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citation codes
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  • section 96(3) of the Civil Procedure Code read with section 108
  • rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Order XXIII, rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • SECTION 151 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order XLIII, rule 1, clause
  • section 96(3) of the Code
  • Order XLIII, rule 1(m),
  • Order XXIII, rule 3,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 96(3) of the Civil Procedure Code read with section 108
  • rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code
  • Order XXIII, rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • SECTION 151 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • Order XLIII, rule 1, clause
  • section 96(3) of the Code
  • Order XLIII, rule 1(m),
  • Order XXIII, rule 3,
Smart Summary

Legal Opinion Summary — Murphy, J. (with concurring judgment by Nanavati, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns an order made under Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code. In the original suit before the First Class Subordinate Judge, Poona, an application purporting to be signed by all parties was submitted stating that the parties had compromised and requesting a decree in terms of that compromise. The applicants were represented in the lower court by a pleader and a mukhtyar. The lower court's order read "Granted. Decree accordingly," and a decree was passed.

Subsequent to that decree, the applicants (who appear to be the defendants in the context) challenged the decree in this Court, alleging that the compromise had not been made with their consent or authority. They contended that the mukhtyar and the pleader lacked authority to compromise and should have been put to strict proof of that authority. An affidavit was filed in this Court making these allegations and disputing the propriety of the lower court's recording of the compromise.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an appeal lies against an order recording a compromise under Order XXIII, rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, where the lower court also passed a decree in terms of that compromise and there was no contest in the lower court.
  2. Whether an appeal against the order recording the compromise (without an appeal against the decree) can, if entertained, affect or set aside the decree which followed the order.
  3. What remedies, if any, are available to a party who alleges that a compromise recorded by the lower court was not truly made with their consent or was procured by an unauthorized agent (for example, review, proceedings under section 151, or a separate suit for fraud).

Arguments of the Parties

Respondents' Arguments (as presented by Mr. Thakor)

  • A preliminary objection: no appeal lies against the kind of order made under Order XXIII, rule 3 where a decree has been passed with the consent of parties and there was no contest in the lower court.
  • Relied on an earlier Division Bench decision in Gulabchand v. Ramsukh to support the proposition that where the terms were signed and no adjudication took place the appeal is incompetent.
  • Pointed out that other remedies (review, section 151 application, separate suit) remain available to the aggrieved party, implying that a direct appeal is not the proper remedy in the circumstances.

Appellants' Arguments (as described in the opinion; represented by Mr. Rao)

