 of the Indian Contract Act it was contended that unlawfully detaining any property to the prejudice of a person and with the intention of causing any person to enter into contract would vitiate the later. Again adjudication mentioned in the bond referred to pending proceedings. The said bond was executed on the 10th of March, 1969. It referred to fine and penalty as may be imposed after adjudication of the goods. On a true construction the bonds do not cover the second series of notices which are the imposed ones in this case. We are unable to uphold the contention of the learned Advocate General that execution of the bond disentitles the appellants from getting a relief which they would otherwise get.

9. In view of what has been held above namely that there was no mis-declaration of goods to attract the provisions of S. 113(i) of the Customs Act; that a declaration of value for foreign exchange was not material for the purpose of the Customs Act; that the goods were not either dutiable or export goods and that by making a wrong decision as to jurisdictional facts the Customs authorities could not confer jurisdiction upon themselves; the appeal succeeds. The order and judgment of the Court below are set aside. The Rule issued on the 14th of July, 1969 is hereby made absolute. There will be no order as to costs, There will be a stay of operation of this order for a period of six weeks after the reopening of Court after the long vacation.

S.K Mukherjea, J.:—I agree.

Appeal allowed. Rule made absolute.