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  • S. 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 read with Rule 8 of the Rules
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 6 of the Old Rules
  • Rule 8(1) of the Rules.
  • Ghose) u/s. 6(1) B.H Act
  • Rule 8 of the Rules
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • S. 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 read with Rule 8 of the Rules
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 6 of the Old Rules
  • Rule 8(1) of the Rules.
  • Ghose) u/s. 6(1) B.H Act
  • Rule 8 of the Rules
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This application was brought by the Secretary and certain other members of the Managing Committee of Karanjali B.K. Institution (an aided multipurpose school in Diamond Harbour sub-division, 24 Parganas) challenging the Board's order of supersession dated 17 January 1976.

Procedural history relevant to this petition (as contained in the opinion):

  • Earlier, a guardian of a student had applied under Article 226 for appointment of an Administrator or ad hoc Committee because the Managing Committee's term had expired; a Rule was issued in C.R. Case No. 497(W) of 1973 and elections were directed by Banerjee, J. The Committee was reconstituted on 18 November 1973 and began functioning after a departmental nominee joined on 22 June 1974.
  • On 5 December 1975 the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education issued show-cause notices to members under Rule 8 (Management Rules) proposing supersession of the Managing Committee and listing seven charges (including alleged improper appointment of a teacher, misappropriation of paddy sale proceeds, unauthorized sale of livestock, failure to invite tenders, withholding government grants, irregular admission of a student, and a prior criminal conviction of the Secretary).
  • Nine members submitted replies (annexed as Annexure 'D'), contending that many charges predated the present Committee and seeking a hearing.
  • No personal hearing was granted. On 17 January 1976 the President of the Board, relying on a report of the Director of Public Instruction (D.P.I.), purported to exercise powers under s. 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 read with Rule 8 and superseded the Managing Committee, appointing an Ad hoc Committee.
  • The present application challenges that supersession order on grounds set out below; the court made the Rule absolute, quashed the impugned order and issued a mandamus restraining respondents from giving effect to it (subject to a three-week operational stay).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned order of supersession contravened the proviso to Rule 8(1) (the statutory requirement to "afford a reasonable opportunity to the Committee to present its case") by denying a personal hearing or other reasonable opportunity.
  2. Whether reliance by the Board's President on an undisclosed report of the Director of Public Instruction (D.P.I.) without furnishing it to the Managing Committee violated principles of natural justice embodied in Rule 8(1).
  3. Whether the President validly invoked and lawfully exercised the emergency powers under s. 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 (i.e., whether the mandatory preconditions and post-conditions of s. 28(2) were satisfied).
  4. Whether the impugned order was vitiated by failure to state adequate reasons for the conclusion that the Managing Committee "has not been functioning properly".

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' (Managing Committee's) Arguments — (represented by Mr. Kashi Kanta Moitra)

  • The order of supersession violated Rule 8(1) which, by its proviso, mandates that the Board "shall afford a reasonable opportunity to the Committee to present its case": denial of a personal hearing amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity.
  • Many charges in the show-cause notice related to periods before the present Managing Committee existed; the new Committee could not be held responsible for those earlier acts.
  • The Committee was prevented from confronting or seeing the D.P.I.'s report on which the President purportedly relied; reliance on such undisclosed material violated natural justice.
  • The President's use of s. 28(2) powers was improper because there was no emergency, the notice was issued by the Board (not the President), records did not show existence of an emergency, and the President did not thereafter report to the Board or state reasons as required by s. 28(2).
  • The impugned order lacked stated grounds or reasons; the bare conclusion that the Committee "has not been functioning properly" is merely a recital and does not disclose the factual basis for the decision.

Respondents / Ad hoc Committee's Arguments — (represented by Mr. Nani Coomar Chakraborty and Mr. Bimal Dutt)