  • The appellants contended that the decree should be set aside because there had been no compromise with their consent and because the mukhtyar and pleader lacked authority to compromise on their behalf; they sought strict proof of such authority.
  • Argued (or raised the difficulty) that vacation of the order made under Order XXIII, rule 3 would, in itself, have the effect of setting aside the decree which was based on that order (i.e., that an appeal against the order should be capable of affecting the decree).
  • An affidavit was filed in this Court reiterating these allegations and challenging the propriety of the lower court's recording of the compromise.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gulabchand v. Ramsukh (unreported) Held that no appeal lies where a decree is passed by the Court with the consent of parties and there was no adjudication—an appeal is barred under section 96(3) when there was no contest in the lower court and the Court merely passed a decree in terms of a signed agreement. The Division Bench ruling is treated as binding; the court applies its ratio to hold that no appeal is competent in the present case and upholds the preliminary objection.
The Bengal Coal Company, Ltd. v. Apcar (Apear) Collieries, Ltd. Expressed the principle that if a decree follows an order recording compromise, the earlier order and previous proceedings merge in the decree (quote cited: the decree is the final declaration of the Court's mind and previous proceedings lose their separate existence). Cited by the Court to support the view that where a decree follows the recording of a compromise, prior orders merge into that decree and appeal against the order alone would be anomalous.
Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen Held that the right of appeal from interlocutory orders ceases with the disposal of the suit. Used to support the proposition that interlocutory orders recording compromise cease to be separately appealable once the suit is disposed of by the decree.
Thenal Ammal v. Sohkammal (Sokkammal) Held that an appeal lies against a decree passed in accordance with a compromise where the authority to enter it is impeached. Noted as one of the two reported appeal decisions; recognized by the Court as providing support for the proposition that appeals may lie where authority is impeached, but set against other authorities and treated with caution.
Satyanarayanamoorthi v. Butchayya Identified in the record as a revision application (single Judge decision); the opinion does not provide a detailed principle beyond noting its procedural posture. The Court notes it was a revision application (single judge) and treats it as of limited weight compared to Division Bench authority; no detailed application beyond that observation is recorded.
Muhammad Rashid v. Rahmatullah This is identified as a Lahore decision and is described as a revision application; no specific rule or principle is stated in the opinion. The Court records that it was a revision application; no further application of its ratio is set out in the opinion.
Paban Sardar v. Bhupendra Nath Nag Noted that there had been a contest in the original Court; held that a consent decree under rule 3 of Order XXIII can be passed only after there has been an order that the compromise be recorded, and that the aggrieved party has a right of appeal against that recording order; section 96(3) is not otherwise a bar to such an appeal. Cited to show circumstances in which an appeal against recording of compromise may be competent (i.e., where a distinct adjudication or contest occurred and the order recording compromise is separately challengeable).
Sreemati Sabitri Thahurain v. F.A. Savi (Thakurain) Noted in the opinion as a revision application; the opinion does not extract a specific legal principle from it for the present decision. Cited among authorities but treated as not directly on similar facts; no specific application recorded in the opinion.
Uman Kunwari v. Jarbandhan This case is named in the list of authorities cited; the opinion does not state any principle drawn from it. No specific application of this case is recorded in the opinion.
Lakshmi v. Maru Devi Was in the matter of an execution application where a remand had been ordered; not treated as directly analogous to the present case. Cited to indicate it was not on similar facts; the Court states the remand only carried out the terms of the first order and thus does not control the present appeal.
Alamelu Ammal v. Rama Aiyar Division Bench view that there could be no appeal against an order recording a compromise “when it has become merged in the subsequent decree.” Cited by Nanavati, J. to reinforce the merger principle and to show that the weight of authority supports the position that the appeal is barred when the order recording compromise has been subsumed into the decree.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeds along two interrelated lines: (1) stare decisis and the binding effect of a prior Division Bench decision of this Court (Gulabchand v. Ramsukh), and (2) legal principle concerning the effect of a decree entered by consent and the availability of appeals from orders that are subsumed in such a decree.

1. Binding precedent and the primary ground for decision:

  • The Court treats the Division Bench decision in Gulabchand v. Ramsukh as binding. That decision held that where there was no contest in the lower court and the terms of a compromise were signed and presented for the Court to pass a decree, no appeal lies because the dispute before the Court did not involve adjudication on the lawfulness of the agreement. On that authority the Court finds that, on the facts before it (no material in the record showing a contest or a basis for adjudication), a direct appeal is not competent.

2. Consideration of the broader argument and collateral authorities:

  • The Court examines a number of authorities and recognizes a division of opinion in various High Courts. Two reported appeals — Thenal Ammal v. Sokkammal and Paban Sardar v. Bhupendra Nath Nag — were singled out as supporting, in different ways, the position that an appeal may lie when authority to enter the compromise is impeached or where there was a contest in the original court.
  • However, the Court emphasizes that where there was no contest and the order recording the compromise and the decree in its terms were passed practically simultaneously, the proper remedy is to challenge the decree (by appeal), or to pursue other remedies such as review or an application under section 151 in the original court — remedies that would open the matter for adjudication and provide material on which an appellate court could act.
  • Nanavati, J., concurring, grounds his reasoning on section 96(3) read with section 108 of the Civil Procedure Code: section 96(3) bars appeals from decrees passed by consent; section 108 brings orders under the same part as appeals from original decrees so that an order recording compromise made with consent is not an independently appealable interlocutory order after disposal of the suit. He also stresses the practical difficulty faced by an appellate court when there is no evidence on the question of the compromise — the appellate court is at a great disadvantage.
  • Both judges accept the "merger" idea drawn from cited authorities: when a decree follows an order recording compromise, the order and earlier proceedings become merged into the decree (the decree being the final declaration), and, accordingly, an appeal against the order alone, leaving the decree intact, would be anomalous and ineffective to set aside the decree.