  • Personal hearing is not an absolute right in every case; rules of natural justice do not require a personal hearing in all circumstances (relied on authorities including Hariprasad Singh v. Commissioners of Income Tax).
  • The President's order states that "prompt action is thus called for" and refers to "the emergency arising out of the situation", implying circumstances warranting immediate action under s. 28(2).
  • The Board and the Ad hoc Committee relied on the D.P.I. report and the alleged need for prompt/emergency action to justify the President's use of s. 28(2).
  • It was suggested on behalf of the Board that relevant documents could have been annexed to the Committee's reply; the Committee was not under obligation to do so but could have.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Khem Chand v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Supreme Court 300 Illustration on what may amount to a "reasonable opportunity" in the context of Article 311(2) — used in relation to hearing requirements. The court noted the case was cited but emphasized that the content of "reasonable opportunity" depends on facts and cannot be fixed by rigid formula; the reasoning guided the court's fact-specific analysis of Rule 8(1).
Fedco (P) Ltd. v. S.N. Bilgrami Others, AIR 1960 Supreme Court 415 Authority on reasonable opportunity to be heard (paragraphs dealing with hearing under an administrative order). The court referred to it to show established authorities on hearing but stressed that the requirement is fact-dependent and that the present facts must be examined to determine if a reasonable opportunity was afforded.
Hariprasad Singh v. Commissioners of Income Tax, West Bengal, AIR 1972 Cal 27 Support for the proposition that personal hearing is not a matter of absolute right in every case. The court accepted the general principle from this decision (that personal hearing is not always required), but held that, on the facts here, denial of personal hearing nevertheless amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity.
Sarat Chandra Mal v. The President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (C.R. No. 5629(W) of 1972) — unreported, judgment of A.K. Sen, J. (25.9.1973) Illustration that s. 28(2) emergency powers cannot be routinely invoked; emergency must be bona fide. The court relied on and expressly agreed with the observations in this unreported decision to support the view that s. 28(2) should not be used as a routine substitute for Board action and that no bona fide emergency was shown here.
Lilabati Kanjilal v. The Administrator, Nasra Girls' High School, 71 CWN 216 Case cited by respondents for the proposition that no duty of hearing/quasi-judicial duty arises on supersession under an older rule (Rule 6). The court observed that this case was relied upon by respondents but distinguished it because it dealt with an older Rule 6 that did not contain the present proviso requiring a "reasonable opportunity to the Committee to present its case".
Adwaiiya Kr. Maity v. The President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, 71 CWN 396 Similar authority cited for the proposition that no hearing duty arose under the older rule. The court distinguished it for the same reason as Lilabati Kanjilal: it turned on Rule 6 of the old rules which lacked the specific "reasonable opportunity" language in Rule 8(1).
State v. Sachinath Ghose (Court of the Magistrate 1st Class, Diamond Harbour) — Court Case No. 085 of 1964 Not cited as precedent on a legal principle; recorded in the opinion as a factual allegation (conviction of the Secretary under s. 6(1) of B.H. Act). The court recorded this conviction as one of the charges listed in the Board's show-cause notice; it is treated as part of the factual matrix rather than an authority applied in reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded step-by-step, closely following the language of Rule 8(1) and s. 28(2) of the Act and applying established principles of natural justice as they operate in administrative decision-making:

  1. The court first emphasised that the meaning of "reasonable opportunity" is fact-dependent and that rules of natural justice cannot be reduced to a rigid formula; therefore the specific facts of this case must determine whether the Committee had a reasonable opportunity to present its case.
  2. On the factual matrix the court observed that, except for charges numbered 2, 4 and 5, the other charges indisputably related to periods before the present Managing Committee's constitution in 1974; consequently the new Committee could not reasonably be held responsible for those prior acts without proper investigation and opportunity to show otherwise.
  3. Turning to Charge No. 2 (alleged misappropriation of sale proceeds of paddy), the court relied on an extract from the Order Sheet of the Block Development Officer (Annexure 'E') which showed that the school was exempted from the levy and that only 5.59 quintals were actually sold voluntarily and accounted for. That document — signed by a member of the Ad hoc Committee — substantiated the Committee's position that the levy allegation was erroneous.
  4. The court found that, had a personal hearing been accorded, the Managing Committee could have produced Annexure 'E' to rebut the charge. Because no hearing was given and the D.P.I. report (on which the President explicitly relied) was not furnished or disclosed to the Committee, the Committee was denied the opportunity to see or rebut material relied upon against it. The court held that reliance on material behind a party's back is contrary to the rules of natural justice, as embodied in the proviso to Rule 8(1).
  5. On the question of the President's exercise of powers under s. 28(2), the court set out the statutory conditions (existence of an emergency, not acting contrary to any Board decision, reporting to the Board thereafter with reasons). The court found no evidence in the Board's records of any emergency, no record explaining why the President alone took over the matter (especially since the show-cause notice had been issued by the Board's Secretary), and no subsequent report or statement of reasons by the President as required by s. 28(2).
  6. The court accepted and relied upon an earlier (unreported) decision of A.K. Sen, J. which held that s. 28(2) should not be invoked as a routine substitute for ordinary Board procedure; the court agreed that the mere statement that "prompt action is thus called for" does not itself establish an emergency. Given the longstanding nature of some alleged mismanagement (e.g., a charge alleging misappropriation over ten years), it was implausible to treat the situation as a newly-arising emergency justifying immediate presidential action.
  7. The court also found that the impugned order failed to state the reasons or the factual basis for the conclusion that the Managing Committee "has not been functioning properly"; this amounted to a bare conclusion replicating the language of Rule 8 and did not disclose the grounds on which the President arrived at his decision.
  8. For all these reasons — denial of a reasonable opportunity (including non-disclosure of the D.P.I. report), improper invocation and exercise of s. 28(2), and failure to state reasons — the court concluded the impugned order contravened Rule 8(1) and was invalid.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