3. Remedies and the Court's practical stance:

  • The Court notes that if a party alleges fraud, lack of authority, or that a petition was not what it purported to be, the aggrieved party has alternative remedies: an application for review in the original court, an application under section 151 of the Code to reopen the matter, or a separate suit to prove fraud. These avenues would permit the original court to examine evidence and would produce material for any subsequent appeal.

4. Ultimate application to the present facts:

  • Because the Division Bench authority binds this Court and because there was no material before this Court showing a contest or ground for adjudication in the trial court, the Court upholds the preliminary objection that no appeal is competent and dismisses the appeal with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court dismisses the appeal and upholds the preliminary objection that no appeal is competent against the order recording the compromise in the circumstances of this case (i.e., where there was no contest in the lower court and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise).

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The decree passed by the lower court in terms of the recorded compromise stands; the appeal challenging the order recording the compromise is dismissed and the appellants must pursue the alternative remedies identified by the Court if they wish to challenge the validity of the compromise (review, section 151 application in the original court, or a separate suit for fraud).
  • Precedential effect: The Court relies upon and applies an existing Division Bench authority (Gulabchand v. Ramsukh) and other decisions supporting the merger principle. The decision follows existing binding precedent rather than announcing a new rule of law; it therefore does not purport to create a novel precedent but enforces the view that orders recording compromises that merge into a consent decree are not independently appealable where there has been no contest below.
  • Practical guidance: Where a compromise is recorded and a decree follows, a party seeking to challenge the recording should ordinarily do so in the original court (review or section 151) or, if challenging the decree's validity, by appealing the decree so that the appellate court can consider evidence and adjudicate on the substantive questions.
Result: Appeal dismissed. Costs awarded against the appellants.

This summary is strictly confined to matters stated in the provided opinion. No information not contained in the opinion has been added.

    Onkar Bhagwan v. Gamna Lakhaji And Co.

    Murphy, J.:—

    This is an appeal against an order made under Order XXIII, rule 3, of the Civil Procedure Code. In the course of a suit in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge, Poona, an application was put in purporting to be signed by all the parties to the suit, the applicants being represented by their pleader and a mukhtyar. The application was to the effect that the dispute between the parties had been compromised, and requested the Court to pass a decree in terms of the compromise. The Court's order was “Granted. Decree accordingly.” Strictly speaking, the learned Judge should have made an order recording the compromise and then passed a decree in its terms. But the actual words used are, more or less, a formality, and I think that the word “Granted” means the same thing. A decree was accordingly passed.

    Thereupon, the applicants came to this Court challenging the decree on the ground that it had not been a compromise with the consent and authority of the defendants, i.e, the applicants, and contending that the Court below should have held that the mukhtyar had no authority to compromise the suit, putting him to strict proof of his authority, and similarly in the case of the pleader, who represented applicants in that Court. An affidavit has been filed in this Court making these allegations and challenging the propriety of the order recording the compromise in the Court below.