THE RULE WAS MADE ABSOLUTE. The court issued a Writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned order of supersession dated 17 January 1976 (annexure "F" to the petition) and a Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to that order in any manner whatsoever. The court ordered no costs.

Additional operative directions and immediate effect:

  • The operation of the court's order was stayed for a period of three weeks from the date of the judgment; any further stay must be obtained from the appellate court.
  • The interim order previously granted also continued for three weeks from date.
  • The respondents were left at liberty to proceed according to law (i.e., to re-start any lawful procedure consistent with this judgment).

Implications:

  • The direct effect is to nullify the President's supersession order dated 17 January 1976 and to restrain the respondents from giving it effect pending any lawful action taken in compliance with the procedural and natural justice requirements identified by the court.
  • The court's decision emphasises that (i) Rule 8(1)'s proviso requiring a "reasonable opportunity" must be respected, (ii) material relied upon (such as the D.P.I. report) must not be used behind a party's back, (iii) s. 28(2) emergency powers cannot be invoked routinely without evidence of an emergency and the post-action reporting and reasons required by the statute, and (iv) administrative orders must identify the factual grounds supporting their conclusions. These are legal principles applied to the facts of the case rather than the creation of a novel precedent; the court expressly refrained from laying down a general rule of law beyond the facts at hand.

    Sachi Nath Ghosh & Ors. v. West Bengal Board Of Secondary Education & Ors.

    JUDGMENT

    1. This is an application by the Secretary and certain other members of the Managing Committee of Karanjali B.K Institution in the Diamond Harbour Sub-division in 24 Parganas. The school is an aided multipurpose School.

    2. Prior to issue of this Rule, a guardian of one of the students moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for an appointment of the Administrator or an Ad hoc Committee by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education on the ground that the life of the Managing Committee had expired. A Rule was issued by P.K Banerjee, J. in C.R Case No. 497(W) of 1973.

    3. The aforesaid Civil Rule was disposed of on the 25th May, 1973 by Banerjee, J. with a direction to hold the election of the Managing Committee within three months. Banerjee, J. appointed two advocates of this Court to conduct the election. The time was thereafter extended by another three months. The reconstitution of the Managing Committee was made on the 18th November, 1973. Thereafter the departmental nominee was placed on the 22nd June, 1974 and the Committee began to function.

    4. Thereafter a notice was received by the individual members of the Managing Committee dated 5th December, 1975 from the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (hereinafter referred to as the Board). By the said notice, the members were asked to show cause why the Managing Committee should not be superseded in terms of Rule 8 of the Rules for Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided and Unaided), 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), and seven days time was given to reply the notice. The charges on which the Managing Committee was proposed to be superseded were as follows:—

    1. One Sri Mahendra Nath Ghose (since dismissed from services) was appointed by the Secretary as an Assistant teacher of the school with effect from 2.4.69 and his appointment was approved by the M.C on 10.8.69 though the Secretary and the Headmaster were fully aware of the fact that Sri M. Ghose was then in service in the Eastern Rly till 5.5.70

    2. During 1974-1975 paddy field measuring 22.56 acres of land (school property) were cultivated and the total levy of 71.36 quintals of paddy was estimated by the Block Development Officer, Kulpi I. The price of 71.36 quintals of paddy is Rs. 5350/- @ Rs. 75/- per quintal, but the Secretary deposited only Rs. 597-80 to the school funds and thereby misappropriated Rs. 4,752-20.

    The Secretary has misappropriated about Rs. 30,000/- as the sale proceeds of paddy during the last 10 years of his regime as the Secretary of the successive M.C of the School.

    3. The milk cow, buffalows and ox (school property) were sold out in 1971-1972 without any reasonable grounds.

    4. No tenders were invited in respect of selling of fish and no proper accounts have been maintained.

    5. The Secretary used to keep Govt. grants with him for days and weeks together instead of disbursing the same. Teaching and non-teaching staff are not allowed to put the dates under their respective signatures in the acquittance register to facilitate this malpractice.

    6. One Sm. Malabaika Ghose (relative of the Secretary) though not a bona fide student of the institution was allowed to appear at the H.S Examination 1972 as a regular student of the School.

    7. The Secretary was convicted in a Court Case No. 085 of 1964 (State v. Sachinath Ghose) u/s. 6(1) B.H Act in the Court of the Magistrate (1st class) Diamond Harbour and sentenced by the learned Court.”

    5. Replies were sent to the above notice by nine members of the Managing Committee. The reply has been set out in Annexure ‘D’ to the petition. The main point stressed in the reply was that most of the charges contained in the notice to show cause related to a period when the present Managing Committee was not in existence. Consequently, it was contended that the New Committee could not be held responsible for those allegations. One paragraph of the reply is material and may be quoted.

    “It is further submitted that the grounds alleged are all extraneous and irrelevant and no allegation is made against the members of the Managing Committee as such of which the S.I of Schools is the most important member. Further the allegations are very vague and the Managing Committee desires to be heard before the Board if necessary through a lawyer.”

    6. Admittedly there was no further communication from the Board and no hearing was given to any member of the Managing Committee. On the 22nd January, 1976 a communication was sent to the Headmaster of the school stating that the President of the Board has passed an order on the 17th January, 1976 superseding the Managing Committee and appointing an Ad hoc Committee in its place. The order of the President which was set out in the communication is as follows:—

    “The D.P.I, West Bengal had sent a report to the Board on the affairs of Karanjali B.K Institution, P.O Karanjali, 24-Parganas, with the recommendation for supersession of the Managing Committee of the School and appointment of an ad hoc Committee in its place. On the basis of the said report the members of the Managing Committee of the School were directed to show cause why in view of the grounds stated in the notice it should not be deemed that the Managing Committee of the School had not been functioning properly and why the said Committee should not be superseded and an Administrator/Ad hoc Committee appointed in its place to exercise the powers and perform the duties of the Managing Committee. Nine members of the Managing Committee has submitted their explanations. No reply from other members of the Managing Committee has been received. Presumably they have no explanation to offer in the matter. Considering all the facts and circumstances including the explanations submitted by the members of the Committee I am decidedly of the opinion that the Managing Committee of the said school has not been functioning properly. Prompt action is thus called for.

    In the emergency arising out of the situation, I, President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, in exercise of the powers vested in me under S. 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 read with Rule 8 of the Rules for Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (Aided & Unaided) 1969 as amended supersede the Managing Committee of Karanjali B.K Institution 24-Parganas and appoint an Ad hoc Committee as recommended by the D.P.I West Bengal with the following personnel.”

    7. It is this order of supersession of the Managing Committee of the School, which is challenged before me in this application.

    Mr. Kashi Kanta Moitra, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners challenged the order on various grounds. His first contention was that the impugned order was in violation of Rule 8(1) of the Rules. My attention was drawn to the fact that not only was the show cause memo issued under Rule 8(1) of the Rules but also the impugned order by the President of the Board has been passed under S. 28(2) of the Act read with Rule 8(1) of the Rules. There is one another aspect of this argument to which I shall advert later on but the present contention that we are concerned with is that Rule 8(1) embodies statutorily the principles of natural justice which has been violated in the present case. In order to appreciation this contention it will be necessary to set out Rule 8(1) of the Rules which are as follows:—

    Rule 8. Power of Board to approve and supersede Committee—

    “(1) The constitution of a Committee shall be subject to the approval of the Board and the Board shall have the power to supersede a Committee that has, in its opinion, not been functioning properly and to appoint an Administrator to exercise the powers and perform the functions of the Committee:

    Provided that before superseding a Committee under this rule the Board shall have due regard to the report of the Director and shall afford a reasonable opportunity to the Committee to present its case before the Board.”