    Mr. Thakor for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection, and his contention is that no appeal lies against an order of this nature. He has relied on the decision of a Bench of this Court in an unreported case, Gulabchand v. Ramsukh. In that matter, it was held by the learned Chief Justice, in deciding such a preliminary point, that no appeal lay, his reasons being (p. 40):—

    “…an appeal from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties is barred by section 96, sub-section 3. The appellant urges that the Court has passed an order under Order XXIII, rule 3, and that an appeal lies under Order XLIII, rule 1, clause (m), from such an order. But in this case there was no question whether an agreement had been arrived at, the terms were signed by the parties and all that the Court had to do was to pass a decree according to the terms to Which the parties had agreed. There was no adjudication, therefore, on the question whether a lawful agreement had been arrived at, because it was never disputed that the parties before the Court had come to an agreement. It was open to any one of the parties before the decree was passed to contend that a lawful agreement had not been arrived at.

    Under these circumstances we think that no appeal is competent. There are other remedies open to the appellant if he thinks fit to pursue them.”

    The ratio decidendi of that case, which binds us, is that where there has been no contest in the Court below, but an application for compromise has been put in and recorded and a decree passed in its terms, no appeal lies, either against the decree itself, an appeal therefrom being barred under section 96(3), or against the order under Order XLIII, rule 1(m), since there are no materials for an adjudication. What the learned Chief Justice meant was that before there can be an appeal under Order XLIII, rule 1 (m), there must have been some contest in the original Court, a contest which might be brought about, conceivably by one party alleging that there was a compromise and the other not, or, where the circumstances are similar to those in the present case, where one of the parties is disowning the authority of his agent or pleader to compromise for him, either by an application for a review, or under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, which would open the whole matter and allow an adjudication from which an appeal might lie. A direct appeal was not possible on the facts in that case, and in the present one as there was and is no material before the Court on which a decision can be come to. The ruling is of a Division Bench and binds us.

    But the case has also been argued on a wider basis, and we have been referred to numerous cases, which I will do no more than name. These are: The Bengal Coal Company, Ltd. v. Apear Collieries, Ltd. which is based on Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen,(2) Thenal Ammal v. Sohkammal,(3) Satyanarayanamoorthi v. Butchayya,(4) Muhammad Rashid v. Rahmatullah,(5) which is a Lahore decision, Paban Sardar v. Bhupendra Nath Nag,(6) Sreemati Sabitri Thahurain v. F.A Savi,(7) Uman Kunwari v. Jarbandhan,(8) and Lakshmi v. Maru Devi.(9) The difficulty raised in the argument was that where the appeal is against the order and not against the decree, even if the appeal against the order were entertained, it would not affect the decree, which has not been appealed against, the rival contention being that the vacation of the order Would, in itself, have the effect of setting aside the terms of the decree. It may be noted that of these cases, Satyanarayanamoorthi v. Butchayya and Muhammad Rashid v. Rahmatullah were revision applications, as was that of Sreemati Sabitri Thakurain v. F.A Savi. The other cases were nearly all not on similar facts. One, Lakshmi v. Maru Devi, was in the matter of an execution application, where a remand had been ordered, which in fact only carried out the terms of the first order, which was appealed against; and the only two cases decided in appeal were the ones in Thenal Ammal v. Sokkammal and Paban Sardar v. Bhupendra Nath Nag. The ratio decidendi in Thenal Ammal v. Sokkammal was that an appeal lies against decree passed in accordance with a compromise, where the authority to enter it is impeached, and in Paban Sardar v. Bhupendra Nath Nag it appears that there had been a contest in the original Court, though the decision was set aside on the ground that a consent decree under rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Civil Procedure Code can be passed only after there has been an order that the compromise be recorded, this not being a mere matter of form, as the aggrieved party has a right of appeal against this order, and section 96(3) of the Code is not otherwise a bar to an appeal from such a decree.

    There is a difference of opinion between several High Courts in India on this point. I think, myself, that the proper course in a case, such as the present, where the order for making the decree is passed practically simultaneously with the one recording the compromise, and where the compromise is challenged, on the ground that none has really been arrived at, would be to challenge the decree, either by an appeal, or, as suggested by Mr. Thakor, by an application for review, or one under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code in the original Court, when the matter could be gone into on the merits, the difficulty being that if we entertain Mr. Rao's argument, the setting aside of the order made under Order XXIII, rule 3, would not have the effect of setting aside the decree which is based on it.