    8. The main argument of Mr. Moitra centered around the crucial expression in the Rule which have quoted above is “reasonable opportunity to the Committee to present its case”. Reference was made in this connection to several decisions. The first decision referred to was the case of Khem Chand v. Union of India reported in AIR 1958 Supreme Court 300 on the question as to what amounts to reasonable opportunity within the meaning of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Reference was also made to the decision of Fedco (P) Ltd. Another v. S.N Bilgrami Others reported in AIR 1960 Supreme Court 415. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the Report deal with the question of reasonable opportunity to a licensee of being heard under the Imports (Control) Order 1955.

    9. I have merely noticed the cases mentioned above briefly and do not propose to discuss them in detail. This is because it is well settled by now that what is a reasonable opportunity would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It has repeatedly been held that rules of natural justice cannot be reduced to a rigid formula or a straight jacket. That being so, what has to be examined is, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, was the Managing Committee of the School given a reasonable opportunity of stating its case before the impugned order of supersession was passed? The main grievance made by Mr. Moitra on this count was that the Managing Committee should have been given a hearing by the Board in the present case.

    10. Mr. Nani Coomar Chakraborty, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the members of the Ad hoc Committee appointed by the Board contended before me that personal hearing could not be claimed as the matter of right. He referred to various decisions on this point including the case of Hariprasad Singh v. Commissioners of Income Tax, West Bengal reported in AIR 1972 Cal. 27 in support of this proposition. This aspect of the matter need not be probed further because it cannot be disputed, in my view, as a proposition of law that rules of natural justice do not require that a personal hearing must be given in every case.

    11. That being the legal position, let us now turn to the facts of the present case. With regard to the charges which were levelled against the Managing Committee in the notice to show cause it was not disputed even by Mr. Chakraborty or Mr. Bimal Dutt, learned Advocate for the Board that except for charges 2, 4 and 5 the rest of the charges had nothing whatsoever to do with the present Managing Committee which was constituted in the year 1974. In other words, certain charges were being levelled against the Managing Committee which indisputably this committee had nothing to do with as they related to a period prior to its existence.

    12. Charge No. 2 which I have set out above is to the effect that the Secretary sold a certain quantity of paddy which was the subject-matter of levy by the Block Development Officer Kulpi-1 and misappropriated most of the sale proceeds. In the reply to the notice it was specifically stated that although in the draft levy roll 71.30 quintals of paddy was sought to be levied from the school, on investigation, the Requiring Authority exempted the school from the levy altogether. The school however voluntarily sold its entire products of paddy and the price was duly accounted for in the school records.

    13. My attention was drawn in this connection to a document which is an extract from the Order Sheet of the Block Development Officer, Kuipi and which is Annexure ‘E’ to the petition. The order is in the following terms:—

    Extract from the Order Sheet

    Office of the Block Development Officer, Kulpi

    Levy on ProducerYear - 1975-1975

    Secretary Karanjali B.K Institution

    Karanjali 24-Parganas

    Date 30.12.74

    As per Draft Levy Roll he was asked to sell 71.35 quintals of paddy as levy against 22.56 acres lands.

    The petitioner was exempted from Levy. The petitioner is willing to sell the entire produce voluntarily to the Government.

    Date 20.1.75

    The entire Produce of the Institution Concern was 5.59 qntl. as stated by the petitioner.

    The petitioner appeared before me and found that he has actually sold the above Quantity voluntarily to the Government.

    Sd/- Illegible

    12.12.75

    Extn. Officer, Social Education

    SealKulpi Dev. Block 24-Parganas

    14. This document, which I was told on instruction by Mr. Moitra is signed by a member of the Ad hoc Committee of the School appointed by the Board, clearly and convincingly substantiates the case of the Managing Committee that the School was exempted from the levy. Hence the charge of misappropriation as contained in charge no. 2 is palpably erroneous. If a hearing was granted to the Managing Committee as demanded by it, it would have been able to produce this document and perhaps convince the Board that this charge must fail. Mr. Chakraborty argued that the members of the Committee could have annexed this document to their reply. Undoubtedly they might have done so, but they were under no obligation to do so. Since they were demanding the hearing they might have thought that such hearing would be given where they could produce this document.