    It is not, however, necessary to decide this point, because in this appeal we are concluded by the previous decision of the Division Bench of this Court, which I have already referred to. Following that decision, we uphold the preliminary objection that no appeal is competent against the order in this case, and dismiss the appeal against the order with costs.

    Nanavati, J.:—I agree. I think that where a compromise has been recorded, and it has not been challenged in any way in the lower Court, the recording of that compromise must be held to have been done by consent, and I think, section 96(3) of the Civil Procedure Code read with section 108 would bar the appeal.

    Section 108 of the Civil Procedure Code lays down—

    “The provisions of this Part relating to appeals from original decrees shall, so far as may be, apply to appeals—

    (a) from appellate decrees, and

    (b) from orders made under this Code etc.,”

    and section 96 is in the same part. Section 96(3) clearly lays down that—

    “No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.”

    It follows, therefore, that an order recording a compromise, if made with the consent of parties, would not be an order appealable, even though under Order XLIII, rule 1, an appeal is provided against orders under Order XXIII, rule 3.

    It may be objected that if that be so, the party aggrieved by a fraudulent petition of compromise would have no remedy, but I do not think that it is correct. The party could ask for a review from the Court which recorded the compromise and set forth its grievance, ??? it could then have an opportunity of showing to the Court that the petition was not what it purported to be, or possibly it could make an application under section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, and it has always a remedy by a separate suit to prove fraud. But, if there, is no contest before the Court which recorded the compromise on the point which is sought to be agitated in the appeal, the Appellate Court is clearly at a great disadvantage, there being no evidence on which to base a decision. It seems to me, therefore, that the principle laid down in the unreported case referred to by my learned brother must govern our decision in the present case.

    In that view of the matter, it is really unnecessary to consider the second point argued by Mr. Thakor, namely, that no appeal against the order could be entertained in the absence of an appeal against the decree following the order recording the compromise. However, as the question has been fully discussed, I should like to say that it seems to me that in a case of this nature, where a decree as a matter of course followed the order recording the compromise, it would be anomalous to permit an appeal on the order alone leaving the decree untouched. Once a decree is passed all previous orders in the case, whether good or bad, merge into the decree or become ancillary to it. The decree could only be set aside by means of an appeal against it, and the provisions permitting appeals from certain orders were not meant to provide a short and inexpensive cut to a person against whom a decree is outstanding to have it set aside by means of appealing against some order leading up to the decree. None of the reported cases cited before us lead necessarily to this result. The only case that may give some support to such a view is that of Satyanarayanamoorthi v. Butchayya which is a decision of a single Judge. The weight of authority seems to be against that decision, for the learned Judge himself refers to a case of that High Court ??? which a Division Bench took the view that there could be no appeal against the order recording a compromise “when it has become merged in the subsequent decree”: Alamelu Ammal v. Rama Aiyar. That was also the view taken in The Bengal Coal Company, Ltd. v. Apcar Collieries, Ltd., where it was stated (p. 930) “If the decree follows the order it will be no straining of the language to say that the order, and for that matter all previous proceedings, get merged in the decree which is the final declaration of the Court's mind and decision and lose their separate existence.” See also Madhu Sudan Sen v. Kamini Kanta Sen, where it was held that the right of appeal from interlocutory orders ceases with the disposal of the suit. I, therefore, think that in a case of this nature, if a party wishes to appeal against an order recording a compromise, and a decree has followed, he must, if at all, appeal against the decree, and challenge the order in such appeal.

    Appeal dismissed.
    J.G.R
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    Comments

    Onkar Bhagwan v. Gamna Lakhaji And Co.
    (Sep 20, 1932)