    15. In this background, and without intending to lay down any general proposition as to the right of personal hearing, I am of the opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of this case, by reason of denial of a personal hearing the Managing Committee has been denied a reasonable opportunity of stating its case. That being so the impugned order must be held to be in contravention of Rule 8(1) of the Rules. This contention on behalf of the petitioner therefore succeeds.

    16. Another aspect of the same question of reasonable opportunity of stating its case was canvassed before me and may be briefly dealt with. It was pointed out that the opening sentence of the order of the President of the Board dated the 17th January, 1976 which is impugned in the present case, mentions that the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal had sent a Report to the Board on the affairs of the School recommending the supersession of the Managing Committee and it is on the basis of this recommendation that the impugned order was passed. Admittedly, no copy of this Report of the D.P.I West Bengal was furnished to the members of the Committee at any stage. Mr. Moitra submitted that this amounted to denial of a reasonable opportunity to the Committee of stating its case.

    17. In my view, this contention of Mr. Moitra should also succeed. The order of supersession shows ex facie that the President of the Board was clearly relying on the report of the D.P.I West Bengal. The members of the Managing Committee were at no stage given any opportunity of looking into the contents of the report nor of rebutting the same. It is well settled that if any material is relied on behind back of a party in arriving at a finding such a procedure would be contrary to the rules of natural justice, which are embodied in the Proviso to Rule 8(1) of the Rules. That being so, it must be held that the impugned order is in contravention of Rule 8(1) of the Rules on this ground also.

    18. The next branch of Mr. Moitra's argument centered around the fact that the President of the Board had passed the impugned order under S. 28(2) of the Act read with Rule 8 of the Rules.

    Section 28(2) of the Act reads as follows:—

    “The President may, in any emergency, exercise any of the powers of the Board provided however that he shall not act contrary to any decision of the Board, and shall, as soon thereafter as may be, report to the Board the action taken by him together with reasons therefor.”

    19. This S. 28(2) clearly empowers the President to exercise all the powers of the Board subject to certain conditions. The first condition is that there must be an emergency. The second condition is that the President must not act contrary to any decision of the Board. The third condition is that he must report to the Board as soon as possible after the action taken. The fourth condition is that he must state the reasons in his report as to why he exercised the powers of the Board under S. 28(2) of the Act.

    20. It was submitted by Mr. Moitra that none of the conditions with which the powers of the President under S. 28(2) of the Act are hedged, has been fulfilled in the present case. First of all it was submitted that there was no emergency in the present case justifying supersession by the President and not by the Board. It is curious to note that the notice to show cause, part of which I have set out above, was sent by the Secretary of the Board and not by the President. Undoubtedly, when there is an emergency, the President can, by virtue of S. 28(2) of the Act exercise the powers vested in the Board under Rule 8 of the Rules which would include the exercise of the entire gamut of powers starting from the issue of the notice to show cause and ending with the passing of the final order. At the time of the hearing, the entire records of the Board with regard to the impugned order of supersession were produced before me. Mr. Bimal Dutt, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the Board, was entirely unable to show anything from the records as to why this curious dichotomy of the Secretary of the Board issuing the notice to show cause and the President of the Board passing the order of supersession was introduced in the present case. Mr. Moitra justifiably commented that since the notice to show cause was issued by the Board and not by the President, it is to be presumed that when the notice was issued on the 5th December, 1975 there was no emergency justifying action by the President under S. 28(2) of the Act. It was submitted that between 5th December, 1975 when the notice was issued and the 17th January, 1976 when the order of supersession was passed by the President nothing happened which could be said to be in the nature of an emergency. As I have said the records of the Board are entirely silent on this aspect of the matter. There is nothing in the record to show as to at what stage the President decided to take up the matter and passed the impugned order. There was no record in the file as to the existence of an emergency with regard to the affairs of this School. It may be also noted that there is nothing in the record to show that the President had sent any report to the Board subsequent to the order of supersession or had recorded any reasons for his action as required by S. 28(2) of the Act.

    21. My attention was drawn in this connection to an unreported decision of this Court in the case of Sarat Chandra Mal v. The President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education (C.R No. 5629(W) of 1972) in which the judgment was delivered by A.K Sen, J. on the 25th September, 1973. Reference was made to a portion of the judgment which is set out hereinbelow:

    “So far as the last point raised by Mr. Mukherjee is concerned it must be said that on the facts of the present case the President could not have bona fide relied on S. 28(2) of the Act and invoke his emergency powers. No case of emergency had been made out. The question of approval was pending with the Board since end of 1970. It has rightly been pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee that between December 20, 1971 and June 13, 1972 the Board itself had met thrice in February, March and May 1972 and as such there would have been no difficulty in placing the matter before the Board. To invoke the power under S. 28(2) as has been done was to convert the said provision as a routine procedure not intended by the legislature. I am in an agreement with Mr. Mukherjee that on the facts of the present case exercise of powers under S. 28(2) was not bona fide”.

    22. Learned advocate on behalf of the Board and the Ad hoc Committee relied on a sentence in the order of supersession which says “prompt action is thus called for” and a part of sentence which says “in the emergency arising out of the situation”.

    23. In my opinion, a mere statement that prompt action is required does not constitute an emergency justifying action by the President under S. 28(2) of the Act. It must be remembered that one of the charges was that the Secretary has misappropriated about Rs. 30,000/- as the sale proceeds of paddy during the last ten years. If such an action of the Secretary, assuming it is true, constitute mismanagement justifying supersession then it has been going on for ten years. In that context, it is extremely difficult if not impossible to say what fact supervened to convert the situation into one of emergency justifying action by the President. As I have already said, the records are conspicuous by their silence on this aspect of the matter. I am in respectful agreement with the observations of A.K Sen, J. in the unreported case mentioned above that this power under S. 28(2) of the Act is not intended to be a substitute for the routine procedure. This contention on behalf of the petitioner therefore that neither the conditions precedent for the exercise of power under S. 28(2) of the Act nor the conditions subsequent thereto have been fulfilled in the present case must be accepted. Consequently, the impugned order must be held to be invalid on this ground also.

    24. Before I leave this aspect of the matter I must point out that although a specific allegation has been made in the petition that there was no emergency justifying the action by the President of the Board, there is no affidavit by the President of the Board dealing with that allegation. Even assuming for the sake of argument, that satisfaction of the President of the Board regarding the emergency may be a matter of subjective satisfaction, there is nothing before me to show that the President was so satisfied apart from certain averments of an Assistant Secretary of the Board in his affidavit.

    25. My attention was drawn in this connection by Mr. Chakraborty to a decision of this Court in the case of Lilabati Kanjilal v. The Administrator, Nasra Girls' High School reported in 71 CWN 216 and another decision in the case Adwaiiya Kr. Maity v. The President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education reported in 71 CWN 396. In the later case D. Basu, J. held that there is no duty of hearing or any quasi-judicial duty cast on the Board in case of supersession. But as pointed out by Mr. Moitra both the above cases turned on a construction of Rule 6 of the Old Rules relating to supersession which did not contain the expression “reasonable opportunity of stating its case”. These cases are therefore clearly distingushable on this ground.

    26. The next argument of Mr. Moitra was that the impugned order is bad as it did not give any reason in support thereof. All that the order says it that the “the Managing Committee of the said school has not been functioning properly”. According to Mr. Moitra, this is merely a recital of the language of Rule 8 and does not constitute the reason for the order. In my view, this argument is also sound and should succeed. Apart from the fact that the statement that the Managing Committee of the School is not functioning properly is a mere repetition of what is contained in Rule 8, it can at best be called a conclusion or inference. What are the grounds on the basis of which this conclusion or inference was arrived at by the President is not to be found either in the order or in the records. That being so, the order must be held to be bad on that ground also.

    27. That disposes of all the contentions raised in the instant case.

    28. In the result, this application succeeds and the Rule is made absolute. There will be Writ in the nature of Certiorari quashing the impugned order of supersession dated 17th January, 1976 which is contained in the communication which is annexure “F” to the petition and Writ in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect thereto in any manner whatsoever. The respondents will however be at liberty to proceed according to law.

    29. There will be no order as to costs.

    30. The operation of this order is stayed for a period of three weeks from date and any further stay must be obtained from the appeal court.

    31. It is further ordered that the interim order granted herein will also continue for a period of three weeks from date.

    Rule made absolute.

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    Sachi Nath Ghosh & Ors. v. West Bengal Board Of Secondary Education & Ors.
    (Sep 2, 1976)